CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

THIRTEEN PRINCIPAL UPANIṢADS

General Editor of the Project
Mahamahopadhyaya Prof. Jayantkrishna H. Dave
M.A. LL.B., Vidya Vacaspati, Hon. Director, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan

Vol. II
MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANIṢAD WITH GAUḌAPĀDA - KĀRIKĀS

Critically Edited
with exhaustive introduction, Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, Comparative study and full Comments with old and modern interpretations

By
Mahamahopdhyaya Prof. Jayantkrishna H. Dave

Published with the Financial Assistance from
Shri Mumbadevi Temple Trust, Bombay

1990
BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN
Kulapati K. M. Munshi Marg
BOMBAY-400 007.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with Kārikās

The Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan has started the project of "Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads" under the General Editorship of Mahamahopadhyaya Prof. Jayantkrishna Harikrishna Dave, the Hon. Director of Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.

Under this project MM. Prof. J. H. Dave took up three Atharvaveda Upaniṣads–Praśna, Muṇḍaka and Māṇḍūkya to be printed in two volumes. Apart from being the General Editor Prof. Dave is also their contributor and author.

The first volume on Praśna and Muṇḍaka has already been published in 1988 and has been well received. It contains a fresh translation of the text and Śaṅkara Bhāṣya with full notes from Ānandagiri, Śaṅkarānanda, Nārāyaṇa and Ācāryas of other schools, comparative study, introduction to the upaniṣads and the philosophies of the three Ācārayas — Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, Prāṇasūkta of Atharvaveda, a glossary and Index.

In this second volume on Māṇḍūkya with the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda, Prof. Dave gives fresh translation of the text of the Upaniṣad, the Kārikās and Śaṅkara Bhāṣya with notes on the first Āgama Prakaraṇa from Kūranārāyaṇa (Rāmānuja school), Madhva and Śrinivāsa (Madhva school) and on the first two chapters (Āgama and Vaitathya) from Puruṣottama Goswāmī (Vallabha school). Modern interpretations are also noted. An exhaustive Introduction discusses all the various problems connected with the Upaniṣad and the Kārikās including a chapter on Vedānta and Buddhism. Full summary of Śaṅkara's interpretation on the Upaniṣad and Kārikās is given along with introduction to the philosophies of four Ācāryas. The Glossary gives separately the interpretations of Śaṅkara and that given by Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya based on Buddhist texts. This edition takes into consideration all the various prior conflictious views expressed on the Upaniṣad, Kārikās, Vedānta and Buddhism.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

THIRTEEN PRINCIPAL UPANIṢADS

General Editor of the Project
Mahamahopadhyaya Prof. Jayantkrishna H. Dave
M.A. LL.B., Vidya Vacaspati, Hon. Director, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan

Vol. II
MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANIṢAD WITH GAUḌAPĀDA - KĀRIKĀS

Critically Edited
with exhaustive introduction, Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, Comparative study and full Comments with old and modern interpretations

By
Mahamahopdhyaya Prof. Jayantkrishna H. Dave

Published with the Financial Assistance from
Shri Mumbadevi Temple Trust, Bombay

1990
BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN
Kulapati K. M. Munshi Marg
BOMBAY-400 007.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

First Published in April 1990

All Rights reserved by the Publishers

Price: Rs. 200/-

PRINTED IN INDIA

By K. V. Gopalakrishnan at Associated Advertisers & Printers, 505, Arthur Road, Tardeo, Bombay 400 034, and Published by S. Ramakrishnan, Executive Secretary, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 400 007.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

THIRTEEN PRINCIPAL UPANIṢADS

Vol. II
MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANIṢAD WITH GAUḌAPĀDA - KĀRIKĀS

Dedicated to
Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekharendra Saraswati Swaminah
Paramacharya of Kanchi on his 97th Jayanti Celebration

General Editor

Mahamahopadhyaya Prof. Jayantkrishna H. Dave

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

General Editor's Foreword

The Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan had started a project of "The Ten Principal Upaniṣads" under the General Editorship of the Late Dr. P.B. Gajendragadkar, Retired Chief Justice of India. Under his General Editorship and guidance, the first volume dealing with Īśa and Kena Upaniṣads was published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan in 1981. The volume was very well received.

After the sad demise of Dr. Gajendragadkar, the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan has revised this old project and has launched a new and enlarged project of "The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads" and has appointed me as its General Editor.

On this new and enlarged project, I have first taken up the three Atharvaveda Upaniṣads —Praśna, Muṇḍaka, and Māṇḍūkya with its 215 kārikās. They are being published in two volumes. In the earlier project, there were different contributors of the Bhāṣyas of different Ācāryas but in this new and enlarged project, I have accepted the entire burden of being the sole contributor and writer of the two volumes comprising Praśna and Muṇḍaka (Vol. I) and Māṇḍūkya with 215 Kārikās (Vol. II).

The first volume on Praśna and Muṇḍaka was published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan in 1988. It contains the Text of the Upaniṣads with a fresh translation of the Text and Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, full notes from Ānandagiri, Śaṅkarānanda, Nārāyaṇa and Ācāryas of other schools, a comparative survery, translation of the Prāṇa sūkta of Atharvaveda and Introductions to the Upaniṣads and to the philosophies of the three Ācāryas—Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva along with a glossary and Index. The present volume deals with the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with 215 Kārikās of Gauḍapāda in four chapters. In the general introduction I have discussed the various problems connected with this Upaniṣad and the Kārikās with a section on Vedānta and Buddhism. Thereafter I have given a full summary of the interpretation of Śaṅkara on the Upaniṣad and the Kārikās. Short descriptions of the philosophies of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha are given as the 12 Mantras of this Upaniṣad and the 29 verses of the 1st chapter of Kārikās are considered as Śruti in the Rāmānuja and Madhva sampradāyas. Extracts from the commentary of Kūranārāyaṇa (Rāmānuja sampradāya) and of Madhva and Śrīnivāsa (Madhva sampradāya) are given at the end of the 1st chapter. I could also procure the text of the commentary of Puruṣottama Goswāmī (Vallabha Sampradāya) on this Upaniṣad and the first two chapters of the Kārikās and its extract is also given at the end of the 1st chapter.

I have given a fresh translation of the text of the Upaniṣad, complete translation of the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya and in the comments I have given full notes covering Ānandagiri, Śaṅkarānanda and other old and modern interpretations. Certain important words as interpreted by Śaṅkara and certain words as interpreted according to Buddhist texts by Prof. Bhattacharya are listed separately. After consideration of various theories I would say that I am in agreement with the view generally held that the old traditional

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

interpretation of Gauḍapāda by Śaṅkara is correct and that Gauḍapāda in spite of his use of some Buddhist technique and terminology—may be for his own special purpose—has not deviated from the doctrinal purity of the Kevala Advaita Vedānta and that there is no difference of views between Śaṅkara and his sampradāyavid Paramaguru Gauḍapāda.

As mentioned in my foreword to the first volume on Praśna and Muṇḍaka, I repeat my sense of gratitude to Swāmī Ānandāśram of Kaivalyadhām Math, Vārāṇasī, M.M. Śrīdhar Śāstrī Pāṭhak, Paṇḍit Shintre Śāstrī, and Paṇḍit Rāmānath Jhā. I have grateful memories of the discussions held with Paṇḍitrāj Veṅkaṭeśwar Dīkṣitār and Paṇḍit Lakṣmīrām Śāstrī of the Bhavan.

For this present volume, I am specially grateful to late Pūjya Akhaṇḍānand Saraswatī of Vṛndāvan Āśram, who took great interest in my work and presented to me (1) his three Hindi Pravacana volumes on the first three chapters of these Kārikās (2) Sanskṛit Mitākṣarā commentary of Swayamprakāśānanda (1910) (3) his own copy of the Māṇḍūkya-Rahasya-Vivṛti by Saccidānandendra Saraswatī.

Puruṣottama Goswāmī's commentary on the first two chapters of the Kārikās was made available to me by Dr. A.D. Śāstrī, Head of Sanskrit Department, M.T.B. Arts college, Surat. Late Prof. R.A. Kashyap of the Bhavan made available to me Śrī S.C. Vasu's notes on Māṇḍūkya according to the Madhva school. I am thankful to both of them.

This revised and enlarged project of the Upaniṣad is receiving substantial financial assistance from Shri Mumbadevi Temple Trust, for which the Bhavan is highly thankful to them.

I am beholden to the authorities of the Bhavan for entrusting me this project and particularly to Shri S. Ramakrishnan for his kind co-operation, keen interest and total involvement. Late Prof. R.A. Kashyap continued as the chief co-ordinator of this project and I am obliged to him for the assistance he has given me at every stage. His research assistants Kum. Hemangini Jai and Dr. (Smt.) Shveni P. Pandya have also been assisting in reading proofs and checking up quotations. Prof. Suresh A. Upadhyaya and his assistant Shri G.B. Jani have been helpful in reading proofs from the second chapter onwards. Shri D.R. Amladi was helpful in reading proofs at the early stage and then preparing the Index to the present volume also. I am thankful to all of them.

I am obliged to all the earlier authors who have either edited this Upaniṣad and Kārikās or written on the subject connected with this volume and needless to say, I have profited from their work. As an exhaustive sandarbha-grantha Sūci is given in the 1st Volume on Praśna and the Muṇḍaka, the same is not reproduced here.

I am also thankful to the Associated Advertisers and Printers, Bombay, for processing the volume in an excellent way.

Jayantkrishna Harikrishna Dave.
Editor and
Hon. Director,
Bhavan.

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Bombay 400 007.
Date : 7-6-1990

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Contents

1.	General Editor's Foreword	i
2.	Transliteration scheme	iv
3.	General Introduction (Problems)	v
4.	Vedānta and Buddhism	xvii
5.	Summary of Māṇḍūkya and Kārikās according to Śaṅkara	xxi
6.	Kevalādvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dwaita and Śuddhādvaita	xxxvi
7.	Āgama-Prakaraṇa	1
8.	Kūranārāyaṇa-Madhva-Puruṣottama Goswāmī	87
9.	Vaitathya Prakaraṇa	104
10.	Advaita Prakaraṇa	167
11.	Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa	253
12.	Śaṅkara's interpretation of certain words	361
13.	Buddhist interpretation of certain words	364
14.	Akārādikrama of Kārikās	365
15.	Index	373

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translitȩration Scheme

अ a, आ ā इ i, ई ī उ u, ऊ ū ऋ ṛ ए e, ऐ ai, ओ o, औ au. क् k, ख् kh, ग् g, घ् gh, ङ्, ṅ च् c, छ् ch, ज् j, झ् jh, ञ् ñ, ट् ṭ, ठ ṭh, ड् ḍ, ढ् ḍh, ण् ṇ, त् t, थ् th, द d, ध् dh, न् n, प् p, फ् ph, ब् b, भ् bh, म् m, य् y, र् r, ल् l, व् v, श् s', ष् ṣ, स् s, ह् h, क्ष kṣ, ज्ञ j्ञ, ः h.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

General Introduction (Problems)

Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with Kārikās has been considered as the most important and basic work on Vedānta. It is the basis on which Śaṅkara has raised, systematised and elaborated his magnificent philosophy of Kevalādvaita. In Śaṅkara Sampradāya the 215 Kārikās on Māṇḍūkya are traditionally known as "Gauḍapāda-Kārikā" composed by Gauḍapāda, the Paramaguru (Guru's Guru or a predecessor Guru) of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara wrote his Bhāṣya both on the upaniṣad and the Kārikās and on all the three there is the commentary of Ānandagiri which brings out the implication of every word in the Bhāṣya. According to Ānaṇdagiri, Lord Nārāyāṇa expounded to Gauḍapāda at Badarikāśram this knowledge and Gauḍapāda thereafter based and composed thereon his 215 Kārikās divided into four chapters viz. Āgama (29), Vaitathya (38), Advaita (48) and Alātaśānti (100) (AG on GK 4-1). In Śaṅkara Sampradāya, Gauḍapāda is highly respected and is known as a great Sampradāyavid Ācārya of Vedānta. In the daily-recited Guruparamparā of Kevalādvaita, the following is the order of Gurus Viz. Lord Nārāyaṇa, Brahmā, Vasiṣṭha, Śakti, Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka, Gauḍapāda, Govinda Yogīndra, Śaṅkarācārya, Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka, and Vārtikakāra Sureśvara. From Nārāyaṇa to Śuka are legendary figures and from Gauḍapāda onwards the personages are historical. From Nārāyaṇa to Śuka, they are related as father and son; from Śuka onwards they are related as Guru—Śiṣya. Balakṛṣṇānanda (17th century) in his Śārīrakamīmāṁsābhāṣyavārtika states that people of Gauḍa Jāti were staying at Kurukṣetra on the bank of river Hīrarāvati. The best among them (Gauḍapāda) used to remain constantly in Samādhi right from the Dwāpara age. People did not know his name and he was therefore known only from his Gauḍa Jāti as Gauḍapāda. The historicity of Gauḍapāda cannot be questioned on account of many references and this ancient and strong tradition.

But a number of problems have been raised and elaborately discussed in modern times about both the Māṇḍūkya and the Kārikās. Dr. Walleser believes that "there was no such person who existed as Gauḍapāda and the Kārikās are of unknown authorship and later on ascribed to Gauḍapāda as the author was unknown—these Kārikās being the summary of verses in Pādas of the Gauḍa school". He says that at many places the Kārikās are cited but without the name of the individual author. This contention of Dr. Walleser is disputed by Prof. L.D. Barnette and Dr. T.P.M. Mahadevan has pointed out that in Bṛhadāraṇya-kopaniṣad-Bhāṣyavārtika Sureśvara mentions Gauḍapāda, Gauḍapādīya vacas and Gauḍapāda at three different places (1-4-389, 2-1-386 and 4-4-886). In Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad commentary 1-8, Śaṅkara mentions Gauḍapādācārya, disciple of Śuka. In Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣya in the concluding verse, Gauḍapāda has been referred to as Paramaguru by Śaṅkara. Pāda is an honorific title and plural is used for respect. Like Dramiḍācārya, Gauḍapāda is known only by his place name. Dr. Walleser's view is therefore rejected as unsound. A school or a people cannot be the authors of a text (Prof. V. Bhattacharya). Gauḍapāda is a nickname (Prof. Karmarkar).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Gauḍapāda has been quoted by many authors. Among the Buddhists, Bhāvaviveka (500 A.D.) in his own commentary, Tarkajwālā on his Mādhyamakahṛdayakārikā quotes four passages resembling Gauḍapāda Kārikās. Śāntarakṣita (700 AD) in his Mādhyamakālaṅkāra Kārikā quotes the Gauḍapāda Kārikās as the view of the Aupaniṣads. This reference is important and clearly shows that Buddhists themselves do not regard Gauḍapāda as a Buddhist but the follower of the Upanisad doctrines. Kamalaśīla, the disciple of Śāntarakṣita, describes these views of Kārikāṣ as Upaniṣad-Śāstra.

Śaṅkara quotes GK. 1-16 on Br.Sū. 2-1-9 and GK. 3-15 on Br.Sū. 1-4-14 and states that the Kārikās are composed by Vedānta-artha-sampradāya-vid Ācārya. Govindānanda in Ratnaprabhā on Br.Sū. and Ānandagiri in Nyāya-nirṇaya refer to Gauḍapāda as Vṛddhasammati. Sureśvara in Naiṣkarmyasiddhi (5-41-44) quotes GK 1-11 and 15. His Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika references are mentioned hereinbefore. Vidyāraṇya in Pañcadaśī (2-28) refers to Gauḍapāda teaching. In Sadānanda's Vedāntasāra GK 3-44 & 45 are quoted and its commentator Nṛsimhasaraswatī calls it Vṛddhasammati. All this evidence from different chapters of Kārikās strongly supports the view that all the four chapters of the Kārikās are of Gauḍapāda, a predecessor Guru of Śaṅkara, whether Gauḍapāda is Guru's Guru or a distant predecessor Guru of Śaṅkara it is difficult to say. Śrīvidyāraṇya states that there were five Ācāryas between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara.

Al-beruni (11th century A.D.) mentions one Gauḍa anchorite as representing Vedānta views and this Gauḍa can be identified with Gauḍapāda.

Sadāśivabrahmendra in his Jagadgururatnamālāstava states that Gauḍapāda expounded the Bhāṣya of Patañjali and was the teacher of Apalonys (=Apalunya of Greece in 100 A.D.). The Greek accounts as well as the identity of the author of Jagadgururatnamālāstava are questioned and cannot be relied on. (cf. Kāñcī Paramācārya's "Ādi Śaṅkara" published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan (1988) pp 1 to 14).

As Bhāvaviveka (500 AD) quotes from Gauḍapāda and as Gauḍapāda has similarity of thought and expression with Nāgārjuna (third century A.D.) and his disciple Āryadeva, Gauḍapāda's date is therefore placed between 300 to 500 A.D. In addition to Gauḍapāda Kārikās on Māṇḍūkya, Gauḍapāda is credited with the authorship of several other works viz. (1) Bhāṣya on Īśvarkṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhyakārikā (2) Uttaragītā (3) Subhagodayastuti (4) Śrīvidyāraṇyasūtra. Doubts have been expressed about their authorship by Gauḍapāda. Prof. Karmarkar however is inclined to believe that the first three are the genuine works of Gauḍapāda. The (3) and (4) Śākta works are also believed to be his as Śaṅkara himself is believed to be the author of Prapañcasāra and Saundaryalaharī and Śrīvidyā Upāsanā is common in Śāṅkara Sampradāya.

Gauḍapāda was himself a great yogī as indicated by Balakṛṣṇānanda Saraswatī. He might have been an Upāsaka in early life. It has been suggested that he might have composed these works attributed to him in early life and thereafter having deeply studied Upaniṣads and Buddhist doctrines, he advocated in his mature age his Ajātivāda. Prof. Karmarkar observes that

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Gauḍapāda wrote the Kārikās to controvert the teachings of Laṅkāvatāra where Buddha teaches a large number of doctrines but fails to give the most important one and this fact is observed by Gauḍapāda in 4-99 "Naitad Buddhena Bhāṣitam" (oneness of Brahma). Madhva (13th century A.D.), Vyāsa-tīrtha and Śrīnivāsa record another and most probably a later tradition. According to Madhva, the 12 Mantras and 29 Kārikās of the first chapter are Śruti and were revealed by Nārāyaṇa to Varuṇa in the form of a frog. These Kārikās were seen by Brahmā and Varuṇa recited them. Madhva quotes verses from Padma, Garuḍa and Harivaṁśa-Purāṇas but none of these verses are traceable in their current printed editions. Kūranārāyaṇa of the Rāmānuja school also regards these 29 Kārikās as part of Śruti and has written his commentary on them. Thus there is Madhva Bhāṣya and Śrīnivāsa's Vivṛti and also Kūranārāyaṇa commentary on 12 Mantras and 29 Kārikās. Puruṣottama Goswāmī (1668 A.D.) of the Vallabha Sampradāya wrote a commentary on the first two chapters of these Kārikās but describes these Kārikās as those of Gauḍapāda. These 29 Kārikās of the first chapter are distributed in four parts—1 to 9 after the 6th Mantra, 10 to 18 after the 7th Mantra, 19 to 23 after the 11th Mantra and 24 to 29 after the 12th Mantra. They are introduced by the words "Here are these verses" (Atra Ete Śloka Bhavanti). Madhva and Kūranārāyaṇa's interpretations are given hereafter at the end of the first chapter. An extract of Puruṣottama Goswāmī's view is given at another place in this book. Madhva and Kūranārāyaṇa interpret the entire Āgama Prakaraṇa as presenting the Upāsanā of Hari through the Samasta and Vyasta Aum and Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, Prājña and Turīya are considered as the forms of Hari—they guide and control Jīva in the various states of Jāgrat etc. Words and phrases are interpreted in a way consistent with their systems.

Various questions have been raised and discussed in this connection. Deussen stated that as Śaṅkara does not cite anything from the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, according to Śaṅkara Māṇḍūkya has no claim to the position of an Upaniṣad. This view is not acceptable. Amarnath Roy and Madhavan have pointed out how Māṇḍūkya is indirectly referred to by Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, Maṇḍana and others. All Upaniṣads need not be cited by Śaṅkara. Sureśvara quotes the sixth Mantra of Māṇḍūkya as Śruti in Bṛ. Up. Vā. 3-8-26, and that settles the issue. According to Śaṅkara's school, the 12 Mantras are the Upaniṣad and the 215 Kārikās are of Gauḍapāda. The other opinion of Madhva and Kūranārāyaṇa that the 12 Mantras and 29 Kārikās of the first chapter are all part of Śruti is opposed on many grounds. Many MSS give only the 12 Mantras. It is only the commentators on 29 Kārikās of Bhakti schools that treat them as Śruti. The 29 Kārikās had become famous as connected with the Upaniṣad and a prestigeous work of Vedānta and it was possible to interpret the 29 Kārikās in a way consistent with their Bhakti schools. An attempt is made to show that even Śaṅkara and some of his followers seem to regard the 29 Kārikās as part of Śruti. Madhavan has discussed all those references and pointed out that there is no substance in that contention. Rāmānuja has cited in his Br.Sū. Bhāṣya verse "Anādimāyayā Supto" (GK 1.16) along with a Śruti passage, implying that GK 1-16 too is Śruti. But in all these cases it is possible to

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

hold that the word Śruti is used in a very loose and broad sense e.g. Gītā too is called an Upaniṣad. The Āgama Prakaraṇa is based on the 12 Mantras and had acquired a prestige. Even Al-beruni refers to Gauḍa Anchorite's work. Śaṅkara's tradition viz. that all the 215 Kārikās are of Gauḍapāda, seems to be more ancient and acceptable. So far as Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (12 Mantras) is concerned, it has been held by an unanimous tradition as one of the ten old upaniṣads. Muktikā Upaniṣad says that if there is no time to read other Upaniṣads Māṇḍūkya alone is sufficient to enlighten the Mumukṣu on Vedānta.

We have discussed above two problems raised (1) There is no Upaniṣad like Māṇḍūkya and Gauḍapāda wrote it and all Kārikās. But there is a strong tradition and proof that Māṇḍūkya has been recognised as an Upaniṣad and it is absurd for a human being like Gauḍapāda to introduce 29 Kārikās as Śruti. The word Kārikā (from the root Kṛ to make) shows that Kārikās are of human authorship. The word Kārikā is never used for any Śruti Mantra in verse.

The second problem that the 12 Mantras and 29 Kārikās are Śruti is also discussed above. Out of the two traditions, Śaṅkara's is more ancient and acceptable. The word Śruti used for 29 Kārikās can be explained as used loosely.

The third problem is raised by Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. He says that the Kārikās were composed first and the 12 prose Mantras are composed later on the basis of the 29 Kārikās. The contention is elaborately discussed by Madhavan and rejected. "Atra Ete Śloka Bhavanti" "Here are these verses" need not be taken as cited by way of "Pramāṇa" or authority by the Upaniṣadic Mantras but as Tātparyeṇa Vyākhyāna by Gauḍapāda by way of explaining the substance of the Upaniṣadic Mantras.

Prof. Bhattacharya says that (1) "Atra Ete Sloka Bhavanti" shows that Kārikās are prior to 12 Mantras (2) certain words in prose Mantras like "Saptāṅga" and "Ekonaviṁśatimukha" are not explained in the Kārikās. Kārikās use Viśva for Vaiśvānara of prose mantras. Jāgaritasthāna etc. are not found in Kārikās. There are different interpretations of Turya, Miti, Apīti etc. in Kārikās etc.

The reply to this criticism is that Kārikās are not a sort of commentary on Mantras but have taken the Mantras only as basis and Gauḍapāda emphasized only those points which he thought proper. Prose Mantras when read independently make a coherent sense but Kārikās of the 1st chapter when read independently seem unconnected. The Kārikās therefore seem to be later and are on the basis of the prose Mantras. Gauḍapāda also refers to other views of those who believed that creation is real and rejected them. Gauḍapāda advocates Ajātivāda but for "manda" adhikārins he explains creation through Māyā or illusion. His opinion is that creation is Swabhāva which is interpreted by Śaṅkara as Māyā. Swabhāva is also interpreted as Māyā by Śaṅkara in Br. Sū. 2-1-33 and in Gītā5-14. On GK 4-27, Ānandagiri interprets Swabhāva of Citta as Avidyā. It is to be noted that even Madhva and Kūrañarāyaṇa state that the explanation of creation as Swabhāva is the opinion of Siddhānta and they take Swabhāva in the sense of Līlārūpa and as opinion of Śruti and

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Brahmasūtras. Prof. Karmarkar's view that 'Swabhāva' is not the siddhānta view does not seem to be correct.

In this connection, the question arises as to what is the significance of the words "Atra Ete Śloka Bhavanti?" Apparently these words may imply that the Kārikās are prior to the prose Mantras. But as there is an ancient and strong tradition that the Kārikās are of Gauḍapaḍa as is indicated by the various old references to Kārikās as of Gauḍapāda, it has to be seen if these words "Here are these verses" can be explained otherwise. From Al-beruni's mention and various respectful references, the Kārikās had obviously acquired high prestige as an authoritative exposition of Vedānta and were critically studied along with the Prose Mantras in the Sampradāya.

Pāṭhaśālā teachers while explaining the prose Mantras of the Upaniṣad introduced the Kārikās to the students, adding "Here are these verses". "Atra Ete Śloka Bhavanti" is therefore the words of the then teachers explaining to students the Śruti prose Mantras and the Kārikās written later, on the basis of those Mantras, by Gauḍapāda. Prof. Karmarkar rightly remarks that these innocent looking expression has unnecessarily caused such a furore amongst students of Advaita Vedānta. MSS state that these are the words of "Vārtikakāra" i.e. Gauḍapāda. In any case, the contention that the prose Mantras are based on the Kārikās has no force.

Another contention is raised by Prof. Bhattacharya viz. that all the four chapters of the 215 Kārikās are independent works and have no relation or connection with one another. Prof. B.N.K. Sharma also subscribes to this view. In the first place, according to the more ancient and stronger tradition, Gauḍapāda is the author of all the various four chapters as quotations from various chapters are found as referring to him. Further Śaṅkara has clearly and understandably pointed out the connection between the various chapters. The first chapter is predominently based on the scripture (Āgama) and concludes that Ātmā is non-dual and when correct knowledge is attained there is no duality. But the proof advanced in the first chapter is mainly scriptural. The unreality of duality can be explained predominently on the basis of reasoning also—for this purpose there is the second chapter. But merely because duality is unreal, that does not necessarily establish by reasoning that Advaita is the absolute truth. There may be Śūnya or vacuity of Nihilists. The unreality of duality was proved mainly on two "Hetus" in the second chapter (a) Dṛśyatva and (b) having an "ādi" and "anta". The third chapter now proceeds to say that even Advaita can be established not only from Āgama but by reasoning also. Having established unreality of duality in the second and the truth of Advaita in the third chapter both predominently by reasoning Gauḍapāda in the 4th chapter refutes the arguments of the rival schools like Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and various schools of Buddhism etc. by pointing out their mutual Virodha and employing the arguments of one school against the other and finally establishing his own doctrine of Ajāti, Asparśa-yoga, Catuṣkoṭivarjita Brahma, the one eternal Vijñāna Brahma, adding in 4-99 that this upaniṣadic doctrine is something different from what Buddha had stated.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Prof. Bhattacharya is not satisfied with Śaṅkara's explanation. Madhavan discusses in detail and rejects the view of Prof. Bhattacharya. Prof. Bhattacharya's objection is that the first chapter is not only based on Āgama but has Tarka also but it is possible to say it is Āgama pradhāna and includes some Tarka also. The second objection is that the author Gauḍapāda does not state the connection of chapters as Śaṅkara states. But authors need not and do not always state that; it is the duty of commentators to point out the Sangati as is done in most of the philosophical works. The third objection is that the subject of the second and the third chapter is practically the same but it must be noted that the emphasis, purpose and treatment are different. A further objection is that there are many places where Kārikās are repeated. But that frequently happens in such other works which are mainly Upadeśa treatises. On the contrary, it proves that the author of all chapters is the same. There is a special Maṅgala verse in the fourth chapter but that has not any special significance. As Ānandagiri observes on GK 4-1, Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with all the 215 Kārikās of Gauḍapāda being one treatise, there is Maṅgala in the beginning with Aum, in the middle at 116th Kārikā (GK 4-1) and at the end in GK 4-100 at all the three places, i.e. in Ādi, Madhya and Anta. Prof. Bhattacharya does not admit that the views of dualists and Vaināśikas are refuted in the fourth chapter; he contends that Gauḍapāda has accepted the views of the Vaināśikas. This view of Prof. Bhattacharya is strongly opposed, duly examined and rejected by Prof. Madhavan and Prof. Karmarkar. Reference may be made to our notes on these verses.

This brings us to the main thesis and contention of Prof. Bhattacharya. Prof. Dasgupta in his "History of Indian Philosophy Vol. 1" observes that "Gauḍapāda was possibly himself a Buddhist. He associated all Buddhist Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda doctrines and had the highest respect for Buddha and for his teachings which he believed to be his". Prof. Dasgupta's remarks are believed to be based not on a detailed study of the Kārikās. But Prof. Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya edited the Kārikās as "The Āgama Śāstra of Gauḍapāda" in 1943 with his own, and sometimes speculative, interpretations and has endeavoured to prove that Gauḍapāda was only reproducing Buddhist philosophical ideas and that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist himself. It is true that Prof. Bhattacharya has made an elaborate study of Buddhist texts and has tried to interpret the Kārikās in the light of Buddhist ideas. Shri Purohit ("Gauḍapāda and Buddhism" in Oriental Conference Report 1935), Prof. Mahadevan ("Gauḍapāda a study in early Advaita" chapter 9), Swami Nikhilanand (edition of Māṇḍūkya), Prof. Karmarkar (edition of Kārikās), Saccidānandendra (in his Māṇḍūkya-rahasya-vivṛti) and others have strongly opposed the views of Prof. Bhattacharya and the replies thereto are shortly stated as follows: (1) There are a large number of Buddhist words, ideas and expressions mainly in the 4th chapter (They are listed hereafter with interpretations of Śaṅkara also). But the utmost that can be said in this connection is that Gauḍapāda studied deeply Buddhist philosophy and adopted some of their expressions and arguments in refuting other schools of philosophy but that does not mean that he adopted the Buddhist tenets also.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Many of the expressions can also be explained, as done by Śaṅkara, in Vedāntic sense. (2) The expression "Dwipadām Varam" in GK 4-1 is a salutation to Buddha according to Prof. Bhattacharya. Śaṅkara says that it refers to Puruṣottama. Ānandagiri says it is to Nārāyaṇa. It may even be to Gauḍapāda's Guru Śuka. "Dwipadām Varam" is not a special title of Buddha and it is pointed out that Mahābhārata uses that expression a number of times for several other personages. (3) Asparśayoga has been interpreted by Prof. Bhattacharya as the last of the 9th Dhyāna called Anupūrva vihāra" (successive state of Dhyāna) taught by Buddha as it is "Asukha yoga". This has been considered a special pleading and Prof. Karmarkar observes that Gauḍapāda owes that expression to Gītā (Mātrāsparśāḥ and Duḥkhayoni 2-14 and 5-22) and he has listed a number of similiar or identical ideas in Gauḍapāda and Gītā. See also Bṛ.Up. (Mādhyandinī Pāṭha) 4-314 "Mātrā-asaṁsarga" and Bṛ.Up. 4-6-15 "Kena kaṁ sparśet". Also see our comments on 4-2 (GK). (4) The main doctrine of Ajātivāda of Gauḍapāda, Saṁvṛti and Paramārtha etc. are traced by Prof. Bhattacharya to Buddhism. But as pointed out by Śaṅkara these ideas are the natural conclusions of the Upaniṣadic ideas.(5) The simile of Alāta is called by Prof. Bhattacharya Buddhistic. But whirling of something is not necessarily Buddhistic. Gītā refers to Bhrāmayan etc (18-61) and "alāta" is referred to in Rāmāyaṇa also etc. (6) There are many parallel passages in Gauḍapāda with those of Mūlamādhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna.

The reply is—yes, there are. Gauḍapāda has utilised Buddhist ideas and arguments which are acceptable to him but his ultimate conclusion is not identical with that of the Buddhists. (7) The word Buddha has been used many times. Very often it means the wise people. In GK 4-99 it refers to Gautama Buddha. But this fact leads us no further. (8) The word "Agrayānataḥ" in GK 4-90 is interpreted by Śaṅkara as "Prathamataḥ," by Prof. Bhattacharya as "from Mahāyāna" and by Prof. Karmarkar as "from Pūrvamīmāṁsā". "Āgrayānataḥ" most likely means before proceeding further—before making yāna (going) further (Agre) i.e. Prathamataḥ as Śaṅkara interprets it. Saccidānandendra (in his Māṇḍūkya-rahasya-vivṛti) has discussed these parallel passages and shown their difference. The expression Agrayānataḥ is dubious and no theory can be based on it.

Apart from these arguments and counter-arguments, there is a clear tradition of Guruparamparā in Śāṅkara Sampradāya, daily recited, describing Gauḍapāda as Paramaguru of Śaṅkara and in Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣya (concluding verse) Śaṅkara himself refers to him as that with great respect. In Br. Sū. Bhāṣya too, as pointed out earlier, he is referred to as the Ācārya who knows the Vedānta Sampradāya. Śantarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, eminent Buddhists, do not accept Gauḍapāda as a Buddhist but an Aupaniṣada. Mokṣa is called Brāhmaṇyapada (GK 4.85) by Gauḍapāda. Gauḍapāda quotes Īśa (in 7-25), Katha (in 1-28, 3-13 and 24), Chāndogya (in 3-13 and 15), Taittirīya (in 3-11), Bṛhadāraṇyaka (in 1-1, 2, 9, 12; in 2-3, 5, in 3-12, 13, 15, 25, 26), Vājasaneyī Saṁhita (in 3-24) and uses terms like Vedapāraga (in 2-35), Vedānta-Vicakṣaṇa (in 2-31) and Yajñavid (in 2-12). Prof. Karmarkar notes that when Gauḍapāda controverts the views of "Manovidaḥ" and "Buddhividah" in GK 2-25, he

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

combats the Buddhist views; also GK 4-28 and 4-54, show that Gauḍapāda does not hold the Vijñānavāda Buddhist views.

The expression "Naitad Buddhena Bhāṣitam" is interpreted by Prof. Bhattacharya as "Avacanam Buddhavacanam" saying that the transcendental truth cannot be explained to another in words. Prof. Karmarkar refers to Laṅkāvatāra where Buddha is supposed to have said "Bhāṣiṣye" many times, but did not say that and says that Gauḍapāda perhaps refers to that. The plain meaning of this expression, however is, as stated by Śaṅkara, that even though there is some apparent similarity of Vedānta with Buddhist ideas, they are not the same. The Nitya one Vijñāna, the eternal Adhiṣṭhāna, is the doctrine of Vedānta and "Etad" this doctrine is not what Buddha said.

Dualists and Realists describe Śaṅkara with a sneer as Pracchanna Bauddha. On the other hand in recent times, Buddhist texts have been studied with great fervour and many scholars have highly appreciated Buddhist philosophical thought and contribution. Some of them steeped in Buddhist thought have naturally endeavoured with delight to identify Gauḍapāda completely with Buddhist philosophy of Vijñānavāda and or Śūnyavāda but that view is also rightly rejected. Dr. Radhakrishnan tries to bring Buddha himself very near the upaniṣadic view as accepting a permanent transcendental self (Gautama Buddha p.33) and that opinion too is strongly criticised by Rahul Sāṅkṛityāyana (in his "Buddha Darśana") who emphasizes the "anattā" doctrine of Buddha. The truth that appears to be is that Buddha did borrow from the Upaniṣadic ideas and developed his own system. Gauḍapāda too, borrowed from all his predecessors, upaniṣads and Buddhist philosophers, and developed Ajātivāda, Nitya Catuṣkoṭivarjita one Vijñāna Brahma and Asparśayoga, pointing out that it had the basis in Upaniṣads. But he is careful to further state that his doctrine is not the same as that of Buddha.

"Kṣaṇikatva" or momentariness of everything is one of the major doctrines of Buddhism and a Nitya Ātmā is incompatible with that theory. As pointed out by Dr.T.V.R. Murti (The central Philosophy of Buddhism) 1955 pp 3-15 there are two traditions of Indian Philosophy, the Ātman tradition representing all the schools except Buddhism and the Anātman (anattā) tradition represented by Buddhism alone.

Gauḍapāda emphatically belongs to the school of Ātman theory, quite distinct from the school of Anātman (anattā) theory of Buddhists.

Prof. Bhattacharya would like to place Gauḍapāda in the Buddhist camp. Dr. Radhakrishnan would like to place Buddha in the Upaniṣadic camp. But veteran Buddhist teachers of the past like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla disclaim Gauḍapāḍa as a Buddhist and Rahul Sāṅkṛityāyana and other modern Buddhist scholars emphasize "Anattā" as the central doctrine of Buddhism. In the light of this, Gauḍapāda's statement that "This is not stated by Buddha" could only have its plain natural meaning and would mean that his doctrine differs from that of the Buddhists on the major tenets. This is exactly what Śaṅkara points out in the last few lines of his Bhāṣya on GK 4-99, Śaṅkara repeatedly mentions as against the Vaināśikas that no imagination, smṛti (memory) etc. can be without a proper substratum, Āśraya, Āspada, or

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Adhiṣṭhāna and that there must be a Sākṣin even of Abhāva or Ajñāna.

With regard to the use of Buddhist expressions by Gauḍapāda, Madhavan puts forth a conjecture on p.220 (Gauḍapāda a study in early Vedānta), "The answer is that the exigencies of his time must have made him use of Buddhist terminology, even as the Hindu monks who preach Vedānta in the countries of the west today feel the necessity of clothing their thoughts in christian expressions".

So far as the titles of the whole treatise of Kārikās and individual chapters are concerned, there is a variety of names. Kārikās are called Gauḍapādīyakārikās. 2nd and the 3rd chapters are sometimes called Upadeśa granthas. Śāntarakṣita would call it Upaniṣad Śāstra. Pañcadaśi called it Māṇḍūkya vārtika. The first chapter, based on Āgama or Śruti is called Āgama Prakaraṇa. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th prakaraṇas are consistently called Vaitathya, Advaita and Alātaśānti. Prof. Karmarkar would call the first prakaraṇa as Oṁkara-nirṇaya. Prof. Bhattacharya calls all the Kārikās as Āgama Śāstra of Gauḍapāda.

There are several other works on Vedānta with which these Kārikās are compared in order to know which is prior and which is the borrower. One such work is "Paramārthasāra" attributed to Bhagawān Ādiśeṣa. It is on Advaita and has points of similarity in doctrines, terms and expression with the Kārikās. Prof. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī says that Ādiśeṣa's work is the original while Prof. Madhavan holds the opposite view. Another such work is Yogavāsiṣṭha. There is very much in common between that and Gauḍapāda. Dr. Atreya says that Yogavāsiṣṭha is earlier while another view is that both have a common source. Dr. V.Raghavan places Yogavāsiṣṭha between 11th to 13th century. The third such work is the Bhāgawata Purāṇa. Prof. Madhavan feels that no case is made out for dating Bhāgawata purāṇa earlier than Gauḍapāda. Prof. Karmarkar has listed many cases of similarity of thought and expression in the Kārikās and other works, both Vedāntic and Buddhistic e.g. Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, Bṛhadarāṇyaka, Chāndogya, Gītā, Īśa, Kaṭha, Kauṣītakī, Kena, Laṅkāvatāra, Manu, Muṇḍaka, praśna, Śvetāśvatara, Taittirīya, and Yogavāsiṣṭha.

Some people have questioned the genuineness of the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara on Māṇḍūkya as that of Ādi Śaṅkara but that view is opposed by T.R. Chintamani in Proceedings of the 3rd oriental conference 1924 pp 419-425, who maintains that the tradition is right in ascribing it to Ādi Śaṅkara.

Certain remarks of Dr. Radhakrishnan in his 'History of Indian Philosophy Vol.II' on Gauḍapāda have been objected to and criticised by Swami Nikhilānanda in his Ed. of Māṇḍ. Up. with Kārikās. "The general idea pervading Gauḍapāda's work that Bondage and liberation, the individual and the world are all unreal makes the caustic critic observe that the theory which has nothing better to say than an unreal soul in trying to escape from an unreal bondage in an unreal world to accomplish an unreal supreme good may itself be an unreality. If we are to play the game of life, we cannot do so with the conviction that the play is a show and all the prizes in it are mere blanks." (In Ph. Vol.II p.463). Gauḍapāda denies the reality of causation and by Ajātivāda, he means that Brahma has never become the universe. Gauḍapāda does explain the universe

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

through Māyā e.g. "Anadimāyayā suptaḥ" 1-16; "Māyāmātram idam dwaitam" (1-17), he cites "Indro māyābhiḥ" 3-24; he gives the firm view of the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) as "Kalpayati ātmanā ātmānam" 2-12; he uses "Māyā" in 4-44, 4-58, 4-59 and 4-61. For purpose of Vyavahāra he does refer to phenomenal reality, because external objects are actually (upalambha) perceived as also for the sake of Varṇāśramadharmas(samācāra) i.e. morality. Advaitins have taught creation to those who fear from the idea of Ajāti (GK. 4-42). Śruti texts talking of real creation are explained "Upāyaḥ saḥ avatārāya". They are intended to gradually make the student realise the ultimate absolute truth that Brahma is eternal, 'Aja', unborn, "Kūṭastha" unchanging. In "Kalpayati" (2-12) Vivartavāda is clearly made out (cf. Ānandagiri). An attempt is made to find difference in the teaching of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara eg. Swapna and Jāgrat both are classed together as one by Gauḍapāda etc. But the words Swapna and Nidrā are used in a special sense by Gauḍapāda there. Nidra means Ajñāna of Tattva (Āvaraṇa) and Swapna means Anyathāgrahaṇa (Vikṣepa). In Jāgrat and Swapna both, there is Anyathāgrahaṇa of Reality from the Absolute point of view and therefore they are classed as one. It is further observed that Gauḍapāda is more negative than Śaṅkara who is balanced. But Deussen remarks "both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara hold the same view on all the essentials and many ideas and imagery in which Śaṅkara indulges are already seen to occur in Gauḍapāda (reconciliation of scriptures, polemic against causality, the objectless perception etc, serpent and rope, universal space and Jar-space, dream, māyā, mirage etc.). Indeed, it can be said that Śaṅkara developed the doctrine of Gauḍapāda into a system in the same way as Plato did those of Parmenides" (Sixty Upaniṣads p.606). Prof. Karmarkar quotes with approval the similar considered opinion of the late learned Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudeo Śāstrī Abhyaṅkar in his Siddhāntabindu Introduction. It appears futile to attempt digging out differences between Śaṅkara and his acknowledged Paramaguru Gauḍapāda. When seen in proper perspective, no such differences exist. Gauḍapāda clearly says in 1-5 that one who realises the unity of Bhoktā and Bhojya in all the three states of Jāgrat Swapna Suṣupti remains untouched or uncontaminated (Na lipyate). Even when he is "Bhuñjānaḥ i.e. continues to enjoy life or becomes Yādṛcchika yati (selfcontrolled ascetic), the main Upadeśa is "Advaite Yojayet Smṛtim" (2-36) constantly keep one's memory in Advaita and "Tattwād Apracyuto Bhavet" 2-38 never deviate from Absolute Truth. Life, whether active or otherwise is to be led with Brahmavidyā continuously at the back of the mind. Therefore Gītā also says "sarvathā vartamano'pi" (6-31), "Viṣayān caran (api) prasādam adhigacchati" Gītā (2-64). "Paramahaṁsa—Parivrājakatva" is prescribed in order that the aspirant may not succumb to worldly temptations and deviate from Tattva (Reality)" Tattwād Apracyuto Bhavet".

In his Bhāṣya on Praśna 1-16 Śaṅkara observes that Jihma (crookedness) Anṛta (falsehood) and Māyā (deluding behaviour) even in a small degree are bound to remain in those who are involved in various kinds of contradictory worldly dealings; even for sport or joke falsehood is practised. To avoid these defects completely and not to yield and surrender to worldy temptations that

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

may make the mind deviate from the goal, seclusion, order of recluse and constant thought of Reality are prescribed.

Gauḍapāda is more interested in describing the ultimate Reality and deals with phenomenal reality only by a few hints by using "Māyāmātram idam Dwaitam", "Saṁvṛtyā Jāyate Ṣarvam", Laukika, upalambha and samācāra etc. Vivartavāda is made out from GK. 2-12. Gauḍapāda says (1-18) that all talks of duality are before the realisation of Advaita (Upadeśāt (Pūrvam) ayam vādaḥ). Before realisation, duality or phenomenal Reality is explained for the purpose of Vyavahāra "Bhūtapūrvagatyā" as Śaṅkara puts it in his Bhāṣya on the 7th Mantra while discussing the world "Vijñeyaḥ". In Turīya Ātmā all Upādhis are negated and in that Advaita Ātmā there is no such Tripuṭī of Dṛṣṭā, Dṛṣṭi and Dṛśya; and so when the 7th Mantra says that Turīya Ātmā is to be "vijñeya" (known), it is only by "Bhūta-pūrva-gatyā" from the earlier phenomenal point of view, which is due to Avidyā. This is the same thing as "Upadeśāt (pūrvam) ayaṁ vādaḥ"—1-18. "Māyāmātram idam dvaitam, advaitaṁ paramārthataḥ" 1-17. "Duality is due to Māyā and non-duality is the Absolute Truth" is accepted both by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. "No birth or destruction, no bondage or liberation etc" in GK 2-32 is the description of Paramārtha Absolute Truth, to realise which the Aspaŕśayoga discipline and a continuous untiring and rigorous preparation is prescribed from 3-41 to 47 by Gauḍapāda. "Yatra kiñcinna jāyate" (3-48) i.e. Ajāti is declared by Gauḍapāda as the "Uttama" i.e. the Paramārtha or the Absolute Truth—not as empirical or phenomenal or Laukika vyavahāra Reality. Even the word "vijñeya"used in the 7th Mantra of the Upaniṣad as stated earlier, presupposes a prior phenomenal point of view—"Bhūtapūrvagatyā", as Śaṅkara puts it. When Gauḍapāda says in 4-57 that "Saṁvṛtyā jāyate sarvam"—the Saṁsāra is explained by Saṁvṛti (i.e. Saṁvaraṇa) empirical existence or phenomenal reality i.e. Avidyā-viṣayaḥ Laukiko Vyavahāraḥ" (Śaṅkara). Creation and cause and effect relationship are explained by Saṁvṛti. The main contention of Gauḍapāda is that whatever is Dṛśya and perishable i.e. having "Ādi" and "Anta" has no claim to Absolute Reality, it only appears to be true though unreal. The intrinsic nature of a thing never changes. Absolute Truth is Catuṣkoṭi-varjita Ātmā or Brahma who is Nitya and unborn-Apūrva (causeless), Anantara (having none of a different kind from), Abāhya (having nothing external to it), Anapāra (effectless) and Avyaya (undecaying) (GK 1-26) and is to be meditated upon as Praṇava (Auṁkāra) both as Vyasta and Samasta Aum and as Para Brahma or Apara Brahma according to one's adhikāra or level of spiritual progress. In 3-76 Gauḍapāda talks of 3 kinds of Adhikārins (Āśramas)-uttama, madhyama and hīna. For the uttama, Ajāti is upaḍiṣṭā and for others who unnecessarily fear from the idea of Ajāti, the wise have taught upāsanā and explained creation duality and empirical existence by Swabhāva (1-9), Māyā (1-17), saṁvṛti (4-57), upalaṁbha (actually finding the world) and samācāra (morality) (4-42). Even though phenomenal reality or vyāvahārika satya (Laukika vyavahāraḥ) is explained by postulating Avidyā—Avidyā has no real existence and does not remain on realisation of Absolute Truth.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

"Tattvamasyādi-vākyottha-samyagdhījanmamātrataḥ
Avidyā saha kāryeṇa nāsīd asti bhaviṣyati"

With the mere rise of the correct knowledge attained through the Mahāvākya "Tat Ṭwam Asi", Avidyā along with its effects never was, nor is nor will ever be.

Gauḍapāda, therefore, says "Sā Ca Māyā Na Vidyate" (4-58) this Māyā never really exists. Then the uttama Adhikārin (Āśrama) realises the Ajāti Brahma.

Ahaṁkāro dhiyaṁ brūte taṁ suptaṁ mā prabodhaya
Utthite paramānande na twaṁ nāhaṁ na vai jagat.

Ego says to intellect "Do not wake up him who is sleeping. When that Supreme Bliss wakes up, there will be no existence either of you or me or the universe".

Anādi-māyayā supto yadā jivaḥ prabudhyate
Ajam anidram aswapnam advaitaṁ budhyate tadā

GK 1-16

It is interesting to note that all the three Ācāryas, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva rely on this Kārikā as authoritative but of course interpreting it in a way consistent with their respective systems. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja cite it in their respective Br.Sū. Bhāṣyas and Madhva while commenting on the Āgama Prakaraṇa as Śruti in his Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣya. Being traditionally known as part of his Kārikās, this is also the view of Gauḍapāda, consistent with his Ajātivāda.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

VEDĀNTA AND BUDDHISM

Dr. T.R.V. Murti, a great champion and exponent of Buddhism, remarks in his book "The central philosophy of Buddhism" at p.10 that there are two main currents of Indian Philosophy—one having its source in the Ātmā-doctrine of the Upaniṣads and other in the anātmā—doctrine of Buddha. They conceive reality on two distinct and exclusive patterns. The Upaniṣads and systems following the Brahmanical tradition conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core or soul (Ātman), immutable and identical amidst an outer region of impermanence and change, to which it is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed the substance view of reality (Ātma-vāda). In its radical form, as in the Advaita Vedānta, it denied the reality of the apparent, the impermanent and the many, and equated that with the false. The Sāṁkhya did not go so far; still it is inclined more towards the substantial the permanent and the universal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with its empirical and pluralist bias accords equal status to both substance and modes. The Ātman is the very pivot of their metaphysics, epistemology and ethics."

"The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial of substance (Ātman) and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in flux. Existence for Buddha is momentary (kṣaṇika), unique (swalakṣaṇa) and unitary (Dharmamātra). It is discontinuous, discrete and devoid of complexity. The substance (the universal and identical) was rejected as illusion. This may be taken as the Modal view of Reality. Hectic attempts were made to fit this theory with the doctrine of Karma and Rebirth. Avidyā (ignorance), which is the root cause of suffering, is the wrong belief in the Ātman and Prajñā (wisdom) consists in the eradication of this belief and its attendant evils".

Dr. Murti observes on p.332 of the same book "The differences of the Absolutes, at least in the manner of their approach should not be overlooked. Every absolutism may be understood as a mode of the negative judgement as negation of illusion. (But) There is difference with regard to the illusion with which they start and the standpoint from which they negate the illusory. By implication, this entails a difference in the way that the relation between the real and the appearance is conceived in each system".

Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj makes the pregnant suggestion (at p.73 of his Hindi Introduction to Śaṅkara Bhāṣya of B.S.) that these (various absolutes) are not identical and that they are all Absolutism, yet the Śūnyavāda of Mādhyamika, Vijñānavāda of the Yogācāras, Śāktādvaitavāda of the Śāktas, the Śabdādvaitavāda of the Grammarians and the older Vedāntins like Maṇḍana Miśra differ in themselves to a greater or lesser extent. The Advaita taught by Gauḍapāda has its own special feature. In the circumstances, it is difficult to estimate whether and to what extent Śaṅkara has been influenced by other systems (cited by Dr. Murti on p.116).

The Vedānta starts with the reality of being as **revealed by the Upaniṣads** and the Vijñānavāda bases itself on the **deliverance of the highest trance-states** where the object drops out leaving consciousness as the sole reality (Dr. Murti p.216).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

"It is our contention that there could not be acceptance of any doctrinal concept by either side from the other as each had a totally different background of tradition and conception of reality. Besides, it is readily assumed that there is no difference between the Absolute of Vedānta and that of the Mādhyamika or Vijñānavāda. If we carefully analyse their respective standpoints, we would find that all these agree with regard to the logical form of the absolute, as free of empirical determination and as the essence of phenomena and also as realised in an intuitive experience. But they differ with regard to the nature of this Absolute (that with which they identify it) and the mode of their approach. It can make for confusion to ignore the differences. What is real for the one is the appearance for the other"(Dr. Murti on p.116 and note 2).

"The Vedāntin might have profited by the technique or method of the Mādhyamika. The Mādhyamika and Yogācāra also had a theory of illusion to account for the emergence of appearance. Knowledge of this turn in Buddhism must have sent the Vedāntin back to his own texts and enabled him to perceive the truer meaning of the Upaniṣad in Advaitism. Presumably, there has been borrowing of technique and not of the tenets. Śrīharṣa, as is well-known, employs Mādyamika method in his Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍakhādya and even says to in so many words, but he at once preserves the doctrinal originality of the Vedānta." (Dr. Murti on pp 16-17).

Even though both Vedānta and Mādhyamika talk of illusion, Vedānta says that as the illusory Prapañca is superimposed on Brahma, On negation of that illusion by Jñāna, the substratum Brahma which is all throughout immanent in that illusory Prapañca, reveals Itself. But even though the Mādhyamika says that Prapañca is illusory, "the Absolute is no where explicitly shown to be in the things constituting their very soul". The relation between the two is not made abundantly clear. This may be said to constitute a drawback in the Mādhyamika conception of the Absolute". This is how Dr. Murti the great exponent of Buddhism, has to admit on p, 237 in "The central Philosophy of Buddhism".

This is exactly the criticism of Śaṅkara against Mādhyamikas—as there cannot be any Niradhiṣṭhāna Brahma. In the Brahma sūtras 2-2-31, Śaṅkara says that just as when the exception to a rule is negated, the original rule prevails. Similarly on negation of world-illusion, the substratum self-luminous Brahma shines forth.

For Gauḍapāda, Āgama is first and reason is next. He follows Śruti very closely and on an analysis and intuition of the three states of Jāgrat, Swapna and Suṣupti, he establishes the Turīya Absolute and gives us a totality view of Reality. After establishing the Nitya vijñāna (Brahma) of the Upaniṣads upto verse 86 in chapter IV, Gauḍapāda from verse 87 onwards again comes to the theme of the 3 states as in the Śruti and chapter I. As against this Nāgārjuna does not make any statement on the Ultimate nature of Reality. By his dialectic method he negates all theories but he has no theory of his own as he says "sarva-dṛṣṭīnām Niḥsāraṇam" MK 13-8.

Dr. K.V. Apte, after an elaborate and close examination of the Mādhyamika conception of Absolute has come to the conclusion that the Mādhyamika Śūnya is negative and not positive (Bharatiya Vidya Vols. 45 to

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

48, 1988; MM Prof. J.H. Dave felicitation vol. pp. 204–220).

One theory of Prof. Bhattacharya is that the Gauḍapāda originated the Vedāntic school of Vijñānavāda as against that of the Buddhists with only one difference—Vijñāna is Nitya for Gauḍapāda while it is Dhruva (continuous or Pravāha-nitya) for the Buddhist. But for Gauḍapāda, Dhruva and Nitya mean the same thing as Ātmā is called Dhruva in the sense of Nitya in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-4-20. Further Gauḍapāda in G.K. 4-28 refutes the Buddhist Vijñānavādaby stating that the Buddhist Vijñānavāda believes in some kind of Jāti (origination) of citta while for Gauḍapāda there is only Ajāti from the transcendental point of view. Mādhyamika view is rejected by Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on GK 1-6—"Na hi Nirāspadā Rajjusarpamṛgatṛṣṇikādayaḥ kvacid upalabhyante kenacit"; also on GK. 4-28 and G.K. 4-99. There cannot be any illusion without a substratum. There are some, particularly among modern Buddhists, who would like to have the Buddhist Absolute as something positive and permanent like the Vedantic Brahma but the Buddhist fundamental theory of Kṣaṇikatva (momentariness) violates against such a conception of their Absolute.

It has been admitted by Dr. Murti that "in the first three chapters of Gauḍapāda Kārikās, there is nothing to which an orthodox Vedāntin can take any objection" (p.114). In chapter 4 of the Kārikās, there is terminology and technique of Buddhists but as observed earlier, that does not make the tenets of Gauḍapāda identical with those of the Buddhists. Why he used their technique and terminology can be explained in various ways. eg. Gauḍapāda uses here the Āvītanyāya, addressing the opponents in their own language and trying to distinguish his system from theirs—like Hindu Monks addressing Western audience in christian terminology (as observed by Dr. Mahadevan). Sadāśiva Brahmendra records a tradition which says that Gauḍapāda refuted and converted Ayārcya and other Buddhists. There might be historical error here in naming personalities but the tradition may suggest Gauḍapāda's intention to refute and convert Buddhists of his times. Instead of calling Gauḍapāda a Buddhist, this would on the contrary suggest that he was refuting and trying to convert Buddhists to the Vedantic view.

It is a matter of only conjuncture and speculation as to whether Vedānta borrowed from Buddhism or vice versa. Chāndogya 6-2-1 refers to one view that non-being alone existed. Śaṅkara observes that this may refer to the śūnyavāda later developed by the Buddhists. Non-being also suggests its psychological counterpart viz. the denial of soul or Ātman. Dr. R.D. Ranade on p.132 ("A constructive survey of Upaniṣadic philosophy") refers to the doctrine of non-being, denial of soul, a contempt of sense pleasure bordering on pessimism, the order of mendicant, the idealistic theory of knowledge and the doctrine of karma in Buddhism as having their source in certain passages of the Upaniṣads."

On the question of Māyāvāda and the theory of "double truth" (Pāramārthika-sattā and vyāvahārikasattā of Vedānta and Paramārtha and saṁvṛti of the Buddhists), Dr. R.D. Ranade has collected 15 Upaniṣadic passages on p.179 and observes on p.165 (Constructive survey of the Upaniṣads)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

"the conecption of a veil, of blindfoldness, of a knot of ignorance, of non-being, of darkness, of death, of unreality and uncertainty, of untruth, of crookedness, falsehood and illusion; of the power of God, of this power as identical with nature, of meshes, of semblance, an as-it-were and an appearance and finally of a word, a mode and a name—when we consider these, let no man stand up and say that we do not find the traces of the doctrine of Māyā in the Upaniṣads". Madhusūdana saraswatī in his commentary on Saṅkṣepa śārīraka on verse 217 cites the Pre-śaṅkara vākyakāra Brahmānandin who refers to saṁvyavahāramātra (i.e. vyāvahārikasattā) as against the Pāramārthikasattā. Gaudapāda is referred to by Śaṅkara as Sampradāyavid and Paramaguru. Śaṅkara cites on Br. Sū. 1-1-4, 3 verses of an earlier Vedāntin supporting the theory that all the Pramāṇas of empirical life are sublated on the knowledge of the supreme (Pramāṇantu Ātmaniścayāt). On Māṇḍūdya G.K. 2-32 Śaṅkara cites an Āgamavid ("Siddhaṁtu Nivartakatvāt") "Śāstra is valid as it negates the Adhyasta Prapañca, on self-luminous Ātman."

Prof. Dasgupta (H.I.P. Vol. I p.421) suggests that Aśvaghosa who was a learned Brāhmin scholar in his early life might have much of Upaniṣadic influence in his interpretation of Buddhism. Nāgārjuna too was a great Brāhmin scholar converted to Buddhism. External influence on the rise of Mahāyāna has been surmised by some scholars eg. Kern, Max Muller, Keith, Stcherbatsky and others" (Murti on p.81).

It thus seems that Kevala Vedānta too had its own tradition of Nitya Brahma, illusion, Māyā, Paramārtha and Vyavahāra etc. Sureśwara also refers to a number of old monistics' schools slightly differing from each other. Vedānta Absolute is referred to in Īśa 8, Kaṭha 1-3-14, Muṇḍaka 1-1-6, Praśna 4-10, Māṇḍūkya 7, Taitt 2-7, Chā 6-41, Bṛh. 2-36 etc. etc. But Mutual influence of Vedānta on Buddhism and vice versa cannot be ruled out as each generation profits with the growth of technique and the method of Dialectic developed by the another system and tradition.

There is no doctrinal difference between Śaṅkara and his Sampradāyavid Paramaguru Gauḍapāda. Gauḍapāda has clubbed together Swapna and Jāgrat in G.K. 1-11 to 15 and Śaṅkara has explained why they are so clubbed together. Some difference is tried to be made out between Śaṅkara and Gauḍapāda on the ground that according to Śaṅkara Jāgrat is different from Swapna. But on Bṛ. Up. Bhāṣya 4-3-19 Śaṅkara observes "Jāgaritepi yad darśanaṁ tadapi swapnam manyate śrutiḥ" (Śruti's view is that perception in Jāgrat is also swapna). Gauḍapāda is expressly mentioned by Sureśwara in his Bṛ. Up. Vārtika and the 6th Mantra of Māṇḍūkya is referred to by him as Śruti in Bṛ. up. vār.3-8-86.

Saccidānandendra Saraswatī has on pp.457-463, collected in his Māṇḍūkya-Rahasya-Vivṛti, a number of socalled similar passages in Vedānta and Buddhism and pointed one their different implications in the two systems.

The Buddhist denial of Ātman is not the same as Neti Neti of the Upaniṣad. Buddhism at no place refers to any Upaniṣadic teaching or makes any analysis of the three states of Jāgrat, Swapna and Suṣupti as is done by the Vedānta to

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

establish Nitya Turīya Brahma. Vedānta relies on Āgama and the totality of experience while Buddhism relies on Trance states. Advaya for Gauḍapāda is the same as Advaita (no second apart from Brahma); Advaya for Buddhist means "neither of the two extremes - is or is not."

Summery of
Māṇḍūkya and Kārikās according to Śaṅkara

For the purpose of meditation Aum (the name) is described in Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad as representing Brahma (the namable) — the name and the namable being considered identical. Aum is thus the entire universe in Trikāla and also in Trikāla-atīta. This Ātmā is Brahma, this is done by pointing at the disciple's heart i.e. the disciple's Pratyagātmā is Brahma; and for purposes of easy understanding of Ātmā, Ātmā is imagined as having four quarters. The first quarter of Ātmā is called Vaiśvānara; he has the conceit of waking state, he cognises external objects, has seven limbs (like Dyuloka etc.) and nineteen mouths (Jñānendriyas etc.) and experiences gross objects. The second quarter of Ātmā is called Taijasa; he has the conceit of dream state, he cognises internal objects (mental impressions), has similar seven limbs and nineteen mouths and experiences subtle objects. (The seven limbs like "heaven as head" etc. and mentioned in Praśna Upaniṣad are the limbs of the Samaṣṭi or cosmic soul, called Adhidaiva and they are intended here in connection with the individual, Vyaṣṭi, Pratyagātma, called Adhyātma. The intention of Śruti is to demonstrate the identity of Adhidaiva and Adhyātma i.e. Tat and Twam padārthas). In that state or at that time when in deep sleep one perceives no dream or has no desires, that is the sleeping state. The third quarter of Ātmā is called Prājña; he has the conceit of the state of deep sleep; he then enters into the Avyakta the Causal Self, all his experiences are undifferentiated, he is mere mass of consciousness only, mostly full of bliss, experiencing bliss and is a doorway leading to the experiences of Swapna and Jāgrat states. In the 6th Mantra of the Upaniṣad, this Prājña (of the individual or Adhyātma) is identified with Īśwara or Avyākṛta of the cosmic i.e. Adhidaiva and various attributes applicable to Īśwara are stated in connection with Prājña, thereby implying the identity of Adhyātma and Adhidaiva. Thus Prājña is called Lord of all, knower of all, inner controller and creator and destroyer of everything. (In Jāgrat, Swapna, Suṣupti and Turīya states, the Adhidaiva or cosmic soul is respectively called Virāṭ, Hiraṇyagarbha or Sūtrātma, Īśwara or Avyakta and Brahma; and the Adhyātma or individual soul is respectively called, Vaiśvānara or Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña, and Turīya. By applying in the 6th Mantra the attributes of Adhidaiva Īśwara to Adhyātma Prājña, the Śruti indicates the ultimate identity of Adhidaiva and Adhyātma i.e. Tat and Twam padārthas).

At this stage, after the 6th Mantra, the first nine Kārikās of Gauḍapāda's first Āgama Prakaraṇa are introduced. Gauḍapāda takes the hint from the 6th Mantra and he makes no distinction between Adhidaiva and Adhyātma. It is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

for this reason that he calls Vaiśvānara i.e. Viśva as all-pervading (Vibhu). Viśva cognises external objects, abides in the right eye, and has enjoyment and satisfaction of the gross objects. Taijasa cognises internal objects, abides in the mind and has enjoyment and satisfaction of subtle objects. Prājña's cognition is made into a mass, he abides in the space of the heart and has his enjoyment and satisfaction in bliss. One who knows that in the three states of Jāgrat, Swapna and Suṣupti the Bhogya and Bhoktā are one and the same is not contaminated even when he enjoys Bhogas.

As the sixth mantra describes Prājña as the creator and destroyer of everything, Gauḍapāda incidentally discusses various creation theories, rejects them and finally gives his own conclusion.

Prājña is called the Kāraṇa (yoni) of the Prapañca in the 6th Mantra by the Śruti. In Reality there is no causality but here Śruti talks of Prājña as cause, from the phenomenal point of view. Admitting from the phenomenal point of view for the time being cause and effect relationship in the case of creation, we can say that creation can only be of an effect that existed earlier in the form of causes (sat-kārya)—Vandhyāputra (asat-kārya) cannot be born either really or even in illusion. Prāṇa-puruṣa when conditioned by the Upādhi of Tamas creates all inanimate objects and as Caitanya pradhāna Puruṣa creates separately all Jīvas who are conscious beings and are as it were rays of consciousness.

From the point of view of Ultimate Truth, creation is only illusory but some people believe in real creation. Their views are to be rejected. Among the realists, some say that creation is the manifestation of God's power; others say it is a dream or illusion (this refers to some people who believe that there is a kind of reality in dream also eg. followers of Rāmānuja). Firmly believing in real creation, some say it is the will of God; others say it is brought about by time; or that it is for God's enjoyment or sport. But how can Āptakāma God have any craving? Creation is only due to Swabhāva i.e. illusion, Māyā of the Deva. (Swabhāva is interpreted as Māyā = illusion by Śaṅkara in Br. Sū 2-1-33 and Gītā 5-14 also). In the 7th Mantra Turīya is described by negating the Upādhis of the first three states viz. Jāgrat, swapna, suṣupti and establishing that one and the same Ātmā who is in the three states is the Turīya, called the fourth only for convenience. This Turīya Ātmā is self-luminous and cannot be described positively as no other light can illuminate it. But by removing the Āropa of Upādhis, Turīya can be known; he is not related to anything, is ungraspable, uninferable, unthinkable, undescribable, of the essence of consciousness constituting the self alone, where there is cessation of phenomenal world; he is peaceful, all Bliss and non-dual. After the 7th Mantra, Kārikās 10 to 18 of Gauḍapāda are introduced to explain the significance of the 7th Mantra. The Turīya is all-pervading as the three states arise from it. He is the Lord of all, capable of controlling all miseries, changless, non-dual and luminous. In order to properly ascertain the nature of Turīya, the general and

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

special characteristics of Viśva Taijasa and Prājña are described. Viśva and Taijasa are bound by both Kārya and Kāraṇa (Kārya = Phala = effect; Kāraṇa = Bīja or Hetu = cause). Prājña is bound only by Kāraṇa; but Turīya is not bound either by Kāraṇa or Kārya. Prājña does not know either the self or others, truth or untruth but Turīya is always all-seeing. Want of knowledge of duality is common to both Prājña and Turīya but Prājña is associated with Nidrā (sleep = seed = cause) while such sleep does not exist in Turīya. Viśva and Taijasa are associated with dream and sleep. Prājña is associated with sleep only but there is neither dream or sleep in Turīya. Sleep here means non-apprehension (want of knowledge = Āvaraṇa) of Reality and dream here means mis-apprehension (projection of something false on Reality = Vikṣepa). When both of such sleep and dream, disappear (i.e. when the erroneous knowledge due to Āvaraṇa and vikṣepa disappears), Turīya is realised. Jīva was sleeping (i.e. sleeping and dreaming) under the influence of beginningless Māyā (illusion). When he is awakened, he realises the sleepless dreamless unborn Non-duality. If the multiplicity of the universe existed in reality—there is no scope for Advaita and Advaita theory would have to be given up, but duality is mere illusion and therefore non-duality alone is the Supreme Reality. The objector says "If you are going to establish Advaita when Prapañca goes, even then how can there be Advaita so long as Prapañca has not disappeared?" The reply is that Prapañca is not a real Vastu—Here is therefore no question of its first existing and then retiring. All Prapañca is illusory. If any one has imagined duality in the form of teacher, pupil, scripture—that duality will disappear as soon as there is correct knowledge. The explanation through the medium of duality a teacher, pupil and scripture is only intended for the purpose of teaching the ignorant pupil but when Reality is realised all duality ceases to exist.

After giving the significance of the 7th Mantra through 10 to 19 kārikās, the 8th Mantra of the Upaniṣad is reproduced. This Ātmā described in four quarters is Aum from the point of view of the syllable. This Aum syllable is made up of three letters which are its sounds (Mātrās). These Mātrās A, U and M are to be considered as the quarters of Ātmā (for the purpose of meditation), Vaiśvānara of the Jāgrat is to be meditated upon as the first letter A of Aum on account of the common features of its pervasiveness (Śruti says A is all speech) and on account of its being the first. One meditating in this way fulfills all his desires and becomes the first. Taijasa of the Swapna is to be meditated upon as the second letter U of Aum. The common feature being superiority (U comes over A) and being between the two (A and M). The meditator increases the continuity of his highest knowledge and is treated equally by friends and enemies and no one is born "Abrahmavid" in his family. Prājña of the sleep is to be meditated upon as M of Aum. Common features are measuring (Viśva and Taijasa are measured like measuring barley, as they are coming out and going back) and becoming one. The meditator measures all (i.e. measures the real nature of the world) and becomes the merging place of all within his self.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

After 8 to 11 Mantras of the Upaniṣad, Gauḍapāda's Kārikās 19 to 23 are introduced to explain those Mantras. When there is a desire to say that Viśva is A, the two common features are "being the first" and "pervading". In the case of Taijasa the common features are "superiority (or coming after)" and "being between the two". In the case of Prājña, the common features are "measuring" and "merging". One who knows the common features of the 3 states is worthy of worship and is a great sage. The letter A leads the meditator to Viśva, the letter U to Taijasa and the letter M to Prājña. There is no access for attaining the measureless soundless, non-syllabic (after Aum which is Turīya).

After Kārikās 19 to 23 on Mantras 8 to 11, the 12th and the last Mantra of the Upaniṣad is reproduced. The fourth measureless soundless, incomprehensible, of the nature of cessation of all phenomenal universe, all bliss and non-dual Aum is verily Ātmā only. He who knows this merges his Self in the Self.

After this 12th and the concluding Mantra of the Upaniṣad, there are 24 to 29 Kārikās of Gauḍapāda. One should know Aum quarter by quarter of Ātmā, for quarters of Ātmā are to be meditated upon as Mātrās of Aum. After knowing Aum quarter by quarter, one should not think of anything else. One should fix his mind on Praṇava (Aum), Praṇava is without fear. One united with Praṇava has no fear. Praṇava is the lower Brahma as well as the Highest Brahma. Praṇava is causeless, having nothing which is of a different class from it, nothing external to it, is effectless and changeless. Praṇava is the beginnning, middle and end of all. One knowing Praṇava in this way immediately attains Ātmabhāva, Praṇava should be known as Īśvara abiding in the heart of all. Having realised the all-prevading Aum, the wise never grieve. Aum-kāra is measureless (or soundless or partless) as also possessed of infinite sounds or parts. It is the negation of all duality and All Bliss. One knowing this is alone the real sage, not any other.

Thus this Upaniṣad prescribes the Vyasta and Samasta Upāsanā of Aum for realising the real nature of Ātman, stating that the transcendental reality Brahma is the same constant Turīya in the three states of Jāgrat, Swapna and Suṣupti.

Vaitathya Prakaraṇa of Kārikās

In the first chapter, the unreality of duality was established predominently on the basis of Āgama (śruti). This chapter is begun to show the unreality (Vaitathya) of duality mainly through reasoning. As Gauḍapaḍa wants to establish the unreality of Jāgrat, he first establishes the unreality of dream entities. Then he proceeds to prove that Jāgrat too is equallty unreal like Swapna from the point of view of ultimate Reality; and then he postulates the ultimate truth as stated in Kārikā 32 viz "There is no birth or destruction, no bondage or liberation etc."

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

All entities seen in dream are unreal as they are located in the body in an enclosed space. The dreamer does not actually go to places in dream; Br. Ār Up. 4-3-14 denies the real existence of chariots etc. etc. preceived in dream.

That text is primarily intended to prove that Atmā is Self-luminous as there is no other light in dream that makes the dreamer see dream objects but that text incidentally envisages the reasoning (Nyāya) adopted in this Kārikā. The fourth Kārikā is enigmatic and pithy. It is explained by Saṅkara by a syllogism. Entities perceived in the waking are unreal like entities perceived in dream. Just as entities are perceived in dream and are unreal in the same way, entities are also perceived in the waking state and are therefore unreal-the common factor is "being perceived" (Dṛśyatva). For this reason "entities in the waking state are unreal" is the conclusion. The difference in waking and dream is that entities in dream are a) perceived within the body and
b) within a limited space .

The common factors are "Dṛśyatva" and "asatyatva". The wise therefore regard the waking and the dream states as the same on account of the well-known ground of "Dṛśyatva" (Grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva). The 6th Kārikā incorporates one of the central doctrines of Vedānta viz. "that which does not exist in the beginning and in the end is non-existent in the middle also. Such objects are illusory and though unreal they only appear as real". Gītā 2-16 lays down the same principle. Sat never becomes Asat and Vice Versa. Sat is Trikāla-abādhya. Gauḍapāda lays down another principle later on in GK 3-21 that the intrinsic nature of a thing never changes. There is a similar echo of this in Gītā ("Prakṛtiṁ yānti Bhūtāni" and "Prakṛtistwāṁ Niyokṣyati)". An objector would say that "objects in the waking state serve a useful purpose" but that usefulness in the waking state is contradicated in the dream—thus objects in the waking are illusory as they have an Ādi (in waking) and Anta (in dream) and Vice-versa. Sometimes unusually extraordinary objects are seen in the dream which are not met in the waking state but that is only the attribute of the local agent—the dreamer e.g. Dwellers in heaven have many hands, eyes etc. Even in the waking state a well-trained person going to another country sees extraordinary things on his way. In dream also, sometimes we imagine in mind and sometimes we perceive dream objects outside the mind—but both such internal things and external objects in dream are illusory. Similarly in Jāgrat also we sometimes imagine in mind and sometimes perceive objects outside the mind—but both such internal things and external objects in Jāgrat are similarly illusory as illustrated in the dream. The objector says "If every thing is illusory then is it all Śūnya—vacuity? who imagines these illusory objects in waking or dream states? The firm Siddhānta of Vedānta is given in reply—the self luminous Ātmā through his *Māyā* imagines *himself* various entities experienced internally or externally and *he alone cognises* them. Here the Vivarta-vāda is postulated. Ātmā is one and multiplicity is imaginary (Mithyā). It is due to Māyā. There is no other material (upādāna) except Ātmā. There is no other supervisor (Nimitta) like external

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Iśvara except Ātmā himself. There is no other support like earth for a potter except Ātmā. There is no real modification (Pariṇāma) but false (imaginary) modification (Vivarta). The Vedāntic illustration is the imaginaing by ignoance of a snake on a rope. A further implication of this doctrine is that knowledge and memory must have a substratum or Āśraya which is not the case with the school of Buddhists who postulate Nihilism. The authority for the above-mentioned doctrine is Vedānta i.e. the Upaniṣads. The order in which things are imagined by Ātmā is stated. Ātmā is Prabhu, turns his mind outward and imagines various worldly objects—steady and unsteady. First he produces in his mind a hazy image of objects unmanifested in name and form and then imagines them externally in a way fit for phenomenal worldly dealings. Those objects which are "cittakālas" i.e. remaining only as long as the thought exists and are in the mind (antaḥ) only as well as those objects which are called "Dwayakālas" i.e. which are the objects of recognition, which exist for an earlier and later period and which are "Bahiḥ" i.e. perceived externally by senses and are fit for worldly dealings and are therefore called conforming to two points of time; both these kinds of objects (cittakālas and Dwayakālas) are illusory or Mithyā. The special feature of the latter's being perceived externally by senses and becoming objects of recognition is not due to their being not imaginations. Dwayakāla = Bhedakāla = Pratyabhijñākāla = anyonyaparicchedya = Indriyakāla. Bhedakāla means Kālasya bheda - which are limited by mutually determined time. Thus both Cittalālas and Dwayakālas are imaginary-for even in dream we find some objects are Cittakālas and others are Dwayakālas and yet they are Mithyā. Objects perceived in the mind like mental impressions are unmanifested while objects perceived externally through sense organs like eyes etc are manifested. But this distinction of being manifested or unmanifested does not make them real; for the same is the case in dream also which are admittedly illusory. In dream there are internal sense organs (like eyes etc) and in Jāgrat there are external sense organs.Merely a variety of sense-organs cannot make any difference. But what is the root cause of imagination of subjective and objective entities which are related to each other as cause and effect? Reply is—Ātmā first imagines Jīva which is of the nature of cause and effect. On Ātmā who is pure, Jīva is imagined as a snake is imagined on a rope. Then for the Jīva are imagined various subjective and objective entities like Prāṇa etc. distinguished as Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala etc. Once Jīva is imagined, he is thereafter competent for all further imaginations- his memory is determined by knowledge that leads to further memory etc., and they become the cause and effect of one another in succession. Ātmā is imagined in various ways like a rope in the dark which is imagined as a snake or a line of water etc. As when the true nature of rope is ascertined, all imaginary illusions disappear, similar is the case with the conviction of undual Ātmā. Ātmā is imagined as Prāṇa and other infinite entities. This is all due to the Māyā of Luminous Ātmā by which he is deluded. The endless entities which are imagined as Ātmā are now illustrated. Such imagined entities—a few of them only are illustrated here—are believed

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

by those respective schools as real. The shools are mentioned according to Ānandagiri, Śaṅkara has writtern no Bhāṣya on these Kārikās 20-28 stating that it serves no purpose.

1) Prāṇa by worshippers of Hiraṇyagarbha and Vaiśeṣikas
2) Four Bhūtas (earth, water, fire and wind) by Lokāyatas
3) Three Guṇas (Sattva, Rajas-Tamas by Sāṅkhyas)
4) Three Tattvas (Paśu, Pati and Pāśa by Śaivas)
5) Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña by those believing in Pādas
6) Objects like Śabda etc. by Vātsyāyana
7) Three lokas (Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Swaḥ) by believers in Lokas
8) Deities like Agni, Indra etc. by followers of Vedic Devatākāṇḍa
9) Vedas by knowers of Vedas
10) Yajña by Baudhāyana and others
11) Puruṣa as enjoyer but not Doer
12) Objects of enjoyment by cooks
13) Believers in Truth as Sūkṣma
14) Gross body by Cārvākas
15) Personified God Śiva with Trident or Viṣṇu with discus
16) Vacuity (Śūnya) amūrta-by Vaināśikas
17) Time by Astrologers and Astronomers
18) Quarters (Dik) by those believing in omens through sound of birds and known as Swarodayavids.
19) Vāda or Kāla by those believing in magic
20) Believers in 14 Bhuvanas
21) Believers in Manas (Mind)
22) Intellect by Buddhists
23) Citta or Vijñāna by Yogācāras
24) Dharma and Adharma by Mīmāṁsakas.
25) 25 Tattvas of Sāṅkhyas
26) 26 Tattvas of Yoga of Patañjali
27) 31 Tattvas of Pāśupatas (Kalā-Niyati-Kāla, Avidyā and Rāga considered as included in Māyā of the 36 Tattvas of Śaivas)
28) Tattvas are infinite
29) Lokas i.e. Lokānurañjana by Laukikas
30) Āśramas by Dakṣa and others
31) Three genders by grammarians
32) Para and Apara Brahama by some
33) Real world creation by Paurāṇikas
34) Sustenance of world by Paurāṇikas
35) Destruction of world by Paurāṇikas
36) All these opinions, some stated and others unstated, are varieties of imagination—Ātmā is imagined in these various ways.

The reason behind all these is like this. Whatever entity a teacher presents to the pupil as Reality or Ātmā, the pupil sees that entity as Ātmā assumes the form of that entity and protects the pupil. Firm attachment to that entity takes

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

hold of that pupil and makes him solely engrossed in it. Even though Ātmā is not separate from these entities, Ātmā is imagined as if it were separate. One who knows this to be the real nature of things is alone entitled to interpret the true meaning of the Vedas. The wise see the whole universe as unreal like dreams, illusions or a city in the air. The ultimate Truth, therefore, is that there is no destruction or birth, no Jīva is either bound or seeking liberation. This Kārikā summarises the conclusions that follow from the authority of scriptures and reasoning. Infinite unreal Bhāvas like Prāṇa etc. which are not the ultimate Truth are imagined to be Ātmā but when the mind in Samādhi is not active and is steady, none of these Bhāvas are perceived. Therefore the objects which are apparently perceived when the mind is active cannot have a real existence from the point of view of ultimate Truth and Non-duality alone is the happiest thing. Multiplicity which is only imagined cannot be identical with Ātmā when examined in the light of Absolute Truth. Nor can multiplicity have an independent existence by itself. Being unreal it cannot be said to be either separate or non-separate. This is what is said by those who know the Reality. Sages who are free from attachment, fear or anger and have delved deeply into Vedas realise Ātmā as free from imagined attributes, as cessation of Prapañca and as non-dual. Having known Ātmā in this way one should fix Non-dual Ātmā in his memory and having realised non-duality he should behave in the world as if he is Jaḍa (dull-witted) (or not feeling anything). He should avoid praise, salutations, words like Swadhā (as in Śrāddha) etc. He should be a self-controlled ascetic, sometime imagining Ātmā as his support, at other times his changing body as his support and depend upon whatever is available by chance. Having seen the Truth internally (within the body) and externally (in the outside world) and having become one with Reality and taking delight in that, he should never deviate from that Reality.

Advaita Prakaraṇa—the third chapter.

The first chapter was Āgama-prakaraṇa. There Ātmā was stated as Prapañcopaśama and Advaya. And when Ātmā is known, duality does not exist. In the second chapter, unreality of duality was established mainly by reasoning on the grounds of Dṛśyatava and having Ādi and Anta. But if all duality is false, is there then Śūnya or vacuity? No. There is Advaya Ātmā and that is established mainly by reasoning in the Third chapter called Advaita. In the 2nd chapter, the conclusion was that all objects in duality including the devotee and the object of his devotion are illusory and therefore a Jīva who takes to the line of devotion and understands that his devotion is the means for attaining to liberation has only a poor knowledge of Reality; for he believes "I am the devotee, my object of devotion is Brahma. At present I am living in the Kārya Brahma who is born in a manifested embodied form as Saguṇa Brahma or personal God and after worshipping that manifested embodied Brahma, I shall, after the dissolution of body, attain to the unborn non-dual Brahma. Before creation everything else and myself were unborn." Those who know Brahma as eternal and unborn regard such devotee as a person of shallow intellect (Kṛpaṇa),

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Kena Upaniṣad says that "Brahma cannot be expressed by speech or thought or by mind—know that alone as Brahma, not one whom the people worship". For these reasons, Gauḍapāda says that he will describe unborn Brahma which is Akārpaṇya (non-pitiableness). It is without birth and maintains its sameness (unchanging nature) all throughout. It appears as being born but in Reality nothing is born. The Supreme Ātmā is subtle, partless and all-pervading like Ākāśa and is said to manifest itself into embodied Kṣetraja Jīvas as Mahākāśa (great space) manifests itself into Ghaṭākāśas (spaces enclosed in jars). Ātmā, further rises in the form of aggregates of bodies as Jars are produced from Ākāśa. This illustration explains the origination of Jīvas from Ātmā. The third Kārikā is to show that Advaita is not contradicting some of the Śruti texts which talk of merging of Jīvas into Ātmā. When Jars are destroyed, spaces enclosed in them merge in Mahākāśa, similarly Jīvas merge in Ātmā. But the dualist may object to this on the ground of different births, deaths, happiness, actions and their rewards. This contention is replied to by stating that connection of happiness etc. with different Jīvas is due to different Upādhis (limitations). When one Jar is connected with dust, other jars are not similarly affected. Ākāśa is only one, jars are the Upādhis. Similarly Ātmā is one but Upādhis of mind due to Avidyā cause multiplicity in Vyavahāra. Advaita is Absolute Truth but multiplicity is admitted as phenomenal Reality in Vyavahāra. The latter is due to Upādhis caused by Avidyā. From the Absolute point of view happiness, misery etc. are not connected with the attributeless changeless Advaita Ātmā. Śaṅkara, in the Bhāṣya, elaborately refutes the Sāṅkhya view of many Puruṣas and Vaiśeṣika view of Ātmā having attributes of Icchā etc. as also their doctrine of Samavāya.

After refuting the views of Sāṅkhya, Śaṅkara refutes the Vaiśeṣika views that desire, happiness, misery etc are the qualities of individual Ātmans joined to them by Samavāya Sambandha and that Ātmans are many etc. Śaṅkara attacks the very concept of Samavāya and establishes that there is only one Ātman and desire, happiness, miseries etc. are superimposed on Ātmā by Avidyā due to the Upādhi of Buddhi etc. and therefore there is no difficulty for Vedānta in explaining Bandha and Mokṣa. Form, function and name may differ here and there but Ākāśa is not thereby divided into parts; the same applies to Jīvas. Just as Ghaṭākāśa is neither the modification nor part of Ākāśa, similarly Jīva is not the modification or part of Ātmā. Only to the ignorant, the sky appears as soiled with impurities, similarly Ātmā appears impure only to the ignorant.

Ātmā in regard to births, deaths etc. in different bodies is similar to Ākāśa in Ghaṭākāśa, Maṭhākāśa etc. Aggregates like bodies, jars etc are like bodies in a dream and are put forth by Māyā (avidyā) of Ātmā. Jīva is the innermost Ātmā in the sheaths and he is like Ākāśa. Same Brahma is identified in each of the various pairs, adhidaiva and adhyātma in Madhu Brāhmaṇa of Bṛ. Up. Jīva and Supreme Ātmā are identical and non-dual. Their difference shown in Karma-kāṇḍa is not in a primary but Gauṇa sense. Multiplicity is censured in the Śruti (Bṛ. up. 4-3-23 etc.) Creation explained in Śruti in many other ways is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

only a device to make the intellect to ultimately grasp the identity of Jīva and Brahma. There are people of three varying levels of comprehension. Discipline of meditation is prescribed for middle and lower classes. Dualists are firmly set in their doctrines and contradict one another but our Ajātivāda feels no conflict with them. Advaita is the Ultimate Reality and Dwaita is only its effect. For dualists, duality exists both as real and unreal. We do not pick up quarrel with them. Advaita Reality becomes manifold through Māyā. If it is modified in reality, the immortal would become mortal. Some disputants postulate the birth of the unborn Ātmā but how can the unborn immortal Ātmā have the nature of mortality? The Immortal never becomes mortal and mortal immortal. Reversal of one's intrinsic nature never takes place. If the Immortal becomes mortal, the immortal nature is not natural or changeless. How can the subsequent merging into Brahma be changeless? Creation mentioned in Śruti texts can be either real or illusory but that alone is the true view which is the ascertained view of the Śruti and also corroborated by reason and no other, Śruti describes Ātmā as "not this" "not this". Indra appears many because of Māyā. The unborn Ātmā appears as born in many forms because of Māyā. By stating "not this not this" the śruti has negated all dualistic creation and this establishes the incomprehensible unborn Ātmā. The existent can have birth only through Māyā and not in reality—otherwise there would be Anavasthā. The non-existent cannot have a birth either through Māyā or in reality. In dream the mind vibrates through Māyā into appearance of duality—so also is the case with the waking state. All duality is perceivable by the mind. When the mind becomes non-mind (ceases to act) duality is not experienced. When the mind ceases to act, the Truth is comprehended. Mind ceases to be mind and free of cognition for want of any object to be cognised. Jñāna which is unborn and without imagination is itself Brahma, unborn and eternal. Working of the controlled mind, free from imagination, should be clearly distinguished from the mind in deep sleep. Mind in deep sleep is only temporarily withdrawn but the controlled mind is identical with all pervading illumined fearless Brahma. Brahma is unborn, sleepless, dreamless, without name and form, ever illumined, omniscient and nothing is to be done by way of disciplinary activity. Brahma is beyond speech and thought, calm, effulgent, unmoving and fearless. This is Asparśa Yoga, where there is no touch. It is difficult to be realised. Yogins are afraid of it where in fact there is no fear. Those yogins who have no Advaita darśana have to practise control of mind for fearlessness, knowledge, destruction of misery and peace. But control of mind is as difficult as draining the ocean with the help of a blade of grass. Mind is to be controlled when distracted with desires and enjoyment, also when in pleasurable sleeplike repose—for both Kāma and Laya are harmful. Constantly remembering that duality is misery, one should turn away from Kāma and Bhoga. By constantly thinking of unborn Brahma one does not see duality. When there is sleeplike repose, the mind should be awakened, when distracted it should be pacified. It should be known when getting dirty and should not be disturbed when in equilibrium. One should not relish pleasure when in Samādhi and with discernment remain free from attachment. When the steady mind tries to turn

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

out, it should be unified with effort. When there is no repose or distraction, mind becomes motionless, without imagined objects. Such a mind attains the nature of Brahma. It rests in the Self, peaceful with Nirvāṇa, is the highest bliss, identical with The Unborn, Knowledge and is omniscient. No Jīva is ever born, there is no cause giving birth to it. The highest truth is that nothing is ever born.

The Fourth Chapter - Alāta Śānti, quenching of fire brand.

Śaṅkara first gives the mutual relation and Saṅgati of the four chapters, Assertion of Advaita, predominently on the basis of śruti, is made by determining the meaning of AUM (1st chapter). That Advaita is established by proving the unreality of all differences appearing on account of external objects (2nd chapter). To dispel the doubt that Advaita too may be unreal, Advaita is established on the basis of śruti and reasoning (3rd chapter). Mutually contradicting views of opponents are refuted and Advaita is at the end proved by Āvita-nyāya (Vyatireka inference) (4th chapter).

Gauḍapāda in this chapter refutes the views of Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and the various schools of Buddhism and at the end reiterates the analysis of the three states (Jāgrat Swapna Suṣupti) as stated in the first chapter and re-affirming his Upaniṣadic siddhānta adds in 4-99 that these tenets are not expounded by Gautama Buddha. He perhaps deliberately uses some Buddhist terminology and arguments as this chapter is specifically addressed to those opponents whose views he is refuting.

In the Maṅgala verse in the beginning of this chapter Gauḍapāda salutes his Guru (Śuka) or Nārāyaṇa identified with Sky-like all pervasive Jñāna and who has realised all-pervasive-Jīvas-as that Jñāna nondifferent from Jñeya and Jñātā. Ānandagiri adds that this Jñāna was imparted to Gauḍapāda by Lord Nārāyaṇa at Badarikāśrama. In the next verse Salutation is made to the Śāstra teaching Asparśayoga which brings happiness and is beneficial to all. Some disputants like Sāṅkhyas are Satkāryavādins and some like Vaiśeṣikas are Asatkāryavādins. Their mutual dispute about Jāti (birth) establishes Ajāti as the Existent cannot pass into birth and the non-existent can never at any time pass into birth. We do not dispute with them and accept Ajāti indirectly established by them. Disputants desire to prove Jāti of the Ajāta entity but how can the Ajāta immortal Entity pass into birth? The immortal never becomes mortal or mortal immortal. The inherent nature (Prakṛti) never changes. Those in whose view the Ultimate Reality becomes mortal by passing into birth, how can their Mokṣa remain changeless which is acquired by performance of Karma? Inherent nature (Prakṛti) is either acquired by superhuman faculties, or is there along with the birth, or is not created or which does not change.

All Ātmans are by nature free from old age and death. Those thinking otherwise deviate from their true nature.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Refutation of Sāṅkhya.

Pradhāna is called Aja and Nitya but is split into Mahat etc. How can it remain Aja and Nitya! If Kārya is non-different from Kāraṇa,then Kārya becomes Aja like Aja Pradhāna (kāraṇa). If Kārya is born, how can its non-different Kāraṇa remain Aja? There is no illustration for a Nitya entity giving birth to an effect. In case an effect is born of another born entity, there would be Anavasthā. If an effect gives birth to a cause and cause to the effect how can any of them be anādi (beginningless)? If Hetu is the cause of Phala and Phala of Hetu, it would be like the birth of a father from the son. You must state the order of Hetu (cause) and Phala (effect). If both arise simultaneously there is no relation between them like two horns of a cow arising simultaneously. If your cause is born of effect, then how can the unestablished cause produce effect? You must state which one is first - cause or effect. As there is inability, want of knowledge or violation of order in the Sāṅkhya theory, the wise approve of the doctrine of Ajāti. The illustration of seed and sprout is itself in the category of Sādhya and cannot be urged to prove the Sāṅkhya theory. Want of knowledge of which is prior and which is posterior establishes Ajāti-otherwise, how can the antecedent cause of a born entity not to be known? The implication is that Jāti (origination) of entities is Māyika, Vyāvahārika only and not Pāramārthika. The conclusion is that nothing whatsoever is born—either from itself or another, whether it is existent, non-existent, or existent-non-existent. From Anādi Phala (Dharma adharma) Hetu (Dehādi) cannot be born and vice versa. An entity having no beginning cannot pass into birth. (Agreeing with sāṅkhya refutation of Vaiśeṣika, the Asatkāryavāda of Vaiśeṣika is summarily rejected).

Refutation of Buddhist School.

Bāhyārthavādin Buddhist argues that subjective cognition (Prajñapti) must have an objective cause (Nimitta, external object) because of diversity of cognitions and experience of pain etc. But Vijñānavādin Buddhist replies that subjective cognition has an objective cause when seen from the logical point of view but it is no cause when seen from the point of view of the highest Truth.

Mind does not touch external objects or its reflection. There is no real existence of external objects and reflection is not different from the mind. The mind does not come into contact with external objects for all the three times (i.e. at any time). There is no possibility of Anyathā-Khyāti. How can there be any causeless Bhrānti if there is no cause in the form of prior Abhrānti (real external objects somewhere, sometime)? Gauḍapāda accepts so far the argument of Vijñānavādin that "mind sees only the appearance of external objects" but says that it does not pass into any birth as asserted by Vijñānavādin. Those who think that the mind is actually creating external objects are only seeing the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

footprints of birds in the sky. Śūnyavādins are still worse, trying to grasp the sky in their hand. An Aja entity cannot be born as Ajāti is its inherent nature which can never change. If Saṁsāra is Anādi it will never end. If Mokṣa has a beginning, it will never be eternal. That which does not exist in the beginning and in the end is also non-existent in the present. Such objects are similar to illusions, Service - giving purpose of entities in Jāgrat is contradicted in the dream and vice versa. So entities in Jāgrat and Swapna having a beginning and end are only illusory. Objects in dream are within body in a limited space. The dreamer on waking is not at the place seen in the dream. Conversations in dream are found unreal on waking. Another body on bed is perceived as different from the dream body. Therefore objects seen in dream are unreal. Dream experiences are similar to waking experiences. Jāgrat is therefore called the cause of swapna. That being so, Jāgrat experiences appear real to the dreamer alone. For the enlightened, the birth of anything is not established. There is no birth of an unreal from the real. Unreal objects are seen in Jāgrat; with their impressions, same are seen in dream but sometimes, what is seen in dream is not seen in waking.

The unreal cannot be the cause of unreal nor can unreal be the cause of real. Real cannot be the cause of real, much less of unreal. Both in Jāgrat and Swapna, one comes in contact with inconceivable objects as if they are real, on account of want of discrimination. The wise preach the doctrine of Jāti (birth) as ordinary people are afraid of Ajāti and because of perception of external objects and their faith in the virtuous life. For those who are afraid of Ajāti and accept duality - the evil consequences are negligible (as they lead a virtuous life). Like an illusory elephant, entities are said to be real because of perception and behaviour like real objects. But Vijñāna has only the appearance of being born, moving and being a Vastu. Really vijñāna is Aja-Acala, Śānta and Advaya. Neither the mind nor the Ātmans are ever born. Those who know this do not fall in error. A fire-brand appears as straight crooked etc. Similarly vibrations of Vijñāna appear as perceiver, perceived etc. Like Alāta, vijñāna when not in vibrations presents no appearances. Appearances do not come in or go out of Alāta, they have no substance; same is the case of appearances in the case of Vijñāna - they are inconceivable. There is no Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva as Ātman is not a Dravya or Adravya in the Naiyāyika sense - Ātman is one Aja and there is no relation of Guṇa-guṇībhāva.

Thus there is no causality - appearances are not created by citta nor citta by those appearances. The wise have therefore accepted Ajāti. So long as one is hauted by the idea of cause and effect, there is Saṁsāra, not otherwise. Everything has only an empirical existence (Saṁvṛti) by Avidyā and that is not permanent. The Ultimate Reality is of the nature of Existence and there is nothing like destruction. Ātmans appear to be born by Māyā, not really. That Māyā also does not really exist. Dharmas are like illusory seed and illusory sprout - which are neither Nitya nor subject to destruction. Ātmans are Aja, we cannot call them eternal or non-e ternal as words cannot decribe them and so

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

there is no scope for discrimination. Both in Jāgrat and Swapna, Citta is non-dual but appears as dual. Ātmans are beyond speech and mind. What is perceived by speech and mind is not Paramārtha. All duality that appears and is subject of speech is non-different from Caitanya. Like in the dream, the waking man, his waking mind and objects seen by the waking mind are all one and the same. Citta and Jīvas are both objects of perception of each other. Both are devoid of characteristics which are means of correct knowledge - as one is cognised only through the other.

The conclusion is that no Jīva is ever born. The Ultimate Truth is that nothing is born (71).

Duality which has subject-object relation is only the vibration of the mind. Citta unrelated to any object is eternal and without attachment. That which exists in the imaginary phenomenal existence does not exist really. It may exist according to other schools. Ātman too is spoken as unborn from this imagined phenomenal experience as Ātmā cannot be so described. Man has only a persistent belief in duality which does not exist in reality. When this false persistence ceases, he is not born again. When the Citta is not associated with causes giving superior, middle or inferior births, there is no birth as there is no effect without a cause. Citta is Aja, free from cause, remains the same and is non-dual. Duality and birth are objects only perceived by the mind. This is the true causeless state of citta and when there is no other separate cause like Dharmādi one becomes free from grief, desire and fear. Having realised the absence of reality in those unreal objects, Citta attains purity and becomes unattached. When citta has turned away from objects and becomes unattached - this is Mokṣa of the enlightened - the state of Brahma, undifferentiated, birthless, non-dual. Brahma is Aja, sleepless, dreamless, self-blazing, always illumined from its very essential nature. Happiness is concealed on apprehension of duality and misery is manifested. The fourfold alternative theories of *Is, Is not, Is and is not* and *Is not Is not* with notions of *moving, steady, moving and steady* and *nothing nothing* - these theories conceal Ātmā. One knowing Ātmā as untouched by these theories is omniscient. This omniscience befits a true Brahmin. It is without Ādi-madhya-anta. There is nothing more to desire. This tranquility and control is the natural discipline of Brahmins.

Duality with external objects and their perception is Laukika (Jāgrat). Duality with perception but without external objects is Śuddha Laukika (Swapna). Duality without object and perception is Lokottara (sleep). Knowledge, objects of knowledge and the particular knowable are proclaimed by the enlightend. When knowledge and the threefold Knowables are known gradually there arises omniscience in a man of the highest intellect. One should know Heya, Jñeya, Āpya and Pākya. Except for Jñeya Brahma, the other three are perceived only by Avidyā. All Ātmans are by nature enlightened from the beginning and well ascertained. One having no need for further knowledge

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

attains immortality. By nature Ātmans are like sky, all pervading,-there is no multiplicity anywhere. From the beginning they are peaceful, unborn, ever liberated, same and not distinct from one another. This is Brahma unborn, same, pure. Those wandering in duality have no purity. They lower themselves and are known as Kṛpaṇas. Those firmly convinced of Aja, Sāmya Brahma are men of highest wisdom. Ordinary men do not know this. Knowledge does not cross over to Ātmans or Ātmans to knowledge. Both are identical. Knowledge is without attachment. If one entertains the slightest difference, there is no non-attachment and removal of veil concealing Ātma. All Ātmans are without veil and pure by nature. From the very beginning they are enlightened and liberated. They are described as "being realised" as they have the capacity for this highest knowledge. Knowledge of this all pervading enlightened one does not cross over to any entities and all entities also do not cross over to knowledge. This Śāstra of Ātmā, all pervading, unmoving, unchanging, partless, eternal, non-dual, unattached, unseeable, ungraspable, free from old age and death, the Brahma, without distinction of Jñātā, Jñāna and Jñeya - the Ultimate Absolute Ātma-tattva was not declared by Gautama Buddha and is to be known only in Vedānta.

This state is difficult to grasp, profound, aja Sāmya viśarada. Knowing it, we salute it as best as we can.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

KEVALA-ADVAITA (ABSOLUTE MONISM) OF ŚAṄKARA

The usually accepted date of Śaṅkara is A.D. 788 to 820. His doctrine, briefly stated, is that Brahman is the Reality, the world has apparent reality and the individual soul is non-different from Brahman and none other. The uniyerse is superimposed on Brahman like silver on a shell. Brahman is *Nirguṇa* (without attributes) and therefore cannot be described by words. The *śruti* therefore states that it is inaccessible both by mind and speech. Attributes like *Sarvajñatva* (it being omniscient) etc., are due to the *Upādhi* (conditioning) of *Avidyā* (ignorance). Individual soul, though really of the nature of *Brahma* appears by ignorance as if it is different from Brahman. The feeling of "I-ness" comes on account of the *Upādhis* (conditions) of mind, intellect etc. In sleep, the mind, intellect etc., are absorbed and therefore there is then no feeling of "I-ness". Similarly, in the state of liberation also, these various *Upādhis* (conditions) are completely absorbed and then too there is no "I-ness" left. *Jīva* being essentially of the nature of Brahman is one only and not many but pleasure and pain are distinctly experienced on account of the distinct internal organs *(Antaḥ-karaṇas).* Consciousness is all pervading *(Vyāpaka)* and it is the same as Ātman or Brahman.

The means to realise Brahman are stated in this order. By performing the duties of *Varṇas* and *Āśramas* as prescribed by the scriptures without desire for the fruits, the mind is purified. By *Karma* and *Upāsanā* only *cittaśuddhi* is attained as also concentration of the mind. But liberation can be had only by knowledge. The method is *Śravaṇa, Manana* and *Nididhyāsana*. There is no *Samuccaya* of *Karma* and *Jñāna*. The *mumukṣu* should have the fourfold qualification namely, (1) Discrimination between what is permanent and ephemeral; (2) Non-attachment to fruits of this or the other world; (3) *śama, dama* etc. and (4) the desire to be liberated. Then only one is qualified to know Brahman. The knowledge in error is indescribable *(Anirvacanīya Khyāti).*

The primary cause of the phenomenal world is *Ajñāna* (ignorance). When Brahman is associated with *Ajñāna*, also called *Avidyā* or *Māyā*, he is known as *Īśvara* (God). Brahman is of the nature of knowledge and not a knower with knowledge as its attribute, because it is *Nirguṇa*. Phenomenon is superimposed on transcendental Reality Brahman; it is called *Mithyā* i.e. having only phenomenal reality, not the ultimate reality. *Ajñāna* is not *Sat* (existing) as it disappears on one having knowledge and not *Asat* as there is its *Pratīti*, as both *Sat* and *Asat* cannot be together, *Ajñāna* is *Anirvacanīya* (indescribable). Truth or Reality is relative: ultimate *(Pāramārthika)* as of Brahman, phenomenal *(Vyavahārika)* as of the universe and illusory (as of dream).

Phenomenal reality is contradicted or arrested by the realisation of Brahman but Brahman is never *'bādhita'* at any stage; but the universe, even though ultimately in *Pāramārthika* stage, is unreal, does have reality in the phenomenal sense. Just as visions in dream are true so long as we are in dream

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

but appear false when we wake, similarly about the phenomenal world. The function of *Śāstra* is only to remove *Ajñāna,* thereafter Brahman which is self-luminous, shines of its own accord.

When Brahman becomes *Māyā-Śabala,* the universe is created by his thought. He creates, sustains and destroys. This *Lakṣaṇa* is called *Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa* but in reality Brahman is *Sat* (existence), *Cit* (consciousness) and *Ānanda* (bliss) only. This *Lakṣaṇa* is called *Swarūpa Lakṣaṇa.* In creation Brahman associated with *Māyā* is the material and instrumental cause. *Jīva* is not *Aṇu* but *Vyāpaka.* He has *samsāra,* and rebirth till liberation. In the *Mahāvākya 'Tat-twam-asi'* (That thou art) there is *Bhāga-Lakśana* (secondary meaning) where part of the meaning is retained and part is given up. The illustration is *Saḥ Ayam Devadattaḥ* (that is the same Devadatta as seen before). The fire of *Jñāna* destroys *Sañcita* and *Kriyamāṇa Karma* but not *Prārabdha.* Even a *Jīvan-mukta* has to suffer *Prārabdha* till he lives in the body and thereafter he becomes *Videha-mukta.*

Sources of knowledge are six, *Pratyakṣa* (Preception), *Anumāna* (inference), *Śabda* (scriptures), *Upāmāna* (comparison), *Arthāpatti* (implication) and *Anupalabdhi* (negation). Scriptural authority is the highest so far as all *Alaukika* matters are concerned. Other sources are helpful but secondary. There is *Vivarta* of Brahman into universe. *Vivarta* means change only in appearance. The famous illustrations are of rope appearing as serpent and shell appearing as silver. *Ātman* in waking, dream and deep sleep is respectively known as *Viśva, Taijasa* and *Prājña* and beyond these three states he is known as *Turīya.* This is with regard to *Vyaṣṭi* (individual); when considered in the aggregate or collectively, it is known as *Vaiśvanara, Hiraṇyagarbha, Īśvara* and *Brahman.* Just as *Maṭhākāśa* and *Mahākāśa* are essentially one, similarly *Turīya* (Ātman) and Brahman are one. *Śruti* describes *Nirguṇa, Nirvikalpa* Brahman by *Neti Neti* (negatively), Ātman or Brahman is called *Kūṭastha Nitya. Māyā* or *Ajñāna* is non-different from Brahman, *Māyā* has three qualities of *sattva; rajas* and *tamasa* and it is the primary cause of the universe. Brahman is the *Adhiṣṭhāna* (substratum). In *Mukti* there is no difference of *Jīva* and *Brahma.* There is complete Bliss. Phenomenal world is unreal—being *jaḍa, Dṛśya,* limited, having change etc. Brahman is beyond all this and is the ultimate reality.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

VIŚIṢṬA ADVAITA (QUALIFIED MONISM) OF RĀMĀNUJA

Rāmānuja was born in A.D. 1027 and is said to have lived for 120 years. His is a religious view and his system is known as *Śrī-Sampradāya.* His is a philosophy of a personal God called Viṣnu or Nārāyaṇa who is Brahman. Individual souls (called *Cit*) and nature (called *Jaḍa* or *Acit*) stand in relation to Lord Nārāyaṇa as his adjectives or body. The system is based on the *Prasthānatrayī, Pañcarātra Āgamas,* devotional songs of Alvars, and *Viṣṇu* and *Bhāgavata Purāna.* The relation of the Lord to *Jīva* is described in five ways: (1) as substance and attribute; (2) as controller and controlled; (3) as supporter and supported; (4) as whole and part and (5) as end and means *(Prakārī-Prakāra, Niyantṛ - niyamya, Ādhāra-ādheya, Amśī-amśa* and *Śeṣin—Śeṣa).* Brahman i.e. *Nārāyaṇa* qualified by *Cit* and *Acit* is the only reality.

This *Nārāyaṇa* is free from defects or bad attributes *(Heya guṇas)* and possesses all auspicious attributes like omniscience, compassion, love etc. He possesses a heavenly body and is easily accessible to devotees. The Lord is not only *Jñāna Svarūpa* but has also *Jñātṛtva* (is knower and has also the attribute of knowledge). God and souls both are substances and also have attributes. God by *Svarūpa* (nature) is *Kūṭastha nitya,* but when qualified with *Cit* and *Acit* is *Pariṇāmī nitya.* Both God and souls have an inseparable attribute called *Dharma- bhūta-jñāna* apart from their being a substance. This attribute changes into various forms, but not the substance. Thus there is no real change in God. In this way Rāmānuja avoids the defect in *Naiyāyika's* pure *Pariṇāma-vāda.*

Jīva and *Jaḍa* are distinct from God. Thus there are three *Tattvas.* Rāmānuja accepts the *Satkāryavāda,* the twentyfive principles of *Sāmkhya* and the *Yoga* method of concentration but *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are not the cause of the world but these two are subordinate and dependent on the Lord. This *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* is distinct from the Lord and has three qualities of *Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.* The Lord is the material and instrumental cause of the universe. *Jīvas* are many, they are *Aṇu* and not *Vyāpaka.* There is no *Mithyātva* (unreality) of the world as in the *Śaṅkara* system. There is *Sat-khyāti* and not *Anirvacanīyakhyāti. Pradhāna* really changes into the world like milk into curd and the world is real. Even in the shell and silver illustration and in dreams, the objects are real according to Rāmānuja. *Śāstra* is real and gives *Tattvajñāna.* Sources of knowledge are only three: perception, inference and *Āgama.* After knowing *Karma,* there can be *Brahma-Jijñāsā.* As a result of the *Mahāvākyas* like *Tat-tvam-asi* etc, the *Upāsanā* becomes strong and stabilised and thereby the Lord is pleased with the devotee. But there is no *Mukti* so long as one is living. There is no *Jīvan-mukti* according to Rāmānuja. After *Prārab dha* is enjoyed, the body falls and the devotee gets a divine body and thereby he enjoys *Sāmya* (equality) with the Lord and this is *Mukti.* There is no identity

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

with the Lord. The individual souls retain their distinction from the Lord Nārāyaṇa—Viṣṇu—Vāsudeva. The Lord is all-pervading, transcendent as well as immanent. When the Lord is associated with subtle *Cit* and *Acit,* He is the material cause and when He makes special *Samkalpa,* He becomes the instrumental cause. He is the inspirer and giver of fruits according to *Karma,* still *Udāsīna,* inner controller *(Antaryāmin)* and *Bhaktilabhya. Jīva* is conscious, self-luminous, dependent on the Lord, happy, eternal, and separate in each body. *Jīva* is of three kinds: the bound *(Baddha),* the liberated and the *Nitya.* From *Brahmā* to a worm all are bound; the liberated have no *Prākṛta* subtle body, they stay in *Vaikuṇṭha* with the Lord and are possessed of eight qualities. *Nitya Jīvas* have complete knowledge; they are Ananta, Garuḍa and others. They serve the purpose of the Lord and can take *Avatāras* also. They, from the beginning, have no bondage of *Samsāra.* There is distinction of status in *Nitya Jīvas* but not so in *Mukta Jīvas.* The latter do not take any *Avatāra.* The power of creation etc., is with the Lord alone. *Jīva* is *Kartā, Bhoktā* and of the nature of bliss. He gets a body of five elements but he himself is the body of the Lord. He moves in *Saṁsāra* with *Liṅga deha* and has rebirths, but in *Mukti* he is free from *Liṅga deha* and rebirths. *Jagat* is beginningless, *Karma* is an accessory of *Jñāna.* As in *Saṅkara-Vedānta, Sādhana catuṣṭaya* is not necessary. *"Neti Neti" Śruti* means that the Lord has no *Heya* qualities. *Bhakti* is worship—devotion. *Karma* and *Jñāna* are the causes of *Bhakti. Sādhanā Bhakti* leads to *Prapatti,* complete surrender and dedication to God. *Māyā* does not mean illusion but the power of God. There is fivefold manifestation of God: (1) as *Nārāyaṇa;* (2)as *Vaikuṇṭha,* His abode; (3) as *Antaryāmin;* (4) as *Avatāras;* incarnations and (5)as *Vigraha* (idols). *Nārāyana* has various forms called *Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha.Kaiṁkarya,* service of God, leads to *Prapatti.* Rāmānuja says that *Mokṣa* is nothing but eternal service to God *(Nitya-kaiṁkarya-prāpti). Jīva* must make himself fit for acceptance of God. *Avidyā* is concealing from our view the true nature of God. God is supreme, adorable, personal, compassionate and loving. He is the enjoyer of sacrifices and austerities. He is the great Lord of all the worlds. He is the friend of all creatures. When the *Jīva* attains *Mukti,* his knowledge expands. God is the internal controller *(Antaryāmin)* and abides in the heart of every body. Limbs of God and *Vaikuṇṭha* are called *Nitya-vibhūti.* Faith leads to *Bhakti, Jñāna* of God's various attributes leads to *upāsanā,* that produces love for God. *Teṅgalai* (southern) school of this *sampradāya,* has greater regard for the *Tamil Prabandhas,* while the *Vadagalai* (northern) school accepts both the Sanskrit texts and *Prabandhas* as equally authoritative. Rāmānuja believes in *Jñāna-Karma-Samuccaya.* As he accepts Tamil *Prabandhas* also, his system is known as *Ubhaya-vedānta. Bhakti* is defined as *Snehapūrvam Anudhyānam*—meditation with love. It is active intellectual devotion with love.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

DWAITA (DUALISM) OF MADHVA

Madhva is said to have been born in A.D. 1199 and lived for 79 years; according to another view he flourished between A.D. 1238 and 1317. His system is unqualified dualism. Madhva believes in five great distinctions *(Bhedapañcaka):* (1) between God and *Jīvas;* (2) between God and matter; (3) between *Jīvas* and matter; (4) between *Jīva* and another *Jiva; and* (5) between one matter or part and another. He insists on three kinds of faith: (1) in the *Prasthānatrayi,* (2) in the interpretation of Madhva and, (3) that Madhva had his mission entrusted to him by God. He is regarded as the third *Avatāra* of *Vāyu*—the first being Hanumān, the second Bhīma and third Madhva. According to him God is only the *Nimitta Kāraṇa,* and not *Upādāna* (material) *Kāraṇa.* His philosophy is theistic to the core. God is Nārāyana. He is a personal God and not an abstraction. There is a hierarchy among deities. First is Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu), second is His consort Lakṣmī and third as Vāyu who is the prophet and anything coming to God should come through Vāyu. God creates the *Jagat* out of *Prakṛti.* God takes in his belly the *Mahat* and other elements and enters the *Brahmāṇḍa.* From his navel was born *Brahmā,* then other deities and then the mind; in due course was created, *Avidyā* which has five *Parvas—Moha, Mahāmoha, Tamisra, Andhatamisra* and *Tamas. Avidyā* is further divided into four parts—*Jivācchādikā etc. Avidyā* attaches to individual *Jīvas. Jagat* is not *Mithyā* as in the system of Śaṅkara but very much real. Madhva and those who followed him later have very strongly attacked the *Māyāvāda* and *Mithyātva* of Śaṅkara. Like Rāmānuja he does not believe that God is the *Upādāna Kāraṇa.* He also does not believe that *Cit* and *Acit* are the bodies of God. Just as there is *Tāratamya* among deities, all have not the same status—similarly all souls are not qualified for *Mokṣa.* God condemns some, and redeems some. In *Mukta Jīvas,* liberated souls, also there is *Tāratamya* (distinction) in their bliss *(Ananda).* He takes the entire *Vedic* and *Puranic* literature as authoritative for purposes of interpretation and he relies more on *Purāṇas* than on *Prasthāna-trayī. Pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge) are three: Perception, inference and *Agama. Veda* as a whole is authoritative. Brahman is described in *Upaniṣads* as *"Ekam Eva Advitīyam"*—it means Brahman is unsurpassed in excellence, without equal, since it penetrates everywhere. Attributes of Brahman are absolute and without any limitation. Brahman is Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu; Lakṣmī is His Consort; dependent on Him is His creative energy and is the intelligent *Prakṛti.* God rules over *Jīvas* and matter but does not create them from nothing and reduce them into nothing. God takes into account the *Karma* of *Jīvas* but is not dependent on it. *Jīvas* are many and every space is filled with them. *Jīva* is an active agent, with responsibility to suffer, but is also dependent on the guidance of God. *Jīva* is *Aṇu,* God is all-pervading. *Vāyu* mediates between God and *Jīvas.* Madhva is described as son of God *(Hareḥ Sutaḥ).* His system comes in conflict with many scriptural passages monistic in nature and he is obliged to twist their meaning. The *Mahāvākya 'Tat-Tvam-Asi'* according to him means *Jīva* is the essence of God, or is similar

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

to God or it is *"Saḥ Ātmā Asat Tvam Asi"*. *"Ayam Ātmā Brahma"* is simply eulogy of *Jīva* or is only for meditation or is *Pūrva-Pakṣa*. *Atmā* is *Brahma* because *Atmā* is *vardhamāna* (increasing). There cannot be any identity of *Jīva* with Brahman. "A King punishes those who pose like a king and gives the desired thing to those who sing his glory". *God is Satyakāma* and therefore His creation *Jagat* is also *Satya*. It is because of the *Viśeṣas* that we have *Bheda* (distinctions). *Viśeṣas* are infinite. *Jñāna* produces dependence on and love for God. Sound and strict moral life is necessary for *Mokṣa*. Moral rules have to be obeyed without desire, By *Bhakti* God is pleased, showers His grace and gives the *Abhīṣṭa*. God has infinite and limitless *Śakti* and *mokṣa-sādhanā* is pure service to God in the form of devotion. *Bhakti* is defined as strong and the highest love for God knowing His greatness. Grace of God is essential and is proportionate to devotion. *Jīva* is freed only when he departs from the body. *Jīvan-mukti* is not possible. On liberation *Jīvas* assume bodies of *Śuddha-sattva*. There is birth according to *Karma* and also *Punarjanma*. *Mukti-yogya Jīvas* are of five kinds—*Deva, Ṛsi*, Pitṛ, *Cakravartin* and men. God i.e. Nārāyaṇa or Puruṣottama alone is *Vedya*. The entire drift of all Vedas is on *Śrīpati Hari*. Madhva recommends Aṅkana (mark like *Cakra* etc. on the body), *Nāmakaraṇa* (naming a relative with any one of the names of God) and *Bhajana*. By following the various *Sādhanās*, even the *Asura Jīvas* can have *Mukti* gradually *(Krameṇa)*. Madhva relies on those Upaniṣadic passages like *Dvāsuparṇā* etc., where distinctions are mentioned e.g., *Chāndogya* 8-12, *Bṛh*. 4-37, *Muṇḍaka* 3-1-1, Praśna 4-9 and *Śvetā*. 1-9.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

ŚUDDHA-ADVAITA (PURE MONISM) OF VALLABHA

Vallabhācārya flourished in the 15th century A.D. (1473-1525). His philosophy is called Śuddhādwaita—pure non-dualism—i.e. without *Māyā*—called pure, because according to him the *Prapañca* or universe is not *Māyā* i.e. illusory as in the system of Śaṅkara but *satya* i.e. real. In addition to three well-known *vedānta Prasthānas* viz. *Upaniṣads, Brahma sūtras* and *Gītā*, he bases his philosophy on *Bhāgavata* which he considers as the *Samādhi-bhāṣā* of Vyāsa and thus the highest authority. His *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtras* is called *Aṇu-bhāṣya* and as it was left incomplete by him, it is said that his son Viṭṭhala completed it. He is said to have written a *Bhāṣya* on *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* also. His commentary *Subodhinī* on *Bhāgavata* is available only on 1, 2, 3, 10 *skandhas* and 4 *Adhyāyas* of 11th *skandha* and one verse of the 5th *skandha*. He has also written *Tattva-dīpanibandha* in 3 chapters and sixteen small *Prakaraṇa granthas* called *Ṣoḍaśa-granthas*. He is also said to have written several other works.

After Vallabha, his son Viṭṭhala and in his line Puruṣottama Goswāmī (1668 A.D.) and several others greatly enriched the *sampradāya* literature. *Puruṣottamji* in his *Prakāśa* on Vallabha's *Aṇubhāṣya* gives a comparative study of various earlier *Bhāṣyas*. Gopeśwara, Mathurānāth, Lalubhaṭṭa and others have also made notable contribution.

Brahma is *sat-cit-ānanda* and It alone is the Supreme Reality. It is *Rasātmaka*, having form, blissful, all pervading, having all attributes, omniscient, having contradictory qualities and is devoid of ordinary common attributes. By its own desire It created the universe. Brahma is both the instrumental and material cause of *Jagat*. Even though there is *pariṇāma* from Brahma there is no *vikāra* in Brahma i.e. this is *Avikṛta-pariṇāma vāda*. *Jagat* is *satya* and not illusory as in *Śaṅkara vedānta*. *Prapañca* is *Satya*. According to Śaṅkara, *Jagat* i.e. *Prapañca* is *Māyika*-illusory ephemeral; the appearance of *Jagat* is due to *Bhrānti*-error. This doctrine is rejected by Vallabha. Brahma has all kinds of attributes-even contradictory attributes and this is the *"Bhūṣaṇa"* and not *"Dūṣaṇa"* for Brahma. Brahma's *kartṛtva* (being a creator) is *Swābhāvika* (natural) and not *Māyika* (illusory). Vallabha accepts *Avikṛta-pariṇāma- vāda* and his illustrations are *Kāmadhenu, Kalpavṛkṣa* and *Cintāmaṇi* etc; while Śaṅkara believes in *Vivartavāda* (false transformation) and not *Pariṇāmavāda (real transformation)*, *Jagat* is the *Ādhibhautika* form of Brahma, *Ākṣara* Brahma is the *Ādhyātmika* form of Brahma and *Pūrṇa Puruṣottama* is the *Ādhidaivika swarūpa* of Brahma according to Vallabha. *Para Brahma* is *Puruṣottama* and in Him *Sat, Cit* and *Ānanda* are fully manifested. In *Akṣara* Brahma *Sat* and *Cit* are fully manifested *(Avirbhūta)* but *Ānanda* element is a little concealed *(Tirohita)*—i.e. *Ānanda* is not *Āgaṇitānanda* but *Gaṇitānanda* in *Ākṣara* Brahma. In *Jagat* only *Sat* element is manifested but *Cit* and *Ānanda* elements are concealed *(Tirohita)*, *Jīva* is the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

'Aṁśa' of Brahma and is *Aṇu* (atomic) but when the *Ānanda* element is manifested, *Jīva* becomes *Vibhu*. The non-difference *(Abheda)* of *Jīva* and Brahma mentioned in *"Tat twam asi"* simply means that just as ornaments of gold are not different from gold, so too *Jīva* is not different from Brahma. Brahma, as *Kāraṇa* of *Jagat* is real, therefore its *Kārya Jagat* is also real. *Jagat prapañca* is *Satya*-real—but *Saṁsāra* which is made up of *Ahaṁtā-mamatā* is unreal. *Karma* is the *Adhibhautika path, Jñāna* is the *Ādhyātmika path* but *Bhakti* is the *Ādhidaivika path*. As a result of *Karma-mārga*, one has to suffer births and deaths in *Jagat prapañca*. As a result of *Jñāna-mārga*, one gets absorbed in *Ākṣara*-Brahma but *Bhakti-mārga* is the best and its reward is the *Sahabhāva* with *Ādhidaivika Para Brahma Puruṣottama* and enjoyment of His *Kṛpānanda*. Those *Jīvas* who are absorbed in the *Akṣara* Brahma can also by *Bhagawadicchā* be graced and can come back to enjoy His *Kṛpānanda*. There does remain some distinction- difference—between Puruṣottama and those enjoying this *Kṛpānanda;* without this difference, it is not possible to enjoy this *Kṛpānanda*. *Jnānī Jīvas* are absorbed in *Akṣara* Brahma but this condition is a little inferior as there is no *Bheda* for enjoying *Kṛpānanda*. *Dwaita prapañca* is real but *Bheda-dṛṣṭi* or *Dwaita—Jñāna* is *Mithyā*-unreal. This *Mārga* is called *Puṣṭi-mārga*. *Puṣṭi* is the *Anugraha* of *Bhagawān* who is Puruṣottama. *Puṣṭimārga* is attainable only through the *anugraha* (grace) of *Bhagawān* it does not require any other *Sādhana* or means—this *Puṣṭi* or grace alone is capable of doing everything. The Phala is *Bhagawat Prākaṭya* and for that *Prema-Lakṣaṇā Bhakti* is necessary. This *Parā Bhakti* can blossom through *Navadhā Bhakti* and other *Sādhanas*.

Brahma has *acintya* powers *(Śaktis), Māyā* is Brahma-*Śakti* remaining in Him and capable of creating anything. Vallabha treats the *Pūrva Kāṇḍa* and *Uttara Kāṇḍa* of *Veda* as one *Śāstra*. In addition to *Upaniṣads, Gītā* and *Brahma- sūtras,* Vallabha considers Śrīmad-Bhāgawata as the 4th and the Superior *Pramāṇa*, being the *Samādhi-bhāṣa* of Vyāsa. By *Jñānaniṣṭhā,* one can have *sarvajñatā,* by *dharmaniṣṭhā* one can have *cittaprasannatā*. But by *Bhaktiniṣṭhā* one can have *Kṛṣṇa-prasannatā*. In *Kali* age, the last one is the best *mārga*. By *Brahma-sambandha* one gets the *Adhikāra* of *Bhagavat-Sevā*. Our best *Gurus* are the *Gopīs* whose love for *Kṛṣṇa* was supreme.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Māṇḍūkya is the shortest among the ten famous Upaniṣads, having only 12 mantras and here *AUM* is described, for purposes of meditation, as representing the same *Akhaṇḍa* (undivided) and constant *Caitanya* which is called *Vaiśvānara* or *Viśva* in the waking state (*Jāgrat*), *Taijasa* in the dreaming state (*Svapna*) and *Prājña* in the sleeping state (*Suṣupti*) and (the fourth) called *Turīya* as the transcendental Reality which is represented by *Amātra* (the Soundless Immeasurable) after the three letters A, U and M of *AUM*. This symbol *AUM* is described from the point of view of the name (*Abhidhāna*), i.e., *AUM* and also from the point of view of the nameable (*Abhidheya*), i.e., *Brahma*. The *Akhaṇḍa Caitanya* in these four stages (*Jāgrat, Svapna, Suṣupti* and *Turīya*) is represented by A,U,M, and *Amātra* (the Soundless Immeasurable).

The *Ṛṣi* of this Upaniṣad is Māṇḍūkya, of the family of Maṇḍūka. The word Maṇḍūka also means a frog. A legend says that sage Vasiṣṭha once recited the hymn of Rain and on hearing it, the frogs were delighted. The Sage was pleased and blessed them saying that there would be *Ṛṣis* in their family. This is the explanation of the name of sage Māṇḍūkya. There is another meaning also assigned to the word Maṇḍūka. There is one slow way of imparting knowledge which is like the slow gait of an ant (*Pipīlikā*) but this Upaniṣad imparts knowledge quickly and like the jumping gait of a frog (Maṇḍūka). This is another explanation how frogs are connected with this Upaniṣad. The purpose of this Upaniṣad is to show that the transcendental reality *Brahma* is the same constant *Turīya* in the three states of waking, dream and sleep.

On this Upaniṣad, there are 215 Kārikās which according to *Advaita Vedānta* of Śaṅkara are composed by Gauḍapāda in four chapters called *Āgama, Vaitathya, Advaita* and *Alātaśānti*. This Gauḍapāda Ācārya is considered as the teacher's (Govindapāda's) teacher of Ādi Śaṅkara and the line of teachers (*Guru-paraṁparā*) in this *Saṁpradāya* is stated to be in this order :—

Lord Nārāyaṇa, Brahmā, Vasiṣṭha, Śakti, Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka, Gauḍapāda, Govindayatīndra, Śaṅkarācārya and the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

latter's four (principal) disciples Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka and Sureśvara (the author of Vārtikas). According to Ānandagiri who has written a commentary on *Śāṇkara-Bhāṣya* on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda Kārikās, Lord Nārāyaṇa imparted the knowledge contained in these Kārikās to Gauḍapāda at the Badarikāśrama in the Himālayas and Gauḍapāda thereafter summarised that knowledge in these Kārikās. He was called Gauḍapāda as, according to Bāla Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī, he belonged to the Gauḍa country and as he was a wandering recluse, his original name was forgotten and he therefore came to be known as Gauḍapāda and that he flourished in the *Dvāparayuga*—thereby connecting him with his legendary teacher Śuka, son of Vyāsa of the *Mahābhārata* fame.

According to Śāṅkara *Saṁpradāya* all these Kārikās on the 12 mantras of this Upaniṣad were composed by Gauḍapāda in four chapters (29 + 38 + 48 + 100 = 215 Kārikās).

But the Ācāryas like Rāmānuja, Madhva and others believe that the 12 mantras along with the 29 Kārikās of Āgama chapter thereon are part of the Upaniṣad proper and therefore authoritative as Śruti while the other three chapters containing (38 + 48 + 100 = 186) Kārikās are of Gauḍapāda and are not authoritative according to their respective Schools.

Gauḍapāda rejects causality, i.e., *Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* between *Brahma* and the universe. In other words, there is no causation from the transcendental point of view and therefore he proclaims *Ajāti-vāda* (non-creation); he rejects the four alternative theories with respect to the nature of *Brahma* or *Ātmā* (called the *Catuṣkoṭi-Nyāya*) referred to in 4-33 and declares in 2-32 that the Absolute truth (*Paramārthatā*) is that where there is no destruction or birth, no bondage, none desirous of liberation or none liberated. Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* on these 215 Kārikās tries to show that there is no difference between his view and that of Gauḍapāda. Ānandagiri explains in detail the *Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya* on these Kārikās; Śaṅkarānanda (of Śaṅkara School) has written his *Dīpika* on the 12 mantras of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. According to Sadāśiva-Brahmendra and also his commentator, Gauḍapāda refuted the views of the Buddhists and defeated Ayārcya, the teacher of Śākya king Prāvṛti and other Buddhists. Gauḍapāda rejects several theories about creation in 1-7 to 9 as also several views about the ultimate cause in 2-20 to 28. He refutes all the Buddhist

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Schools and proclaims that *Vijñāna*, i.e., *Ātma* is eternal. Gauḍapāda has accepted certain Buddhist words and arguments; he has also used the arguments of one School against the other refuting each School with the arguments of the other. But he clearly distinguishes his philosophy from those of all the Buddhist Schools. For him, *Ātmā* is not *Śūnya* or *Kṣaṇika* but *Sāt* and not *Anitya* but *Nitya*—*Aja*, *Amṛta*, *Apūrva*, *Anantaa*, Abāhya and *Anapara by nature*.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANIṢAD

WITH ŚĀṄKARA-BHĀṢYA

Invocation for Peace

ॐ भद्रं कर्णेभिः शृणुयाम देवाः भद्रं पश्येमाक्षभिर्यजत्राः ।
स्थिरैरङ्गैस्तुष्टुवांसस्तनूभिर्व्यशेम देवहितं यदायुः ।।
ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ।।

Om, Bhadraṁ Karṇebhiḥ Śruṇuyāma devāḥ Bhadraṁ paśyema akśabhir yajatrāḥ.

Sthirairangaistuṣṭuvāṁsastanūbhiḥ vyaśema devahitaṁ yad yuḥ.

Om Śāntiḥ Śāntiḥ Śāntiḥ.

Translation

Om, O Gods! Let us be capable of performing sacrifices (*Yajatrāḥ*) and hear auspicious sounds with our ears and see auspicious forms with our eyes; with strong (steady) limbs and body and remaining prayerful, let us spend our God-given life. directing our minds to (only) auspicious things.

Aum Peace, Peace, Peace!

Śaṅkara's two Invocatory Verses

प्रज्ञानांशुप्रतानैः स्थिरचरनिकरव्यापिभिर्व्याप्य लोकान्
भुक्त्वा भोगान्स्थविष्ठान्पुनरपि धिषणोद्भासितान्कामजन्यान् ।।
पीत्वा सर्वान्विशेषान् स्वपिति मधुरभुङ्मायया भोजयन्नो
मायासंख्यातुरीयं परममृतमजं ब्रह्म यत्तन्नतोऽस्मि ।।

prajñānānśupratānaiḥ, sthiracaranikaravyāpibhirvyāpya lokān bhuktvā bhogān sthaviṣṭhān punarapidhiṣaṇodbhāsitān kāmajanyān. pītvā sarvān viśeṣān svapiti madhurabhungmāyayā bhojayanno māyāsaṁkhyāturīyaṁ paramamṛtamajaṁ Brahma yattannato'smi.

Translation

Prajñāna Brahma pervades all movable objects (like men) and immovable objects (like trees), i.e., *Lokān* with Its rays (i.e., *Cidābhāsas Jīvas*) and experiences gross pleasures and pain (*Bhogas*) (in the waking state); thereafter (*Punarapi*, i.e., when *Dharma* and *Adharma* which are the cause of *Jāgrat* are reduced

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

and *Dharma* and *Adharma* which are the cause of *Svāpa* arise) It experiences (in the dream state) objects projected by intellect and impressions (*Buddhi* and *Vāsanā*) which result on account of desire (action and ignorance). Then it absorbs within itself all (gross and subtle) objects (of these two states) and enjoys sweet bliss in the sleeping state and in this way makes us experience (these three states) through Its *Māyā* (i.e., connecting us as it were with these three unreal—*Mithyā*—states through Its *Māyā*); to that (*Prajñāna*) *Brahma* who is the highest (*Para*), immortal (*Amṛta*) and unborn (*Aja*) and who is designated as the fourth (*Turīya*, as compared with the three states) on account of *Māyā* I offer my obeisance.

Comments

Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (of Atharvaveda) has 12 mantras. Gauḍapāda, called Paramaguru of Śaṅkara, has written 215 Kārikās thereon. Śaṅkara has written his *Bhāṣya* on both this Upaniṣad and Kārikās. Ānandagiri, also called Ānandabodha, has critically explained the *Bhāṣya*, lucidly bringing out the meaning and implication of every single word or sentence of the *Bhāṣya*. We have used here the Ānandāśrama Edition.

According to Ānandagiri, Gauḍapāda received the knowledge revealing the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad from Lord Nārāyaṇa at Badarikāśrama and thereafter he composed thereon his 215 Kārikās in four chapters called *Āgama*, *Vaitathya*, *Advaita* and *Alātaśānti*.

Śaṅkara here makes invocation, following the practice of the wise people and indirectly suggests also the four indispensable links of the work (called *Anubandhas*) like *Adhikārin*, *Viṣaya*, *Saṁbandha* and *Prayojana*. By offering obeisance to *Brahma* who on account of the three unreal states becomes the enjoyer, Śaṅkara suggests the subject of the treatise (*Viṣaya*) which is the identity of *Tat* and *Tvaṁ* (Supreme Soul and Individual Soul). Reference to *Brahma* also becomes a *Mangalācaraṇa* in itself—as the Holy name of *Brahma* is mentioned. *Brahma* is described as *Aja*, *Amṛta* and *Para* which suggests that in reality there is no cycle of births and deaths (*Saṁsāritva*) for *Brahma* and therefore cessation from *Saṁsāra* (which is due to Ignorance only) is the purpose of this treatise (*Prayojana*). A person desiring that cessation is the *Adhikārin*; and the *Saṁbandha* of the treatise is that of the theme and the treatise which expounds that theme (*Pratipādya-Pratipādaka*).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Conception of multiplicity in the form of *Iśvara*, *Jīva* and *Jagat* is all imaginary—*Kālpanika*—due to *Māyā*; therefore, it is stated that *Jīvas* are only *Cidābhāsas* (*Aṁśavaḥ*) of *Brahma* who is called *Prajñāna* (of the *Mahāvākaya*, "*Prajñānaṁ Brahma*"). *Brahma* is *Prakṛṣṭa Jñānarūpa* (*Prajñāna*) as distinguished from ordinary *Jñāna* as in that highest *Jñāna* all distinctions of *Jñātā*, *Jñāna* and *Jñeya* disappear.

Jīvas are called *Aṁśavaḥ*, i.e., *Cidābhāsas* reflections of *Brahma*, like the reflections of the Sun. Just as *Pratibimba* (reflection) is non-different from *Biṁba* (original image), similarly *Jīvas*, i. e., *Cidābhāsas* are non-different from *Prajñāna Brahma*. *Lokān* means *Viṣayān* (objects), *Bhogān* means experiences of happiness and pain. The three states (of *Jāgrat*, *Svapna* and *Suṣupti*) and the *Jīvas* are all *Māyāvī* (*Mithyā*) and are unreal. They are imagined in or superimposed on Pure *Brahma*. Even though Brahma is called *Māyāvī*, really speaking It is the Highest, Immortal and Unborn.

Brahma is *Vyāpta* (pervaded) in all objects as rope is pervaded in the serpent which appears in place of rope by error.

Error (*Brahma*) is of two kinds—*Sopādhika* and *Nirupādhika*. In *Sopādhika Bhrama*, the deceptive appearance persists to appear even after one obtains the knowledge that it is deceptive appearance only, e.g., there falsely appears a vaultlike surface and a greenish colour in the sky but it persists to appear in that way even though we know it to be false.

Similarly, in the case of a *Jñānin* who has obtained the true knowledge of Brahma, the universe continues to be perceived even though unreal. In *Nirupādhika Bhrama* (error), the deceptive appearance vanishes when the true knowledge of the substratum is obtained, e.g., a rope ceases to appear as a serpent when seen with the aid of a lamp. The *Bhrama* (error) in the case of the Supreme Reality is *Sopādhika Bhrama*. The deceptive appearance (*Pratīti*) persists even after the true knowledge.

Paramamṛtamajaṁ can be split up in two ways:

(1) *Paraṁ*, *Amṛtaṁ* and *Ajaṁ* or

(2) *Paramaṁ*, *Ṛtaṁ* and *Ajaṁ*

Here, *Paraṁ* and *Paramaṁ* mean the same thing. *Ṛtaṁ* means the Divine Truth.

In the first verse, Śaṅkara has stated that *Prajñāna Brahma* has itself pervaded every object—both movable and

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

immovable—with its *Cidābhāsas* and experiences *Bhogas* through the imagined (*Kalpita*) three states. Here *Tat* (*Brahma*) is described as identical with *Tvaṁ* (*Cidābhāsa Jīva*). Thus we come from *Tat* to *Tvaṁ* in this verse which is called a description which is *Vidhi-mukha*, i.e., *Brahma*, the ultimate reality is positively described as distinct from the three imagined states (*Jāgrat*, *Svapna* and *Suṣupti*) and called *Paraṁ*, *Amṛtaṁ* and *Ajaṁ*.

In the next verse, the same thing is described in a *Niṣedhamukha* way where *Tvaṁ* is described as *Tat*, the changeless *Brahma*. *Tvaṁ* realises that distinctions (*Viśeṣas*) are unreal and are to be given up—(*Sarvān viśesān hitvā*) and that *Tvaṁ* is the same as *Turīya Tat* and without qualities connected with the three states (*Vigata-guṇa-gaṇaḥ*). *Hitvā*, i.e., giving up or discarding is indicative of the *Niṣedha-mukha* description.

यो विश्वात्मा विधिजविषयान् प्राश्य भोगान् स्थविष्ठान्
पश्चाच्चान्यान् स्वमतिविभवान् ज्योतिषा स्वेन सूक्ष्मान् ॥
सर्वानेतान्पुनरपि शनैः स्वात्मनि स्थापयित्वा
हित्वा सर्वान्विशेषान्विगतगुणगणः पात्वसौ नस्तुरीयः ॥

yo viśvātmā vidhijaviṣayān prāśya bhogān sthaviṣṭhān paścāccānyān svamativibhavān jyotiṣā svena sūkṣmān. Sarvānetān punarapi śanaiḥ svātmani sthāpayitvā, hitvā sarvānviśeṣānvigataguṇagaṇaḥ pātvasau nasturīyaḥ.

Translation

That (*Tvaṁ*, i.e., self-evident pure Intelligence or Consciousness) who is *Viśvātmā* (soul of the gross universe, which is called its *Virāt* Body and who fancies that the waking state is his real own) directly experiences the various *Bhogas* (objects of senses like sound, etc.), which are caused by virtuous or sinful activities (*Vidhija*) and which are extremely gross (i.e., perceived by the external sense organs); thereafter this very *Pratyagātmā* (Individual Soul) with the help of his own light, experiences other subtle *Bhogas* born of his own mind (i.e., when the *Karma* to be enjoyed in the waking state is reduced and the *Karma* to be enjoyed in the dreaming state arises he enjoys with the help of his own light and through his internal organ, memories and impressions) born of his *Mati*—mind—(which is activised by ignorance, desire and acts. Here this *Pratyagātmā* is known as *Taijasa*); further, he gradually deposits all that within himself (i.e., when

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

this *Pratyagātmā* is tired on account of his moving in these two states of waking and dream and he deposits all those gross and subtle objects of experience into his own *Ajñāta* (unknown) causal self); and becomes mainly *Avyākṛta* (unmanifested) and is called *Prājña* of the sleeping state. But when correct (authoritative) knowledge arises in him, he discards all those objects and realises that he is without all those qualities (like *Antahprajñā*, *Bahiḥ-prajñā*, etc., associated with the dream, waking and sleeping states) and that he is the fourth (i.e., qualityless, unconditioned, entire Supreme Soul). May this *Turīya* protect us (give us liberation and knowledge which are the means (*Sādhana*) of *Mokṣa.*

Comments

Pratyagātmā is called *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* in the three states of waking, dreaming and sleeping; and *Turīya* when after correct knowledge he realises that he is identical with the Supreme Soul. In *Jāgrat* he fancies himself as the enjoyer of the gross world which is *Pañcīkṛta* (i.e., when there is permutation and combination of the five elements to produce various gross objects of the universe). In *Svapna* he fancies himself as the enjoyer of the subtle world which is *Apañcīkṛta* (i.e., when the five elements are still uncombined and are in their subtle form). *Vyaṣṭi* is the individual while *Samaṣṭi* is the aggregate which is made up of *Vyaṣṭis* and both are of the same substance, e.g., a tree is *Vyaṣṭi*; a forest is all the trees taken collectively and is called *Samaṣṭi*. *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, *Prājña* and *Turīya* in *Vyaṣṭi* are *Virāṭ*, *Hiraṇyagarba*, *Iśvara* (or *Avyākṛta*) and *Brahma* when thought of as in *Samaṣṭi*. The three states of *Jāgrat*, *Svapna* and *Suṣupti* are called *Sthūla*, *Sūkṣma* and *Kāraṇa* (or *Avyākṛta*). They are represented for meditation by the three letters, *A*, *U* and *M* respectively. *Turīya* is the Soundless Immeasurable after *AUM*. The *Upāsanā* (meditation) prescribed in Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is of two types—*Vyasta*, i.e., separate individual letters *A*, *U*, *M* and *Samasta*, i.e., all the three letters *A*, *U*, *M* taken collectively.

Some people interpret the first verse of Śaṅkara as that for the treatise of Kārikās and also as Mangala for removing impediments, while the second verse as that for the theme of Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad which describes *Brahma* as distinct from the three unreal and fancied states. Some believe that the first verse is part of the Kārikā treatise, but that is not correct as there

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

is no *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on that verse. Some say that the first verse pays obeisance to *Brahma*, while in the second verse, there is a prayer in the nature of Bhakti (seeking liberation and *Jñāna*) both for *Para-devatā* and *Apara-devatā* by approaching through a qualified Ācārya.

Ānandagiri states that the first three lines of the second verse are in *Mandākrāntā* metre while the last line is in *Sragdharā* metre but that this should not be considered a defect—we can call it *Gāthā chanda.*

* * *

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya (Introductory)

This treatise having four chapters begins with the word *AUM* and it is being commented upon. It summarises the substance of the science of Vedanta and is called *Prakarana.*

(Any work dealing with all aspects and incidental topics keeping in mind one particular end, is called Śāstra but both Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Kārikās thereon satisfy only the definition of *Prakaraṇa* which deals with only one part of Śāstra and is useful for the Śāstra in some other way. Here Śāstra is Vedānta. Its substance is the identity of the Individual Soul and the Supreme Soul; and it is useful to the Śāstra in some other way as it summarises (*Saṅkṣepa*) that substance (*Sāra*). Therefore this treatise is a *Prakaraṇa* beginning with the word AUM and is now begun.) As this treatise is only a *Prakaraṇa* of the Vedānta Śāstra, its theme, connection of the theme with the Treatise and purpose, being the same as those of the Vedānta Śāstra, need not be specifically stated here, as they should necessarily be the same as those for that Śāstra. But for a person (like me) desirous of commenting on this *Prakaraṇa* treatise, they deserve to be briefly stated.

(Śāstra here is Vedānta. Its aim is to: (a) decide the qualifications of the person studying it; (b) approach the proper teacher; (c) mention the two entities, *Tat* and *Tvaṁ* and prove their identity; (d) remove all doubts; (e) find means of obtaining their knowledge and (g) the reward, goal or fruit thereof. The essence of this Śāstra is the identity of *Jiva* and *Brahma.*)

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

This Śāstra (or *Prakaraṇa* Treatise) generates *Brahmajñāna;* and this *Brahmajñāna* has a useful purpose (reward

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

of *Mokṣa*); thus *Brahmajñāna* stands in between Śāstra and *Mokṣa*; therefore the special *saṁbandha*, theme and purpose of *Brahmajñāna* can also be called the special *saṁbandha* theme and purpose of this Śāstra indirectly and through the intermediation of *Brahmajñāna*. (*Sambandha* of the Śāstra is the connection of the theme with the treatise which expounds it—the *Pratipādya* and *Pratipādaka* relation; the theme being the identity of *Jiva* and *Brahma*.)

But what is the purpose (goal) of this Śāstra? We reply to that question. (The goal which is *Mokṣa* is the real nature of *Ātmā* which is *Nitya* and therefore always with *Ātmā* but the Śāstra shows the means which remove the impediments in realising that *Mokṣa* and therefore the means prescribed have their utility).

Just as a person attacked by a disease, when cured, is restored to his normal state of health, similarly when the (illusory) world of duality ceases to affect the *Ātmā* who fancies himself as unhappy, the normal state of *Ātmā* is regained.

Comments

The healthy condition of a person before the onset of disease is his own inherent natural condition not different from his normal self and the same manifests itself on the removal of the impediment of disease when scientific medical treatment is given. Here, the medical means are not useless as they remove the impediment of disease; at the same time, the healthy condition manifesting itself thereafter is only his normal, inherent natural self—not any transitory newly acquired thing. Similarly, in the case of *Ātmā* also, the means, i.e., *Brahmajñāna* for *Mokṣa* are not useless, as the said means remove the impediment of Ignorance and then *Ātmā's* eternal inherent, natural, normal state manifests itself of its own accord. This normal condition of *Ātmā*, being always there, is really speaking not created by any means—it is always there; the means only remove the impediment. As in the case of the illustration (person attacked by disease), it is so in the case of *Ātmā*. *Ātmā*'s essential state is all bliss but *Ātmā* superimposes on himself unhappiness by connecting himself with ego and the manifold world born of Ignorance and feels himself unhappy; but when a merciful teacher instructs him about the *Mahāvākya* and when with the knowledge of the non-dual self, duality ceases and the impediment of *Avidyā* is removed, his permanent natural normal self manifests itself of its own accord. This

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

normal condition, which was always there and would ever be afterwards, is not newly created; it always was and is all bliss without any unhappiness, non-different from *Brahma* and is his essential nature. But the Śāstra has also its purpose; it is not useless as it is useful in removing the impediment of *Avidyā*; at the same time the *Ātmā* is complete in himself at all times and eternal and on removal of impediment manifests his essential nature of his own accord.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

To realise non-duality of Brahman is the purpose. The world of duality is caused by *Avidyā* and when correct knowledge removes *Avidyā*, there is cessation of the world of duality; therefore, for the elucidation of this correct knowledge of *Brahma*, this treatise is begun.

Comments

If the ego and the world of duality were eternal, they could not be removed by any kind of knowledge—perhaps it may be argued that they may be removed by the performance of daily and occasional religious rituals—but this cannot be as the ego and world of duality (though unreal) appear as real on account of *Avidyā* only and therefore they could only be removed by the correct knowledge of *Brahma*.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

That the world of duality is due to Ignorance (*Avidyā*) is proved by the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śruti and other Śrutis which say "That state in which there is as it were (*Iva*), a world of duality, where there appears as it were anything else, there one sees another and one knows another. But where, as in the case of one, everything has verily become *Ātmā*, how can one see another or know another?"

Comments

In the Śruti passage, the word *Iva* (as it were) is used; this shows that duality is in appearance only and is not real, and is therefore due to only *Avidyā* (ignorance of the nature of *Ātmā*). But when the correct knowledge arises, when the doer, instruments of doing and all else are realised as *Ātmā* alone, and not different from *Ātmā*, i.e., where by the correct knowledge the world of duality is known to be as *Ātmā* alone, at that time there is cessation of the "cause and effect" duality and there arises realisation of the fact that the world of duality was due to *Avidyā* which ceases on the arising of cor-

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

rect knwoledge—e.g., a serpent seen by error in place of a rope ceases to so appear when there is correct knowledge of the rope. By other Śruti passages is meant such other Śruti passages like "Here there is no duality". "All modification is only a name arising out of speech." Duality is the counterpart (*Pratiyogī*) of absolute non-existence abiding in the substratum *Brahma*. (*Adhiṣṭhānaniṣṭha—atyantābhāva—Pratiyogitvaṁ*).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The aforesaid discussion proves the utility of this *Prakaraṇa* treatise which has four chapters. The subject matter of all the four chapters is now stated. Of this *Prakaraṇa* treatise, the first chapter is for determining the meaning of *AUM* based chiefly on the authority of Vedic texts, which serves as the means of obtaining the correct knowledge of the Reality which is *Ātmā*. The first chapter of this treatise is by way of exposition of Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and is mainly based on that Vedic text and here argumentative reasoning is not mainly resorted to. It describes the means of obtaining the *Jñāna* of the Reality that is *Ātmā*, i.e., the essential nature of *Ātmā* without the superimposition of the unreal duality is *Him*. This *Jñāna* and liberation is the *Phala* (end to be achieved) and by the determination of the meaning of *AUM*, this knowledge of Reality arises incidentally.

The second chapter of this treatise is for establishing the unreality of the world of duality by logical reasoning (viz., the universe is *Dṛṣya*—object of sight—is impermanent, etc.) Just as when the illusion (doubt) of serpent, etc., on a rope is removed the true nature of rope is realised, similarly when knowledge of duality ceases, non-duality is realised.

The third chapter is intended to establish the truth of non-duality by logical reasoning as it may be argued otherwise that just as duality is unreal, similarly even non-duality too may be unreal.

The fourth chapter is for refuting the non-vedic views opposed to this view establishing the truth of non-duality by proving their falsity with the help of their own arguments and on account of their mutually contradicting each other's position.

But how do you say that the determination of the meaning of AUM is the means of realising the true nature of *Ātmā*? (This doubt arises as by the knowledge of one object we do not have the knowledge of another object unless we prove

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

their concomitance.) The reply given is that we establish the means of realising *Ātmā* through AUM on the basis of Vedic texts and not by ordinary *Anumāna* and *Vyāpti*. The Vedic texts are as follows :—"This is *AUM*" (i.e., *Brahma* is realised by *Lakṣaṇa* (indication) through *AUM* as it is very near *Brahman*. It is like *Śākhā-candra Nyāya*. The moon very near behind the branch of a tree is indicated by pointing out the branch as the moon. Similarly, when one meditates on *AUM* in *Samādhi*, *Brahma Caitanya* shines up. That is why determination of AUM is the means of realising *Brahma*).

(The sacred text says) This *AUM* is the best support (like a symbol; just as an image is a symbol of Viṣṇu, similarly AUM is a symbol to be resorted to as support for the purpose of meditation.) (Another text says) Sage Pippalāda, in Praśna Upaniṣad, instructed Satyakāma by stating "Oh Satyakāma if one meditates on *AUM* as *Para* or *Apara Brahma* that becomes the means of realising *Para* or *Apara Brahma*."

(Another text says) By uttering the word AUM, one should join onself with *Atma*, i.e., when one, in *Samadhi*, makes a fusion of gross A into subtle U, and that into causal M and finally all that into *Pratyagātmā* which is beyond cause and effect—this procedure becomes the means for *Brahma-jnaāā*.

(Another text says) AUM is *Brahma*. (By what is known as *Bādha Samānādikaraṇya* one should realise that what is called AUM is really the nearest *Brahma*. Just as when we tell a person that what he was seeing and thinking of as a stub is really speaking a man.)

(*Bādha-Samānādhikaraṇya*—when in the same location, two contradictory object are mentioned and when the literal sense of one is negated and the opposing literal sense of the other is affirmed, e.g., this stub is man. Here literal sense of stub is negated and the opposing literal sense of man is affirmed, i.e., what appears as stub is not a stub but is a man).

(Another text says) *AUMkāra* alone is all this. (Just as *Brahma* is the substratum of all, so AUM too is the substratum of all. Both have this common characteristic. *Ādi* after Śrutis implies another Śruti. "*AUM* is ALL THIS").

Objection :—There is illusoy appearance of *Prāña*, etc, in the *Ātmā*. Therefore, *Ātmā* is their substratum. But how can *Aumkāra* be the substratum of all? Just as *Ātmā*'s consciousness continually throbs (shines) in *Prāṇa*, etc., similarly

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Aumkāra has not such continous shining as substratum in all.

Reply :—Just as rope, shell, etc. are the subsratum of illusory appearance of serpent, silver, etc., in the same way *Ātmā* being the highest Reality is the substratum of illusory appearances of *Ātmā* and in the same way, all the extensive display of speech having for its objects of expression *Prāna* etc., has for its substratum *Aum* only (For the Chāndogya text says that all speech is pervaded by *Aumkāra* and therefore *Aum* is aptly called the substratum of all speech).

Objection :—If that is so, then there will be two Substrata—one *Ātmā* and the other *Aumkāra.*

Reply :—*Aumkara* is *Atma*'s own form. *Aum* is the expression of *Ātmā* and *Ātmā* is expressed by *Aum.* All extensive display of speech is but the modification of *Aumkāra* and it names or expresses the *Prāṇa*, etc., which are the illusory appearances of *Ātmā*, and these *Prāṇa.*, etc which are expressed by words are not different from their names or expressions which express them. (All words of expressions are only *Aumkāra* as *Aum* pervades all speech. Thus it is said that *Aum* is everything, as expression *Aum* and the expressed *Ātmā* are not different. The name and the nameable are one only. In this way, when the name and the nameable are one, the nameable object does not remain distinct from name and there does not remain two distinct things like the name and the nameable (*Viṣaya* and *Viṣayin*) and ultimately only one entity, devoid of subject object-relationship, of distinction (of the name and the nameable is established and all modifications are found as unreal). Therefore the scripture says, "All modi. fications arise from speech and are (nothing but) a name only.

Objection :—But if all modifications are unreal, how can *Aumkāra*, the unreal, be the means of knowing *Brahma*?

Reply :—The Śruti text says that "All these (modifications) are held together by the cord in the form of speech related to *Brahma*, the specific names being the strands of that cord." Another text says, "All common and specific objects are made possible for mundane experience by names only..."

(In this way, as all objects are known by intellect through names, and as all speech is only *Aum* (being pervaded by *Aum*) and as this *Aumkāra* by its secondary or indicative sense is the means of knowing *Brahma*—it is appropriate that the author now begins the first *Āgama* chapter of this treatise).

(Having established the general purpose of the first chapter, the Śruti text is cited in support) and therefore it is said :—

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

KĀRIKĀ—ĀGAMA PRAKARAṆA

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—First Mantra

हरिः ॐ। ओमित्येतदक्षरमिदं सर्वं तस्योपव्याख्यानं भूतं भवद्भविष्यदिति सर्वमोंकार एव। यच्चान्यत्त्रिकालातीतं तदप्योंकार एव ॥ १ ॥

Hari Oṁ. Omityetadakṣaramidaṁ sarvaṁ tasyopavyākhyānaṁ bhūtaṁ bhavadbhaviṣyaditi sarvamoṁkāra eva. yaccānyattrikālātītaṁ tadapyoṁkāra eva. (1)

Translation

Hari Aum. Aum is the word that is all this (universe). A clear and explicit exposition of this (*is now begun*); all that is past, present and future is *Aum* only. Even that which is beyond this threefold conception of time is also *Aum* alone.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

It is said (by Śruti) that all kinds of objects, expressed by names, are not different from the said names which are not different from *Aumkāra*; therefore, all this (universe) is *Aumkāra* alone. Similarly, the highest (cause) *Brahma* is realised through the means of the name (*Aum*) indicating the nameable (*Brahma*). For this reason, that (Brahma) is also *Aumkāra* only. (Ātmā who is consciousness alone, is beyond the cause and effect relationship and there is in *Ātmā* no distinction of naming words and the nameable object. *Ātmā* therefore cannot be *Aum* in the literal sense; but *Ātmā* can be realised through *Aum* by *Lakṣaṇa*, i.e., by its indicative sense; this word *Aum* is thus of the same nature of the higher and lower *Brahma* and therefore this treatise now begins a clear and explicit exposition of this *Aum*. The word *Upavyākhyāna* means clear and explicit exposition and the sentence in the Upaniṣadic text should be completed by adding "now is begun".

Aum is the means for realising *Brahma* and is therefore nearest to *Brahma*. (Further) everything which is conditioned by the triple conceptions of time like past, present and future is all *Brahma* by the same logic. And all that is beyond this triple conception of time and yet known only from its effects such as *Avyakta* (unmanifested), etc., and which is unconditioned by time is also *Aum* only. (The same logic means that the thing to be named and its name are one. According to Advaita Vedānta everything is only the illusory manifesta-

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

tion of one Supreme Reality *Ātmā* and therefore the Chāndogya text says that everyting is but name only. The names have their substratun in *Aum* and *Aum* is *Brahma* as explained earlier. *Avyākṛta* (unmanifested) is *Ajñāna* with reflection of *Brahma* (*Sābhāsa Ajñāna*) which is indefinable (*Anirvācya*). The word *Ādi* after *Avyakta* means *Sūtra*, i.e., *Ātmā* having the nature of a string. *Avyakta*, etc., is beyond time as it is called even the cause of time and thus cannot be conditioned by time, e.g., Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says that Sūtra existed even before *Saṁvatsara* (time).

(The Śruti text has already indicated that as the name and its nameable thing both are imagined in *Brahma* and are therefore one; in spite of this, why should it further say 'all this is Brahma?' The reply is as under).

Even though the name and its nameable thing are one, the Śruti has first described the position by giving prominence to name when it said "All this is the word *Aum*." Now the Śruti after giving importance to the name is now describing the same matter by giving prominence to the thing signified by the name—this is done to make us realise that the name and the thing signified by that name are one; otherwise (if only the first statement is made) it would mean that the knowledge of the nameable thing is dependent on name and therefore it may be suggested that the oneness of the name and the nameable thing is only stated in a metaphorical sense. The reason for knowing this oneness of the nameable thing and the name is to dissolve simultaneously with one single effort both the nameable thing and the name so that *Brahma* which is other than both of them can be realised. (For this reason, the Śruti has stated the same proposition in a reverse manner also. The unity of the thing and its name is in the primary and not in the secondary sense—it is for the purpose of realising *Brahma*, realising which one becomes blissful. This very thing is later expressed by the Śruti by stating that "the *Pādas* are the letters of the word *Aum* and the letters of the *Aum* are the *Pādas* (quarters)."

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Second Mantra

सर्वं ह्येतद्ब्रह्मायमात्मा ब्रह्म सोऽयमात्मा चतुष्पात् ॥ २ ॥

sarvaṁ hyetadbrahmāyamātmā brahma so'yamātmā catuṣpāt. (2)

Translation

All this is verily *Brahma*. This *Ātmā* is *Brahma*. This *Ātmā* has four quarters.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

(After describing the unity of the thing and its name the Bhāṣyakāra quotes the Śruti) that all this (cause and effect) is *Brahma*, i.e., all which was stated as *Aum* only—that is this *Brahma*. That *Brahma* which was described (as identical with all) in an inferential manner is now being specifically pointed out directly as "This *Ātma* is *Brahma*". By "this *Ātmā*" is meant that which is described as divided into four quarters (viz., *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, *Prājña* and *Turīya*) and pointed out, with a gesture of the hand, as idential with one's innermost self—"this *Ātmā* (is *Brahma*)". (The gesture is by touching the heart with the hand). This very *Atma* who is designated by *Aumkāra* is both *Para* and *Apara* and has four quarters (*Pādas*) or feet (*Ātmā* is *Para* as the invisible substratum of everything and *Apara* as one's innermost self (*Pratyagātmā*) and established in the form of cause and effect as the *Ātmā* of everything. *Ātmā* is here said to have four quarters or *Pādas*; He is so fancied as having four *Pādas* for better realising the nature of *Ātmā*).

These four *Pādas* are not like the four feet of a cow but they are like four fractions of a coin called *Kārṣāpaṇa*. (It is like having fractions of a coin for practical commercial affairs and not like four feet of cow—as *Ātmā* cannot have feet—*Ātmā* is *Niṣkala*). *Ātmā* is described here as having four quarters (*Pādas*), viz., *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, *Prājña* and *Turīya* and one has to dissolve each former one into the latter and ultimately realise *Turīya*. For the first three *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*, the word *Pāda* is to be derived as *Padyate Anena* and used in the sense of *Karaṇa*"—instrument. In the case of *Turīya Pāda* is to be derived in the sense of *Karma*, objective case—as *Padyade* the object achieved is *Turīya*. (The first three—*Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are the *Sādhana*—means—and *Turīya* is *Sādhya* the object to be achieved).

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Third Mantra

जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः
स्थूलभुग्वैश्वानरः प्रथमः पादः ॥ ३ ॥

jāgaritasthāno bahiṣprajñaḥ Saptāṅga ekonaviṁśati-mukhaḥ sthūlabhugvaiśvānaraḥ prathamaḥ pādaḥ. (3)

Translation

The first quarter is *Vaiśvānara* whose sphere of activity is the waking state (*Jāgarita*), who cognises external objects,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

who has seven limbs, nineteen months and who experiences gross objects (*Sthūlabhug*)

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

(*Ātmā* is *Niravayava*—without any parts—how can *Ātmā* have even two, much less four feet or four parts like fractions of a coin? The reply is that one has to fancy these four quarters as a means to realise *Turīya*. In reality there are no parts or *Pādas* in *Ātmā*. Keeping this in mind the Bhāṣyakāra now proceeds to explain the first *Pāda*).

Jāgarita-sthānaḥ : One whose sphere of activity is the waking state (i.e., one who misconceives as relating to himself all objects of the waking state).

Bahisprajnah : One whose awareness is of objects other than himself (objects which are not *Ātmā*; awareness is known to be internal but that awareness, i.e., consciousness (which is his own nature and is not really reflected in external objects as it does not need external objects to shine; as a matter of fact there is absence of outward objects) only appears, as it were, related to external objects on account of *Avidyā* (ignorance).

(According to Gauḍapādācārya, the consciousness which is one's own nature has in reality no external objects; when on account of ignorance it becomes *Buddhi-Vṛttirūpa*—as modification of *Buddhi*—then only it becomes related to external objects. But even then also it does not really experience external objects; for that modification of consciousness itself does not really take place and all external objects are merely imagined. Therefore that modification of consciousness as external object is only *Prātibhāṣika*—existing only in appearance).

(*Viśva* who is called *Saptāṅga* is now explained as described in Praśna Upaniṣad and this *Viśva* (*Ātmā* in the waking state) is identified with *Vaiśvānara*, the *Ātmā* of the universe, in the manner explained hereafter). *Saptāṅga* means one having seven limbs. The Upaniṣad text says, "Of this *Ātmā* who is *Vaiśvānara*, the *Ātmā* of the universe. *Saptāṅga* means one having seven limbs. The Upaniṣad text says, "Of this *Ātmā* who is *Vaiśvānara*, the luminous region is the head (i.e., the *Dyuloka*, the shining sky is in place of the head. The sun having manifold forms (i.e., colours like white, yellow, etc.) is the eye.

The wind which has the nature of moving in various directions is his breath. *Sandeho Bahulaḥ* means that *Ākāśa*—

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

ether—with the quality of extensiveness is the middle part of his body; his Kidney is *Rayi* (water which is the cause of *Rayi*, i.e., food); earth (which has the quality of support) is his feet (and the food that will first come is the oblation); this is the imagery of the *Agnihotra* sacrifice and the *Āhavanīya* fire (which is one of the three fires of *Agnihotra* sacrifice) is described as the mouth and in this way the imagery of the seven limbs is completed. These are the seven limbs of *Viśva* (identified with the universal *Ātmā Vaiśvānara*).

Similarly, he (*Viśva*) has nineteen mouths. They are the five organs of the intellect (*Buddhīndriyāṇi*, viz., ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose); five organs of action (*Karmendriyāṇi*), viz., speech, hand, leg, anus, genital organ); five kinds of *Prāṇa* (i.e., vital breath like *Prāṇa Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna* and *Samāna*); and mind (*Manaḥ*), intellect (*Buddhi*), egoism (*Ahaṁkāra*) and the mind-stuff (*Citta*)—these nineteen are as it were his mouths—not real mouths but they are the instruments of experiencing external objects. (The word *Upalabdhi* is intended to include *Karma* also. *Mana* and *Buddhi* are well-known instruments of *Jñāna*, i.e., *Upalabdhi*, *Karmendriyas* are instruments of *Karma*. *Prāṇas* are indirectly the instruments of both *Jñāna* and *Karma*. *Manas* and *Buddhi* are the common instruments everywhere. *Ahaṁkāra* is also an instrument indirectly like *Prāṇas*. *Citta* is the instrument for the rise of the reflection of *Caitanya* (A.G.).

Vaiśvānara who is thus characterised by the above mentioned qualities and who experiences the gross objects like sound, etc., through the instruments like ear, etc., as explained earlier, is called *Sthūlabhuk*—one who experiences gross objects. (Organs like the ear, etc., are graced by deities of the organs like *Dig, Āditya*, etc., and comprehending the objects like sound, etc., by organs like ear, etc., is the grossness of those objects).

(*Vaiśvānara* means one who leads all creatures in various ways, or he is all beings (the different creatures experience pleasure or pain according to their meritorious or evil acts and this *Vaiśvānara* is the giver of the rewards of their acts—that is why he is called *Vaiśvānara*).

Viśvānara is the same as *Vaiśvānara* by applying the *Taddhita* termination "*an*" which is applied to a word without changing its meaning. The creatures are many and yet he is designated in the singular as he is the *Ātmā* of all the beings

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

as seen in the aggregate in the sense of *Samaṣṭi* and also called *Virāt.* (In this way *Vaiśvānara* can be explained as in *Karmadhāraya Samāsa*) This *Vaiśvānara* is the first quarter. (Even though *Vaiśvanāra* of the waking state arises after the *Taijasa* of the dreaming state) *Vaiśvānara* is here called first because the subsequent quarters are realised after knowing this *Vaiśvānara* (This first place given to *Vaiśvānara* is from the point of view of *Laya* the point of view of absorption from waking into dream state, etc., and not from the point of view of *Sṛṣṭi* arising from sleep into dream and then into waking states. This is the sense).

(The Mantra starts by describing *Pratyagātmā*—the individual self and how is it that the seven limbs of the universal soul (*Adhidaiva*), viz., *Dyuloka* as head, the Sun as the eye, etc., are mentioned in connection with this *Pratyagātmā*? The Bhāṣyakāra says:—) How is it that when the Mantra starts discussing the four quarters of *Pratyagātmā,* by saying "this *Ātmā* is *Brahma*" and then mention is made of *Dyuloka* as the head, etc., with reference to this *Pratyagātmā*? We reply that this statement is not faulty.

The purpose is to describe that the entire *Pañcīkṛta* phenominal universe including that of Gods (*Adhidaiva*) has four quarters from the standpoint of Ātmā as *Virāt.*

Comments

The intention is to state that there is no *Bheda*—difference—between *Adhyātma* (individual) and *Adhidaiva* (relating to Gods). Thus the first quarter mentioned in connection with *Viśva* is also of *Virāṭ,* the totality of Gross universe, i.e., *Pañcīkṛta Prapañca.* The second quarter is of *Apañcīkṛta* five *Mahābhūtas* and their effects and the *Ātmā* there known as *Hiraṇyagarbha.* When the *Ātmā* gives up *Karyarūpa* and enters into the *Kāraṇarūpa* which is *Avyākṛta* he is the third quarter.

When the *Ātmā* gives up all Kārya-*kāraṇa-bhāva* and remains as the substratum of all illusions, he is the fourth quarter. In this way, there is no difference between *Adhyātma* (individual) and *Adhidaiva* and the four quarters are mentioned keeping this in view. Each first mentioned quarter is to be absorbed into each succeeding quarter and thereby one has to establish himself in the *Turīya* state.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

And in this way alone the non-duality can be established by the cessation of the entire illusory phenomenal multipli-

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

city; and further that one *Ātmā* is realised as abiding in all beings as also all beings are seen as abiding in *Ātmā*. And in this way the meaning of the Śruti passage "One who sees all beings in the *Ātmā*" may be briefly known as the final conclusion. Otherwise, the *Pratyagātmā* (Individual Soul) would be seen, like the Śāṅkhya philosophers as limited in one's own body alone and if that position is accepted, the special distinguishing feature of Śruti, viz., establishment of non-duality would have to be given up and in that case (there would be duality and) there would be no difference between the *Advaita* of *Śruti* and the view of Sāṅkhya and other philosophers.

Comments

When the *Jijñāsu Mumukṣu* has understood the four *Pādas* and has ended at *Turīya*, the illusory multiple phenomenal world which is an obstacle to true knowledge ceases to have any effect and one realises the meaning of the Upaniṣadic *Mahāvākya* that "I am the non-dual entire *Brahma*". When this true knowledge arises, the one non-dual *Ātmā* is seen as abiding in all beings from *Brahmā* (Creator) to the stub; further, as the Śruti says, "There is only one divinity in all beings", one and the same *Brahma*—consciousness abides in beings in the form of Individual Souls and all these illusory multiple beings are seen as imagined in *Ātmā* alone. It is then established that *Ātmā* is *Pūrṇa* (entire) and other beings have no existence or independent vibration apart from that of *Ātmā*. In this way Manu's verse, viz., "one who sees *Ātmā* in all beings and all beings in *Ātmā* is *Ātmayājin* (Sacrificer of himself, i.e., studying the nature of *Ātmā*) and attains *Svarājya* (identity with *Brahma*)" gets support from Śruti. One should not think that Manu's words are not authoritative, for Śruti itself says that "what Manu has stated is medicine". The Śruti basis of Manu's statement is cited in the *Bhāsya* as "one who sees all beings, etc."

The meaning is this. As per the method cited above, one dissolves the three *Pādas* and gets established in *Turīya* which is eternal, knowledge alone, concentrated existence and bliss and self-contained. He realises that *Ātmā* is *Brahma*, he does not find any other substratum for all beings and is convinced that they are all illusory and superimposed on *Ātmā*. He knows that *Ātmā* alone gives them existence and vibration. Thereafter he does not desire to protect or defend anything; when the Truth is thus known as stated above, the real meaning of Śruti is accomplished.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya then points out what fault would arise if the non-difference between *Adhyātma* and *Adhidaiva* is not accepted for the knowledge of Reality—"Vedānta view would then be identical with the Sāṅkhya view". The Sāṅkhya and others believe that *Ātmā* is limited in each individual body but this view is opposed to the non-dual proposition of Śruti. Sāṅkhya believes in different *Ātmās* in different bodies particularly to make accommodation for different pleasure and pain felt by different individuals but such different arrangement of pleasure and pain can also be explained in the *Advaita* Śruti view by resorting to different *Upādhis* (conditioning or limitations).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

All Upaniṣads seek to establish the identity of all with *Ātmā*. It is therefore quite proper to describe *Dyuloka*, etc., as the seven limbs with reference to the individual self associated with the gross body, keeping in mind the identity of *Adhyātma* (*Viśva*) with the *Adhidaiva* (*Virāt*). This fact is further established by the indication in the Chāndogya Śruti which states "your head shall fall if..."

Comments

Objetion :– Supposing we believe in *Bheda-Vāda* of Sāṅkhya, etc., and not *Advaita* as you state. We may then explain "identity" of *Jīva* and *Brahma* mentioned in Śruti as meant only for the purpose of meditation, e.g., Śruti says *Anna* is *Brahma* which is for meditation only.

Reply :– *Advaita* mentioned in Śruti cannot be for mere meditation (i.e., in a secondary sense). In order to determine the true import of the Śruti sentences there are six indications (*Lingas*) like identical mentioning in the beginning (*Upakrama*) and in conclusion (*Upasaṁhāra*), frequent repetition of the same thing, special or extra-ordinary nature, reward, glorification and reasoning. From all these indications, the Upaniṣads seek to establish that in all different bodies, there is only one *Ātmā*. If the *Advaita* Śruti is only for meditation, then these six indications would be contradicted. For this reason, the seven limbs like *Dyuloka* (connected with *Virāṭ*) are mentioned in connection with the individual self in the gross body (*Viśva*) believing in the ideality of *Vyaṣṭi* (*Adhyātma*) *Viśva* with the *Adhidaiva* universal *Virāt*. Another reason for the identity of *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma* is known from a passage in the Chān-

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

dogya. A student was meditating on parts of *Vaiśvānara* but was instructed to meditate on the whole. The teacher said that had he not come to him and known the "*Samasta-Upāsanā*" and continued to have only "*Vyasta-Upāsana*", his head would have fallen, his eyes would have become blind, etc. This passage indicates the identity of *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma*—for "*Dyuloka*", etc., is said here as the head, etc., of *Vyaṣṭi*, individual soul.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The identity of *Virāj* (with *Viśva* or *Vaiśvānara*) is intended to imply the identity of *Hiraṇyagarbha* (with *Taijasa*) and *Avyākṛta* (with *Prājña*). This proposition is also stated in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa (of Bṛhadāraṇyaka) : "That shining and immortal *Puruṣa* in this earth and the shining immortal *Puruṣa* in the body are both of them Madhu only, etc." The identity of the Self in *Suṣupti* (sleep) and *Avyākṛta* (The unmanifested, i.e., *Īśvara*) is a proved fact as there is no distinction between them. This being the case, non-duality would be clearly established on the cessation of all duality.

Comments

In the original text, specific mention is made of the identity of *Virāṭ* and *Viśva* (i.e., *Vaiśvānara*) only but the identity of others, i.e., *Hiraṇyagarbha* with *Taijasa* and *Avyākṛta* (*Īśvara*) with *Prājña* is to be taken as implied from this and in this way the Bhāṣyakāra says that non-duality is finally established.

The identity of *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma* is indicated in Madhu Brāhmaṇa also. Identity of *Virāṭ* with *Viśva* and *Hiraṇyagarbha* with *Taijasa* is established. The identity of *Avyākṛta* with *Prājña* is established in the following way. *Prājña* (in deep sleep) after having withdrawn all distinctions remains *Nirviśeṣa*, i.e., without distinction; similarly *Avyākṛta* (i.e., *Īśvara*) also withdraws everything in the state of *Pralaya* (universal destruction) and remains without any distinction (*Nirviśeṣa*). This state of remaining without distinction is their common feature. In this way, the identity of *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma* is established and by this process of *Upasaṁhāra*—absorbing one into the other—non-duality is proved as the final result.

Bhāṣyakāra has used the word "and" (*ca*). This "and" is intended to suggest that this *Advaita* (non-duality) is not

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

realised by mere removal of obstacles but it flashes forth directly from the instructing *Vākya* (words) of (a properly qualified) *Ācārya*.

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Fourth Mantra

स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः
प्रविविक्तभुक् तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः ॥ ४ ॥

svapnasthāno'ntaḥprajñaḥ Saptāṅga ekonaviṁśati-mukhaḥ praviviktabhuk taijaso dvitīyaḥ pādaḥ (4)

Translation

Taijasa is the second quarter, who has for its sphere of activity the dream state, whose consciousness is internal (i.e., mental impressions), who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and who experiences subtle objects.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Taijasa is called *Svapnasthāna* because the dream state is his sphere of activity. The waking consciousness is associated with means, and appears as if it is conscious of external objects but in reality these external objects are nothing but mental vibrations.

(This waking consciousness) leaves in the mind corresponding impressions. The mind (in the dream state) is thus possessed of impressions left by the *Jāgrat* like a piece of canvas with pictures painted on it; it appears in the dream as if it is in the waking state but without any external means; this is due to the mind being impelled by ignorance, desire and past actions.

Comments

The *Taijasa* has the conceit or egoism that the state of dream is his own; therefore he is called *Svapnasthāna*. The dream state can be differentiated from the waking state in several ways.

(1) In the waking state there are many means, i.e., *Karaṇas* or organs.
(2) The waking state is conscious of objects as if they are external.
(3) The dreaming state is without any external means.

In reality the external objects seen even in the waking state are but the *Vivarta* (false appearance) due to ignorance and have no actual reality and therefore the objects in waking

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

consciousness are not real but only appear to be so (*Pratibhāsika*). That waking consciousness is not established by the correct knowledge and is known only by the inner observer (*Sākṣīvedya*). Therefore the word "*Iva*" is used in the *Bhāṣya*. The multiplicity seen in *Jāgrat* is unreal—to show that it is called mental vibrations (*Manaḥspandamātra*). The mind in dream gets possessed of impressions left on it by the waking consciousness. Being thus possessed of impressions of the waking state the mind experieneces the dream as if it is in the waking state. The illustration given is—a painted canvas appears as if it is a picture of multi-dimensions. The dreaming state is that which is without any external means (*Sādhanas*, i.e., *Karaṇas*—organs.)

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Thus it is said (in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Praṣna Upaniṣads) "In the dream state he takes some portion of the impressions of the waking state which has all kinds of means (*Sarvāvataḥ*)". Similarly in the Praṣna Upaniṣad of Atharvaveda after introducing the subject with "All senses become one in the highest deity, the mind", it is stated "here, i.e., in the dream" state, the deity, i.e., the mind enjoys greatness".

As compared with the external sense organs, the consciousness in dream is of the nature of mental impressions and *Taijasa* who is possessed of dream consciousness is called *Antaḥprajña* (of internal awareness). He is called *Taijasa* luminous as he becomes the subject (seeing the dream), though that Dream consciousness is without gross objects and is only of the nature of light. *Viśva* (who is the subject seeing the waking state experiences consciousness associated with gross objects, whereas here in the dream state the consciousness which is experienced is consisting only of impressions and therefore the enjoyment here is subtle (*Pravivikta*). *Taijasa* is the second quarter.

Comments

The dream arises from the impressions of the experience in the waking state. To establish this proposition two Śruti texts are cited. The mind takes some part of the impressions of the waking state which has all kinds of means and experiences in dream. The mind which is thus transformed into a dream state becomes the object of sight of the inner observer (*Sākṣin*). For that, another Śruti text (of Praśna) is cited. The mind is called the highest (in the Śruti text) as it is the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Upādhi (conditioning) of the Sākṣin and it is extra-ordinary; and the mind is called deity (*Deva*) as it is shining. All senses become one in the mind. The self-luminous observer in the dream enjoys greatness of the mind, i.e., the mind which transforms itself both as objects and their knowledge. The mind becomes the objects and also their perceiver—not the *Ātmā*.

Objection :—The consciousness of *Viśva* which is caused by external objects and the consciousness of *Taijasa* which is caused by mental impressions—both of them are internal only (as in reality external objects are not real but appear only as "*Vivarta*"—false appearance due to *Avidyā*—this being so why call one of them external and other internal?

Reply :—We have already indicated earlier why the consciousness in waking state is *Bahiṣprajña*, Now mind is internal as compared with sense organs and consciousness in dream is known only as the modification of the mind. Therefore *Taijasa* is *Antaḥprajña*. If *Jāgrataprajña* itself is of the nature of mind (there being no external objects in reality, they being only *Vivarta*), then *Svapnaprajña* which owes its existence to the *Jāgṛtaprajña* should necessarily be internal and thus *Taijasa* is properly called *Antaḥprajña*.

Objection :—*Taijasa* who sees *Svapna* is not a *Vikāra* or modification of light. Why then should he be called *Taijasa*?

Reply :— In dream which is of the nature of mental impressions, gross objects are not perceived. There is no contact with gross objects, the consciousness is only in the form of light and the observer in *Svapna* is therefore properly called *Taijasa*—luminous. By the word *Tejas*—light, the consciousness in the nature of mental impressions is indicated.

Objection :—We should say that both *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are *Praviviktabhuk* enjoyer of subtle objects.

Reply :— We say no. Even though there is no distinction in their enjoyment, there is some secondary distincition between the two. The consciousness enjoyed by *Viśva* is gross and with objects.

In the case of *Taijasa*, it is without contact with gross objects, of the nature of mental impressions and the enjoyment is subtle. Seven limbs and nineteen mouths are to be explained in the same way as in the case of *Viśva*.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Fifth Mantra

यत्र सुप्तो न कंचन कामं कामयते न कंचन स्वप्नं पश्यति तत् सुषुप्तम्। सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयो ह्यानन्दभुक्चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञस्तृतीयः पादः ॥ ५ ॥

yatra supto na kaṁcana kāmaṁ kāmayate na kaṁcana svapnaṁ paśyati tat suṣuptaṁ, suṣuptasthāna ekībhūtaḥ prajñānaghana evānandamayo hyānandabhukcetomukhaḥ prājñastṛtiyaḥ pādaḥ. (5)

Translation

That state wherein the sleeper does not see any dream or desire any enjoyable object, that is called the state of deep sleep. It is the third quarter called *Prājña* whose sphere is deep sleep, in whom all experiences become undifferentiated, who is a mere mass of consciousness only, who is mostly full of bliss, who experiences bliss and who is the doorway leading to the experiences (of the other two states of dream and waking).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Inasmuch as absence of knowledge of Reality is a common feature of sleep along with the waking state which is the perception (of gross objects) and the dream state which is the non-perception (of gross objects)—it is for this reason that the adjectival clause "wherein sleeper..." is used so as to enable one to grasp what is deep sleep.

Or the absence of the knowledge of reality is the common feature of all the three states (of waking, dream and deep sleep), therefore the Śruti text differentiates the state of deep sleep from the other two states by using the two adjectival clauses, particularly the second clause (does not desire any enjoyable object). "*Yatra*" means in which place or at which time—the sleeper does not see any dream or desire any enjoyable object. Verily, in deep sleep there does not exist any dream or desire for any enjoyable object—a characteristic of perceiving things otherwise than what they are—which characteristic is common to both the earlier states (of waking and dream). He is called *Suṣuptasthāna* as his sphere is deep sleep. All objects of duality in the two states of waking and dream are differentiated even though they are (only) mental vibrations. Without losing that characteristic (of being differentiated) as in the two states of dream and waking the dualistic phenomenal world becomes non-discernible like the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

day covered over by the darkness of night—in this sense everything is called *Ekībhūta* unified (undifferentiated) in the state of deep sleep. For this reason conscious experiences which are only mental vibrations felt in the dream and waking state, become as it were one compact mass of consciousness—this state (of deep sleep) is called *Prajñānaghana* (a unified mass of consciousness) as there is no discrimination (of multiplicity). Just as diverse things are not discriminated due to the darkness of night and is therefore called a compact mass (of darkness). Similarly everything (in deep sleep) becomes a compact mass of consciousness. The word *Eva* (verily) in the text is meant to denote that there is no other kind of thing except consciousness (in deep sleep). Here (in deep sleep), the mind is free from the pain of efforts to be made for mental vibrations necessary for assuming forms of subject and object and is therefore called predominantly blissful—*Ānandamaya*—but it is not pure superlative bliss.

As in a popular sense a person is said to enjoy happiness when he has not to make any exertion, this state which is extremely free from exertion is experienced by him (*Prājña*), therefore he is said to enjoy bliss. The Śruti text (also) states, "This is his highest bliss". *Prājña* is called *Cetomukhaḥ* as he is the doorway to the consciousness of two other states of consciousness of dream and waking. Or *Caitanya* (*Sākṣī* Reality) is the doorway for the *Prājña* for alternately going to and coming from waking and dream into deep sleep; therefore he is called *Cetomukhaḥ*. (According to Prof. Bhattacharya *Cetomukha* means having the mind as the mouth). He is conscious of all objects, of past and future also and therefore he is called *Prājña*. He is called *Prājña*, best knower, even in deep sleep because he was so in his two earlier states. Or because mere undifferentiated consciousness is his special characteristic. In the other two (*Viśva* and *Taijasa*), there is no doubt consciousness also, but that is of diversified objects. This is *Prājña* and he is the third quarter.

Comments

Jāgrat (waking) is here called *Darśana* because in this state there is perception (*Darśana*) of gross objects. While *Svapna* (dream) is here called *Adarśana* as in dream we do not perceive gross objects but see only mental impressions of gross objects seen in waking. Both in dream and waking,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

absence of knowledge of Reality is common as in deep sleep. In other words, there is *Āvaraṇa* or concealing of Reality in all the three states but in addition to that concealment, there is false projection (*Vikṣepa*) in dream and waking. In the Upaniṣadic text, the words "wherein the sleeper, etc," is used to distinguish sleep from dream and waking as concealment of Reality is common to all the three states. Only one adjectival clause "does not see dream" is enough to so distinguish sleep but the second adjectival clause "does not desire any enjoyment" is needed to show that in sleep *Prājña* has no touch with any enjoyable thing. Multiplicity perceived in waking and dream—seen in a differentiated form—is nothing but mental vibrations only. Without giving up that differentiated form—this multiplicity with all its diversity becomes *Ekībhūta* or unified and becomes *Avyākṛta* (unmanifested) or the cause (*Kāraṇa*). Just as the day when enveloped by the darkness of night is described as darkness, similarly, all this multiplicity in the form of Effect (*Kāvyajāla*) is described as *Kāraṇa*. The word "*Iva*"—as it were—is used as the multiplicity only appears to have a unified nature (*Ekibhūta*) for it once again becomes differentiated on once again going into the dream and waking states. In deep sleep, there is the causal state (*Kāraṇa Avasthā*) and all consciousness of waking and dream get unified here and therefore *Prājña* is called *Prajñānaghana*. No other kind of consciousness remains here in deep sleep. *Prājña* is called *Ānandamaya*, predominantly blissful—not pure supreme bliss as *Prājña* is associated with the *Kāraṇa Upādhi* (conditioning of *Kāraṇa* which is *Ajñāna*—ignorance) Otherwise, he would be the same as *Mukta* liberated and in that case the liberated would also have further rebirths and *Saṁsāra*. The predominant bliss of *Prājña* is due to the fact that in deep sleep he has no more exertion of mental vibrations as in dream and waking. For that the Śruti text is also cited. *Prājña* in called *Cetomukhaḥ* because he is a doorway towards the consciousness of dream and waking or because *Caitanya* (the *Sākṣī* Reality) is the doorway for the *Prājña* for alternatively going to and coming from dream and waking into deep sleep. *Prājña* knows all past and future and all things. This all-knowing consciousness of *Prājña* is described with reference to the two earlier states of waking and dream—for in deep sleep he is without any differentiated consciousness. Mere undifferentiated consciousness is his peculiar characteristic. With this fifth Mantra the third quarter in the form of *Prājña* in the individual body is explained.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Sixth Mantra

एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् ॥ ६ ॥

eṣa sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo'ntaryāmyeṣa
yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānāṁ. (6)

Translation

This (*Prājña*) is the Lord of all; he is the knower of all; he is the inner controller; he is the source of all and he is the one from whom everything originates and in whom they finally disappear.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

This very (*Prājaña*) when he is in his original unconditioned state (i.e., when seen without limitations and seen predominantly as consciousness) is the Lord of everything, i.e., the ruler of everything which is physical as also of that which pertains to deities. This (*Prājña*) seen as *Iśvara* is not someone separate and independent extra individual (Creator) as other Schools of thought hold (e.g., the *Naiyāyikas*). In this connection we have the Śruti passage, viz., "O Gentle one! The mind is bound to *Prāṇa* (i.e., *Prājña*, same as *Iśvara*). He knows all things in their different conditions and therefore he is *Sarvajña* knower of all. He alone enters into everything and controls them from within and is therefore called *Antaryāmin*, inner controller. From him alone the aforesaid diversified universe is created and therefore he is called *Yoni* the origin of everything. As he is in this way the origin so also he is the one alone wherein everything disappears.

Comments

In the Śruti text, various adjectives are used in connection with *Prājña* by taking his identity with the *Adhidaivika Iśvara*, the inner controller. This is done by discarding his predominant limitations and seeing him as predominant consciousness.

Otherwise, his independence cannot be explained. He is not a separate extra creator—i.e., only an efficient cause (*Nimitta Kāraṇa*) and not material cause (*Upādāna Kāraṇa*) of the universe as is held by the Naiyāyikas. The Vedānta holds that *Iśvara* is both the efficient and material cause of the universe. This proposition of Vedānta is logically explained in Brahma Sūtra 2-2-37 "*Patyuḥ Asāmanjasyāt*". But the Śruti also discards the Naiyāyika theory that God is separate (*Taṭa-*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

stha) from the Universe. This unknown supreme *Brahma* is here designated as *Prāṇa* or *Sad* (in the text cited). *Manas* (mind) is the *Jīva* consciousness conditioned by *Manas* (mind). "Mind is bound to *Prāṇa*." Here the word *Prāṇa* of the individual is used to designate the Supreme Reality and by using the word *Manas* for *Jīva* and stating that *Jīva* ultimately goes (bound) to the Supreme Reality, the implication is that there is no difference between the Individual and the Supreme Soul in the ultimate Reality. Vyāsa, Parāśara and others are also sometimes called *Sarvajña*; to distinguish *Prājña* (*Iśvara*) from them, he is called the inner controller—none other can enter inside everything and control them. With the above mentioned three adjectives, further adjectives are used to show *Prājña* as the cause of the universe. As Naiyāyikas hold that *Iśvara* is only the *Nimitta Kāraṇa*, the Śruti says that he is also the *Upādāna Kāraṇa*—the origin as well as one in whom they disappear. This is logically explained in Brahma Sūtra 1-4-23. "*Prakṛtiḥpratijñā Dṛṣṭāntānurūparodhāt.*" He being alone the origin as also the one in whom everything disappears—therefore he alone is the *Upādāna* (material cause)—this is the implication.

(Gauḍapāda Ācārya having recited Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad so far, now gives his explanatory verses.)

Gauḍapādīya Kāriṛkā

Here are the explanatory verses.

बहिष्प्रज्ञो विभुर्विश्वो ह्यन्तःप्रज्ञस्तु तैजसः।
घनप्रज्ञस्तथा प्राज्ञ एक एव त्रिधा स्मृतः ॥ १ ॥

bahiṣprajño vibhurviśvo hyantaḥprajñastu taijasaḥ,
ghanaprajñastathā prājña eka eva tridhā smṛtaḥ. (1)

Translation

Viśva is all pervading and cognises external objects. *Taijasa* cognises internal objects and *Prājña's* cognition is made into a mass. In this way, one and the same *Ātmā* is designated in these three ways.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

As *Ātmā* moves is succession in the three states, it is proved that he is separate from these three states. By the memory that I am the one who slept, am myself the one, who is waking, it is established that one and the same *Ātmā* moves in three states (and as *Dharma, Adharma, Rāga, Dveṣa*, etc., are the qualities of the three states) it is established that he is pure.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(*Saṅga*—association or connection also is an object of *Jñāna* and therefore connected with the three states—therefore) it is also established that he is unrelated (*Asaṅga*). This is corroborated by the Śruti passage by the illustration of the great fish.

Comments

Viśva is called "All pervading" in the Kārikā by keeping aside the Individual and Universal (*Adhyātmika* and *Adhidaivika*) distinctions. The word "*Hi*" in the Kārikā is used to indicate the earlier Śruti passage which obliterates the distinction of the Individual and Universal Souls. If the three states are natural to *Ātmā*, then they would not be separated from *Ātmā*. Just as the *Caitanya* element remains constant in three states, similarly the three states would then be constantly associated with *Ātmā*. But this is not so—when there is waking there is no dream and vice versa and in sleep there is no waking or dream. Thus these three states are not constantly and natural with *Ātmā*, but are only different adjectives and sub-divisions and therefore *Ātmā* is the same throughout. As the three states come and go with respect to the same *Ātmā*, *Ātmā* is established as separate from these three states. He who had slept that very myself is now waking —by this continuing connection, it is established that there is the same *Ātmā* in the three states. *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Rāga*, *Dveṣa*, etc., are all impurities and are associated with the three states and not with *Ātmā*—therefore *Ātmā* who is distinct from the three states is established as *Śuddha* (Pure). *Saṅga* (association or connection) is also an object of *Jñāna* and is accepted as the quality of the three states—therefore *Ātmā* is established as *Asaṅga*—unrealated. This position is logically established and is corroborated by the Śruti text giving the illustration of the great fish. A great and powerful fish moving in the river stream goes from one bank of the river to the other and is distinct from and rises superior to those banks. He is not related to the good or bad qualities of the banks. He is not clinging anywhere. A hawk or an eagle moving in the sky is never thwarted anywhere, in the same way *Ātmā* also moving in succession in the three states has the above-mentioned charactertistics.

In the first *Āgama* chapter, there are 29 Kārikās. They are introduced with words "Here there are these verses". Nine Kārikās are after the sixth Mantra. Further nine Kārikās are after the seventh Mantra; further nine Kārikās are after the 11th Mantra and the remaining six Kārikās are after the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

12th Mantra. All the 215 Kārikās of the four chapters are of Gauḍapāda according to Śaṅkara *Saṁpradāya.* Rāmānuja and Madhva hold that the 29 Kārikās of the first chapter are part of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and those of the other three chapters are of Gauḍapāda and therefore are not authoritative.

Ānandagiri connects the word *Vibhu* (all pervading) with *Viśva.* Karmarkar connects *Vibhu* with one *Ātmā* assuming three forms. Ānandagiri says that by describing *Viśva* as *Vibhu,* identity of the individual and universal (*Adhyātmika* and *Adhidaivika*) is intended to be indicated. As in the Kārikā, the word *Vibhu* is placed with *Viśva,* Ānandagiri's explanation is more plausible and agrees well with Śaṅkara Vedānta.

The Upaniṣadic text mentions *Vaiśvānara* as *Bahiṣprajña*" but the Kārikā changes that into *Viśva.* "*Vibhutva*" all pervasiveness is the nature or *Svarūpa* of *Ātmā* and not its quality (*Guṇa*) as *Ātmā* is *Nirguṇa.* Gauḍapāda clearly intends the identity of the individual and universal souls by using "*Vibhu*" for *Viśva* and discussing various theories of creation when he explains the nature of *Prājña.*

Kūranārāyaṇa of Rāmānuja *Saṁpradāya* explains "*Vaiśvānara*" as "known by all men". *Viśva* means gross objects and one who experiences them is *Viśva.* "One who does not get destroyed is called *Nara*". Kuranārāyaṇa says *Smṛtaḥ* means known or designated by Brahmā, as the first chapter of Kārikās is part of Upaniṣad according to him.

Prof. Bhaṭṭacārya reads "*Tridhā Sthitaḥ*" for "Tridhā *Smṛtaḥ*".

Gauḍapāda is teacher's teacher of Śaṅkara in Śaṅkara *Saṁpradāya* which begins with Nārāyaṇa; from Nārāyaṇa upto Śuka there is father-son relationship and from Śuka onwards there is teacher-disciple relationship. The four chapters of Kārikās are the explanation of the philosophy of Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad of 12 Mantras. Ānandagiri records a tradition that Lord Nārāyaṇa gave the knowledge to Gauḍapāda at Badarikāśrama and Gauḍapāda put that in Kārikās.

Prof. Bhattacharya puts forward a theory that Kārikās were first composed and Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is based on them and that Gauḍapāda was probably a Buddhist. Mahadevan has strongly criticised and replied to this theory. Prof. Surendranath Dāsgupta also thought that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist but Swāmi Nikhilānanda and Karmarkar have successfully refuted that view. Swāmi Saccidānanda Saraswatī in his Māṇḍūkya Rahasyavivṛti (Sanskrit commentary) and Intro-

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

duction (English) published in 1956 from Holenarsipur has convincingly refuted theories of Prof. Bhattacharya. There is also a view that all the four chapters of the Kārikās are independent but that view is not generally accepted. It is to be noted that Buddhists themselves do not accept Gauḍapāda as a Buddhist. Buddhist writers like Śāntarakṣita and Bhāvaviveka (fifth and eighth centuries A.D.) quote some of these Kārikās as Vedānta Śāstra. Tradition of Śāṅkara *Saṁpradāya* is the oldest and appears to be reliable and correct. Gauḍapāda distinguishes his philosophy from all the Buddhist schools and holds that *Ātmā* is not *Śūnya* but *Sat* and is not *Anitya* but *Nitya*. An effort is made by Dr. Radhakrishna to distinguish the philosophy of Gauḍapāda from that of Śaṅkara by saying that the former is more negative while the latter is more positive. But this view is also resisted by Nikhilānanda, Akhaṇḍānanda and others who assert that there is no distinction between the two. The *Prakaraṇa Grantha* of 215 Kārikās are given various titles—Āgama Śāstra, Māṇḍūkya Vārtika, Gauḍapāda Kārika, etc. Gauḍapāda has used Buddhist terminology and arguments to refute other Schools of thought but that does not necessarily make him a Buddhist as his Vedāntic tenets are different from those of the Budhist. Gauḍapāda quotes as authorities from Iśa, Kaṭha, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā and is accepted as a great Saṁpradāya Vid Ācārya in the Śaṅkara School of Vedānta.

Madhva records a tradition from Padmapurāṇa, Harivaṁśa and Garuḍapurāṇa that Varuṇa as Ṛṣi saw this Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad in the form of a frog through the grace of Nārāyaṇa and added Kārikās of the 1st chapter which were earlier seen by the Creator Brahmā. Rāmānuja quotes as authority Kārikā, 1-16 in Br. S.1-1-1 along with a passage from Śvetāśvatara. Kuranārāyaṇa of the Rāmānuja School interprets the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with 1st chapter of Kārikās as the *Upāsanā* of Hari in His four forms and Madhva also interprets them in the same way.

There is a view that the *Śāṅkara-Bhāsya* on Kārikās is not by Ādi Śaṅkara but one of the successor Śaṅkarācāryas. But T. R. Chintāmaṇi strongly controverts that view and asserts that the *Bhāṣya* is a genuine *Bhāṣya* of Ādi Śaṅkara and that the tradition is right.

We have fully translated the *Śāṇkara-Bhāṣya* on the Upaniṣad and 215 Kārikās adding full and exhaustive notes from Ānandagiri who clearly and minutely brings out the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

implication of every single word of the *Bhāṣya*. After that we have discussed and commented upon the main interpretations of some of the recent annotations. Several questions raised in connection with Gauḍapāda and the Kārikās have been fully discussed in the Introduction.

Regarding views of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, Deussen remarks, "Both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara hold the same view in all the essentials and many ideas and imagery, in which Śaṅkara indulges, are already seen to occur in Gauḍapāda (reconcilation of the scriptures, polemic against the causality, and objectless perception, etc.; serpent and rope, universal space and jar-space, dream, *Māyā*, mirage, etc.); indeed, it can be said that Śaṅkara developed the doctrine of Gauḍapāda into a system in the same way as Plato did those of Parmenidess" (*Sixty Upaniṣads*, p. 606). Karmarkar quotes with approval a similar considered opinion of the late learned Mahāmahopādhyāya Vasudeo Shāstri Abhyankar in his Introduction to his edition of *Siddhāntabindu* (*Gauḍapāda Karika*, p,xlvii). It appears futile to attempt digging out imaginary differences between Śaṅkara and his acknowledged Parama guru Gauḍapada; when seen in proper perspective no such difference exists.

Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* on each one of the four chapters of the Kārikā treatise points out the connection of each succeeding chapter with the preceding one and explains how the entire treatise of 215 Kārikās is one coherent book where all the four chapters are interrelated and there does not appear any convincing argument to reject that explanation.

दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वो मनस्यन्तस्तु तैजसः ।
आकाशे च हृदि प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा देहे व्यवस्थितः ॥ २ ॥

dakṣiṇākṣimukhe viśvo manasyantastu taijasaḥ
ākāśe ca hṛdi prājñastridhā dehe vyavasthitaḥ. (2)

Translation

(*Viśva, Taijasa* and *Prājña* move in the three states in order but in reality all the three are one—for this another reason is given.) *Viśva* has his place at the opening of the right eye, *Taijasa* in the mind and *Prājña* in the sky inside the heart. In this way one and the same (*Ātmā*) is settled in the body in three ways.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

This verse is intended to show that the three, viz., *Viśva* and others have their experience in the waking state itself. The right eye is chiefly the means of cognising gross objects and *Viśva's* presence is felt there (by Sages who contemplate). There is a Śruti text (of Bṛhadāraṇyaka) which says, "There is a person, called Indra who is (mainly) seated in the right eye." Indra means the shining one *Vaiśvānara*, also called the *Ātmā* of *Virāṭ* (aggregate of gross bodies) inside the Sun; he and the cogniser in the right eye both are the same.

Objection :—*Hiraṇyagarbha* is different from *Kṣetrajña* in the right eye who is controller of the eyes, the cogniser and the lord of the body. How can they be one?

Reply :—No. We do not admit any distinction in them in reality; for the Śruti says that one and the same shining deity is concealed in all beings. The Smrti (i.e., *Gītā*) also says, "O Bharata. Know me as *Kṣetrajña* in all *Ksetras* (bodies). Even though undivided it is seated in all beings as if divided."

Comments

Viśva, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* move in three states in order but in reality they are all one. If we can show that in the same body and in the same waking state the presence of all the three is felt, then we have to admit that he is the same *Ātmā* in the three states of waking, dream and sleep. Even though *Ātmā* is all pervading, he takes these states as if they are his own.

The meaning is that in the same state (waking) and in the same body all the three are felt as present as cognisers and as there cannot be three cognisers in the same state and the same body, they cannot be different from one another and they are the same. *Mukha* in the Kārikā means the place of perception. The right eye is stated as the means of perception of gross objects by *Viśva* as sages in contemplation feel the presence of *Viśva* chiefly in the right eye. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka text says that Indra is seated in the right eye. *Vaiśvānara*, the *Ātmā* of *Virāṭ* (aggregate of gross bodies) and the cogniser in the right eye (i.e., *Viśva*) are the same. The reason is that the shining quality (*Indra*) of the *Adhidaivika Virāṭ* is also justifiably found in the *Adhyātmika* (individual) *Viśva*. The objector says that very well. We may admit the identity

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

of *Virāṭ* and *Viśva* but how can *Hiraṇyagarbha* who is the *Adhidaivika* (cosmic) *Abhimānin* of the aggregate of subtle universe, also called *Liṅgātmā* be also the same as the cogniser in the right eye, also called *Viśva*, the one who experiences the waking *Saṁsāra*? *Virāṭ* is the cosmic *Abhimānin* of the aggregate of gross universe, i.e., the totality of gross bodies (*Samaṣṭi-deha*) while *Viśva* in the right eye is the *Abhimānin* of the individual body (*Vyaṣṭi-deha*) and also called *Kṣetrajña*. How can the *Abhimanins* of gross or subtle *Samaṣṭi-deha* and *Vyaṣṭi-deha* be identical? To this objection the reply given is that the Śruti itself says that one and the same shining *Deva* stays concealed in all beings. *Gītā* (13-2 and 13-10) also says that he is the same as *Kṣetrajña* in all beings and that even though undivided he appears as if divided in all bodies. The all-pervading *Cidātma* is indivisible in reality but on account of his falsely imagining himself as having different bodies, he thinks himself by ignornce as distinct in different bodies.

Even though *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are given different designations in the Kārikā, the Kārikā itself says in verse one that one and the same *Ātmā* is known in three ways. There is therefore nothing to distinguish between the view of Gauḍapāda who gives different designations of one and the same *Ātmā* and the view of Śaṅkara who says that all the three are one. Karmarkar sees some difference in the two views but there seems to be no such distinction. This is clearly clarified by Ānandagiri as stated above.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Even though *Viśva* is felt as existing equally in all the sense organs without any special distinction, he is described as existing specially in the right eye as perception is considered at its best in the right eye. With his abode in the right eye, and having seen forms, he closes his eyes, remembers the same forms within his mind and sees those very forms as if in dream in the form of impressions. As he perceives objects in the waking, in the same way he perceives objects in dream. Therefore *Taijasa*, the perceiver in the mind, is the same as *Viśva*. In the sky in the heart, as the activity called memory has ceased, the same perceiver (*Viśva*) becomes one with *Prājña* who is a mass of consciousness as at that time there is no activity of the mind. Perception and memory are vibrations of the mind and in their absence, the perceiver (*Viśva*) exists in the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

heart alone, without any distinguishable feature, in the form of *Prājña*. The Śruti text also says, *Prāṇa* withdraws all of them (the sense organs) within himself.

Comments

The right eye is considered as the best means of perception of *Viśva* because the Śruti says so; and further actual experience also supports that view (use of right limbs—right hand, right leg, etc., is considered auspicious and in majority of normal people use of right limbs is made quickly by practice and reflex action; that is perhaps, what is meant by *Pāṭava* in the *Bhasya*).

After seeing forms in the waking state, the perceiver closes his eyes, remembers the forms and sees them as impressions in his mind—thus *Viśva* becomes *Taijasa* in the waking state itself. Just as *Viśva* (with closed eyes) sees objects (in his mind) in the waking state, in the same way he perceives objects when he experiences a dream. There is therefore no distinction between *Viśva* and *Taijasa*. Just as *Viśva* can become *Taijasa*, he can also become *Prājña* in the waking state. What is after all the sleeping state? There is no perception or memory at that time. So when *Viśva* has no perception or memory in the waking state which are but the vibrations of the mind, he is as good as unified with *Prājña* who experiences no form of perceiver or perceived and who is therefore called a mass of consciousness—without distinctive knowledge or other forms.

In sleep, he remains in an unmanifested form. He is then the unmanifested *Prājña* in the *Ākāśa* of the heart. The Śruti text also states that the *Prāṇa* in the individual withdraws all sense organs like speech, etc,. within himself; this is with reference to *Adhyātma* (Individual). With reference to *Adhidaiva* (cosmic) *Vāyu*, the *Sūtrātma*, withdraws correspondingly Agni, etc., within himself. *Adhyātma* and *Adhidaiva* are ultimately one; thus *Prāṇa* in the individual and *Vāyu* in the cosmic both withdraw speech, etc., and Agni, etc., respectively and thus the *Saṁvarga-vidyā* indicates that both *Prāṇa* and *Vāyu Sūtrātma* are the unmanifested. It is thus properly stated that in sleep, *Prājña* remains in the form of unmanifested *Prāṇa*.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

(Having pointed out the identity of Individual *Prājña* with *Avyākṛta* of *Adhidaiva*, identity of *Taijasa* with *Hiraṇ-*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

yagarbha is now pointed out; *Taijasa* is identical with *Hiraṇyagarbha* as both of them are experienced in the mind. *Hiraṇyagarbha* is known as *Liṅgātma*, and Śruti identifies it with mind (and *Taijasa* is also experienced in the mind, therefore both *Taijasa* and *Hiraṇyagarbha* are identical). Śruti further says that this *Puruṣa* (i.e., *Hiraṇyagarbha*) is all mind. (Now the objector questions the position that *Prāṇa* is *Avyākṛta*, i.e., unmanifested).

Objection :—*Prāṇa* is manifested. When a person is asleep, all his sense-organs get merged into *Prāṇa*. How do you then say that *Prāṇa* is unmanifested?

Reply :—There is no fault; for when we say *Avyākṛta* unmanifested, it means absence of the knowledge of time and space and *Vastu*.

Comments

Earlier, identity of *Viśva* of *Vyaṣṭi* and *Virāj* of *Samaṣṭi* as also of *Prājña* of *Vyaṣṭi* and *Avyākṛta* of *Samaṣṭi* was pointed out. The *Bhāṣya* now points out the identity of *Taijasa* (of *Vyaṣṭi*) and *Hiraṇyagarbha* (of *Samaṣṭi*). *Hiraṇyagarbha's* presence is felt in *Samaṣṭi* mind and *Taijasa's* presence in the *Vyaṣṭi* mind. *Hiraṇyagarbha* has the conditioning (*Upādhi*) of *Kriyāśakti* and is known as *Liṅgātmā*; and the Śruti identifies it with mind, and *Taijasa* is also experienced in mind. Further, *Puruṣa* is declared by Śruti as all mind and *Hiraṇyagarbha* is also *Puruṣa* and experienced in mind. For these reasons, identity of *Taijasa* with *Hiraṇyagarbha* is properly established. The objector now questions, "How do you say that *Prājña* of the sleeping person is unmanifested (*Avyākṛta*)? When the person is asleep, people near about him clearly see and feel that his *Prāña* is manifest to them. How then is that *Prāṇa* unmanifested? Further, sense organs like speech, etc., get merged in that *Prāṇa* when the person is asleep and these sense organs assume the form of *Prāṇa*—that also shows that *Prāṇa* is *Vyākṛta*—manifested." The *Siddhāntin* replies that as the characteristics of *Vyaṣṭi Prāṇa* and *Samaṣṭi Avyākṛta* are the same, they are identical. As regards their unmanifested nature, what we mean by unmanifested is "absence of any limitations of time and space and *vastu*". As that characteristic is also common in *Vyaṣṭi Prāṇa* and *Avyākṛta* of *Samaṣṭi*, both deserve to be one.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

When there is an egoistic feeling that this is my *Prāṇa*, then *Prāṇa* is definitely manifested but in sleep there is absence of any egoistic feeling that *Prāṇa* is limited in my body and therefore (so far as I am concerned) *Prāṇa* is unmanifested there being absence of any egoistic feeling of limitation. Just as at the time of death, *Prāṇa* of persons of limited egoistic feeling is called *Avyākṛta* (unmanifested), similarly (in sleep) *Prāṇa* of a person of egoistic feeling assumes the same unmanifested condition (as in death); further, as is the case with the *Adhidaiva Avyākṛta*, *Prāṇa* (of *Vyaṣṭi*) in deep sleep contains the seed of future creation (creating universe in one case, going into dream and waking states in the other case). Similarly the cogniser of *Samaṣṭi Avyākṛta* and *Vyaṣṭi Prāṇa* is also the same pure consciousness (*Cid-dhātu*). This is the additional reason why *Prāṇa* and *Avyākṛta* are one. (So far we have established the identity of *Prāṇa* in sleep and *Avyākṛta* on the ground of absence of limitation of space and time and *Vastu*. We further say that) *Prāṇa* in deep sleep of persons of egoistic feeling is really speaking identical with the apparently different cognisers in the dream and waking states; and also further as stated earlier that the *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma* are identical. For these reasons, the attributes "becoming one" and "mass of consciousness" are justified in the case of *Prājña* the *Prāṇa* in deep sleep. (So also the attribute *Sarveśvara*, lord of everything, etc.)

Comments

In the case of a person in deep sleep, even though others round about feel that his *Prāṇa* is manifested, the sleeping person has no knowledge of space and time and *Vastu* and for him the *Prāṇa* is unmanifested. The condition of being unmanifested is comparable to death. In both cases, *Prāṇa* is unmanifested and further there is a seed of future creation (creating universe again for *Adhidaiva* and going into dream and waking conditions for the *Adhyātma*). *Īśvara* or *Avyākṛta* and *Prāṇa* are thus identical on account of these common characteristics. Further, pure consciousness (*Cid-dhātu*) is the real cogniser. In spite of various limitations (*Upādhis*) in different states, the cognisers in these different states have been established as one. Moreover it has been repeatedly stated that *Adhidaiva Ātmā* and *Adhyātma Ātmā* are one. For these reasons the various attributes of "becoming unified",

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

"mass of consciousness", "Lord of everything", etc., can justifiably be applied to *Prājña*, the *Prāṇa* in deep sleep, who is the same as *Īśvara* or *Avyākṛta* of *Samaṣṭi* or *Adhidaiva*.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection:—How do you say that *Prāṅa* is *Avyākṛta*? The Śruti text says that mind is tied up with *Prāṅa*. Here we should interpret *Prāṅa* as *Sat* (pure-existence), i.e., *Brahma* (and not *Avyākṛta*) as the subject matter in the context begins by stating that "everything in the beginning was *Sat* (i.e., pure *Brahma*) only.

Reply:—There is nothing wrong. Here the word *Sat* is admittedly used to contain within itself the seed of creation (i.e., it should be taken to mean *Avyākṛta*—The unmanifested cause of the universe and not pure attributeless *Bramha*. Even though the word "*Sat*", i.e., *Brahma* is called *Prāṇa*, *Brahma* in that context which is indicated by the words *Sat* and *Prāṇa* should not be understood as one without the attribute of being the seed of creating all beings. If in that context the Śruti had intended to refer to attributeless (Pure) *Brahma*, Śruti would have used such words as "Not this, not this"; "That from whom speech turns away"; "It is other than the known unknown". The Smṛti, i.e., *Gītā* also describes (attributeless, i.e., the *Nirguṇa Brahma*) as neither *Sat* (existence) or *Asat* (nonexistence). If by the above mentioned Śruti passage, attributless *Brahma* had been intended who is without the seed of creation, then those who are in deep sleep and those who get unified with that "*Sat*" at the time of world dissolution (*Pralaya*) would not come back to dream and waking states or future rebirths. Moreover, the liberated souls (who get completely merged in *Brahma*) would have to come back for future births—for absence of seed (for future creation) would then be the common characteristic of all the three, those in deep sleep, those at the time of *Pralaya* and those who are liberated.

Comments

The word *Prāṇa* is generally used for *Prāṇa-Vāyu* with its five modifications but in the Śruti passage under discussion, *Prāṇa* is used for *Avyākṛta*. The objector says that as the passage begins with the description of "*Sat*" which is *Brahma Prāṇa* (in the passage "mind, i.e., *Jīva* is tied to *Prāṇa* i.e., *Brahma*") should mean Pure *Brahma* and not *Avyākṛta*. The reply is that here words *Sat* and *Brahma* are admittedly used for not *Nirguṇa Brahma* but *Śabala Brahma* and therefore

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Prāṇa here means not pure, attributeless, *Nirbīja* (without the seed or cause of creation) *Brahma* but *Sabīja* (with the seed of creation) *Śabala Brahma. Manas* is used for *Jīva* and here *Jīva* is intended for all *Kāryajāta*, i.e., created beings. "*Prāṇanibandhanaṁ hi Manaḥ*" therefore means all created beings have their causal relationship with *Sabīja Brahma*—the *Prāṇa* the *Avyākṛta*. If attributeless, *Nirguṇa*, conditionless (*Nirupādhika*) Pure *Brahma* had been intended in the passage beginning with *Sad Eva Saumya* Śruti would have used words like "Not this, Not this", etc. *Gītā* also describes Pure *Brahma* as not *Sat*, not *Asat* (i.e., speech cannot describe it).

Further, at the time of sleep, Śruti says one gets unified with *Sat*. The same thing happens during the world dissolution. If one were to get merged with Pure *Brahma*, the person in deep sleep would not wake up again and after world dissolution, there would be no future creation. Therefore, *Sat Brahma* in the passage under discussion is *Sabija* or *Śabala Brahma*, not pure *Brahma*—for in the relative plane only we can talk of creation and causality. Moreover, liberated souls who are completely merged in Pure *Brahma* would have future births—as if we interpret *Sat* as *Nirbija Brahma*, such liberated souls would have the common characteristic of *Nirbijatva* with those in deep sleep and those at the time of world dissolution.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

(The objector attacks the Vedānta view of *Ajñāna* (ignorance) which is *Anādi* (without any beginning), *Anirvācya* (indescribable), having the power of concealing (*Āvaraṇa*) and also of projecting (*Vikṣepa*) and is not mere negation (*Abhāva*) but *Bhāvarūpa* (something positive). According to the objector, *Ajñāna* is mere *Abhāva*, *Agrahaṇa*, not grasped by sense-organs, i.e., false knowledge and its impressions and he says that such *Abhāva-rūpa Ajñāna* cannot be the attribute of *Brahma*).

Reply :—Knowledge alone burns (i.e., destroys) the seed (*Bīja* in the form of *Ajñāna*) and if such seed (i.e., *Ajñāna*) is not there, then knowledge itself becomes futile (without any utility). Therefore in that Śruti passage the word *Sat* with the seed of creation (i.e., *Ajñāna*) is described as *Prāṇa* and in all Śruti passages that alone is stated as the cause of creation. For this very reason pure (absolute *Nirguṇa*) *Brahma* is described as "beyond *Akṣara* (indestructible unmanifested) which on its part is beyond the manifested". "He is the unborn substratum of the superimposed cause (*Ābhyantara*) or effect

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(*Bāhya*);" "From whom speech turns away"; "Not this, Not this", etc.—in all these latter passages *Brahma* is described without the causal seed of creation of the phenomenal world. The Upaniṣad will hereafter state that what was so far described as *Prājña* (in the relative plane of the phenominal world) is in reality *Turīya*, without any seed (of *Ajñāna*) and free from any relationship with body, etc. The *Bījāvasthā*, (causal condition with the seed of ignorance) is experienced in this very body by the person who wakes up after sleep and says "till that time I did not know anything". In this way the Kārikā properly states that *Ātmā* is seated in this very body in these three ways.

Comments

According to Naiyāykas, *Ajñāna* is *Agrahana*, not grasped by sense organs, *Abhāvarūpa* (of the nature of negation), false knowledge and its impression and so it cannot be the attribute of *Brahma*. The reply of the Siddhāntin is that *Ajñāna* is *Pratyakṣa* as there is not only *Āvaraṇa* (concealment) but false projection (*Vikṣepa*) also which is *Pratyakṣa*. Mere *Agrahaṇa* or *Abhāva* is not *Pratyakṣa*. Further, absolute *Nirguṇa Brahma* cannot be the material cause of the universe, *Ajñāna* alone can be that material cause (*Upādāna Kāraṇa*).

Further *Ajñāna* is without beginning (*Anādi*). For example, I have the correct knowledge about *Yajñadatta* now—before that I had ignorance about him. Since when was that ignorance? Well! That ignorance has no beginning, i.,e., *Anādi*—only my knowledge about him destroys that ignorance. In the case of *Brahma* also, its *Ajñāna* is *Anādi* (without any beginning) but is destroyed by the correct knowledge of *Brahma*. Therefore *Ajñāna* cannot be mere *Agrahaṇa* or *Abhāva*. This means that we must postulate *Ajñāna*—ignorance, destroyed by the correct knowledge of *Brahma*, as the seed (cause) of *Saṁsāra* and that *Ajñāna* is *Anādi Anirvacanīya* and burnt by *Jñāna* and that proves that *Jñāna* is not futile. The purport of the whole discussion is to prove that in the above mentioned Śruti passage *Brahma* with the attribute (*Śabalatva*) of *Anādi, Anirvācya Ajñāna* seed is the cause of creation and that *Sat* and *Prāṇa* refer to *Avyākṛta* and not to absolute Brahma. The latter is untouched by cause and effect relationship. *Ābhyantara* means cause and *Bāhya* means effect. Both cause and effect are falsely superimposed on absolute *Brahma* who is described both by Śruti and Smṛti as *Kūṭastha*—the supreme unchangeable *Ātmā*. Mind and speech cannot reach it. Knower

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

of *Brahma* fears none. It is described negatively as "not this, not this". The Pure *Brahma* is described in the seventh Mantra. *Bījāvasthā* is experienced in this very body when one wakes up from sleep and says I knew nothing.

Madhva derives *Prājña* as *Pra+ajña*, i.e., one who is ignorant in sleep. But adjectives in the sixth mantra seem to identify him with *Sarvajña*.

The Upaniṣad uses *Vaiśvānara* while Gauḍapāda uses *Viśva* for him. In later Vedānta cogniser of the waking state in the individual is generally called *Viśva* and *Vaiśvānara* is used for *Samaṣṭi* cogniser of gross universe. Śaṅkara says that *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma* are ultimately the same and gives various reasons—the *saptāṅga* of *Adhidaiva* as applied to *Adhyātma*, adjectives like *sarvajña*, etc., applied to *Prājña*, etc.

Kuranārāyaṇa (of Rāmānuja School) takes the 29 Kārikās of the first chapter as part of the Upaniṣad and says with reference to the first Kārikā that the seer of the Mantra is Brahmā and he has seen the unity of all the three *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* which are the different forms of *Hari*. Madhva too offers a similar explanation.

Even though *Ātmā* is *Vibhu*—all pervasive—three distinct places are assigned to him in the three states, viz., right eye, mind and sky in the heart. Ānandagiri states that this is for meditation and sages experience the presence of these three at those respective places when in their meditation (*Dhyāna-niṣṭhaih*).

विश्वो हि स्थूलभुङ् नित्यं तैजसः प्रविविक्तभुक् ।
आनन्दभुक्तथा प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा भोगं निबोधत ।। ३ ।।

viśvo hi sthūlabhuṅ nityaṁ taijasaḥ praviviktabhuk.
ānaṇdabhuktathā prājñastridhā bhogaṁ nibodhata. (3)

Translation

Viśva always experiences gross objects. *Taijasa* subtle objects and *Prājña* the blissful. In this way know that experiences are threefold.

स्थूलं तर्पयते विश्वं प्रविविक्तं तु तैजसम् ।
आनन्दश्च तथा प्राज्ञं त्रिधा तृप्तिं निबोधत ।। ४ ।।

sthūlaṁ tarpayate viśvaṁ praviviktaṁ tu taijasaṁ.
ānandaśca tathā prājñaṁ tridhā tṛptiṁ nibodhata. (4)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Gross objects satisfy *Viśva*, subtle the *Taijasa* and blissful the *Prājña*. In this way know that satisfaction is threefold.

The two verses are explained earlier.

त्रिषु धामसु यद्भोज्यं भोक्ता यश्च प्रकीर्तितः।
वेदैतदुभयं यस्तु स भुञ्जानो न लिप्यते ॥ ५ ॥

triṣu dhāmasu yadbhojyaṁ bhoktā yaśca prakīrtitaḥ.
vedaitadubhayaṁ yastu sa bhunjāno na lipyate. (5)

Translation

He who knows both the objects of experience and the experiencer described in these three states (*Jāgrat, Svapna* and *Suṣupti*), i.e., who knows them as one—such person knowing them both and experiencing them is not affected even though experiencing them.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

In the three states—namely, *Jāgrat* (waking), etc., the object of experience is just one, appearing as threefold as gross, subtle and blissful. The experiencer also is just one called (threefold) as *Viśva, Taijasa* and *Prājña* on account of the connecting realisation as one, namely, "I am that" as also from the absence of distinction in the perceiver. He who knows both (the objects of experience and experiencer though one) appearing as many in the form of *Bhojya* and *Bhoktṛ* (objects of experience and experiencers) is not affected even though he experiences them. The reason is that all objects of experience are experienced by one and the same experiencer. *Ātmā* is not affected because the essential nature of a thing does not get modified by increase or decrease by experiencing that which is its object, e.g., the essential nature of fire is not modified by increase or decrease by its consuming wood.

Comments

The side result of the knowledge of objects of experience and experiencer is stated. Even though the object of experience is one—its being stated as threefold is only a secondary distinction. The connecting realisation of oneness of the experiencer in three states is this—I who was asleep, as dreaming, and who saw dream am now waking—this is the oneness of experiencer. Further there is no distinction of perceiver among *Prājña, Taijasa* and *Viśva* so far as *Ajñāna* and its effects are concerned and there is no authority to make such

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

distinction of perceivers. The second line of the Kārikā states that he who knows (such oneness of) both is not affected even though he experiences the objects. Illustration of fire is given. The essential nature does not get modified this way or that by its enjoying, i.e., consuming its own object, i.e., wood. The knower therefore does not suffer any contamination even though he enjoys the objects. Prof. Karmarkar observes that while explaining the text of the Upaniṣad in Kārikās Gauḍapāda does not explain adjectives like *Saptāṅga*, etc., as he does not think their explanation necessary for his main purpose. Prof. Bhattacharya unnecessarily reads much in this omission and bases a theory on that.

प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सतामिति विनिश्चयः।
सर्वं जनयति प्राणश्चेतोंऽशून् पुरुषः पृथक् ॥ ६ ॥

prabhavaḥ sarvabhāvānāṁ satāmiti viniścayaḥ
sarvaṁ janayati prāṇaścetoṁ'śūn puruṣaḥ pṛthak. (6)

(In the sixth mantra of the Upaniṣad, *Prājña* is described as the *Yoni* source of all, i.e., the cause of world creation. This Kārikā is intended to explain that mantra and to show that such world creation has a phenomenal or emperical existence and is not like a "son" of a barren woman totally non-existent— even though from the transcendental point of view, Absolute *Brahma* has no causality or cause and effect relationship).

Translation

It is an established rule that creation can only be of existing entities. *Prāṇa* (i.e., *Prāṇa-Puruṣa* when conditioned by the *Upādhi* of *Tamas*) creates all (Inanimate objects through *Māyā*); while *Puruṣa* (i.e., *Caitanya Pradhāna Puruṣa* one who is predominantly conscious) creates separately all (*Jīvas*) who are conscious beings (who are as it were rays of consciousness.)

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The creation of different forms like *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* can be possible only when they are existing in their essential nature of *Māyā* (illusion) having names and forms caused by *Avidyā* (ignorance). It has been stated earlier that there can be no son of barren woman either in reality or by illusion (3-28) as such a so-called son is non-existent in past, present or future. If there is creation of absolutely non-existent entities (even in the emperical sense) there would be nothing left to infer the real nature of *Brahma* and thus *Brahma* itself

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

would have to be declared as non-existent. It has been seen that a snake appears in the rope on account of the seed of *Māyā* (illusion) due to ignorance but such snake does pre-exist in the form of a rope. No one sees anywhere illusory objects like snake in rope, mirage, etc., without a substratum. Just as before the illusory appearance of a snake in a rope, the snake did exist in the form of a rope, similarly all entities before their (illusory) manifestation did exist in the form of (their substratum) *Prāṇa* (the seed, the existing unmanifested *Brahma*). For this reason, the Śruti also says "All this (phenomenal universe) is *Brahma*". "In the beginning all this existed as *Ātmā*".

Prāṇa creates everything, etc. *Puruṣa* who is predominantly of the nature of *Caitanya* (consciousness) creates *Jīvas* like the rays of consciousness, like reflections of the Sun in the water, manifested differently as *Viśva, Taijasa* and *Prājña* in various physical forms of gods, animals, etc. They are separate and different from inanimate objects and have the same characteristic (of concsciousness as *Cidātma*) like sparks which are similar to fire or the reflections of the Sun in water (which are similar to the Sun).

All other (inanimate objects) are created by *Prāṇa*—the *Bījātmā* (the causal self) like the spider producing the web (which is inanimate).

In support of the above, there is the Śruti text, "Just as sparks from the fire", etc.

Comments

In the sixth mantra of the Upaniṣad, *Prājña* (identified with *Adhidaiva, Avyākṛta Sarveśvara*) was described as *Yoni* source, i.e., the cause of the phenomenal universe. This Kārikā intends to establish that this phenomenal universe has its basis in Existence (of its substratum Brahma). The *Prāṇa Puruṣa* creates all the phenomenal inanimate universe with the *Upādhi* (i.e., conditioning) which is predominantly *Tamas* (ignorance). For this reason, for that *Puruṣa* who is such cause, the Kārikā uses the word *Prāṇa*. The *Puruṣa* who is predominantly *Caitanya* (consciousness) creates *Jīvas* as if they are the rays of consciousness or similar to reflections of the Sun. This is how the animate and inanimate world is created. This creation is in the nature of super-imposition, only as illusory appearance due to ignorance but it does exist in the form of its substratum *Brahma*. If we do not accept the existence of creation in the phenomenal, i.e., emperical plane and say that it is completely

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Asat (non-existent) even emperically, then we close the door of inferring the real nature of Absolute *Brahma.* (The seventh Mantra describes *Turīya* as *Avyavahārya* unrelated to anything. The same *Turīya Brahma* is stated to be threefold on the phenomenal plane (*Vyavahārya*) as *Viṣva, Taijasa* and *Prājña.* If the above mentioned three are non-existent even in a phenomenal sense—they are the door to realise *Turīya Brahma*—if they are totally non-existent, then *Turīya* would also have to be held as non-existent. The world creation is created by beginningless indefinable *Avidyā* (ignorance) called *Māyā* (illusion) which is the seed—and appears like an illusory snake in a rope. This world creation has its existence in its substratum *Brahma* as the illusory snake has its existence in its substratum the rope. Having explained the first line of the Kārikā in this way, Śaṅkara explains the second line. First he explains the creation of *Jīvas* and then of the inanimate objects.

Prāṇa, i.e., the seed, the unknown, the *Sat Brahma* the Causal self, creates the entire inanimate world (through *Māyā*) which before creation was in the form of *Prāṇa,* the *Bījātmā,* the causal self. Creates means manifests on the phenomenal plane.

The *Caitanya Puruṣa* (consciousness) creates *Jīvas* who are as it were like the rays of the Sun, of the nature of consciousness, of the likeness of *Caitanya.* They are different from inanimate objects. The *Jīvas* appear many on account of their different *Upādhis* (limitations). The illustration of sparks and fire is given to show that *Jīvas* are of the same nature as *Brahma.* The causal self, i.e., *Prāṇa* does not create them. *Jīvas* are not different from *Brahma* just as reflections of the Sun in water are not different from the Sun.

Prof. Karmarkar says that as Gauḍapāda believes in *Ajātivāda* (non-creation), verses 6 to 9 of the Kārikās, (i.e., verse 6 also) refer to the views of the opponents.

But Gauḍapāda does refer to *Māyā* seven times in his work. Here are a few illustrations. He says in 3-24, "*Ātmā* appears to have been created as the manifold universe through *Māyā.*" In 4-74 he says, The (*Brahma*) is born through *Saṁvṛtya,* i.e., through *Māyā.* In 3-15, he says that Śruti postulates creation as a device to ultimately lead to *Advaita.* Kārikā 1-18 says that all the *Vikalpa* of multiplicity is "*Upadeśāt* (*Pūrvaṁ*) *ayaṁ vādaḥ*", spoken of before the instruction of true knowledge, i.e., from the earlier

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

phenomenal point of view. The Gauḍapāda Kārikās are intended to explain the text of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. The seventh Mantra describes the *Turīya*—Absolute *Brahma*—as *Avyavahārya*. From 3 to 6 mantras, the same *Turīya* is explained as *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*, as *Vyavahārya*, i.e., on the relative or emperical plane. In the 6th Mantra, *Prājnā* (identified with *Adhidaiva Sarveśvara*) is described as *Yoni*, cause of world creation. This 6th Kārikā is intended to explain this *Prājña* as cause of world creation, as pointed out by Ānandagiri. Even though there is *Ajāti* from the absolute, i.e., transcendental point of view, we have to explain creation by *Bhūta-pūrva-gatyā*, i.e., from the earlier relative phenomenal point of view. The 7th Mantra itself says that *Turīya*—which is unthinkable, etc.—is to be *Vijñeya*, i.e., should be known. Śaṅkara points out that the word *Vijñeya* is used for *Turīya* with reference to the earier phenomenal point of view when the knower, knowledge and the known were conceived as different and separate. *Turīya* is not *Vijñeya* but *Jñāna-svarūpa* and above the triple distinction of *Jñāta*, *Jñāna* and *Jñeya*, not the object of *Jñāna*. Here in the sixth Kārikā also Gauḍapāda refers to creation and explains *Prājña* as *Yoni* (cause of creation) referred to in the 6th Mantra from "*Bhūta-pūrvagati*"—the earlier phenomenal point of view. It is therefore not necessary to differ from Śaṅkara's explanation and explain the 6th Kārikā as a view of the opponent as is stated by Prof. Karmarkar. *Bhūtapūrvagatyā* is also one of the explanations given by Śaṅkara of *Cetomukhaḥ* in the 5th Mantra.

That the illusory phenomenal universe has its basis in existing permanent *Brahma* is the main point of difference between Gauḍapāda and the currently known nihilism of Bauddhas; and this is the generally accepted interpretation of "this was not stated by Buddha" in 4-99, i.e., the *Satyatva* and *Nityatva* of *Ātmā* as the substratum of the illusory superimposed phenomenal universe was not taught by Buddha. Śaṅkara there points out that *Bhrama* cannot be *Niradhiṣṭhāna* (without a substratum).

Prof. Bhattacharya interprets the word *satāṁ* in the 6th Kārikā as "good wise sages" but that explanation does not fit in and is not proper. '*Sat*' in the sense of existing has a special significance here as pointed out by Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

विभूतिं प्रसवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकाः ।
स्वप्नमायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता ॥ ७ ॥

vibhūtiṁ prasavaṁ tvanye manyante sṛṣṭicintakāḥ.
svapnamāyāsarūpeti sṛṣṭiranyairvikalpitā. (7)

Translation

Others who think that there is (real) creation, believe that creation is the manifestation of the power of God, while others imagine that creation is like dream or illusion.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Those who think of (real) creation believe that creation is the manifestation of the power of God. But those who think about the ultimate reality take no interest in discussing theories about creation. The Śruti itself says that Indra assumes various forms through *Māyā*. The Juggler throws the rope in the sky, he appears to climb it with arms, then becomes invisible to the spectators, then falls down in pieces after a fight in the sky and then finally rises up alive. The spectators see all these tricks of Jugglery but take no interest in believing that all those make-believe tricks are real. In the same way, this manifestation of sleep, dream, etc., is like the throwing up of the rope by the Juggler; *Prājña*, *Taijasa*, etc., are like the Juggler appearing as seated on the rope while the real Juggler is (on the ground) quite different from the rope and (the make-believe) person who climbed on the rope. He is on the ground concealed by his illusion and therefore invisible. So is the ultimate reality called *Turīya*. For this very reason, worthy souls seeking liberation take no interest in these futile theories about creation. These theories are put forth only by those who believe in the reality of creation as some say that creation is like the dream or illusion.

Comments

In the context of the creation of animate and inanimate beings (about which Gaudapāda gave his own view in verse 6) he now states the views of others. Some believe that creation is the manifestation of the power of God. Others believe that creation is like dream or illusion. This view as dream or illusion is different from the illusion theory of the *Siddhāntin*—for there are some who believe that there is some truth or reality even in dream, e.g., Rāmānuja holds such a view. Some hold that there is reality in the illusory effect created by Jewels, etc.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Ānandagiri therefore observes that reference to the theory of dream and illusion in this verse 7 is not to the illusion theory of the Siddhāntin according to whom there is no reality in either dream or illusion. According to Vedānta, even objects in the waking state are illusory while according to those referred to in verse 7, there is reality in the waking state and as dream is based on the waking state, there is some reality in the dream state also. Worthy souls seeking liberation take no interest in futile discussions about theories of creation. Illustration of the Juggler and his rope trick is given. *Prājña, Taijasa* and *Viśva* on the phenomenal plane are compared to the make-believe Juggler climbing on the rope while *Turīya* is like the real Juggler standing aloof and invisible on the ground.

इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिरिति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः।
कालात् प्रसूतिं भूतानां मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकाः ॥ ८ ॥

icchāmātraṁ prabhoḥ sṛṣṭiriti sṛṣṭau viniścitaḥ.
kālāt prasūtiṁ bhūtānāṁ manyante kālacintakāḥ (8)

Translation

Creation is the mere manifestation of the will of the Lord say those who firmly believe in (real) creation. Those whose theory (about creation) is Time state that creation is brought about by Time.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

As the Lord's will never fails in being fruitful, creation is but the manifestation of the will of the Lord. Objects like pot, etc., are but the manifestation of the will (of the pot-maker)—nothing can be created without such a will. Some say that creation is brought about by Time.

Comments

Some other theories about creation are mentioned. *Kālacintakas* are the Astronomers (and astrologers) according to Ānandgiri. In *Gītā* 11-32 Kṛṣṇa calles himself *Kāla*, the destroyer of the universe and Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that this *Kāla* aspect might have been referred to here. Just as in making a pot, the pot-maker first thinks about it in his mind and then gives it an external shape, similarly the first line of this Kārikā says that the Lord first thinks about the universe and God's will is always fruitful—so say those who are *Īśvaravādins*.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

भोगार्थसृष्टिरित्यन्ये क्रीड़ार्थमिति चापरे ।
देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा ॥ ९ ॥

bhogartham sṛṣṭirityanye krīḍārthamiti cāpare.
devasyaiṣa svabhāvo' yamāptakāmasya kā spṛhā. (9)

Translation

Some others say that creation is for the sake of God's enjoyment; still others say it is for the sake of His sport. But we think that this is mere nature (i.e., *Māyā*) of the shining one; for how can the Lord have any craving when all His desires are fulfilled?

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Some others believe that creation is either for God's enjoyment or sport. These two views are refuted by stating that creation is but the nature (*Māyā*) of the shining one. Or affirming his view that creation is but the nature (*Māyā*) of the shining one, the author refutes all earlier theories, adding that there can be no craving in the Lord when all his desires are fulfilled. When a rope appears like a serpent, we cannot assign any reason for it except that it is *Avidyā* (ignorance) which is called *Svabhāva.*

Comments

Gauḍapāda gives two further theories about creation and feeling that it was futile to discuss these theories any further, he gives his own view that creation is but the nature *Svabhāva*—natural direct *Māyā*-illusion. Having affirmed this view as his own as *Siddhanta,* viz., that creation is the natural *Māyā* of the *Māyāvī* Lord, he refutes the two views in the first line or all earlier views of others. The various theories mentioned are: (1) manifestation of God's power; (2) creation is like dream or illusion as explained in notes on verse 7 where too reference is intended to the *Satya Saṅkalpatva* of God, i.e., God's will is always fruitful; (3) creation is brought about by Time, God being indifferent; (4) creation is for God's enjoyment; (5) or for God's sport. All these theories are refuted by the author by stating that God can have no craving as all his desires are fulfilled. Without *Māyā,* there is no useful purpose to manifest *Vibhūti. Svapna* and *Māyā* cannot be real. The Lord is without any *Vikāra* and so cannot have any will or desire for enjoyment or sport. All this leads us to saying that creation is due to *Māyā* (illusion) alone. The rope is the substratum on which a serpent is superimposed by ignorance.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

This *Avidyā* itself is called *Svabhāva* or *Māyā*. Śruti also says that *Ātmā* appears as *Ākāśa*. Regarding Time being the cause of creation, there is no authority to say so(Ānandagiri).

Prof. Karmarkar thinks that the view that creation is but the *Svabhāva* is not the view of Gauḍapāda but of some others who can be labelled as *Svabhāva-Vādins*. As a matter of fact none of the views in Kārikās 6 to 9 is that of Gauḍapāda according to him. But it appears, as pointed out by Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri, on verse 6, that verse 6 gives the view of creation, from the phenomenal (*Vyavahārya*) point of view, before the rise of correct knowledge and here in verse 9 *Svabhāva* means *Māyā*. In *Kevalādvaita*, as pointed out by Śaṅkara on Brahma-sūtra 2-1-33, *Svabhāva* is specifically interpreted as *Māyā*, and in *Gītā* 5-14 also *Svabhāva* is interpreted as *Māyā* or *Ajñāna*. It is but natural to hold that Gauḍapāda the acknowledged Paramaguru of Śaṅkara also uses *Svabhāva* in the sense of *Māyā*. Even though Gauḍapāda says that the ultimate reality is *Ajāti* (non-creation), from the empirical point of view he does refer to *Māyā* as the cause as discussed in notes on verse 6 above.

In this connection, it may be noted that both according to the Schools of Madhva and Rāmānuja *Svabhāva* is the view of *Siddhānta* in this Kārikā but they interpet *Svabhāva* not as *Māyā* but as *Līlārūpa Svabhāva*—nature in the form of *Līlā*.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Now the fourth quarter coming in order is to be stated—beginning with words—"Not conscious of the internal world", etc. As there is no ground to describe *Turīya* by means of any words, it is indescribable by words and therefore *Turīya* is indicated by the negation of all attributes.

Objection :—In that case it is just void (*Śūnya*) only.

Reply :—No. There cannot be any erroneous understanding without any substratum. It is not possible to imagine the illusions of silver or snake or a man or mirage, etc., without their respective substratum of a shell or rope or stump or saline soil respectively.

Comments

After describing the three quarters, the Upaniṣad now starts describing the fourth quarter. The reason why the fourth quarter *Turīya* is described negatively is this. For being described by words, there would be attiributes with a genetive case for the possessor of those attributes. *Turīya* is without

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

that and therefore cannot be described affirmatively or positively by words. It can be described only negatively. But *Turīya* is not void, i.e., *Śūnya*; for all illusory appearances have an existing substratum, e.g., illusion of silver has the substratum of a shell, etc. Similarly, illusory appearance of *Prāṇa*, etc., cannot be without a substratum. So, *Turīya* is not mere void.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection :—In that case, as *Turiya* is the substratum of all illusory appearances of *Prāṇa*, etc., it should be describable by words in the same way as a pot which is the substratum of water is describable by words.

Reply :—No. Appearances of *Prāṇa*, etc., are illusory like the illusory appearance of silver on a shell; the relation between the real and the unreal cannot be described by words; as such relation itself is non-existing.

Turīya cannot be the object of any other *Pramāṇa* (instrument of knowledge), e.g., *Pratyakṣa* (direct perception) like a cow, etc., on account of its own extraordinary nature, as *Ātmā* is without any *Upādhis* (attributes). *Ātmā* also does not possess any *Jāti* (generic property) like the cow (having *gotva* i.e., cowness) as it is non-dual and has no generic or specific characteristics. It cannot be indicated with reference to any activity like a cook (having the activity of cooking) as it is (without activity being) unchangeable. It cannot be described by any attributes like blue, etc., as it is without any attribute.

Comments

If *Turīya* is to be described by words, how can it be done? (1) *Ṣaṣṭhī*, i.e., genetive case to be applied to *Turīya* for possessing any attributes? (2) Is there any *Rūḍhi*—conventional way of decribing it? (3) Has *Turīya* any *Jāti* or generic characteristic? (4) Has it any activity? (5) Has it any *Guṇa* or attribute? As *Turīya* has a unique nature of its own and has no *Upādhis* (limitations) of any kind, none of the above mentioned five alternatives are available for describing *Turīya* by words.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Therefore, *Turīya* cannot be described by words.

Objection :—In that case, it is like the horns of a hare and any effort to know it is futile.

Reply :—No. When *Turīya* is realised as *Atma* itself, all cravings for non-self are destroyed; just as the knowledge of the shell removes the craving for (illusory) silver. There is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

no possibility of any vitiating errors like ignorance, cravings, etc., once it is realised that *Turīya* is *Ātmā* itself. There is no reason why *Turīya* should not be known as identical with *Ātmā*. For, all Upaniṣads end in pointing out this very aim, e.g., "that thou art", "this *Ātmā* is *Brahma*", "that is Real, that is *Ātmā*", "*Brahma* is realised directly and immediately"; "He is both without and within and unborn (causeless)"; "All this is verily *Ātmā*", etc.

Comments

If *Turīya* cannot be described by words, is it like the horns of a hare and is all effort to know it is futile? The Reply is No. The effort is not futile. For, once when *Turīya* is realised as identical with one's own *Ātmā*, all delusions, vitiating errors, ignorance, cravings for all illusory non-self objects are destroyed; in the same way as desire for grasping illusory silver is removed on having the correct knowledge of the shell. To point out this identity of *Turīya* with *Ātmā* is the main purpose of all Upanisads, e.g., "that thou art", etc.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

This very *Ātmā* in its real and unreal aspects is described as having four quarters. In its unreal aspect which is due to ignorance, having the characteristics of three quarters, it is like the illusory appearance of a serpent on a rope and is of the nature of the seed and the sprout (subject to causality, i.e., the relationship of cause and effcet). Now is being described the real nature of *Ātmā* which is not of the nature of seed and sprout (i.e., not subject to causality, i.e., without any kind of relationship of cause and effect), which is like the substratum of rope (on which there is an illusory appearance of a serpent) by negating the earlier stated three quarters which are like the superimposed illusory serpent (on a rope), viz., "Not conscious of the internal world, etc".

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Seventh Mantra

नान्तःप्रज्ञं न बहिष्प्रज्ञं नोभयतः प्रज्ञं न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम् ।
अदृश्यमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं
प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः ।। ७ ।।

nāntaḥ prajñaṁ na bahiṣprajñaṁ nobhayataḥ prajñaṁ na prajñānaghanaṁ na prajñam nāprajñaṁ.
adṛśyaamavyavahāryamagrāhyamalakṣaṇamacintyamavyapadeśyamekātmapratyayasāraṁ prapañcopaśamaṁ śāntaṁ śivamadvaitaṁ caturthaṁ manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeyaḥ. (7)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

This *Turīya* is not conscious of the internal world, not conscious of the external world, not conscious of both, not a mass of consciousness, not mere consciousness, not without consciousness; it is unseen, not related to anything, urgraspable, uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable, of the essence of consciousness constituting the self alone, where there is cessation of the phenomenal world (i.e., the three states of waking, dream and sleep) peaceful, all bliss and non-dual.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection :—After having stated that *Ātmā* has four quarters, the three quarters are described and thus the fourth quarter is from this very fact recognised as other than the first three, viz., that the fourth is not conscious of the internal world, etc. Therefore it is now futile to once again indicate that *Turīya* is not conscious of the internal world, etc.

Reply :—No. Just as the real nature of the rope can be recognised only by negating the illusory apperance of a snake, etc., similarly it is intended to establish that this very *Ātmā* having the three illusory appearances in the nature of three states (of waking, dream and sleep) is *Turīya* itself. This is done in the same way as in (the Upaniṣadic *Mahāvākya*) "That thou art".

Comments

The seventh mantra is intended to show that *Turīya* can be described only in negative terms and not affirmatively. The first three quarters are of the nature of seed and sprout, i.e., are subject to cause and effect relationsip. But *Turīya* is not subject to cause and effect relationship. Even though by describing the first three quarters, we know that *Turīya* is different from them, still it is necessary to point out that the *Ātmā* with the three illusory states of waking dream and sleep is *Turīya* itself. Even though this *Ātmā*, i.e., *Turīya* is self-luminous and needs no other light, still it is necessary to negate the superimposed three states for the correct knowledge of *Turīya*. This Mantra is intended to instruct that the *Jīvātmā* is *Turīya*, i.e., *Brahma*. Even though in the *Mahāvākya* "That thou art", the statement is made in an affirmative manner we have to take both the words "That" and "thou" only in the secondary sense (*Lakṣyārtha*); similarly we have to understand the purport here that the negative description in this Mantra is to establish that this very *Ātmā* in three states is none but *Turīya Brahma* itself.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

If *Turīya* were completely different from *Ātmā* having these three (illusory) states, then the teachings of the scriptures would have no meaning at all as in that case there would be no door (opening), or means to have the knowledge of *Turīya* or we would have to declare that *Turīya* is non-existent void.

Comments

There is an apparent difference between *Ātmā* as characterised by the three states and *Turīya Ātmā* without being so characterised but there is no absolute difference between such characterised *Ātmā* in three states and uncharacterised *Turīya*; for this reason, *Turīya* is not different in substance from such characterised *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. If *Turīya* were completely different from them, the door or opening or means of knowing *Turīya* through *Viśva*, etc., would not be available as there would then be no relation between them, they then being absolutely different. There being no other means of knowing *Turīya* there would be no knowledge of *Turīya*. Then the scriptures talking of *Turīya* would be futile. Śāstra negates the special illusory characteristics of *Ātmā* after first mentioning them and instructs that the uncharacterised *Ātmā* itself is *Turīya*. If the objector says "why should we know *Turīya* at all?" the reply is that in that case we would have to conclude that *Turīya* is non-existent void; for *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are here described and are then negated and this would lead to the conclusion that there is no *Ātmā* and lead to nihilism.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Just as a rope is mistakenly believed as a serpent, etc., similarly one and the same *Ātmā* in the three states is mistakenly believed as "conscious of the internal world" (*Antaḥ-prajña*), etc., and when with the instrument of knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) it is known that the characteristics of *Antaḥ-prajñatva* are negated, at that very moment there is finally established, as a result, the cessation of the unreal phenomenal world superimposed on *Ātmā*. For this reason, no further instrument of knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) or aid is to be sought for the realisation of *Turīya*.

Comments

The objector says "Very, well. Theory of duality may have defects but what is the *Phala* or reward of believing in *Advaita*? Does it require any other *Pramāṇa* or aid? The reply

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

is : the rope is mistaken for serpent, etc. Similarly the same *Ātmā* in three states is mistaken for *Antaḥ-prājña*, etc. After describing them, those charateristics of *Antaḥ-prajñatva* are negated. This very *Pramāṇa* at that very moment produces the *Phala* of the cessation of the unreal phenomenal world. Therefore, for the realisation of *Turīya* no further additional *Pramāṇa* or aid is to be sought. The *Mahāvākya* of the scripture alone is enough; for *Tyrīya* is unrelated to anything and is directly cognised (*aparokṣa*). Even an aid like *Prasamkhyāna* (meditation) is not necessary as meditation does not produce any *Pramā* or correct knowledge.

Śāṅkara Bhāṣya

When there is the discriminating knowledge that this is a rope and not a serpent at that very moment the result is the cessation of the appearance of a snake, etc., and no one seeks any additional *Pramāṇa* or aid for revealing the rope. Similarly in the case of the realisation of the *Ātmā*, cessation of the unreal phenomenal world is the *Phala* (result, reward) and no additional *Phala* or *Pramāṇa* or aid is to be sought for the realisation of (the self-luminous) *Ātmā*.

(Some people believe that mere cessation of the appearance of a snake, etc., is not the *Phala* (result, reward) but the revealing of the object called rope is the *Phala* or the instrument of knowledge and they argue that) when we have the knowledge of the pot, at that time the *Pramāṇa* (instrument of knowledge) does not merely remove darkness but there is the employment of something distinct and positive which reveals the object, namely, the pot.

(To this argument we reply that) it is as good as saying that when there is an activity of cutting wood, etc., apart from separating the two parts, the activity of cutting adds something positive to each of the parts cut. (But apart from the separation of the two parts no one believes that any additional positive element is added to those two parts which are cut).

Comments

In the illustration of rope mistaken as serpent, when serpent is negated, no one seeks any other *Phala*, *Pramāṇa* or *Sādhana* for revealing the rope, as rope is then automatically ascertained. If any additional positive element is postulated to reveal the object rope it would be as absurd as saying

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

that when there is an activity of cutting wood in two parts that activity of cutting adds some positive element in the two parts that are cut.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Just as in the case of the activity of cutting the wood in two parts, that activity is complete, as soon as that result of severance of the two parts is brought about, similarly in the case of discriminating pot from darkness, the *Pramāṇa* (instrument of knowledge) completes its function by bringing about the removal of unwanted darkness and the knowledge of the pot is then (simultaneous) and automatic. (And no additional *Pramāṇa* or aid is necessary for the knowledge of the pot). Knowledge of the pot is (therefore) not the *Phala* (or the result) of the *Pramāṇa* (which is exhausted on the removal of darkness).

Comments

Bhāṣyakara replies to the argument that if *Pramāṇa* is exhausted on removal of ignorance, then there is no other *Pramāṇa* to reveal the object (of which there was ignorance) and thus that object will remain unknown. In reply, the illustration of the pot concealed by unwanted darkness is given. Such a pot covered by darkness was not available for use. As soon as that unwanted darkness is removed, the *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa* (direct perception) exhausts its function and the knowledge of the pot is then simultaneous and automatic (*Ārthika*). It is not the *Phala* or result of *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa* which has completed its function in removing darkness. Of course, that knowledge of the pot by the perceiver is not of long duration as the activity of the perceiver is not steady. The other illustration is that of cutting wood in two parts. The act of cutting is complete as soon as the two parts are severed. Nothing additional is employed or added to either of the two parts thereafter.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The *Pramāṇa* producing knowledge which negates the attributes and is directed towards discriminnating *Antaḥ-prajñatva*, etc., superimposed on *Turīya Ātmā* has no further function except negating such unwanted attributes as "*Antaḥ-prajña*, etc., and cannot function further in (revealing) *Turīya* (which is self-luminous). The reason is that as soon as there is negation of attributes like *Antaḥ-prajñatva*, etc., at that very moment, simultaneously, there is a cessation of all

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

distinctions of knower, known and knowledge. The same will be stated later on, viz., "When the Highest truth is realised, duality ceases to exist". After the moment of the cessation of duality, knowledge of duality cannot exist even for another moment. If such knowledge continues to exist, there would be *Anavasthā* defect *regressus ad infinitum* and therefore duality would never cease to exist.

Comments

In the illustration of pot covered by darkness it may be possible to argue that the *Pramāṇa* which has the *Phala* of removing darkness has also for its *Phala* (result) the revealing of the pot as in this case the pot is *Jaḍa*, i.e., insentient. But *Turīya Ātmā* is *Cetana* and self-luminous and therefore the *Pramāṇa* which has the *Phala* (result) of negating attributes like *Antaḥprajñatva*, etc., cannot have any further *Phala* (result) of revealing self-luminous *Cetana* (sentient) *Turīya*. Simultaneously with the negation of attributes like "*Antaḥprajñā*, etc., there is cessation of duality and with that all distinctions of knower, known and knowledge cease to exist. If knowledge of duality continues to exist thereafter, there would be *Anavasthā* defect. If there is then no knower, how can such knowledge of duality stand without the *Āśraya* of the knower?

Śāṅkara Bhāṣya

Therefore it is established that the cessation of the unreal attributes like *Antaḥprajña*, etc., superimposed on *Ātmā* is simultaneous with the *Pramāṇa* which is the knowledge negating all duality.

(In the Upaniṣadic Mantra) by the word "not conscious of the internal world" is meant that *Turīya* is not *Taijasa*. By the word "not conscious of the external world" is meant that it is not *Viśva*. By stating that it is not conscious of either, the intermediate state between waking and dream is denied. By stating that it is not a mass of consciousness, the state of sleep is denied. It (state of sleep) is of the nature of seed (cause of dream and waking) and (there is ignorance) which cannot discriminate between Truth and error. By stating that it is "not *Prajña*" there is an altogether denial of *Turīya* being of the category of *Pramātṛ* (knower) of all objects. By stating that it is neither *Aprajña* it is meant that *Turīya* is not *Acetana* (insentient).

Comments

Knowledge, after the moment it arises, exhausts itself in negating duality and thereafter it does not remain any

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

more to reveal *Turīya* which is self-luminous, as function of knowledge was to remove the unreal superimpsed attributes on *Turīya* only. Revelation of *Turīya* is not the function or *Phala* of that the *Pramāṇa* which is *Jñāna.*

Deep sleep is the seed or cause of dream and waking. At that time there is neither particular or general knowledge. It is one indistinguishable common mass of everything. *Turīya* is stated as different from *Prājña* of the deep sleep.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection :—But how do you say that attributes like *Antaḥprajña* which are directly perceived are unreal like the snake, etc., superimposed on a rope?

Reply :—Even though they (*Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña*) are really of the essence of consciousness (from the point of view of their substratum) yet they mutually change from one condition to another as do the various appearances of a snake, line of water, etc., on a rope which is their substratum. But the consciousness itself is real as it does not change.

Objection :—Consciousness does appear to change in deep sleep.

Reply :—No. There is an experience of the state of sleep. Śruti also says, "Knowledge of the knower is never absent".

Comments

In the case of the illustration of rope mistaken as snake, the objector says, there is error and therefore what is negated is unreal but in *Ātmā* attributes like *Antaḥprājña* are directly perceived and they therefore should not be called unreal.

The reply is that, changes whatever, cannot be real. Rope does not change. Snake, line of water, etc., are appearances on the substratum rope and they change therefore they are unreal. In the three states, consciousness is the substratum which is constant but the attributes like *Anaḥprājña*, etc., are changing and therefore they are unreal. In sleep also the substratum of consciousness does exist, for after waking from sleep, we have the experience of sleep—otherwise who experienced that sleep? The Śruti cited also says that knowledge of the knower is never absent.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Therefore it (*Turīya*) is unseen. As it is unseen it is not capable of being dealt with (*avyavahārya*); it cannot be grasped by organs of action. It is uninferable as it has no common

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

characteristic for *Anumāna* (inference). For this very reason it is unthinkable and therefore cannot be described by words. Its essence is the certainty of the same *Ātmā* (in the three states), i.e., it should be known by the conviction that there is this same unchanging *Ātmā* in the three states like waking, etc., or in the knowledge of *Turīya*, cognition of *Ātmā* is the proof (*Sāra*, i.e., *Pramāṇa*); for the Śruti says that it should be meditated upon as *Ātmā*.

Comments

Turīya is *Nirviśeṣa* (without attributes) and therefore it is described by this *Niṣedha-Śāstra*. *Adṛṣṭa* by organs of knowledge; *Agrāhya* by organs of action and therefore *Aliṅgaṁ* uninferable. Its essence is the conviction that there is the same unchanging *Ātmā* in the three states—this phrase is intended to show that *Turīya*, described in a negative way, is not *Śūnya* or non-existent. Bhāṣyakāra gives an alternative explanation of this phrase. In the first explanation *Turīya* is described indirectly as the unchanging *Ātmā* in three states. The second explanation is to show that *Turīya* can be directly cognised as *Ātmā*—as the Śruti says that it should be mediated upon as *Ātmā*. *Turīya* is beyond speech and mind and known from Śruti. It is one homogeneous essence, *Paramātma*, and one should rest in Him, realising Him as his own individual *Ātmā*—this *Turīya* is beyond the three states of waking, dream and sleep, it is directly cognised, eternal knowledge itself. This is known from the Śruti.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

So far, there was made a negation of attributes like *Antaḥ-prajña*, etc., which are the attributes of the experience of the three states (*Sthānī-dharma*). Now (the Upaniṣad) mentions the negation of the attributes of the three states themselves (*Sthāna-dharma*) by saying that there is a cessation of the phenomenal universe. Hence it is peaceful, all bliss, non-dual, devoid of any illusory multiplicity, the fourth, and is known as *Turīya*—as it is different in nature from the three quarters which are only appearances. "This is *Ātmā* and is to be known" is the meaning of the *Mahāvākya* "that thou art" and it is like knowing the rope realised as distinct from the illusory appearances of a snake, hole in the ground, a stick, etc. This is described by such Śruti texts as "the unseen seer", "the knowledge of the knower is never absent". One who is so described is to be known. "To be known"—this phrase is used from the standpoint of the earlier unknown condition, for

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

once *Ātmā* is realised, all duality ceases to exist (and there is no distinction of knower), known and knowledge and thus without the knower we cannot speak of "to be known").

Comments

"Peaceful" means without attachment or hatred, etc. and *Kuṭasth*—unchangeable". All bliss means pure and of the nature of highest bliss. *Turīya* is called fourth with reference to the three other quarters which are mere illusory appearances. Of these appearances, the *Sākṣin* is *Turīya* and for that the Śruti is cited that the knowledge of this knower is never absent. Here it is said that *Turīya* is to be known—this statement is made from the standpoint of the earlier condition of ignorance. Once there is realisation of *Ātmā*, all duality ceases to exist and there is no distinction of knower, known and knowledge and without a knower, we cannot speak of "to be known".

Here are these verses.

Gauḍaoāda Kārikā

निवृत्तेः सर्वदुःखानामीशानः प्रभुरव्ययः ।
अद्वैतः सर्वभावानां देवस्तुर्यो विभुः स्मृतः ॥ १० ॥

nivṛtteḥ sarvaduḥkhānāmīśānaḥ prabhuravyayaḥ.
advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānāṁ devasturyo vibhuḥ smṛtaḥ. (10)

Translation

Turīya Ātmā is known as the Superme Lord capable of controlling the cessation of all miseries. He is changeless and non-dual among all entities, all-pervading and luminous.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The Supreme Lord *Turīya Ātmā* is capable of controlling the cessation of all miseries in the nature of *Prājña, Taijasa* and *Viśva* (of the three states). *Iśāna* means the capable supreme Lord, i.e., he is capable of controlling the cessation of miseries. For there is cessation of all miseries when one has Its knowledge. *Avyaya* means one whose nature does not change. Why is it so? Because this *Turīya* is non-dual as all other entities are unreal (illusory) like a snake superimposed by mistake on a rope, This is the *Deva* being luminous, known as *Turīya*—the fourth and all-pervading.

Comments

The following verses are meant for explaining the 7th Mantra of the Upaniṣad *Na Antaḥprajña*, etc., *Turīya* is cal-

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

led all-pervading because all the three states arise from it; without *Turīya* the three states cannot contain *Ātmā* within them. Of all miseries (*Ādhyātmika*, *Ādhidaiva* and *Ādhibhautika*), i.e., of the experiences of these miseries, viz., *Prājña*, *Taijasa* and *Viśva*. The miseries cease only when one has the knowledge of *Turīya*. *Turīya* is changeless by nature and therefore non-dual, not being mutable or perishable. Even though *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, etc., are visible still they are all as unreal and illusory as a snake superimposed on a rope. This characteristic of *Turīya* as beyond the three states is established by the experience of the realised souls.

कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।
प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तौ तुर्ये न सिध्यतः ।। ११ ।।

kāryakāraṇabaddhau tāviṣyete viśvataijasau.
prājñaḥ kāraṇabaddhastu dvau tau turye na sidhyataḥ. (11)

Translation

Viśva and *Taijasa* are known as bound (conditioned) by effect and cause (i.e., *Phala* the fruit or result and *Bīja* the seed). *Prājña* is bound only by cause (seed). But the two (cause and effect) do not exist (have no place in) *Turīya*.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

In order to ascertain the real nature of *Turīya*, the general and particular characteristics of *Viśva*, etc., are described. *Kārya*, i.e., effect, that which is done, is the fruit (result). *Kāraṇa*, i.e., cause, that which does, is the seed. *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are known as conditioned by seed and fruit (result) in the form of non-apprehension and falsely projected mis-apprehension. But *Prājña* is conditioned only by the seed (i.e., nonapprehension only). The non-apprehension only is the seed and this is the reason why he is *Prājña*. But the seed and fruit (i.e., cause and effect) in the form of non-apprehension and mis-apprehension do not exist or are possible in *Turīya*.

Comments

The nature of *Turīya* is ascertained by describing the common and special characteristics of *Viśva*, etc. The common characteristic of *Viśva* and *Taijasa* is that in both there is non-apprehension of reality (which is cause or seed) and also the falsely projected mis-apprehension in the nature of the phenomenal world (which is the effect or the fruit). In *Prājña* there is only non-apprehension of reality (i.e., only cause or the seed). Having described their mutually different characteristics, the nature of *Turīya* is described—both these characteristics

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(non-apprehension and misapprehension do not exist in *Turīya* which is homogeneous *Cetana* of one stable Tenor.

नात्मानं न परांश्चैव न सत्यं नापि चानृतम् ।
प्राज्ञः किंचन संवेत्ति तुर्यं तत् सर्वदृक्सदा ।। १२ ।।

nātmānaṁ na parāṁścaiva na satyaṁ nāpi cānṛtaṁ.
prājñaḥ kiṁcana saṁvetti turyaṁ tat sarvadṛksadā.

Translation

Prājña does not know either the *Ātmā* (Self) or others as a matter of fact, either the truth or untruth. But *Turīya* is always all-seeing.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Now is being explained how *Prājña* is conditioned by the cause and how the bonds (conditionings) of non-apprehension of reality and falsely projected misapprehension do not exist (are not possible) in *Turīya*. Because *Prājña* does not apprehend the duality (of the phenomenal world) which is born of the seed in the nature of ignorance and which is (falsely projected as) other than *Ātmā* (Self) in the way as both *Viśva* and *Taijasa* do and therefore *Prājña* is bound (conditioned) only by ignorance being the non-apprehension of reality and which is the cause (seed) of the falsely projected misapprehension. As *Turīya* is all-seeing, always sees all; there being nothing other than *Turīya*, it always sees all; therefore in him there is no seed (or cause) of non-apprehension of reality. Because of this, there is also the absence of projected misapprehension born of (caused by) such non-apprehension. For, in the Sun who is always shining, there is no possibility of anything (like darkness) contrary to light or any other kind of light (false projection). The Śruti says, "The knowledge of the knower is never absent". An alternative explanation of the phrase *Sarvadṛk* is this—*Turīya* is all-seeing as it is subsisting in all, even in the states of waking and dream and those that appear to be the cognisers of all entities in the three states are but *Turīya* only. There is the Śruti passage to support this explanation. "There is no other seer than this."

Comments

The word *Anṛtam* in the Kārikā means projection born of the seed (cause), namely, the ignorance of Reality. As there is absence of anything other than *Turīya*, *Turīya* itself is *Sarva* all and it is of the nature of *Dṛk* knowledge. It is full

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

and homogeneous *Cetana* of one tenor (*Cidekatāna*). It is not the cause of anything and thus has no effect also.

द्वैतस्याग्रहणं तुल्यमुभयोः प्राज्ञतुर्ययोः ।
बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः सा च तुर्ये न विद्यते ।। १३ ।।

dvaitasyāgrahaṇaṁ tulyamubhayoḥ prājñaturyayoḥ.
bījanidrāyutaḥ prājñaḥ sā ca turye na vidyate. (13)

Want of knowledge of duality is common to both *Prājña* and *Turīya* but *Prājña* is associated with sleep in the form of seed (cause) while such sleep does not exist in *Turīya*.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

This verse is intended to remove the doubt arising on another ground. How is it that when want of knowledge of duality is common to both *Prājña* and *Turīya*, *Prājña* alone is bound by the cause while *Turīya* has no such bondage? The reason is this. *Prājña* is associated with the sleep in the form of seed (cause). Sleep here means non-aprehension of reality. That (sleep) is the seed (cause) of the birth of the cognition of diverse multiplicity. This is called sleep in the form of seed (cause). *Prājña* is associated with that (sleep). But in *Turīya* such sleep in the form of non-apprehension of Reality does not exist; for *Turīya* is always of the nature of knowledge. Therefore there is no bondage of cause in *Turīya*—this is the meaning.

Comments

The objector argues in this way:—"*Turīya* is bound by the cause (seed) as *Turīya* has want of knowledge of duality like *Prājña*. This verse refutes this argument. *Prājña's* position invariably precedes the subsequently arising positions of waking (*Viśva*), etc., which are his effects and thus *Prājña* being the cause is called bound by the cause. This is not so in the case of *Turīya*. It has already been proved that *Turīya* is pure *Cetana* and the objector's argument associating seed, cause or ignorance in *Turīya* is a day too late (*Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*). For otherwise that purity would be contradicted. The objector's argument would also associate *Turīya* with the subsequently arising cognition of diverse multiplicity like that of *Prājña*. On account of these two defects, the objector's argument is not tenable.

स्वप्ननिद्रायुतावाद्यौ प्राज्ञस्त्वस्वप्ननिद्रया ।
न निद्रां नैव च स्वप्नं तुर्ये पश्यन्ति निश्चिताः ।। १४ ।।

svapnanidrāyutāvādyau prājāastvasvapnanidrayā.
na nidrāṁ naiva ca svapnaṁ turye paśyanti niścitāḥ. (14)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

The first two (*Viśva* and *Taijasa*) are associated with dream and sleep. *Prājña* is associated with sleep only but those who are certain about the truth see that there is neither sleep nor dream in *Turīya*.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Dream means falsely projected misapprehension of something else like the falsely pojected misapprehension of a snake on a rope. Sleep is already explained as a non-apprehension of reality, i.e., darkness (ignorance). Both *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are associated with such dream and sleep; therfore they both are said to be bound by cause and effect. *Prājña*, on the other hand, is associated with only sleep without any dream and is therefore said to be bound only by cause but those who are certain about the truth, i.e., those who know *Brahma* do not see either the cause or effect in *Turīya* as that is not consistent with the nature of *Turīya* like darkness in the Sun. For this reason, *Turīya* is described as not bound either by cause or effect.

Comments

To explain "Dream", the illustration of a rope mistaken for a serpent is given. The word "dream" is used here in a special sense. Even though *Viśva* is in the waking state, he is still called associated with "dream" and classed alongwith *Taijasa* of the dream state because the word "dream" here means mistakenly seeing something else in place of the real thing, i.e., to falsely superimpose something else on the substratum and this feature is common to both *Viśva* and *Taijasa* as in both waking and dream *Ātmā* (who is different from body) is mistakenly taken as body, etc., and this is "dream" or misapprehension as something else.

Similarly "sleep" is also used in the sense of absence of knowledge of reality. Both *Viśva* and *Taijasa* have sleep (want of knowledge of Reality) and dream (false projection of duality on the substratum *Ātmā*). *Prājña* has only ignorance of reality (sleep) but no false projection (dream). Neither sleep, i. e., ignorance nor false projection called dream exists in *Turīya*. *Turīya* is always of the nature of knowledge and ignorance is inconsistent with it as darkness is inconsistent with the shining Sun.

अन्यथा गृह्यतः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः ।
विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमश्नुते ।। १५ ।।

anyathā gṛhyataḥ svapno nidrā tattvamajānataḥ.
viparyāse tayoḥ kṣīṇe turīyaṁ padamaśnute. (15)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Misapprehension of Reality as something else is dream and non-apprehension (i.e., want of knowledge) of Reality is sleep. When the erroneous knowledge in the nature of these two (sleep and dream) disappears, *Turīya* is realised.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

When does one become firmly certain about the nature of *Turīya*? The reply is stated. In both the waking and the dream states there is "dream" as in both the states Reality is misapprehended as something else just as a rope is misapprehended as a serpant. "Sleep", i.e., want of knowledge of Reality is common for all the three states (of waking, dream and sleep). As both "dream" and "sleep" are the common features of *Viśva* and *Taijasa* they are placed in one class. As in them "dream" (misapprehension of reality as something else) is predominant and "sleep" (want of knowledge of Reality) is in the background (less predominant) the inversion (erroneous knowledge) in the case of these two (*Visva* and *Taijasa*) is therefore called "dream". In the third state (*Suṣupti*) there is only "sleep", i.e., want of the knowledge of Reality—and therefore inversion (erroneous knowledge) in the case of *Prājña* is called sleep only. With the disappearance of the inversion (erroneous knowledge) of these two (*Viśva Taijasa* as forming one class and *Prājña* as forming the other class) of the nature of effect and cause, i.e., with the disappearance of the (erroneous knowledge) which is of the nature of misapprehension of something else for reality and non-apprehension of reality, which are the bondages in the nature of cause and effect, by the correct knowledge of the Highest Reality, one realises *Turīya*; one ceases to see any of the two bondages and one becomes firmly established in *Turīya*.

Comments

The author now states when there is "dream", when, "sleep" and when, the realisation of *Turīya*. The two states of waking and dream are treated as of one class called "dream" as in both of them there is false projection of duality along with ignorance of reality. The "deep sleep" state is classed separately as "sleep" as there is mere ignorance of reality but no false projection of duality. Of course, in all the three states of waking, dream and sleep there is ignorance of reality. Ignorance is the cause and thereafter further false projection is the effect. These cause and effect are bondages. This ignorance as well false projection are called *Viparyāsa* inversion— erro-

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

neous knowledge of Reality. *Turīya* is pure *Cetana* and in it there is no such *Viparyāsa* either of ignorance of reality or false projection. One gets firmly established in *Turīya* when one has the correct knowledge of the Highest Reality.

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ।। १६ ।।

anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyate.
ajamanidramasvapnamadvaitaṁ budhyate tadā. (16)

Translation

When the individual soul (*Jīva*) who was sleeping under the influence of beginningless *Māyā* gets awakened, he then realises the *Advaita* (non-duality) the unborn, sleepless and dreamless.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

When this individual soul (*Jīva*) who is in the stage of transmigration sees the "dream" in the two states of waking and dream—the "dream" in the nature of *Māyā* (illusion) which has two characteristics, viz., want of knowledge of reality which is the seed (cause) and misapprehension of reality as something else (effect) and which have commenced from time without any beginning—and these "dreams" are like "this is my father, this is my son, this my grandson, field, cattle, I am their owner, I am happy, miserable, suffering loss on account of this or gaining on account of this"—and when that *Jīva* gets awakened from this kind of sleep by the highly merciful teacher who has realised the Reality indicated by Vedanta—by being instructed "thou are not of the nature of cause and effect but "that thou art"—that *Jīva* then realises the Reality in this way. How? The *Turīya* self is "birthless", i.e., beyond cause (*Antara*) and effect (*Bāhya*), or having no modifications like birth, etc., i.e., without any of the various modifications including cause and effect; that *Turīya* is without "sleep" and for that reason, it is also without "dream" as "dream", i.e., misapprehension of reality as something else has for its cause the "sleep" (want of knowledge of Reality). As *Turīya* is without "sleep" and "dream", therefore it is birthless non-duality; and the *Jīva* then realises that his *Ātmā* is that *Turīya*.

Comments

When arises the correct knowledge of Reality and the disapperance of all *Viparyāsa* (erroneous knowledge)? *Paramātmā* himself assumes *Jīva-bhāva* and experiences *Saṁsāra*.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

He is then in sleep under the influence of *Māyā* (illusion) having the two characteristics—ignorance of reality and false projection. He is awakened from this sleep (*Māyā*) by the merciful teacher who instructs him by saying that he is birthless, sleepless, dreamless *Turīya Ātmā* beyond cause and effect and without any of the modifications like birth, etc,, of the empirical existence. This *Māyā* is *Anādi*, beginningless, i.e., appears to be without any cause but completely disappears when there is correct knowledge of Reality. "Birthless" (*Aja*) means without cause (*Antara*) or effect (*Bāhya*) or without any of the *Bhāva-vikāras*.

Rāmānuja has quoted this verse as Śruti in his *Bhāṣya* on Brahma Sūtra 1-4-1- with approval adding that only *Jīva* is bound by *Māyā*.

प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न संशयः ।
मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥ १७ ॥

prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ.
māyāmātramidaṁ dvaitamadvaitaṁ paramārthataḥ. (17)

Translation

If the multiplicity of the universe were to exist, it would certainly disappear. The duality is only illusory (*Māyāmātraṁ*) while non-duality is alone the supreme reality.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

In verse 15 above it was stated that *Advaita* is realised when one is awakened from "sleep".

Objection:—

If *Advaita* is realised when *Dvaita Prapañca* retires. But when *Dvaita* has not retired how can there be *Advaita*?

Reply:—True, that would be the case if *Dvaita Prapañca* was really existing. But it does not really exist, just as a snake does not really exist in a rope (mistaken as a snake) as the snake is imaginary. If the snake was really there, then only there would be the question of its retiring (disappearing). A snake imagined to exist in a rope by error does not really exist in the rope and then (actually) disappears on proper discrimination. The illusory vision created by the magician does not really exist and then disappears when the magical veil binding the eyes of the spectators is removed. Similarly, the duality called the multiplicity of the universe is only illusory and *Advaita* is the Supreme Reality like the rope and the magician. The meaning, therefore, is that there is no such

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

thing as *Prapañca* which can be said to be existing and then disappearing.

Comments

It was stated that *Turīya* is *Advaita* but where was *Advaita* when sometime before there existed *Dvaita Prapañca*? The objector says, "If you are going to establish *Advaita* when *Prapañca* goes, even then how can there be *Advaita* so long as *Prapañca* has not disappeared? The reply is that *Prapañca* is not a real *Vastu* (thing). When a rope is mistaken as a snake, there is no real snake who exists and who then retires on correct knowledge. Similarly, as *Prapañca* is only illusory and not real, there is no question of its first existing and then retiring. There is therefore no difficulty in establishing *Advaita* as Supreme Reality.

If *Prapañca* were there and then to merge into its cause, even then *Advaita* may remain in doubt because of the earler existence of that merging *Prapañca* but *Prapañca* is imaginary, illusory and has no cause, being not a real thing. It is only *Māyā mātra* and being negated (*Bādhita*) it does not exist in past, present or future like the illusion created by a magician.

But if *Prapañca* does not really exist, is there Nihilism (*Śūnyavāda*)? No. *Turīya Advaita* exists like the substratum Rope, when the illusory snake disappears.

This Kārikā is worded in a very terse and pithy manner and it is possible to interpret it in two or three ways.

(1) If *Prapañca* were to exist, then *Advaita* has to go, i.e., has no scope. But as *Prapañca* is only *Kalpita* or illusory therefore *Advaita* alone is the Superme Reality.

Here, we have to read *Advaita* as the subject of *Nivarteta* in the first line.

(2) The opening lines of *Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya* and Ānandagiri state that if *Prapañca* was really existing, then only the question of its retiring becomes relevant. But as *Prapañca* does not exist in reality, the question of its retiring does not arise. A non-existing thing neither comes or goes.

(3) If the illusory nature of *Prapañca* is known, found out, discovered (*Vidyeta* from *Vid* to know), that *Prapañca* is bound to disappear. This seems to be the construction adopted by the late Mr. Maganbhai Patel in his *Jyoti*..

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(4) Prof. Karmarkar suggests an alternative interpretation for *Nivarteta* as *Nitarām varteta*, i.e., if *Prapañca* were to exist, it would remain to exist all the more and contrasts *Nivarteta* with *Vinivarteta* of the next Kārikā. But it is doubtful if any distinction is intended by the author in *Nivarteta* and *Vinivarteta*. In Kārikā 18, the preposition *Vi* seems to be added only for the sake of metre. For instance in Kārikā, 3-43 it is said that one should remove, i.e., take out (*Nivartayet*) his mind from desires and enjoyment—here too the author takes the root *Nivṛt* in the sense of disappearing. So also *Nivṛtti* in the sense of disappearing in Kārikā 1-10 means removal or disappearance. So the interpretation suggested by Prof. Karmarkar is not consistent with the author's frequent use of the verb *Nivṛt* to turn back , goes or disappears.

विकल्पो विनिवर्तेत कल्पितो यदि केनचित् ।
उपदेशादयं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ॥ १८ ॥

vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit.
upadeśādayaṁ vādo jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate. (18)

Translation

If any one has imagined duality (*Vikalpa*) in the form of teacher, pupil and the scripture that (duality) will disappear (as soon as there is correct knowledge). The explanation (through the medium of duality of teacher, pupil and scripture) is intended for the purpose of teaching (and before there is realisation of the Highest Truth); when Reality is realised, all duality ceases to exist.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection :—If there is teacher, pupil and the scripture, how do you say that duality ceases to exist ?

Reply :—If someone has imagined duality (for the sake of instructing the pupil) such imagined duality will disappear on the correct knowledge gained after instruction. As the *Prapañca* (multiplicity) is like the illusion of the magician or like snake imagined as a rope, similarly the distinction of pupil, etc., is imagined before the rise of the correct knowledge and is imagined for the sake of imparting instruction—the talk of teacher, pupil and scripture is from the point of view of the earlier position (before the realisation of highest truth, i.e., from

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the phenomenal point of view) before instruction. When the teaching is complete, and when the Supreme Truth is realised, duality ceases to exist.

Comments

If for the purpose of instructing an ignorant pupil, someone imagines the duality in the form of Teacher, pupil and scripture, that duality is bound to be negated on the rise of correct knowledge and such imagined duality is not inconsistent with or opposed to the ultimate *Siddhānta* of *Advaita*. Such assumption of duality was at the earlier stage when there was no *Ātmajñāna* and was for the purpose of instructing the pupil; when the knowledge on such instruction is gained and the ultimate Reality is realised, duality ceases to exist.

All the distinction of scripture, teacher, pupil is imagined and illusory. Even though illusory and unreal it can still be the cause of real *Tatvajñāna*, e.g., a reflection. The distinction of pupil, teacher and scripture is opposed to its negation (*Nivṛtti-pratiyogī*), not a real thing, and is therefore not inconsistent with or opposed to *Advaita*. As *Prapañca* itself is illusory, a part of it like the distinction of pupil, teacher and scripture is necessarily illusory.

In the earlier stage of instructing a pupil, one may assume duality from the earlier phenomenal point of view, but on the rise of true knowledge, the imagined duality ceases to exist. The construction of the second line of the Kārikā is : "*Upadeśāt Pūrvaṁ ayaṁ śisyādi-bhebda-vādaḥ*".

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Eighth Mantra

सोऽयमात्माऽध्यक्षरमोंकारोऽधिमात्रं पादा मात्रा
मात्राश्च पादा अकार उकारो मकार इति ॥ ८ ॥

So'yamātmā'dhyakṣaramoṅkāro'dhimātraṁ pādā
mātrā mātrāśca pādā akāra ukāro makāra iti. (8)

Translation

This *Ātmā* (described as having four quarters) is *Aum* from the point of view of a syllable. (This *Aum* is) made up of three letters which are its sounds (*Mātrās*). The quarters (of *Ātmā*) are the letters (*Mātrā* of *Aum*) and the *Mātrās* are the quarters (*Pādāḥ*). The letters (*Mātrāḥ* of *Aum*) are *A*, *U* and *M*.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

So far was explained *Aum*, giving prominence to *Abhidheya* (Namable) *Ātmā* (i.e. *Ātmā* indicated by *Aum*) which

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

was described as having four quarters. Now will be explained the same *Ātmā* (as *Aum*) from the point of view of the syllable where prominence is given to the name (of *Ātmā—adhyāyākṣaraṁ*). Which is that syllable? The Śruti says that this syllable is *Aumkāra*. *Adhimātraṁ*, i.e., this *Ātmā* which is being divided into four quarters is to be thought of from the point of view of the letters (of *Aum*). (*Ātmā* was stated as divided into quarters (*Pādas*) and *Aum* is divided into letters). How is *Ātmā Adhimātra*? When it was stated as divided into quarters The quarters of *Ātmā* are the letters of *Aum*, which are *A*, *U* and *M*.

Comments

So far, the Reality was explained to qualified students of superior and common intelligence by first superimposing and then negating the *Prapañca* on *Atmā*. But students of inferior intelligence cannot grasp this Reality easily. Therefore, they are now instructed to attribute the qualities of the syllable *Aum* on *Ātmā* for the sake of meditation, so that by that process of meditation, they may ultimately realise Reality. *Ātmā* is divided into *Pādas* (quarters) and *Aum* is divided into letters and Śruti says that *Pādas* of *Ātmā* are to be meditated upon as *Mātrās* (letters) of *Aum—A*, *U* and *M*.

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Ninth Mantra

जागरितस्थानो वैश्वानरोऽकारः प्रथमा मात्राऽऽप्तेरादिमत्त्वा-
द्वाऽऽप्नोति ह वै सर्वान् कामानादिश्च भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ९ ॥

jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro'kāraḥ prathamā mātrā"pterādimattvādvā"pnoti ha vai sarvān kāmānādiśca bhavati ya evaṁ veda. (9)

Translation

Vaiśvānara whose sphere of activity is the waking state is (to be meditated upon as) the first letter *A* of *Aum*. On account of its pervasiveness and of its being the first (these two features are the common qualities of *Vaiśvānara* and *A*), one who meditates on the letter *A* in this way fulfils all his desires and becomes the first.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Now is made the specific rule (stating which quarter of *Ātmā* corresponds to which letter of *Aum*). *Vaiśvānara* whose sphere of activity is the waking state corresponds to the letter *A* of *Aum*. By which common feature? By pervasiveness. All speech is pervaded by the letter *A*. Śruti (also) says that

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

A is verily all speech. Similarly all universe is pervaded by *Vaiśvānara*. "Of this *Vaiśvānara Ātmā*, the shining heaven is the head", etc., says the Sruti. We have already stated that there is identity of the name and the namable (what is described by the name). *Ādimat* means that which has a beginning. The letter *A* is with a beginning (being the first letter of syllable *Aum*); so also is *Vaiśvānara*. Or on account of this common feature, *Vaiśvānara* is identical with A. The knower of this identity obtains the following result. "He gets fulfilled all his desires and becomes first among the great"—one who knows *this identity gets* the above mentioned result.

Comments

The detailed rule for meditating on the identity of specific quarter of *Ātmā* with the specific letter of *Aum* is mentioned. The reason for attributing the identity is also given and Śruti is cited in support. Similarly it is pointed out that the name and the namable object are one. Letter *A* in *Aum* is pronounced first before *U* and *M*. Similarly, *Vaiśvānara* of the waking state precedes *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. *A* pervades all speech, similarly *Vaiśvānara* also pervades the whole universe. Two results are stated. The result depends upon which of the two common features is meditated upon. The root "*āp*" is used in the sense of *Vyāp*" pervading so far as the common feature is meant but for purposes of *Phala* or result the root "*āp*" is used in the sense of obtaining, i.e., getting the desires fulfilled.

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Tenth Mantra

स्वप्नस्थानस्तैजस उकारो द्वितीया मात्रोत्कर्षादुभयत्वाद्वोत्कर्षति ह वै
ज्ञानसन्ततिं समानश्च भवति नास्याब्रह्मवित्कुले भवति य एवं वेद ॥ १० ॥

svapnasthānastaijasa ukāro dvitīyā mātrotka-
rṣādubhayatvādvotkarṣati ha vai jñānasantatiṁ
Samānaśca bhavati nāsyābrahmavitkule bhavati
ya evaṁ veda. (10)

Translation

Taijasa whose sphere of activity is the dream state is (to be meditated upon as) *U*, the second letter of *Aum*. The common feature is either superiority or because it is between the two. One who knows this (meditates in this way) increases the continuity of his highest knowledge and is treated equally (by his friends and enemies) and no one is born in his family who is not the knower of *Brahma*.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Taijasa whose sphere of activity is the dream state is *U*, the second letter of *Aum*. What is the common feature? Because of superiority, *U* appears as if it is superior to *A*, similarly is *Taijasa* superior to *Viśva*. (The second common feature between the two is—*U* is in the middle, between *A* and *M*. Similarly *Taijasa* is between *Viśva* and *Prājña*—therefore the common feature is being between the two. The result for the of knower this is being stated. He increases the continuity of the highest knowledge and is treated equally both by friends and enemies; that is they do not envy him. In the family of him who knows this, no one is born who does not know *Brahma*.

Comments

The common features are put forward. For unless they are pointed out, it is not possible to superimpose one on another for the sake of meditation. Even though *A* was described as best of all letters, still from the point of view of the sequence of pronouncing, *U* comes over *A* and therefore *U* is here called supreior to *A* by way of courtesy. Similar is the superiority of *Taijasa* over *Viśva*.

It is also proper to treat the enjoyer of subtle things superior to one who enjoys gross things. *Taijsasa* has *Ubhayatva* not because he is twofold but because he is between the two. The difference in result would be according to the meditation of the specific common feature. The last result is additional for the meditator of the second common feature.

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Eleventh Mantra

सुषुप्तस्थानः प्राज्ञो मकारस्तृतीया मात्रा मितेरपीतेर्वा मिनोति
ह वा इदं सर्वमपीतिश्च भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ११ ॥

suṣptasthānaḥ prājño makārastṛtīyā mātrā miterapītervā minoti ha vā edaṁ sarvamapītiśca bhavati ya evaṁ veda (11)

Translation

Prājña whose sphere of activity is sleep is (to be meditated upon as) *M*, the third letter of *Aum*. This is on account of the nature of measuring or on account of all becoming one in it. One who knows this (meditates in this way) measures all this (measures the quality, i.e., the real nature of the world) and becomes the merging place of all within himself.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Prājña whose sphere of activity is sleep is *M*, the third letter of *Aum*. What is the common feature? Here is the common feature. *Prājña* as it were measures both *Viśva* and *Taijasa*. Just as Barley is measured by a measure called *Prastha*, similarly both *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are being measured by *Prājña* from their coming out of and going back into *Prājña* (in sleep). Similarly, when one pronouncing of *Aum* is complete and when it is again pronounced *A* and *U*, as it were, enter into and go out of *M*. "*Apiti*" in the text means becoming one. In the pronouncing of *Aum*, *A* and *U* merge as it were in *M*. Similarly *Viśva* and *Taijasa* merge into *Prājña* at the time of sleep. For this alternate common feature, there is an identity of *M* and *Prājña*. The reward of one who knows this is stated. He measures all, i.e., he realises the real nature of the world. He becomes the merging place (*Apīti*), i.e., he becomes the *Ātmā*, the cause of the universe. (the causal self *Īśvara*). The secondary results are stated to glorify the principal (i.e., to glorify the meditation on *Aum* as the principal means of knwoledge and these other meditations on parts of *Aum* are secondary and are not separate from the main meditation).

Comments

In repeated pronouncing of *Aum*, *A* and *U* go into and come out as it were from *M*. The result of measuring is realising the real nature of the universe—one sizes up, grasps, measures up the real quality of the world like the true knower. He also becomes *Apīti*, i.e., the merging place, the *Avyākṛta* or *Īśvara* who is the causal self—merging place—of the universe. Meditations on specific letters or parts of *Aum*, along with the *Phala* mentioned for them, are all secondary and are intended to glorify the principal meditation on *Aum* as the means of knowing *Brahma* and therefore these secondary meditations are only parts of the main meditation and are not intended to be separate and distinct.

Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā

विश्वस्यात्वविवक्षायामादिसामान्यमुत्कटम् ।
मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ स्यादाप्तिसामान्यमेव च ॥ १९ ॥

viśvasyātvavivakṣāyāmādisāmānyamutkàṭaṁ.
mātrāsaṁpratipattau syādāptisāmānyameva ca. (19)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

When there is a desire to state that *Viśva* is *A*, the common feature of "being the first" is prominent; for this equating (of *Viśva*) with the letter *A* (of *Aum*) the other common feature of "pervading" is prominent.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

When there is a desire to equate *Viśva* with the letter *A*, the meaning is that according to the above mentioned rule (Śruti text), the common feature which is prominent is "being the first". The phrase *Mātrā-saṁpratipattau* is the explanation of what is stated earlier in the verse *Atvavivakṣāyām*, i.e., when *Viśva* is equated with *A*. The word "And" in the verse is intended to state that the common feature of "Pervading" is also prominent.

तैजसस्योत्वविज्ञान उत्कर्षो दृश्यते स्फुटम् ।
मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ स्यादुभयत्वं तथाविधम् ॥ २० ॥

taijasasyotvavijñāna utkarṣo dṛśyate sphuṭaṁ.
mātrāsaṁpratipattau syādubhayatvaṁ tathāvidhaṁ (20)

Translation

When *Taijasa* is known as *U*, the common feaure of superiority (or coming after) is distinctly seen. For this equating of *Taijasa* with the letter *U*, the other common feature, likewise, is "being between the two".

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

For knowing *Taijasa* as *U*, i.e., when there is a desire to equate *Taijasa* with *U*, "superiority" is the common feature which is distinctly seen. "Being between the two" is also distinctly seen. The rest of the explanation is as before.

मकारभावे प्राज्ञस्य मानसामान्यमुत्कटम् ।
मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ तु लयसामान्यमेव च ॥ २१ ॥

makārabhāve prājñasya mānasāmānyamutkaṭaṁ.
mātrāsaṁpratipattau tu layasāmānyameva ca. (21)

Translation

When *Prājña* takes the form of *M*, the common feature of measuring is prominent. For equating (*Prājña*) with the letter *M*, the other common feature, likewise, is merging.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

For knowing *Prājña* as *M*, the two common features are measuring and merging—this is the meaning.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

त्रिषु धामसु यस्तुल्यं सामान्यं वेत्ति निश्चितः ।
स पूज्यः सर्वभूतानां वन्द्यश्चैव महामुनिः ॥ २२ ॥

triṣu dhāmasu yastulyaṁ sāmānyaṁ vetti niścitaḥ.
sa pujyah sarvabhutanam vandyascaiva mahamunih (22)

Translation

When one knows firmly these features which are common in the three states he is worthy of wordhip and is a great sage.

अकारो नयते विश्वमुकारश्चापि तैजसम् ।
मकारश्च पुनः प्राज्ञं नामात्रे विद्यते गतिः ॥ २३ ॥

akāro nayate viśvamukāraścāpi taijasaṁ.
makāraśca punaḥ prājñaṁ nāmātre vidyate gatiḥ. (23)

Translation

Akāra leads to *Viśva*, *Makāra* to *Taijasa* and *Ukāra* to *Prājña*. In *Amātrā* there is no going anywhere.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

With the aforesaid common features one who meditates upon the above stated *Aum-kāra* identifying the letters of *Aum* with the quarters of *Atma* to that person *Akara* leads to *Visva*, i.e., one knowing *Aum-kāra* with the support of *Akāra* becomes *Vaiśvānara*. Similarly *Ukāra* "leads" him to *Taijasa* and *Makāra* to *Prājña*. The word leads is to be read because of the use of the word "And". When *Makāra* becomes faint and then disappears, there is the destruction of the seed (cause) Then in *Amātrā Aum-kāra* there is no going anywhere.

Prof. Karmarkar says that Kārikā 22 calls the knower *Māhamuni* while the knower in Kārikā 29 is called mere *Muni*. Therefore Kārikā 22 appears to be spurious. But this is reading more into the pharases which are used according to the requirement of the metre. Madhva reads '*Na amātre vidyate agatiḥ*", i.e., one does reach *Amātra* but the general drift of the Kārikās is not favourable to his reading.

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad—Twelfth Mantra

अमात्रश्चतुर्थोऽव्यवहार्यः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैत एवमोंकार ।
आत्मैव संविशत्यात्मनाऽऽत्मानं य एवं वेद ॥ १२ ॥

amātraścarturtho' vyavahāryaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ
śivo'dvaita evamonkāra ātmaiva saṁviśatyātmanā"
tmanam ya evam veda. (12)

Translatio

The fourth is measureless (or soundless), incomprehensible, cessation of all phenomenal universe, all bliss and non-

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

dual *Aum* and is verily *Ātmā* only. He who knows this merges his self in the Self.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Amātra means one who has no *Mātrā* (part or letters or sound). Such *Amātra Aum-kāra* is the fourth and that is pure *Ātmā* only and is non-dual. *Ātmā* is not comprehensible as both speech and mind representing the name and the namable object have ceased, i.e., the ignorance which is the cause of speech and mind has ceased and thus *Ātmā* cannot be comprehended. (Ignorance is the cause of speech and mind corresponding to name and namable objects and when ignorance has ceased to exist, *Ātmā* cannot be comprehended by spech and mind). There is cessation of the phenomenal universe, *Ātmā* is all bliss and is one with non-duality. *Aum* known in this way has three *Mātrās* (sounds) and three *Pādas* (quarters) and therefore that *Aum* is *Ātmā* only. He who knows this merges his self with the Highest Reality. The knower of the highest truth, this knower of *Brahma*, burns the seed (causual state) corresponding to the third quarter and merges the self in the Highest Reality. He is not born again as *Turīya* is not the seed (or cause). For, on true discrimination of rope and snake the illusory snake merges in the rope and in the case of discriminating people it does not arise again which arose earlier due to erroneous impressions. In the case of those *Sanyāsins* (ascetics) who are of common or inferior intelligence, who are as yet in the stage of learning, who are following the path of virtue and who have known the common features of the quarters of *Ātmā* and letters of *Aum*, this *Aum-kāra* when meditated upon as described before becomes a support for realising *Brahma*. This will be so stated in Kārikā 3-16: "The three stages of life, the inferior, middle and superior".

Comments

The purpose of this 12th mantra of Śruti *Amātra*, etc., is to point out the identity of individual *Caitanya* (*Ātmā*) with *Brahma*. For this purpose, by the method of superimposition, *Aum-kāra* of three letters is identified with *Caitanya* with limitations and then on discarding those limitations, that *Caitanya* without limitations is declared by Śruti as identical with the Highest Reality *Brahma*. *Ātmā* is *Kevala*, i.e., non-dual. Name is called speech and namable object is called mind; for there is no object apart from mind—they arise because of ignorance, and when ignorance ceases to exist—speech and mind, the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

name and the namable objects all disappear. But when *Ātmā* is stated as incomprehensible it does not mean that it is *Śūnya* (vacuity). It only means that all modifications cease to exist and what remains is *Ātmā*—therefore the Śruti says "where there is cessation of the phenomenal universe". As all miseries disappear, *Ātmā* is all Bliss. *Ātmā* is the substratum of the illusory phenomena and is therefore non-dual. The *Turīya Aum-kāra* is none else but *Ātmā* only. In *Turīya* identified with *Aum*, there is neither any *Pāda* (quarters) or any *Mātrā*(sound). The ealier division gets merged in the succeeding one and by stages gets merged in *Ātmā*. When *Aum-kāra* is meditated upon in this way, all *Pādas* and *Mātrās* get merged in the self, there remains no duality and Self is realised as identical with *Brahma*. In the case of one who had slept, there is waking again as there is the seed but in the case of liberated soul there is no rebirth as seed of ignorance is burnt—as the cause (seed) is destroyed. *Turīya* is not the seed of anything as it is beyond cause and effect (*Bīja* and *Aṅkura*). Illustration of the illusory snake seen in rope is given. The erroneous impression having gone, the illusion of snake never arises again—the illusory snake has merged in the rope. One with superior intelligence realises this identity of *Pratyak caitanya* with *Brahma* and has no rebirth. Those of middle and inferior intelligence have liberation by stages (*Krama-mukti*) and for that Kārikā 3-16 is cited.

Here ends Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and its *Bhāṣya*. Here are found those verses.

Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā

ओंकारं पादशो विद्यात् पादा मात्रा न संशयः ।
ओंकारं पादशो ज्ञात्वा न किंचिदपि चिन्तयेत् ।। २४ ।।

oṁkāraṁ pādaśo vidyāt pādā mātrā na saṁśayaḥ.
oṁkāraṁ pādaśo jñātvā na kiṁcidapi cintayet. (24)

Translation

One should know *Aum*, quarter (*Pāda*) by quarter. There is no doubt that the quarters (of *Ātmā*) are the *Mātrās* (letters) of *Aum*. After knowing the meaning of *Aum-kāra*, quarter by quarter, one should not think of anything else.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Aum-kāra should be known quarter by quarter, for *Pādas* (quarters) are the *Mātrās* (letters or sounds) because of the common features described already. After having understood

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Aum-kāra in this way one should not think of any other purpose (object) as all his desires are now fulfilled.

Comments

Gauḍapādācārya had composed the earlier verses to explain the text of the Śruti. The following verses are also composed by him to further explain the meaning of the Śruti. The *Vidyā* of knowing *Aum-kāra* quarter by quarter is this. *Pādas* of *Ātmā* are meditated upon as identical with *Mātrās* of *Aum*—and then *Aum-kāra* is to be meditated upon without these divisions as pure *Brahma*—in this way the final goal is achieved.

युञ्जीत प्रणवे चेतः प्रणवो ब्रह्म निर्भयम् ।
प्रणवे नित्ययुक्तस्य न भयं विद्यते क्वचित् ।। २५ ।।

yuñjita praṇave cetaḥ praṇavo brahma nirbhayaṁ.
praṇave nityayuktasya na bhayaṁ vidyate kvacit. (25)

Translation

One should fix his mind on *Praṇava* (*Aum-kāra*), as *Praṇava* is without fear. For one who is constantly united with *Praṇava*, there is no fear anywhere.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

One should fix his mind upon, i.e., meditate on *Aum* of the nature of Supreme Reality as explained before; for *Praṇava* is fearless *Brahma*. For one who is always united with *Aum* in this way, there is no fear anywhere—so says that (*Taittirīya*) Śruti, "The knower of *Brahma* has fear from no one".

Comments

One who is clever in meditating upon *Praṇava* achieves his goal at once by the knowledge of *Praṇava* and thereby negating all duality. Now for one who cannot do that and has to rely upon the teaching only of his preceptor—the procedure of meditation is being stated. He should fix his mind on *Praṇava* as *Praṇava* is fearless *Brahma*. The *Phala* of such fixing of the mind is fearlessness.

In support of this the Taittirīya Śruti is cited.

प्रणवो ह्यपरं ब्रह्म प्रणवश्च परः स्मृतः ।
अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्योऽनपरः प्रणवोऽव्ययः ।। २६ ।।

praṇavo hyaparaṁ brahma praṇavaśca paraḥ smṛtaḥ.
apūrvo' nantaro' bāhyo' naparaḥ praṇavo' vyayaḥ. (26)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Praṇava is indeed the lower *Brahma* and *Praṇava* is also known as the Highest *Brahma*. *Praṇava* is beginningless (*Apūrva* causeless). *Anantara* (having nothing of a different class from it), *Abāhya* (having nothing external to it), *Anapara* (having nothing after it, i.e., having no effect from it) and is changeless.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Praṇava is both the lower and the highest *Brahma*. When from the point of view of the highest reality, the *Pādas* (of *Ātmā*) and *Mātrās* (of *Aum*) disappear, the *Ātmā* is the highest *Brahma* only. It is *Apūrva* having no prior cause. It is *Anantara* as it has nothing which is of a different class from it. It is *Abāhya*, has nothing external to it. It is *Anapara* as it has no *Kārya* or effect. It is both inside and outside, without cause (*Aja*) like salt in the water of the ocean.

Comments

How are the meditators of common or inferior intellect to meditate on *Aum*? The reply is that *Praṇava* is both the lower as well as the highest *Brahma* and such meditations can gradually proceed from the lower to the highest *Brahma*. For meditators of superior intellect, *Praṇava* becomes the means of realising the highest knowledge. They realise *Brahma* as without any attributes or differentiation, homogeneous and one's self. (*Brahma* is described as *Para* and *Apara* in the Praśna Upaniṣad. Prof. Bhaṭṭāchārya reads *Param* instead of *Paraḥ* in Kārikā 26, This fits in well with *Para* and *Apara Brahma* but the more accepted reading is *Paraḥ* and that goes well with all the attributes in the second line of the Kārikā in the masculine gender).

सर्वस्य प्रणवो ह्यादिर्मध्यमन्तस्तथैव च ।
एवं हि प्रणवं ज्ञात्वा व्यश्नुते तदनन्तरम् ।। २७ ।।

sarvasya praṇavo hyādirmadhyamantastathaiva ca.
evaṁ hi praṇavaṁ jñātvā vyaśnute tadanantaraṁ. (27)

Translation

Praṇava is the beginning, middle and end of all. Having known *Praṇava* in this way, one immediately attains that *Ātmabhāva* (*Brahma*).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Praṇava (*Aum*) is the beginning, middle and end of all, i.e., of the entire phenomenal universe including sky, etc., which

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

appears as if created in the same way as magician creates illusory elephant, or as is an illusory snake superimposed on a rope, or like a mirage or like a dream (i.e., without undergoing any change in itself *Praṇava* appears to create, sustain and destroy the illusory superimposed phenomena and remains intact and distinct as its substratum). One who knows *Praṇava Ātmā* in this way like the magician, etc., attains immediately that *Ātmabhāva* (union with *Brahma*).

Comments

Praṇava (*Aum-kāra*) identified with individual *Ātmā*, the *Turīya*, is described as *Apūrva*, etc. This Kārikā states the reason for this and adds that one who knows this becomes *Kṛtakṛtya* (attains his final goal). All created beings depend on *Praṇava* for their birth sustenance and destruction. But the *Pariṇāmavāda* (real birth, etc., i.e., real modification of *Praṇava*) is rejected and *Vivartavāda* (illusory modification) is here postulated. *Praṇava* identified with *Pratyagātmā* does not undergo any change in itself and becomes the cause of the phenomenal universe on account of its *Māyāśakti*. It is like a magician without undergoing any change in himself and creating illusory appearances with the help of his *Māyā*; or it is like a rope, without any change in it, appearing like an illusory snake because of ignorance. In the same way, *Ātmā* identified with *Praṇava*, on account of its ignorance, becomes the cause of all on the relative phenomenal plane. For this reason, it is proper that from the transcendental point of view, the Highest Reality, *Praṇava* identified as *Ātmā* is described in the previous Kārikā as *Apūrva*, etc. In the *Bhāṣya* it is stated that one who knows this immediately becomes liberated, attains (*Ātmabhāva*). The reason is that knowledge is the direct means for liberation and it needs no other assistance (like combination of *Jñāna* and *Karma*, etc.) "That" *Ātmabhāva* is attained, i.e., that which is described as *Apūrva*, etc.

प्रणवं हीश्वरं विद्यात् सर्वस्य हृदि संस्थितम् ।
सर्वव्यापिनमोंकारं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ।। २८ ।।

praṇavaṁ hīśvaraṁ vidyāt sarvasya hṛdi saṁsthitaṁ.
sarvavyāpinamoṅkāraṁ matvā dhīro na śocati. (28)

Translation

Praṇava should be known as *Īśvara* abiding in the heart of all. Having realised the all-pervading *Aum-kāra*, the wise one does not grieve.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

One should know *Praṇava* as *Īśvara* abiding in the heart of all beings—the heart which is the seat of memory and cognition. Having realised *Aum-kāra* as all-pervading like the sky and as one's *Ātmā* not bound by transmigration, the wise one does not grieve as there is no cause for misery. The Śruti texts also state that the knower of *Ātmā* goes beyond grief.

Comments

For one who meditates on *Praṇava* identifying it with *Brahma*, the place for such meditation is here pointed out. The reason why heart is selected as the place for meditation is that the heart is considered as a seat of memory and cognition. *Dhīra* is the wise discriminating person. *Matvā* means directly realising. One who realises the Highest Reality has no grief as he has realised the truth beyond space and time. Śruti says "for him who has seen non-duality there is no *Śoka* or *Moha*." This Śruti is explained in the second line of the Kārikā. *Ātmajñāna* is the cause of removal of grief. In addition to the Śruti *Tarati Śokam*, etc., the other Śruti text also says, "All the knots of the heart are broken, etc."

अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च द्वैतस्योपशमः शिवः ।
ओंकारो विदितो येन स मुनिर्नेतरो जनः ।। २९ ।।

amātro' nantamātraśca dvaitasyopaśamaḥ Śivaḥ.
oṁkāro vidito yena sa munirnetaro janaḥ. (29)

Translation

He who has known *Aum-kāra* as *Amātra* (measureless or soundless or without parts) as also possessed of infinite sounds or parts, as negation of all duality and as all Bliss—is alone the real sage and not any other.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Turīya Aum-kāra is *Amatrā*. *Mātrā* means measure or limitation. One whose limits are endless, i.e., one who has infinite magnitude is *Ananta-mātra*". The meaning is that it is not possible to measure its extension as "thus far". It is all bliss as there is cessation of all duality. He who has known *Aum-kāra* as explained is the real *Muni* (sage) because he has contemplated upon the nature of the highest reality. Any other person, even though he may be an expert in the knowledge of scriptures is not a real *Muni* (sage).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

A person who has realised *Aum-kāra* as *Turīya Ātmā* is praised here; and one without this knowledge is censured as he is subject to births and deaths and has not achieved the final goal of life-libertion. *Aum* is *Amātra* as all the divisions of *Mātrās* have disappeared .It is *Ananta-mātra* as it is infinite and has no limitations. As there is no duality, which is the cause of grief, it is absolute Bliss. It was the ignorance of *Ātmā* which caused grief. Only he who realises the *Ātmā* described in the first line is the real sage attaining the final *Puruṣārtha* (*Mokṣa*), no other person, not even one possessing expert knowledge of scriptures—as the latter is *Bahirmukha* whose face is turned away from *Brahma.*

Here ends the *Bhāṣya* on the first chapter of the Kārikās the *Āgama Prakaraṇa.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

RĀMĀNUJA, MADHVA AND OTHERS ON ĀGAMA PRAKARAṆA

[Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with the Kārikās in the *Āgama-Prakaraṇa* is considered as Śruti by the Schools of Rāmānuja, Madhva and others and so their interpretation differs from that of Śaṅkara. Commentary of Kūranārāyaṇa (Rāmānuja *Saṁpradāya*) has been published in the *Ānandāśrama Series* (*Granthāṅka* 62, A.D. 1910, pp. 195 to 214). There is Madhva *Bhāṣya* and *Vivṛti* of Śrīnivāsatīrtha. Puruṣhottama Goswāmī (Vallabha *Saṁpradāya*) has written his *Dīpika* on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the first two chapters of Kārikās which has been edited by Ramānath Śāstrī). ask on extract there of is separatility printed at the end]

Mantras—1 and 2

Kūranārāyaṇa

This Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is intended to prescribe the *Upāsanā* of *Bhagavān* who is expounded by the *Samasta* (composite) and *Vyasta* (individual letters of) *Praṇava* (*Aum*) so that a properly qualified soul seeking liberation may attain the highest bliss with the cessation of all miseries. *Brahma* is called *Aum* as the entire *Cit* (sentient) and *Acit* (non-sentient) universe is *Otaṁ* (woven) is *Brahma*. *Brahma* is *Akṣara* as it is never corroded in *Trikāla* (past, present or future). It is called *Sarva* as it is *Pūrṇa* (complete). It is *Aum kāra* as it is *Ākrīyate* by *Aum*, i.e., expounded by *Aum*. This *Brahma* as designated by *Aum* is *Pūrṇa*. *Brahma* is called *Ātmā* as it grasps (*Ādāna*), i.e., controls everything from *Brahmā* onwards. This is the exposition of Brahma as the *Samasta* (composite).

After explaining this *Samasta Pranava Upāsanā*, the Upaniṣad now proceeds to explain the *Upāsanā* of the forms of *Bhagavān, viz., Viśva* and others as expounded through the respective sounds of *Akāra, Ukāra, Makāra* and *Nāda*. This *Brahma* designated by *Samaṣṭi Praṇava* and who is *Akṣara* is the controller (*Niyāmaka*) of everything from *Brahmā* onwards (and therefore called *Ātmā*) and this *Brahmā* has four *parts* (*Aṅgas*) which are its own forms and these four forms stay in the body of each *Jīva* as the controller (*Niyāmaka*) of *Jīva*.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Madhva

This Māṇḍūkya Upanisad recited by Varuṇa in the form of a frog is in the nature of a prayer of god Nārāyaṇa. It is stated in *Padmapuraṇa* that Varuṇa in the form of a frog prayed to Hari. *Harivaṁśa* states that Varuṇa "saw" this Śruti. Thus Nārāyaṇa in four forms is being prayed here. Regarding the Kārikās of the *Āgama Prakaraṇa*, Madhva cites a passage to show that the *Mantras* (i.e., Kārikā verses in the first Prakaraṇa) were seen by Brahmā the creator and Salileśvara Varuṇa has cited them as authority by stating, "These are the verses here."

There is no description of *Jīva*. The entire universe is woven in *Brahma*, i.e., has entered in *Parameśvara* and therefore it is *Aum*. Along with the universe, *Brahma* is *Sarva*. There is no intention to identify *Sarva* with *Brahma*, i.e., *Brahma* is not identical with *Sarva* or *Sarva* with *Brahma*. This is intended to say that *Brahma* is possessed of all qualities (*Sarvaguṇa saṁpanna*). He alone is *Pūrṇa* and beyond three *Kālas*. As he is called *Pūrṇa* he cannot be identified with *Jīva* or with the non-sentient *Prakṛti*. This *Hari* is the *Ātmā* of all sentient beings including Rāma, Brahmā, Rudra and others. This *Parabrahma Hari* is *Sarvātmā* and is designated by *AUM*.

Mantra—3

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Jāgarita Sthāna means *Cakṣuḥsthāna* (whose place of abiding is the eye). *Bahiṣprajña* means one who makes him (i.e., *Jīva*) perceive external objects thus *Bahiṣprajña* is to be taken in a causal sense as "*Bāhyān arthān Prajñāpayati*". *Saptāṅga*, the seven limbs are : four hands, two feet and the face of an elephant. The nineteen mouths (*Ekonaviṁśati-mukhāḥ*) are one central mouth as of an elephant and nine mouths of each of the two sides like that of a *Puruṣa*. *Viśva* is that which is known by all and that is *Sthūla Vastu*. One who enjoys them is *Vaiśva* and *Nara* means one who does not decrease. Thus *Vaiśvānara* means one who does not decrease and enjoys gross objects. In all bodies he stays as *Ātmā* (*Ādānakartṛtvena*) and this is His first form.

Madhva :

His interpretation is similar.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Mantra—4

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Svapnasthāna is *Kaṇṭha-deśastha* (having his place in the neck) *Antaḥ-Prājña* means one who makes the *Jīva* perceive the internal objects in the form of *Vāsanās* (impressions). The dream objects are only partly due to the impressions of the waking state. Śruti is cited "*Dṛṣṭam ca adṛṣṭam*" for the waking state. *Bhuṅkti* means *Bhojayati* (makes the *Jīva* enjoy). *Prājña* and *Bhuṅkti*, etc., are throughout interpreted in the causal sense). The second quarter means that *Taijasa* is the second *Rūpa* (form) of *Brahma* who is *Ātmā* (controller of all). *Citta* is luminous therefore this *Rūpa* is called *Taijasa*.

Madhva :

Svapnasthāna means whose place of abiding is the mind.

Mantra—5

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Supta means either covered by ignorance or has approached *Bhagavān* who is Blissful. He does not see anything else except himself. *Suṣupta-sthāna* is the top of the pericarp of the lotuslike heart. *Ekībhūta* means having become one in the special way with *Vaiśvānara* and *Taijasa*. The word *Ghana* in *Prajñānaghana* means covered by *Ajñāna-karma śakti* (the *Śakti* of *Kṣetrajña jīva*) and thus means *Jīva*. One who knows and makes this *Ghana* (*Jīva*) know his *Jīva-svarūpa* in deep sleep is called *Prajñānaghana*, which is to be read as *Ghana Prajñāna*. *Ānandamaya* means *Pūrṇānanda*. The enjoyment of gross and subtle objects is in the form of a *Krīḍā* (play) of the one who is of the nature of the experience of eternal and complete bliss. *Cetomukha* means having parts which are of the form of knowledge. He does not make the *Jīva* perceive anything external or internal. This is His third form.

Madhva :

In sleep, *Jīva* knows nothing except time, ignorance and happiness. *Prājña* becomes one every day with *Viśva* and *Taijasa*. *Ghana* means of the nature of *Ajñāna*. *Prajñā-naghana* gives to *Jīva* the knowledge of *Kāla*, happiness in sleep, the nature of *Jīva* and ignorance. *Ānandabhuk* means enjoying bliss in the form of his own *Svarūpa*. *Ānan-damaya* means having complete bliss. *Ānandabhuk*, *Ceto-*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

mukha and *Ānandamaya*—are the three characteristics of *Viśva* and *Taijasa* also.

Mantra—6

Kūranārāyaṇa

Three forms of *Brahma* are explained so far. The fourth form will be explained in the 7th Mantra. Some verses also will be cited in the Upaniṣad as part of Mantras. But in the midst of all this, the Upanisad by this sixth Mantra describes the greatness of all the four forms of *Brahma*.

The word *Eṣah* means the *Ātmā* (i.e., *Ādāna-kartā* or *Niyāmaka Brahma*) having four forms. He is the *Antaryāmin*‘ *Niyantā*, cause of all, i.e., of birth and destruction. To emphasise this, *mantras* in the form of verses are cited.

Madhva :

The word *Eṣaḥ* means the *Bhagavān* with four forms.

1st verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Viṣva means *Vaiśvānara; Smṛtaḥ* means *Brahma* who was the *Mantradṛṣṭā* remembering the identity of the four forms of *Bhagavān*.

Madhava :

The same one *Bhagavān* is making these three forms of *Bahiṣprajñā*, etc.

2nd verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Ākāśa means the space at the top of the pericarp of the lotus-like heart. The *Bhagavān* alone is abiding in the body in these three ways.

Madhva :

The same *Paramātmā* stays in the body at three places in three forms.

3rd verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

This is addressed by Brahmā to those whom he is instructing.

Madhva :

Three *Bhogas* are described.

4th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Bhagavān is *Nityatṛpta* (eternally satisfied) but; this *Tṛpti*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(satisfaction) through enjoyment of objects gross and others is interpreted to be His *Krīdā* (play).

5th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

The *Jñanın*, in enjoying the objects, does not suffer any *Vıkāra* (corruption). He believes that in the aforesaid three places, the *Sarveśvara Bhagavān* alone makes him and all other *Jīvas* enjoy the rewards of their actions, that He alone is the giver of rewards, that the enjoyment does not belong to him, that he and other *Jīvas* have no independence. With this faith he is not corrupted.

Madhva :

Dhāma means place of abiding, *Bhagavān*, is the enjoyer and giver of rewards.

6th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

The *Ātmā* with four forms is the cause of creation and destruction of all things. This is the firm view of the wise (*Satāṁ*). He is called *Prāṇa* as he creates all (*Prāṇetṛ*). He creates all (*Janayatı*). This phrase shows that he is the real *Upādāna* (material cause) and not illusory modification (illusory material cause). He is called *Puruṣa* as He possesses all the six qualities in their completeness. *Cetomśūn* means *Jīvas* possessed of rays in the form of knowledge. *Pṛthak*, i.e., as gods, demons, men, etc.

Madhva :

Hari is the creator of everything. Any other view is to be rejected.

7th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Having stated the firm view of the wise, the Śruti now mentions some incorrect views. Some people believe that *Brahma* is modified as *Jīvas* and insentient universe—this being called the *Vībhūtı* of *Brahma* but that is incorrect. Similarly some people think that creation is like dream or illusion, i.e., believe in *Vivarta* (illusory modification) of the universe but that view is also to be rejected.

Madhva :

Bhagvan is not the material cause (*Upādāna Kāraṇa*) but only the instrumental one (*Nımıtta Kāraṇa*) and creates

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the universes at His sweet will. The World is not His modification (*Pariṇāma*) or *Vivarta* (illusory modification). Śruti says He is without *Vikāra*. He is *Sarvajña*. How can He have illusion? His power is unthinkable. Vyāsa also rejects *Māyāvāda* in *Brahmasūtras*.

8th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

In the first line of the 6th verse, the firm view of the Śruti is mentioned. The creation is due to the mere desire of Lord Hari without effort (*Anāyāsa, Sahaja*) without His own modifications, He being of invincible power. This is the firm view of *Aupaniṣadas*. Several other views, which are to be rejected are mentioned in the second line of this verse, viz., *Kāla* (which includes *Niyati, Yadṛcchā, Svabhāva*, etc., mentioned in Śvetāśvatara). The word *Puruṣa* in the 6th verse and *Prabhu* in the 8th shows that other views are to be rejected.

Madhra :

The first line of verse gives the Siddhānta which is reiterated in *Brahmasūtra*. 1-1-2. While stating other opinions about creation, the Śruti states its firm view in between here. *Kāla*, etc., in the 2nd line includes Rudra and Brahmā who are perishable in *Pralaya* and also *Pradhāna* which is non-sentient. Only Nārāyaṇa is the creator.

9th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Bhoga and *Krīḍā* views are rejected as Hari is *Āptakāma*. Then the Śruti gives its own view as *Svabhāva*. Creation is His *Līlā*; this view is reiterated in *Brahmasūtra* 2-1-33. *Lokavat tu Līlākaivalyam*. Hari is *Āptakāma* and has no *Prayojanaspṛhā*.

Madhva :

As Hari is *Āptakāma*. He does not need *Bhoga*. The view that He has *Krīdā* as He is tired of idleness is also to be rejected. He is *Pūrṇakāma*. To create and destory is His *Svabhāva* only—this is the correct view. He requires no *Prayojana*.

Mantra—7

Kūranārāyaṇa :

The activities connected with *Viśva, Taijasa* and *Prājña* are not in *Turīya*. This *Prajña* activity which is not in *Turīya* is like that in the dream and is the activity

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

of *Bhagavān* like *Taijasa*. It also includes insensate state in *Jāgrat* where in *Samādhi* there is only the knowledge of attributeless *Ātmā*— that is also not *Turīya*. That conditon is like sleep. *Turīya* is not without activity—*Aprajña* (*aprajñāpaka*). He gives *Jñāna* to *Mukta Jīvas*. Except for *Mukta Jīvas*, He is *adṛṣṭa*, etc. He is *Ekātmasāra* (i.e. *Pūrṇa* and of the nature of *Jñāna* and *Ānanda*).

Prapañca means *Vyāpta*; *Upa* means *Utkṛṣṭa* and *Śama* means *Sukha*. The entire phrase means He is all pervading and having the highest bliss or that He removes the undesirable bondage of body, etc. (*Prapañca*). *Advaita*—when *Ātmā* is known in some other way it is *Dvita* and therefore *Dvaita* means *Mithyājñāna* which is of the nature of me and mine (*Ahanta, Mamatā*). *Śānta* means without six kinds of *Urmis*. Having described the *Turīya*, the *mantra* states at the end that this *Ātmā* is of fourfold nature and such *Ātmā* with four forms should be known.

Madhva :

Part of head 12 finger-breadths from the root of nose is the place for *Turiya*. He is the *Pravartaka* of *Viśva* and *Taijasa*. Except giving *Jñāna* to *Mukta Jīvas* He has no other activity. He is *Pūrna-Ānanda-Rūpa*. He is not seen only by *Baddha Jīvas*. Madhva's interpretations are mainly like those given above.

10th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Verses corroborating the greatness of the fourth form of Hari are given by the Śruti. He removes all undesirable things. He guides Brahmā and other deities and therefore is called *Iśāna*. He is *Advaita*, i.e., removes *Mithyājñana*. *Bhāvas* (entities) owe their existence due to the *Jñāna* of *Bhagavān*. Śruti says that *Brahma* is to be known as *Asti*. He is *Deva*, to be worshipped and is *Vibhu* (*Samartha*) capable He is so remembered by the seers of *Mantras*.

Madhva :

Bhāva means *Jīva*. *Mukta Jīvas* have to attain Him through *Upāsanā*.

11th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Kāryabandha is in the nature of me and mine due to ignorance. *Kāraṇabandha* is bondage of ignorance which is the cause. *Viśva* is the *Svāmi* of *Jīva* in *Jāgrat Bhrama*. *Taijasa*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

is the *Svāmi* of *Jīva* in *Svapna Bhrama*. *Prājña* is the *Svami* of *Jīva* in sleep where there is only *Kāraṇabandha*. *Turīya* does not control activities either of *Kāryabandha* or *Kāraṇabandha*.

Madhva :

Viśva Taijasa, etc., are themselves not bound but the *Bandhas* of *Jīvas* in the three states are under their control. *Viśva* binds the *Jīva* therefore He is called *Baddha*.

12*th Verse*

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Prājña does not make the *Jīva* perceive anything except *Jīva-svarūpa*, happiness, *Kāla* and *Ajñāna*. *Turīya* is *Sarvadṛk*—makes the *Jīva* perceive everything.

Madhva :

Turīya gives *Jñāna* to *Mukta Jīvas*.

13*th Verse*

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Advaita (= *Mithyājñānanivartakatva*) and Śiva — these two are common to *Prājña* and *Turīya*. But *Prājña* is *Bīja-nidrāyuta*, i.e., He gives *Bījanidrā* to *Jīvas*. *Bīja-nidrā* means the root ignorant belief of *Jīvas* that they have independence in their bodies, house, etc.

Madhva :

Same as above.

14*th Verse*

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Samething stated in other words.

Madhva :

Same. *Prājña* causes *Bhrama*, *Turīya* does not.

15*th Verse*

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Svapna means thinking that the body, houses, etc., which are really in control of *Bhagavān* are believed by *Jīva* as if they are in his own control. *Nidrā* means he is not knowing the truth that *Bhagavān* has complete *Svātantrya*.

Madhva :

Same. *Tattva* means that *Bhagavān* is *Svatantra*. *Nidrā* means ignorance.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

16th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Māyā means the desire of *Bhagvān* as also *Avidyā* which is in His control. On account of *Anādimāyā* of Viṣṇu, which is *Karma-rūpa-avidyā*, the *Jīva* is made to enter *Saṁsāra* (*Supta*) and is awakened only by the *Prasāda* of *Bhagavān.*

At that time the *Jīva* knows *Advaita*, i.e., removal of *Mithyājñāna* which removes all *Aniṣṭa.* Rāmānuja has cited this verse in his *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* along with another Śruti passage, implying that this verse too is part of Śruti.

Madhva :

Anādimāyā means the desire of Viṣṇu and the *Prakṛti. Jīva* is awakened by *Prasāda* of *Bhagavān* and *Upadeśa* of *Guru.*

17th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Prapañca means the belief that I am the owner of the body, houses, etc. This belief is a bondage. If it is there, it can be removed by *Paramārtha*, i.e., the *Prasāda* of *Bhagaavān.* This *Dvaita*, i.e., *Mithyājñāna* is due to *Māyā*, i.e., due to *Bhagavad-icchā* and can be removed only by His *Prasāda.*

Madhva :

Prapañca is the *Abhimāna* in various objects—a belief that they are not in control of *Bhagavān. Māyā* is *Bhagavad-icchā* which is very powerful. It can cause or remove this false belief.

18th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Vikalpa means the *Abhimāna* of *Jīva* that the body, houses, etc., are his and in his control. That false belief i,e., bondage is removed by the *Upadeśa* of saintly people. When *Brahma* is known properly, *Dvaita*, i.e., *Mithyājñāna* is removed.

Madhva :

This being the case, false knowledge is removed by the *Upadeśa* of *Guru.*

Mantras—8 and 9

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Adhyakaṣaraṁ=Superior to all. *Akṣaraṁ*—indestructible. *Adhimātram*=who has many parts *Akāra* (*A iti ākriyate āhuyate*) who is known as A of *Aum. Prājña* and *Taijasa* are *Ādi* of *Viśva.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Madhva :

Ātmā of four forms is the *Ātmā* referred to here. *Adhimātrā* means having *Pūrṇa mātrās*. *Āpnoti=Prāpayati*.

Mantra—10

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Utkṛṣati means relieves the *Jīva* of the bondage of the body, *Samāna* means he is placed in the midst of all entitled to Mokṣa (*Miti* means *Antargati*).

Madhva :

Same.

Mantra—11

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Minoti=the *Jñānin* makes enter the universe in him, i.e., even tnough *Jīva* is *Aṇu*, the qualified pervades like the light of the Sun. Becomes *Apīti* means becomes *Apyayakṛt* remover of pain and other *Aniṣṭa*.

Madhva :

Miti means *Antargati*.

19*th Verse*

Kāranārāyaṇa :

Vivakṣā means *Upāsanā*. *Utkata* means clear (*Spaṣṭa*). By meditating in the *Viśva* form one has *Ādisāmānya*, i.e., *Viśvasāmyatā*.

Madhva :

Sāmya means *Sāmya* in name only.

20*th Verse*

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Meditation of *Taijasa* through *U* of *Aum* gives *Utkarṣa* and *Jñānasantati*.

Madhva :

Parameśvara gives the experience of *Nidrā* and *Svapna*.

21*st Verse*

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Manasāmānya means *Sāmya* with *Prājña* in whom there is an *Antarbhāva* of everything. *Layasāmānya*, i.e., *Sāmya* with *Prājña* who removes all miseries.

Madhva :

Same.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

22nd Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Even one who knows this has his reward.

Madhva :

As there is a reward, it means that the interpretation given above is correct.

23rd Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

The word *Punaḥ* shows that everyday the *Jīva* meets *Prājña* in sleep; similiarly he meets *Prājña* in *Mukti* also. He reads *Na amātre vidyate agatiḥ.*, i.e., the *Upāsaka does attain Turīya. Turīya is Amātra,* i.e, without parts; he becomes one with *Viśva Taijasa Prājña,* i.e., and is thus *Sarvamātra.*

Madhva :

He also reads *Agati* instead of *Gati.*

Mantra—12

Kūranārāyaṇa :

After uttering *AUM,* the Nāda that persists is the designation of *Turīya.* It is called *Avyavahārya* both for the Upāsaka as well as *Mukta.* One who knows this *Turīya* designated by *Nāda* after *Aum* utterance, becomes pure gives up *Ahaṁtā* and *Mamatā* and with the grace of *Paramātman* enters the *Turīya Ātmā,* i.e., he can enter and come out at will, have enjoyment proper for him and live well.

Madhva :

Same.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

24th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

This knowledge of the forms of *Bhagavān* expounded by *Aum* should be acquired without remembering any other thing. *Bhagavān* who is thus to be known through the entire *Aum* is also to be known in four forms, viz.,*Viśva* and others through the letters of *Aum.* Nothing else should be thought of, as the reward of meditating on *Aum* is the best.

Madhva :

Same.

25th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Brahma is so called as it is great and *Pūrṇa* by its qualities. *Praṇava* is Hari. He has four forms. He is fearless *Guṇa-pūrṇa Brahma.* He is called *Praṇava* as he is the *Praṇetā (Netā)* of the four *Avasthās,* viz., *Jāgrat,* etc., The *Upāsaka* on *Praṇava* becomes fearless.

Madhva :

Same.

26th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Apara means earlier, i.e., Hari who is *Pūrṇa Brahma. Para* means coming afterwards, i.e., *Viśva Taijasa, etc., Praṇava is both Mūlabhūta Hari* as also the later forms of *Viśva,* etc. Both *Apara* and *Para Brahma* are *Pūrṇa;* because He has no cause *(Apūrva)* has no end *(Anantara* i.e., *Antara-anta),* all prevading *bāhya)* and independent *(Anapara).*

Madhva :

Apara-later *Para*-earlier, i.e., *Vāsudeva.* First *Vāsudeva* and then fourfold *Praṇava* both are *Brahma.*

27th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Praṇava is *Ādi, Madhya* and *Anta,* i.e., the creator, sustainer and destroyer. Having known Hari in this way the *Upāsaka* after completing the enjoyment of his *Prārabdha*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

attains *Brahma in a special way—the Upāsaka* does not lose his individuality *(Sadā sattve api).*

Madhva :

Same.

28th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Īśvara means controller of all. *Na Śocati* means the *Upāsaka* becomes possessed of the all the eight qualities mentioned in the *Upaniṣads,* viz., *Apahata-pāpmā* etc., and is thus liberated.

Madhva

Praṇava is called *Aṇu* as it abides in the heart of *Jīvas* but it is all pervading and *Mahat* and is *Īśvara with unthinkable power.*

29th Verse

Kūranārāyaṇa :

Amātra=without parts, i.e., remaining in His *Muktarūpa. Anantamātra* means manifested in various forms like *Viśva, Taijasa,* etc., for the purpose of the activity of the universe, by his own will. *Dvaitasyopaśama*—destroying the *Aniṣṭa* of the *Upāsakas. Śiva* of the nature of bliss without misery. The *Upāsaka* is *Muni* and is relieved of births and deaths. Repetition at the end shows that the Upaniṣad is completed here.

Madhva :

Same.

At the end Madhva reads one additional verse which says that one and the same *Cidānanda* Visnu without distinctions is designated in four different forms of *Viśva, Taijasa,* etc. I pay my obeisance to Him

NOTES

1. In *Śrīkara-Bhāṣya* on Br. Sū. 2-3-43, it is said that Māṇḍūkya is the chief Vedānta Upaniṣad and from 1 to 7 mantras, Śiva is designated both as *Praṇava* and *Praṇavātīta.*
2. Vijñānabhikṣu on Br. Sū. 1-2-11 says that in the 5th *mantra* of Māṇḍūkya the *Bhoga* is clearly of *Prājña* who is *Īśvara*. *Jīvas* become absorbed in this *Prājña* in deep sleep and therefore *Jīva* is called *Prājña.* In Māṇḍūkya the four states upto *Turīya* are intended for meditation, there being identity of *Aṁśa* and *Aṁśin.* In the famous Puruṣasūkta, the *Upāsanā* of *Parameśvara* as *Catuṣpāt* is indicated.
3. In *Śrīkara-Bhāṣya* on Br. Sū. 1-1-3, it is stated that in the 7th Mantra of Māṇḍūkya Prapañcopaśama, Śānta, Advaita, etc., refer to *Śiva* and when at other places certain *Tāmasa* qualities are mentioned, they refer to *Kālarudra* who is an *Aṁśa* of *Śiva.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā of Puruṣottama Goswāmī

At the end of the Āgama Prakaraṇa, we have given the interpretations of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the 29 Kārikās according to the schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva. Both these schools consider the Prose Mantras and 29 Kārikās of Āgama Prakaraṇa as śruti. Commentary of Kūranārayaṇa is according Rāmanuja sampradāya and is published in the Ānandasram sanskrit series in 1910 AD as Granthāṅka 62 pp 195 to 214. Madhva Bhāṣya and the vivṛti of śrinivāsa also hold a similar view as against that of Saṅkara according to whom all the Kārikās of 4 chapters are of Gauḍapāda and the Upaniṣad is only of 12 mantras.

Shrī Puruṣottama Goswāmi of the Vallabha sampradāya who was born about 1668 AD has written a commentary called Dīpika on the 12 prose Upaniṣad mantras and the first two chapters of the Kārikās. Either he has not written on the 3rd and the 4th chapters of the Kārikās or what he wrote thereon is not available. He writes at the end of the second chapter of the Kārikās that he would discuss the subject of Jaḍacaryā etc mentioned in the second chapter of the Kārikās in the 3rd Advaita chapter of the Kārikās. This indicates that he did write or intend to write on the 3rd and 4th chapters of the Kārikās but unfortunately they are not available.

This Dīpikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the first two chapters is edited and published by Ramānāth śastrī. The editor does not believe that the Kārikās are part of the Upaniṣad and the text also clearly states the Kārikās as of Gauḍapāda. The manuscript was made available by the late Mulchand Teliwala. It was partly aśuddha and the editor has made it readable. It is admitted that the Kārikās preach Māyāvāda but Śhrī Puruṣottama Goswāmī has deliberately interpreted it to show his ingenuity in bringing the Kārikās in line with the Brahmavāda as preached by Śrī Vallabhācārya.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Puruṣottamji Goswāmī's Dīpikā on

Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the first two chapters of Gauḍapāda Kārikās.

Śrīmad Bhāgawata in the 12th Skandha describes "Aum" as the eternal seed of all Mantras and Upaniṣads. Gita also says that Praṇava is the chief of all vedas. Praṇava is the name of Brahma, Veda also means Brahma, Puruṣottamji agrees with Sankara's Bhāśya till the latter identifies Aum with Ātman but disagrees with the rest; as he says that "Vacārambhaṇa" śruti only gives the illustration of clay and jar and means that all Kāryajata is non-different from Sat. The śruti has not given the illustration of Rope and serpent — the Ākāra is not imaginary as the Sruti favours Sat-kārya-vāda. The Aikya of Aum and Brahma mentioned by the śruti is only for the purpose of Upāsanā. The śruti declares identity of Aum with Brahma. The Individual soul - Pratyagātma is not in the picture here. In support Puruṣottamji cites Nṛsiṃha Tāpaniya śruti. The Swapna prajnā is not merely of the nature of Vāsanā and we see there unknown and unseen things also. In suṣupti Brahma becomes Ekibhūta i.e. stays along with Jīva. In sleep there is no absolute bliss but only ganitānanda (limited bliss). In sleep, Brahma is described as Antaryāmin-the inner controller. In the whole of Māṇḍūkya, reference to Individual soul is irrelevant - but the individual soul is incidentally included by the Pariṣwangaśruti (like one embraced by a loving wife).

Viśwa is the Ātmā of all Piṇḍas. Taijasa is the Ātmā of Indriyas. Prājña is the Ātmā of all mind or Prāṇa. Thus, paramātmā alone is to be known and not the Individual soul. In Jivanmuktadaśā, there is Āvirbhava of Brahma and by Upāsanā and vidyā, the conceit is destroyed - at that time Jīva can become viśva etc - not before that. Reference is made to the eleventh skandha of Bhagāvata. Sṛṣṭi is the Līlā of Brahma. Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are not born. Turīya is described in a certain way but Turīya is not only that much;

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

all Viseṣas are not negated in Turīya. Therefore Turīya is Sarvākārah. The Kārikās from one onewards are cited in the name of Gauḍapāda.

In the second chapter (Vaitathya) the Jaḍacaryā and Yādṛcchikatva is preached for gaining Paramātma-tattva-Jñana which is the means for realising one homogeneous non-dual Ātmajñāna. That Bheda is imaginary and false i.e. Bhedadṛsti is false but Prapañca is real.

Some believe that in Swapna the Sṛṣti is real, without Upādāna, like one created by cintāmani or by some siddha but that view is rejected.

In Jāgarita, *the objects thought of in the mind* are also in a limited space, the body, as in Swapna and in this way Jagarita also is like Swapna, Such mentally thought of objects are absent in the beginning and end and therefore are unreal only when Mano-dhyāta.

Jīva is Aṇu (atomic) and Śruti supports this view only. Deva is Paramātmā and has three kinds of Kārakatva i.e. Atmanā, Atmānam and Atmā. He has his Krīdā or sport. He is Sarvātma and Sarvakāra. In his sport he creates and controls His own forms with appropriate names. He knows this diversity with his Māyā. Paramātmā Himself is Māyā by which the Jīva is deluded. Māyā means that Swarupa of Paramātmā which creates Moha in Jiva. To say that Māyā does not really exist or that Māyā is sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa - is a wrong view of Śānkara sampradāya. The various theories, mentioned in Karikas 19 to 28 are only partial views of Paramātmā - the Siddhānta is that Paramātmā is Sarvātmaka. Even Ajnāna-Śabala view of Kevalādwaita is only a partial view (Kārikās 29, 30).

Bhedavada is censured. Vyāsasmṛti is cited after the 31st Kārikā - the perceivable Jagat is like the bubble, prone to destruction and devoid of happiness and is like Tamas and Swapna.

In Paramātmā there are no Jaḍadharmas like Nirodha or Utpatti. He has also not the Jīvadharmas like Bāddha-sādhaka-mumukṣu or mukta.

Advaita-Jnana is of two Kinds - Akhaṇḍa and Sakhaṇḍa.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

For Akhaṇḍa Brahma jnana, the Adhikāra is gained by Sakhanda Anubhava.

The conclusion is this. Creation is of two kinds - 1) Bhagawadrūpa and 2) Māyika. The first is of three kinds viz. a) Bhoktṛṣṛṣṭi 2) Bahyabhoga-sṛṣṭi 3) Ādhyātmikabhoga-sṛṣṭi - all these three are real and eternal.

The second (Māyiki) is of two kinds a) Bāhya b) Ābhyantara. The first of these two is Avyavasthita and the second one is Vyavasthita -

Both of them are two fold - viz. as Jāgrat and Swapna.

But all Māyikī-sṛṣti is Mithyā having a beginning and an end

In the Bhagavad sṛṣti - the Kāraṇa is Bhagavan; in the Māyikī, Kāraṇa is Māyā, Moha is the Dwāra, Bhagawān is the Kartā and He is having his Krīdā. Moha is due to Ajñāna which should be removed. The means is Brahma - advaya-jnāna. There are various partial - Ekadeśin views. But having Brahma-sphūrti, realising that Brahma is everything - this sakhanda Brahma-advaitajnana has its Phala in Akhaṇḍa-advaita-jnāna which is sakṣātkāra.

To qualify for this, Jadacaryā is advised.

Having a beginning and end is mentioned as a duṣana of asatkāryavada and not of the Sāṅkhyas - as the latter is also Jnānasādhana. Even though other Jnānsādhanas are mentioned in smrtis etc why is Jaḍacarya specially preached here? We shall discuss this in the 3rd Advaita chapter of these Kārikās.

The editor of Purusottama Goswāmī's Dīpikā says in the preface that these Kārikās are of Gaudapāda, the Parāmaguru of Samskara and they specially expound the Māyāvāda. Purusottamji however intends to say to Sankarites that the Kārikās even of your Mūlaguru is capable of being interpreted according to the Brahmavāda of Purusottamji's Guru Shri Vallabhāchārya.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

SECOND CHAPTER : *Vaitathya Prakaraṇa*

वैतथ्यं सर्वभावानां स्वप्न आहुर्मनीषिणः ।
अन्तःस्थानात्तु भावानां संवृतत्वेन हेतुना ॥१॥

vaitathyaṁ sarvabhāvānāṁ svapna āhurmanīṣiṇaḥ.
antaḥsthānāttu bhāvānāṁ saṁvṛtatvena hetunā. (1)

Translation

WISE MEN have declared the unreality of all entities seen in dream on account of their being located within the body in an enclosed space .

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Aum. It was stated that when true knowledge arises, duality ceases to exist. This was on the basis of Sruti texts like "It is verily only one without a second", etc. But this conclusion is based only on the authority of Sruti. Here it is equally possible to establish the unreality of duality through the process of pure reasoning and it is for this purpose that this second chapter is begun with the Kārikā *Vaitathyam,* etc. *Vaitathyam* means being unreal, i.e., false. Whose unreality? Of all the entities and objects perceived in a dream either externally or internally. This is so stated by the wise who are expert in employing *Pramāṇas* (means of knowledge) to establish correct knowledge. The reason for this unreality is stated.

"On account of their being located within". Their location is within the body. Entities like mountains, elephants, etc., are found there (in dream) and not outside the body. They, therefore, deserve to be called unreal.

Objection :— This reason of "being within" is not valid. A pot and other objects, covered by and within a cloth are also *Saṁvṛta.* "located within" and yet they are real.

*Reply :—*These entities (in dream) are located within the body. There is no possibility of mountains and elephants, within the body, within the *Nāḍis* (channels) of the body. No mountain exists in the body. (It is believed that dreams are perceived in the *Nāḍis* within the body, the *Nāḍi* being either *Hitā or Purttat).*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Bhāṣyakāra establishes the connection between the first and the second chapter. One Śruti text is cited "When true knowledge arises, etc." The other Śruti text is, "Where there is as it were duality, etc." The unreality of duality was established in the first chapter predominantly on the authority of Sruti. This chapter is intended to show that it is possible to establish it predominantly on the basis of pure reasoning also. Reasoning leads to *Pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) for arriving at correct knowledge and thus there is scope for thinking based on reasoning. This explains why this second chapter follows the first chapter. In dream, external objects are pots, etc. Internal things are happiness, etc. Wise men, expert in matters of *Pramāṇas* declare the dream objects as unreal. The reason is that they are located within the body, even in *Nāḍis.* The objection is replied to by saying that dream objects are perceived in such enclosed space that they cannot be real—there is no *Ucita* (proper) space for them to really exist there.

Gauḍapāda wants to establish the unreality of *Jāgrat* also further on and the ultimate truth is stated by him in Kārikā 32—"there is no destruction or birth, no bondage or liberation, etc."

अदीर्घत्वाच्च कालस्य गत्वा देशान्न पश्यति ।
प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्तस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ॥२॥

adīrghatvācca kālasya gatvā deśānna paśyati.
pratibuddhaśca vai sarvastasmin deśe na vidyate. (2)

Translation

The dreamer does not actually go to those places perceived in dream because the time is too short; and (moreover) when he wakes up, he is not found at the place (where he had found himself in the dream).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection :— The statement that objects perceived in dream are located in an enclosed space is not correct. For one who had slept in the east sees the dream as it were he was in the north.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Reply :—No. The dreamer does not go out of his body to another region and see the dream; for in his sleeping condition only he, as it were, experiences the dream at a place which is hundreds of *yojanas* away from his body and which can be reached only after a month. The dreamer has no such long time available for going to and coming back from that place. Therefore, on account of the shortage of time, the dreamer does not (actually) go to another place. Moreover, all dreamers when they wake up are not found at the place they have experienced in dream. If the dreamer had actually gone to another place experienced in dream, he should wake up at that place only, but this is not so. One who had slept at night experiences dream objects as if they are in the day, he finds himself in the company of many (If all this is actual) he should have been seen by those in whose company he was in dream. But he is not so seen by them. If he had been actually seen by them, they would say, "We had met you there." But this is not So. The dreamer, therefore, does not (actually) go to another region (in dream).

Comments

The objector says that as dreams are (sometimes) experienced by the dreamer as if he had gone out of his body to another region, dreams are not experienced in an enclosed space in the body, in the *Nāḍis* (channels). Reasons are given in reply as to why the dreamer does not actually go out of his boidy to another region. In the first Kārikā, it was stated that dream is unreal because there is no Ucita (proper) space to experience it acutally. In this Kārikā it is further stated that there is no Ucita (proper) time to experience it actually. The dreamer on waking is not actually found at the place experienced in dream. The time for going to and returning from that place is also too short. He meets many people in dream but those people do not say they have met him; therefore, for want of necessary time, space, instruments, company, etc., objects experienced in dream are unreal.

अभावश्च रथादीनां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकम् ।
वैतथ्यं तेन वै प्राप्तं स्वप्न आहुः प्रकाशितम् ॥३॥

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

abhāvaśca rathādīnāṁ śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam.
vaitathyaṁ tena vai prāptaṁ svapna āhuḥ prakāśitam. (3)

Translation

For this very reason stated here *(Nyāya-pūrvakaṁ)* the Śruti declares that chariots, etc., perceived (in dream) do not (actually) exist. It is, therefore, stated by the wise that Śruti declares the unreality of dream objects as proved.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

For this (additional) reason also, objects seen in dream are unreal. For, by (the Bṛhadāraṇyaka) Śruti text 4-3-14, "There does not exist any chariots, etc." The Śruti has declared the absence of chariots, etc., perceived in dream, basing such declaration on reasoning. Knowers of *Brahma* say that even though this Śruti text is intended to establish that *Ātmā* is self-luminous that Śruti text also follows the reasoning which establishes the unreality (of dream objects) on account of their being in an enclosed location in the body.

Comments

For the unreality of dream objects, additional reason is given. Bṛhadāraṇyaka text 4-3-14 is primarily intended to prove that *Ātmā* is self-luminous; this very Śruti incidentally establishes the unreality of dream objects by envisaging the reasoning *(Nyāya)* adopted in the two Kārikās, viz., "The dream objects are seen in a limited space in the body." Therefore the unreality of dream objects is proved both by Śruti and reasoning. The word *Ca* in the Śruti "*Abhāvaḥ Ca rathādīnām*" shows that not only the objects are unreal but the dream experience itself is unreal—for, when the object is absent or unreal, its *Jñāna,* experience, is equally unreal. The *Nyāya* (reasoning) referred to is "absence of proper time, space, etc". The above-mentioned Śruti reiterates the same reasoning given in the earlier two Kārikās. The primary purpose of that Śruti was to prove the self-luminous nature of *Ātmā.* In the waking state, the Sun, etc., may be said to be illumine the objects, but who illumines objects experienced in dream? The reply is—"the self-luminous

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Ātmā". In addition to proving the self-luminous nature of *Ātmā*, the Śruti also says, "There are no (actual) chariots, etc., in dream," thus reiterating the reasoning adopted in the two Kārikās.

Prof. Karmarkar interprets *Nyāya pūrvakam* not as logical reasoning, but relying on Bṛahadāraṇyaka 4-3-15 to 17 says that the soul enters from one state into another and returns the same way *(Yathānyāyam* means the same way by which one had gone, *Nyāya*—the way of going, entering). He cites passages where *Pratinyāyam* is used in that sense and says that Gauḍapāda refers to this *Nyāya* in this Kārikā. The soul is the same in the three states of waking, dream and sleep; dream is not seen by a different soul.

अन्तःस्थानात्तु भेदानां तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम् ।
यथा तत्र तथा स्वप्ने संवृतत्वेन भिद्यते ॥४॥

antaḥsthānāttu bhedhānāṁ tasmājjāgarite smṛtam.
yathā tatra tathā svapne saṁvṛtatvena bhidyate. (4)

Translation

Entities in the dream state are unreal because they are perceived. For the same reason, entities in the waking state are unreal (they too are being perceived). The nature of these entities (thus) is the same in the dream and waking states. The only difference between dream and waking is that in dream the entities are within and in an enclosed location.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

"Entities perceived in the waking state are unreal"—this is the proposition to be established. "Because they are perceived"—this is the *Hetu* (ground for inference). "Like the entities preceived in dream" —this is the illustration *(Dṛṣṭānta).* Just as entities perceived in the dream are unreal, in the same way the entities are also perceived in the waking state—the common factor is "being perceived"—thus the *Hetu* is brought in relation to the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

proposition to be established *(Pratijñā).* For this reason, "entities in the waking state are unreal" is the conclusion of this syllogism. The difference between the dream and the waking state is that entities in dream are perceived within the body in a limited space. The common factors for both the states are "being perceived" and "unreality".

Comments

In this Kārikā, it is concluded that entities in the waking state are equally unreal like those in the dream—the ground being that "the entities are *Dṛśya,* objects of perception" in both the states. The theory of Vedānta says that all that is the object of perception (is seen) is unreal, illusory, *Mithyā; Ātma,* the subject alone, is real. The phenomenal world is the object of perception and is, therefore, unreal or *Mithyā* Śaṅkara's interpretation takes in view this principle of Vedānta. From the point of view of the ultimate reality, all entities whether perceived in dream or the waking state are objects of perception and are, therefore, unreal, illusory, *Mithyā*—the simple reason being that they are Dṛśya, objects of perception—not subject. Śankara makes out a complete syllogism from this Kārikā— *Pratijñā, Hetu, Dṛṣṭānta, Upanaya* and *Nigamana.* The third line of the Kārikā relates the common factor with the proposition to be established. The second line gives the conclusion. the first and the fourth lines point out the difference between the dream and the waking state.

It is to be noted that *Dṛśyatvāt*—the *Hetu* (the reason) is not stated in the Kārikā but is to be supplied. In the next Kārikā, it is stated that the *Hetu* (reason) is *Prasiddha* (wellknown in Vedānta). Works on Vedānta specify this *Hetu* as *Dṛśyatva* and Śankara is justified in supplying that *Hetu* in this terse and pithy Kārikā. The Kārikā is worded in a sūtra-like manner and the teacher is expected to supply words taken for granted when explaining the full meaning to the student. There are many such pithy and compact statements in these Kārikās. The *Saṁpradāya* says that this *Śāstra* is to be learnt from a qualified *Ācārya.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Prof. Karmarkar says that *Antaḥ-sthānatva* is not the differentiating feature of dream and waking states; for in waking state also so-called external objects are not perceived unless the perceiver's *Buddhi* within the body assumes the shape of external objects. The only difference is the *Saṁvṛtatva* in dream but that makes no material difference—for it matters little whether Devadatta is within the room or outside the room.

Prof. Vidhushekhar reads *Saṁvṛtatvaṁ na bhidyate* for *Saṁvṛtatvena bhidyate.* This reading has no manuscript authority. Śaṅkara admittedly follows the philosophy of Gauḍapāda and sometimes it is risky to interpert Kārikās completely independent of the interpretation of a succession of *Saṁpradāya* authors.

Śaṅkara accepts the traditional reading and interprets the Kārikā on principles of Vedānta well recognised in the *Saṁpradāya.*

Gauḍapāda equates *Jāgrat* with *Svapna* and calls both of them unreal or illusory but this is so only from the point of view of the ultimate reality. He does recognise the difference between dream and the waking states from the phenomenal *(Vyavahārika)* point of view. Two differentiating factors according to the *Sampradāya,* are stated here, viz., *Antaḥsthānatva* and *Saṁvṛtatva* of the dream state. Kārikā 4-87 also states that on the phenomenal or empirical basis *(Vyavahāra)* the waking state is *Savastu* (with external objects) and *Sopalambha* (coming into contact or experiencing). Empirical existence in the waking state is thus recognised by Gauḍapāda. In the first chapter of Kārikās words *Svapna* and *Nidrā* are used by Gauḍapāda in a special sense. *Nidrā* is ignorance, covering, concealment *Āavaraṇa* and *Svapna* means false projection superimposed on reality, i.e. *Vikṣepa.* As in both the dream and the waking states there is false projection super-imposed on the Reality, these two states are put in one class as *Svapna* from the point of view of the ultimate Reality. But this does not mean that Gauḍapāḍa does not recognise the distinction between dream and waking states from the empirical point of view. This is made clear by Kārikās 4-87. Those who find a

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

difference of views between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara on dream and waking states ignore Kārikās 2-4 and 4-87.

Ānandagiri explains that unreality in dream is *Spaṣṭa* (clear) because of want of *Ucita deśa, etc.,* and therefore it is *Sapaksa* in the syllogism. In *Jāgrat* there is *Ucita deśa,* etc., and thus the unreality is *Aspaṣṭa* (not clear) and *Jāgrat* is *Pakṣa* in the syllogism. But there is no complete dissimilarity between *Svapna* and *Jāgrat* as the common features are *Dṛśyatva* and *Asatyatva. Pakṣa* in a syllogism is that where the thing to be proved is in doubt.

स्वप्नजागरिते स्थाने ह्येकमाहुर्मनीषिणः ।
भेदानां हि समत्वेन प्रसिद्धेनैव हेतुना ॥५॥

svapnajāgarite sthāne hyekamāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ.
bhedānāṁ hi samatvena prasiddhenaiva hetunā. (5)

Translation

The wise say that the dream and the waking states are the same as there is similarity of objects perceived in these two states on the ground already well established before.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Those wise people who can discriminate have stated that the dream and the waking states are identical on account of the subject-object relationship in both these states *(Grāhya-grāhakatva)*—this is the conclusion arrived at from what is established by the proof given before.

Comments

The proof given before in the previous Kārikās was this: Just as there is subject-object relationship in the waking state, there is identical relationship in dream also. Therefore, just as in dream, entities are illusory so they are in the waking state also.

Ānandagiri observes that as both *Svapna* and *Jāgrat* are illusory (from the point of view of the ultimate Reality), Gauḍapāda has appropriately used the word *Svapna* (in the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

first chapter) for *Jāgrat* also. The reason for this identity of the two states given by the wise is their common feature of having subject-object relationship. Their unreality or illusory nature is similar. This conclusion is arrived at on the basis of the inference stated before.

Prof. Karmarkar says that the well-established ground intended in this Kārikā is that both *Svapna* and *Jāgrat* are *Vitatha* (unreal) and *Antaḥsthāna* (perceived within). Side by side he also gives Śaṅkara's explanation. It may be observed here that the famous *(Prasiddha) Hetu* in Vedānta is *Dṛśyatva* as interpreted by Śaṅkara and the main attack of Gauḍapāda is on casuality and subject-object relationship. According to Saṅkara, the most important grounds for unreality of *Dvaita* are *Dṛśyatva* and having a beginning and end as stated in chapter two of Kārikās. Reference may be made to his introductory remarks in chapter three.

While Śaṅkara clearly specifies the *Pāramārthika, Vyavahārika* and *Prātibhasika* states, Gauḍapāda concerns himself only with the *Pāramarthika* state and ignores other states as trifles. He occasionally hints at the *Vyavahārika* plane, e.g., 1-17, 1-18, 2-4, 4-87, etc., but does not discuss any other state except the transcendental and postulates "*Ajātivāda*" from the point of view of the Highest Reality. Saṅkara and later Vedānta elaborate the same philosophy in a more systematic and detailed fashion.

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।
वितथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥६॥

ādāvante ca yannāsti vartamāne'pi tattathā.
vitathaiḥ sadṛśāḥ santo'vitathā iva lakṣitāḥ (6)

Translation

That which does not exist in the beginning as well as in the end is non-existent even in the middle. Such objects, though they are like illusions, appear as if they are real.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Here is an additional ground as to why entities perceived in the waking state are illusory—"because they do not exist either in the beginning or in the end. Objects like mirage, etc., do not exist in the beginning or in the end and it is firmly decided in the world that such objects do not exist even in the middle. Similar are the objects in the waking state. For want of their existence in the beginning and in the end they are like illusory mirage, etc., but still they appear as if they are real to the ignorant who do not know *Ātmā.*

Comments

An additional reason is given for the illusory nature of objects in *Jāgrat.* "If *Jāgrat* are illusory like those in *Svapna,* then why are they felt *(Pratīta)* like real?"—anticipating this objection, an additional ground is given for the illusory nature of objects in *Jāgrat,* viz., they do not exist in the beginning or the end. Whatever has a beginning and an end is illusory, e.g., a mirage. These objects only appear as real like *Gandharva-nagara,* even though illusory.

The conception of ultimate truth it that is never ceases to be the Truth—it exists at all times, in past present and future; in the light of this, that which has a beginning and end is not the ultimate truth. *Gītā* 2-16 lays down the same principle that *Sat* (that which really exists) has no *Abhāva, i.e., Sat* never becomes *Asat* or vice versa. It further adds rather mildly that "All entities in the world are *unmanifest* in the beginning and become *unmanifest* at the end—appear only in the middle, why should we grieve for them? Further in Kārikā 3-21 Gauḍapāda adds that the intrinsic nature of a thing never changes—*Sat* never changes its intrinsic nature of being *Sat,* the nature of existing at all times —it is *Trikāla-abādhya. Gītā* also similarly observes *"Prakṛtiṁ yānti bhūtāni".* Prakṛtistvāṁ Niyokṣyati i.e., *Prakrti* (nature) never changes.

सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वप्ने विप्रतिपद्यते ।
तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः ॥७॥

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

saprayojanatā teṣāṁ svapne vipratipadyate.
tasmādādyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ. (7)

Translation

Their (i.e., of the objects in the waking state) capacity to serve a useful purpose is contradicted in the dream. They are, therefore, traditionally known as illusory on account of their having a beginning and an end.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection :—Your statement that objects in the waking state are illusory like those in the dream is not valid. For objects in the waking state like food, drink, vehicles, etc., are seen to have the capacity to serve useful purposes like causing appeasement of hunger, thirst, etc., or doing the work of providing conveyance. This is not so in the case of objects in dream. Therefore, your statement that objects in the waking state are as illusory as those in dream is mere (wild) imagination.

Reply :—We say no. Why? Because that capacity to serve useful purpose which is seen (in the waking state) is contradicted in the dream. A man in the waking state eats, drinks, feels satisfied, has appeased his thirst; as soon as he sleeps, he finds himself (in dream) as afflicted with hunger, thirst, etc., as if he was hungry and thirsty for days and nights together and without any food. In the same way a man who has appeased his hunger and thirst in dream wakes up and finds himself hungry and thirsty. Therefore, it is seen that objects in the waking state are contradicted in dream. For this reason we think that objects in the waking state are also illusory like those in dream and this cannot be doubted. As the common feature in both the states is "having a beginning and end" both the states are traditionally known as illusory.

Comments

Objection is taken on the ground that "objects in *jāgrat* serve useful purposes, yield some concrete results like

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

appeasing hunger and thirst while objects in dream do not serve such a purpose—there is thus no similarity between the two states and therefore objects in *Jāgrat* are not illusory like those in dream". *Saprayojanatā* in the Kārikā is explained by Ānandagiri as *Phalaparyantatva* capacity to yield concrete fruit or result. The reply of the Siddhāntin is that "*Saprayojanatā* capacity to yield concrete result or serve useful purpose in *Jāgrat,* is contradicted in *Svapna* and vice versa. In other words, the *Saprayojanatā* of both *Jāgrat* and *Svapna* has a beginning and end—that capacity of being useful in *Jāgrat* does not exist in *Svapna* and vice versa. On account of beginning and end being thus equally there in both *Jāgrat* and *Suapna* the objects in both states are illusory on the principle stated in Kārikā 2-6. Truth never changes its nature. Here*Saprayojanatva* ofobjects in one state changes its nature and is contradicted in another state and therefore it is *Mithyā.*

Prof. Bhattacharya reads *(Svapne api pratipadyate)* "that the things have some purpose also in dream is known.."; but this reading does not bring out the sense intended by the Kārikā.

अपूर्वं स्थानिधर्मो हि यथा स्वर्गनिवासिनाम् ।
तानयं प्रेक्षते गत्वा यथैवेह सुशिक्षितः ॥८॥

apūrvaṁ sthānidharmo hi yathā svarganivāsinām.
tānayaṁ prekṣate gatvā yathaiveha suśikṣitaḥ. (8).

Translation

What is perceived (in the dream) as sometimes unusually extraordinary (and not met with in the waking condition) is verily the attribute of the local agent—the dreamer in that particular state as is in the case of those dwelling in heaven. The dreamer sees those extraordinary things like a well-instructed person in the waking state who while going to another country sees on the way extraordinary things in that locality.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection :— The statement that "entities in *Jāgrat* and *Svapna* are similar and therefore entities in *Jāgrat* are illusory" is not correct. Why? Because the illustration does not fit in (is not on all the fours). How? Because we do not see in dream the same object only as perceived in the waking state. Then what does one see (in dream)? One sees unusually extraordinary things. One finds himself with eight hands riding on an elephant with four tusks; one perceives other extraordinary things of a like nature in dream. Therefore objects in *Jāgrat* are real as they are not similar to unreal objects of dream. The illustration, therefore, does not fit in and consequently your assertion that objects in Jāgrat are illusory like those in dream is not valid.

Reply :— No. You think that objects perceived in dream are extraordinary (unlike those in the waking state). But (we say that) they are not self-proved (admitted to be absolutely and independently real). This extraordinary feature is the attribute of the perceiver—dreamer, in the state of dream—just as Indra and other dwellers of heaven have a thousand eyes, etc., as their extraordinary attribute; in the same way (perceiving extraordinary objects in dream) is an extraordinary attribute of the dreamer. But this attribute is not self-proved (absolutely real and always associated with *Ātmā* like his own *Cetana* (conscious) nature but is only a temporary feature of the dream condition. The dreamer sees these extraordinary things in dream only when he goes in the dream state. Extraordinary objects are seen by the dreamer as the imaginations of his own mind when he goes into the state of dream. This is like a man in the waking state going to another region by a well-acquainted way and seeing on his way special things belonging to that locality. Just as perception of snake for a rope or of mirage in a place where there is no water is unreal and false—this error is the attribute or mental condition of the perceiver, similarly perceiving extraordinary things in dream is only a (temporarily associated) attribute of the local agent, the dreamer and as such dream objects are

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

unreal. For this reason the illustration of dream (given by us) is not invalid.

Comments

Just as having a thousand eyes, etc., is the attribute of dwellers in heaven, similarly seeing extraordinary objects in dream is the temporary attribute of the local agent *(Sthānidharma)* the dreamer in state of dream. But it was said earlier that whatever is seen is unreal as there is subject-object-relationship—*Grāhya-grāhakabhāva.* So objects seen in the dream are unreal. Then how do we explain the extraordinary sights in dream? In the waking state, for example, a person goes to another region by a route with which he is acquainted very well and there he sees all the special objects of that locality; similarly the dreamer, too, when he goes in the dream state, sees special extraordinary objects of the dream state. But these dream sights are the fancies and imaginations only of the mind of the dreamer. This is an attribute temporarily associated with the dreamer *(sthāni-dharma)* just as perception of snake in a rope is an error which is the mental condition—attribute of the perceiver.

The objector says, "There is *Vaiṣamya* between *Jāgrat* and *Svapna* as we see unusual things in *Svapna , not seen in Jāgrat.* So *Jāgrat* is not unreal like *Svapna".* The reply is that this extraordinary feature of *Svapna* is not due to any extraordinary attribute associated with *Svapna objects* as they are unreal being mere imaginations of the dreamer and are *Jada,* etc. (non-sentient), and *Dṛṣya* (percieved in the dream state). The attribute *(Dharma)* of *Apūrva* (extraordinary) feature, therefore, is the attribute of dreamer (the *Sthānin* of the dream state). But this attribute is not like the intrinsic nature *(Svarūpa)* of the dreamer which is *Cetana* (consciousness). It is only a temporary attribute as it is subject to ending, i.e., *Bādha:* this *Apūrvatva* disappears or is contradicted when the dreamer wakes up. It is only due to *Avidyā,* ignorance that the dreamer goes on imagining and sees in dream unusual sights. Similar is the case with entities perceived in *Jāgrat* also and

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

they too are equally unreal like those in dream being *Dṛśya and having an Adi* and *Anta* (see Kārikās 2-5 and 6). It is all due to *AVIDYĀ Vilasita.* Even heaven, thousand eyes, etc., is all imagination (due to *Avidyā).* There is therefore no *Vaiṣamya* in the illustration given by the Siddhāntin. The above explanation is based on Ānandagiri's commentary.

The terse wording of this Kārikā requires filling up of many gaps and this is observed by both Prof. Bhattacharya and Prof. Karmarkar. The former reads, *"Apūrvaḥ sthānidharmaḥ"* for *"Apūrvam sthānidharmo hi"* and even then confesses that the meaning is not clear. Prof. Karmarkar observes that *Svapna-dṛśya* is an *Apūrva* thing. It is just a *Sthāna-māhātmya.* Even in the waking state untrained men would think it abnormal or impossible that one could fly in a big constellation aeroplane at a rate of 300 miles an hour but a trained pilot does that with great ease. So the *Vaitathya* of things does not depend upon whether the things are normal or abnormal but upon whether they are being belied in another state.

स्वप्नवृत्तावपि त्वन्तश्चेतसा कल्पितं त्वसत् ।
बहिश्चेतोगृहीतं सद्दृष्टं वैतथ्यमेतयोः ॥९॥

svapnavṛttāvapi tvantaścetasā kalpitaṁ tvasat.
bahiścetogṛhītaṁ saddṛṣṭaṁ vaitathyametayoḥ. (9)

Translation

In dream also, what is imagined within the mind is considered as non-existing and what is perceived (in dream) outside the mind appears existing but in truth both of them are known as unreal.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The Siddhāntin refutes the contention of the objector that objects perceived in *Jāgrat* are not similar to those perceived in dream on the ground of extraordinary objects perceived in dream. He now elaborates on the similarity of objects perceived in *Jāgrat* and *Svapna.* Even in the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

dreaming state that which is imagined within the mind is mere fancy and is known as illusory as immediately after they are imagined such fancied things vanish; but in this very state of dreaming, whatever is perceived outside the mind with the help of sense organs like eyes, etc., appear as real (to the dreamer). Here both of them (what is fancied in the mind and what is seen outside the mind through dream eyes) are undoubtedly known as unreal (when one wakes up). Thus even in the dream state there appears a distinction between unreal and real objects (those imagined internally in mind being unreal and those perceived with dream eyes, etc., externally being real). But both kinds of objects (imagined internally and perceived externally in dream) are only modifications of the mind and are found to be unreal.

Comments

The objector says that objects in *Jāgrat* are not illusory as in the waking state; there is a clear distinction between what is real and what is illusory.

Having disposed of the objection on the ground of perceiving extraordinary things in *Svapna* the Siddhāntin replies to this other objection. We know, in the waking state, that whatever is fancied internally in the mind and whatever is perceived externally outside the mind with dream eyes, etc., everything in dream is illusory. Here illusory means unreal from the point of view of the waking state.

We thus find that even in the dream state there is a distinction of real and unreal—whatever is imagined internally in the mind is felt as unreal and whatever is perceived by sense organs is felt as real. But from the point of view of the waking state both of them—imagined internally and perceived externally in dream—are illusory.

Similarly the next Kāṛikā says that the distinction of real and unreal objects in the waking state is similar to that in the dream state and from the point of view of the Highest Reality all things whether felt real or unreal in the waking state are illusory—for everything whether in *Jāgrat* or *Svapna* is *Citta-spandita.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

जाग्रद्वृत्तावपि त्वन्तश्चेतसा कल्पितं त्वसत् ।
बहिश्चेतोगृहीतं सद्युक्तं वैतथ्यमेतयोः ॥१०॥

jāgradvṛttavāpi tvantaścetasā kalpitaṁ tvasat.
bahiścetogṛhītaṁ sadyuktaṁ vaitathyametayoh. (10)

Translation

In the waking state, also, whatever is imagined in the mind is unreal and whatever is perceived outside the mind (with the help of sense organs) is classed as real, but both (distinguished as real and unreal) deserve to be properly (and reasonably) held as illusory.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Both the things distinguished as real and unreal in the waking state deserve to be properly held as illusory. This distinction of real and unreal is found even in the dream state viz., whatever is imagined internally in mind is felt as unreal and whatever is perceived by sense organs outside the mind is felt as real by the dreamer when he is in the dream state (but from the point of view of the waking state, both of them are illusory. Similarly objects whether felt as real or unreal in *Jāgrat* are illusory from the point of view of the Highest Reality).

Comments

Gauḍapāda does not talk of different relative realities but talks only of the *Paramārtha Satya*—the Highest Reality and conspicuously ignores discussing distinctions of relative realities elaborated in later Vedānta. He therefore says that from the point of view of the Highest Reality all entities—whether felt as real or unreal—and whether in *Jāgrat* or *Svapna* are only *Citta-spandita.* Here he says that the distinction of real and unreal is common to both *Svapna* and *Jāgrat* and thus the two states are not dissimilar in this respect. The reason that all those entities are *Bādhita* (contradicted) in the Highest Reality shows that they are all illusory. That is illusory *(Mithyā)* which is *Bādhita* and is not

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Paramārtha satya. It has already been stated that anything having a beginning and an end is illusory. *Jāgrat* entities are contradicted in *Svapna* and vice versa. Both entities are contradicted in deep sleep and these are contradicted in *Paramārtha Satya.*

उभयोरपि वैतथ्यं भेदानां स्थानयोर्यदि ।
क एतान् बुध्यते भेदान् को वै तेषां विकल्पकः ॥११॥

ubhayorapi vaitathyaṁ bhedānāṁ sthānayoryadi.
ka etān budhyate bhedān ko vai tesāṁ vikalpakaḥ. (11)

Translation

If entities in both these states (of *Jāgrat* and *Svapna)* are illusory then who cognises these illusory entities and who imagines them?

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The objector says, "If entities in both these states of *Jāgrat* and *Svapna* are illusory who cognises these things of both kinds—imagined internally in the mind and perceived externally outside the mind—both being only modifications of the mind? Further, who is their imaginer? What is the substratum *(Ālambana)* of memory and knowledge? If you cannot point out any such substratum we will have to say that you desire to conclude that there is nothing like *Ātmā.*

Comments

The objector says that if everything is illusory, it is not possible to deal in terms of knower, known and instruments of knowledge; there can also be no determination of creator, object, instrument, etc. In such a situation who creates or imagines them? Who is real? The creator first remembers the things experienced earlier and then creates similar things later on. He or *Pramātā* (subject) can be inferred only from such facts as memory and past experience. But by

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

hinting at the illusory nature of memory and past experience the objector implies that their substratum(*Āśraya* of memory and experience) is also illusory; and in the absence of subject, all kinds of dealings in terms of creator, creation, etc., become impossible. If everything is illusory, the Individual knower *(Adhyātma Pramātā)* and the cosmic knower *(Adhidaiva Pramātā,* i.e., *Īśvara)* both would be unreal; and if that be so, then it means you desire to conclude that there is no *Pramātā* (knower) or *Ātmā.* But such a position is untenable as one who denies the existence of *Ātmā* is himself the *Ātmā.* Therefore, you should point out the real substratum of memory and experience.

कल्पयत्यात्मनात्मानमात्मा देवः स्वमायया ।
स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति वेदान्तनिश्चयः ॥१२॥

kalpayatyātmanātmānamātmā devaḥ svamāyayā.
sa eva budhyate bhedāniti vedāntaniścayaḥ. (12)

Translation

The self-luminous Ātmā, through his own Māyā, imagines in himself by himself (the various entities which are experienced internally or externally) and he alone cognises such entities (created by his imagination). This is the established conclusion of Vedānta.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

He *(Ātmā)* himself, through his own *Māyā* imagines his own Self. He is Self-luminous. He imagines in himself multiple forms described thereafter just as a snake, etc., is imagined in a rope, etc., He himself is the cogniser of these multiple objects in the same way (as one by ignorance imagines a snake on a rope). There is no other substratum of memory and experience.

The meaning is that Knowledge and memory cannot be without their substratum (or support) as is the case with the School of the Buddhist that postulates Nihilism.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

In the last Kārikā, the objector had asked the Siddhāntin to point out the relative adjustment of the creator, creation, *etc.,* and this adjustment is now described by the Siddhāntin. The instrument *(Karaṇa)* of creation is *Ātmā* himself. The creator *(Kartā)* is also *Ātmā* who is self-luminous *(Deva* shining). *Ātmā* creates through the power of his own *Māyā.* Here, *Vivartavādā* (false modification) is postulated. All creation is *Mithyā,* illusory and all objects are imagined by *Ātmā* through his *Māyā. Ātmā* himself imagines by his *Māyā* the multiple forms. Even though *Ātmā* is non-dual, only one, and the self, all this multiple arrangement is imaginary; for this conclusion, the authority is Vedānta. In the case of the creator of a pot, there is a supervisor different from the material, the earth. Here there is no such supervisor apart from *Ātmā,* There is earth material apart from the potter. Here there is no material apart from *Ātmā.* There the ground is the support. Here there is no support apart from *Ātmā.* The real modification *(Pariṇāmavāda)* is rejected by stating that all this is through his own *Māyā.* The illustration is the imagining, by ignorance a snake as a rope. Having stated that *Cidātmā* becomes the creator of the universe through his own *Māyā,* the Ātmā becomes the knower when he is reflected in the intellct *(Buddhi-Pratibimbita)* and thus he himself becomes the cogniser *(Pramātā).* But his becoming a knower is not real but illusory like imagining by ignorance a snake as a rope. For this established conclusion, there is the authority of Śruti "There is no multiplicity here", etc., *Ātmā* alone is, One who is the creator of the universe, and the knower, he alone is the substratum *(Āśraya)* of knowledge and memory. There is no authority or proof to believe different conscious subjects for memory and experience and it is admittedly known that there is one substratum for them. Further, there must be a substratum for knowledge and memory.

विकरोत्यपरान् भावानन्तश्चित्ते व्यवस्थितान् ।
नियतांश्च बहिश्चित्त एवं कल्पयते प्रभुः ॥१३॥

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

vikarotyaparān bhāvānantaścitte vyavasthitān.
niyatāṁśca bahśicitta evaṁ kalpayate prabhuh. (13)

Translation

The sovereign Lord *(Ātmā)* turns his mind outward and imagines various (worldly) external objects. Similarly, He (first) imagines objects in the form of impressions properly arranged in his mind. In that way He imagines steady objects (like the earth, etc.) and unsteady objects (like lightning, etc.)

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

In what manner does he *(Ātmā)* imagine? This is being stated. He makes, i.e., imagines them as many—the worldly objects such as sound, etc. He also imagines other non-manifest things in the form of impressions *(Vāsanā)* arranged in his mind. He turns his mind outward and imagines steady objects like the earth and (unsteady) objects like the lightning which remain only for a moment. Similarly, he turns his mind inward and imagines fanciful ideas. In this way he imagines. *Prabhu* means the sovereign Lord, *Ātmā*.

Comments

The order in which things are imagined by *Ātmā* is now stated. Objects which are steady as well as those which are momentary are stated. Other objects mean those mentioned in scriptures. Those in the mind arranged in the form of impressions *(Vāsanā)* mean those which are not manifested in name and form. The momentary objects remain only for the time of a passing thought, like lighting, etc. *Ātmā* with his mind turned outward imagines external objects fit for worldly dealings. When his mind is turned inward he imagines various fancies and ideas first in a disarranged form, then arranges them to make them fit for worldly dealings and then further imagines them externally fit for phenomenal dealings. What is meant is this, viz., a potter or weaver desirous of making a pot or cloth first produces in his mind a hazy image of the object and then creates it externally

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

fit for worldly dealings. Similarly, the original creator first has objects unmanifested in name and form in his mind which is characterised by his *Māyā;* first he imagines in his mind the objects to be created and then imagines them externally so that they may be fit for common worldly dealings. This is the order in which things are imagined by *Ātmā.* Prof. Bhattacharya reads *Avyavasthitān* for *Vyavasthitān* in the Kārikā saying that objects in dream are not fixed. He further reads *Bahiścitte.* for *Bahiścitta* to correspond with *Antaścitte.* Prof. Karmarkar rejects those proposed readings.

चित्तकाला हि येऽन्तस्तु द्वयकालाश्च ये बहिः ।
कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषो नान्यहेतुकः ॥१४॥

cittakālā hi ye'ntastu dvayakālāśca ye bahiḥ.
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣo nānyahetukaḥ. (14)

Translation

Those objects which are *Cittakālas* (remaining only as long as the thought exists) and are in the mind *(Antaḥ)* only; as well as those objects which are called *dvayakālas* (which are the objects of recognition and exist for an earlier and later period) and are *Bahiḥ* (perceived externally by senses and are fit for wordly dealings and are therefore called conforming to two points of time)—all of these two kinds of objects are mere imaginations (and therefore illusory— *Mithyā*). The special feature (of "being perceived by senses externally and becoming objects of recognition) is not due to their being not imaginations. (The reason is that objects seen in dream, which are admittedly imagined, also appear externally, perceived by dream senses, and become objects of recognition in dream.)

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The objector raises a doubt here as follows:—"The statement of the Siddhāntin that everything in the waking state is only an imagination of the mind like the dream is to be

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

doubted. For, objects which are imagined in the mind like ideas (or desires) are thus limited by the time of the thought *(Cittaparicchinna)* are different from objects perceived externally on account of the latter being limited by mutually determined time (i.e., by two points in time). But this objection is not valid. *Cittakālāḥ* mean objects perceived within the mind and existing only so long as the thought regarding them exists. There is no other time determining the period of their existence except the time of their thought. Therefore they are known as *Cittakālāh.* The meaning is that they are found to exist only till the time they are imagined. *Dvayakālāḥ,* are objects related to two points of time, i.e., they are *Bhedakālāh,* i.e., there is another distinct time also determining their period of existence *(Kālasya bhedaḥ)* or they may be called *Anyonya-paricchedyāḥ* i.e., time limited by mutually determined time. For example, when we say that he sits till the time the cow is milked what we mean is this. "The cow is milked as long he sits; and he sits as long as the cow is milked". Similarly, we say, "It is till this time" or "It is till that time ", etc. Thus in the case of objects perceived externally their period of existence is mutually determined by one another and therefore they are called *Dvayakālāḥ* related to (limited by) two points of time. According to Siddhāntin all objects whether they are perceived within the mind and are therefore *Cittakālāḥ* or whether they are perceived externally by senses and are therefore *Dvayakālāḥ*—all of them are imagined only. The special feature of the objects perceived externally by senses and their being called *Dvayakālāḥ* is not due to any other cause except their being imagined by the mind. The illustration of dream applies here also.

Comments

In the case of objects imagined within the mind, their existence is only for the time till they are imagined; while objects perceived by senses externally in the waking state remain related to a further period of time and become objects of recognition *(Pratyabhijñā)* later on. As they are recognised later on, they were there earlier and remain later

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

on also, thus they are related to two points of time and, therefore, become objects fit for worldly dealings. The Siddhāntin says that the special feature of objects perceived externally and becoming objects of recognition is no ground to make them real and not mere imaginations. For a similar phenomenon is seen in dream also which is admittedly unreal and illusory - there also some objects are *cittakālāh* and some objects are *Dvayakālāh.* Thus dream and waking state are similar and we cannot differentiate dream from waking state, on the ground of *Cittakāla* and *Dvayakāla.*

Cittakālāḥ means imagined within by the mind which in itself is a false modification of *Ātmā* due to ignorance— "within the mind" means desires, etc., or erroneous perception of a snake for a rope. These are determined by the length of time of their thought or imagination. The objector says that objects seen outside the mind in waking state have the time of their existence mutually related, they are related to two points of time, they are objects of recognition and therefore they are different from objects imagined within the mind.

Bhedakālāḥ means that they are related to some other distinct time also (*Kālasya bhedāḥ* they existed earlier and as they are recognised later on also, therefore there is another distinct time for them to exist, i.e. at the time of their recognition *(Pratyabhiñā).*

Dvayakāla, Bhedakāla, Anyonya — Paricchedya, Indriyakāla, all mean the same thing, differently expressed. It is called *Indriyakāla* as it persists to exist till senses perceive it. It is *Pratyabhijñā-kāla* as it existed earlier and is recognised as existing later also. Three illustrations are given: (1) For such length of time Devadatta is there, till that time he milks the cow. (2) For such length of time the pot is used, till that time he is standing. (3) For such length of time he remained absent and returned finishing his work, till that time he was standing. These are illustrations of things related to two points of time. But the Siddhāntin says that *Cittakāla* or *Dvayakāla* makes no difference–both are unreal. For even in

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

dream we find the same thing—*Cittakāla* and *Dvayalāla* and yet dream is admittedly illusory and unreal. There also we find objects seen once and recognised later in that dream state, perceived externally by dream sense organs, etc. and yet all those objects are admittedly illusory.

अव्यक्ता एव ते येऽन्तस्तु स्फुटा एव च ये बहिः ।
कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषस्त्विन्द्रियान्तरे ॥१५॥

avyaktā eva ye'ntastu sphuṭā eva ca ye bahiḥ.
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣastvindriyāntare. (15)

Translation

Those that are in the mind in an unmanifested form and outside the mind in a manifested form are all mere imaginations. The difference is only in the internal sense organs and external sense organs (the difference of unmanifested and manifested forms is only due to the difference of internal sense organs and external sense organs.)

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objects perceived within the mind like mental impressions are unmanifested while objects perceived externally by sense organs like eyes, etc., are manifested; but this special distinction as being manifested or unmanifested form is no ground for making any of them real (and not illusory). For the same is the case in dream also (which is admittedly illusory). Then how does this special distinction accounted for? The distinction is due to two varieties of sense organs— internal sense organs and external ones. It is therefore established that objects of the waking state also are imagined like the objects of the dream.

Comments

The Siddhāntin wants to prove the illusory nature of both *Jāgrat* and *Swapna.* The objector raises a doubt and says that some objects perceived in *Jāgrat* inside the mind like impressions desires, etc., are unmanifested while some

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

objects perceived in *Jāgrat* outside the mind by sense organs like eyes are manifested and therefore *Jāgrat* is not illusory like *Swapna.* The Siddhāntin says that this special distinction of being manifested and unmanifested is no ground to make any of them real, for in dream also some objects like impressions desires, etc., are unmanifested *(Asphuṭa)* while other objects perceived by dream sense organs are manifested *(Sphuṭa)* and dream is admittedly illusory. The feature of perceiving unmanifested and manifested objects is due to internal sense organs and external sense organs.

Prof. Karmarkar observes that according to the *Naiyāyikas, Indriya* is between *Manas* and objects and thus the fourth *Pāda* may mean that manifested objects are perceived with the help of *Indriyas* while objects in mind are cognised by the mind only. The other interpretation is that mind is *Antarindriya* while external sense organs are *Bahirindriyas.*

In the previous Kārikā the Siddhāntin disposed of the argument based on *Cittakāla* and *Dwayakāla.* In this Kārikā the argument based on *Asphuṭa* and *Sphuṭa* nature of perceiving objects is desposed of.

जीवं कल्पयते पूर्वं ततो भावान् पृथग्विधान् ।
बाह्यानाध्यात्मिकांश्चैव यथाविद्यस्तथास्मृतिः ॥१६॥

Jīvaṁ kalpayate pūrvaṁ tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān.
bāhyānādhyāt ṃikāṁścaiva yathāvidyastathāsmṛtiḥ. (16)

Translation

(Due to *Māyā Ātmā* imagines everything) He first imagines *Jīva* (as of special embodied form) and then imagines various distinct entities both subjective and objective according to his knowledge and memory.

Sāṅkara-Bhāṣya

What is the root source of imagination of subjective and objective entities which are related to each other as cause

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

and effect? It is being stated. *(Ātmā* first imagines) *Jīva* which is of the nature of cause and effect. "I am doing; happiness and misery are mine"—*Jīva* is characterised by this nature. As on *Ātmā* who is pure and not of this characteristic *Jīva* is imagined first as a snake is imagined as a rope. Then for the sake of this *Jīva* are imagined various subjective and objective entities like *Prāṇa,* etc., distingusihed as actions, agents and results (of those actions). But what is the case of this further imagination? That is being stated. This *Jīva* who is imagined by *Ātmā* himself is (now) a competent authority to make all further imaginations. His memory is determined by his knowledge, i.e., His memory is in accordance with his knowledge. Therefore, from the knowledge of the imagination of cause there is the knowledge of the result, then there is the memory of the result of the cause, thereafter there is its knowledge, then that is followed by the knowledge of the nature of action, actor, result, etc., to fulfil that purpose. From them their memory, again its knowledge. In this way he *(Jīva)* imagines in many ways the subjective and objective entities which are the cause and effect of one another.

Comments

Let everything be mere imagination. But in what way is this imagination made? The Siddhāntin replies that due to *Māyā, Ātmā* first imagines himself as *Jīva* as having a special embodied form. The Śruti also says that "Having created it, he entered it", i.e., *Ātmā* himself assumes *Jīva-bhāva* and through him *(jīva)* he creates various other entities. The difference in various imagined entities is due to difference in knowledge and memory. Entities are related to one another as cause and effect. Subjective things are like happiness, misery, knowledge, attachment, etc. They are related to each other as cause and effect. Subjective things are caused by objective things. They in turn create others. In this way, the entities are imagined and are related to one another as cause and effect. But what is the root cause? It is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Jīva. The substratum of the first imagination of *Jīva* is Ātmā who is pure and this imagination is like imagining a snake for a rope. This *Jīva* is now the competent authority to make further imaginations according to his knowledge and memory. This is being explained. If there is food and drink, there is satisfaction; if not, no satisfaction. Thus the knowledge arises that dinner is the cause and satisfaction is the result. Next day there is a memory of that cause (dinner) and result (satisfaction). Then there is the knowledge of the desirability of having that result and means of achieving it. Then for that intended satisfaction the act of cooking, for that rice, etc., for that growing agricultural products, etc.-these kinds of knowledge arise, then their memory, then acting accordingly, then its result. In this order, imaginations are made which are the cause and effect of one another.

Prof. Karmarkar remarks that Gauḍapāda does not dilate upon this topic further as he is mainly interested in the *Ajātivāda* and he points out that *Yogavāśiṣtha* carries this theory to its logical conclusion and speaks of countless myriads of worlds within worlds created by imagination by individual souls.....Why should there be a difference in the powers of imagination of individual souls to start with? To this and similar questions, Gauḍapāda has only one answer, they are all unreal and only the *Advaita Ātman* is the *Paramārthatā.*

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरन्धकारे विकल्पिता ।
सर्पधारादिभिर्भावैस्तद्वदात्मा विकल्पितः ॥१७॥

aniścitā yathā rajjurandhakāre vikalpitā.
sarpadhārādibhirbhāvaistadvadātmā vikalpitah. (17)

Translation

Just as a rope whose nature is not ascertained is imagined in dark as entities like a snake, line of water, etc., similarly *Ātmā* is also imagined (in various ways as described in the previous Kārikā).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

It was stated that the imagination (of *Ātmā*) as *Jīvā* is the root of all (further) imaginations. But what is the cause of that (original) imagination (of *Ātmā*) as *Jīva?* This is being exemplified by an illustration. Just as in our worldly life, a rope in dim light is not ascertained in its own form that this is it (rope) and then it is being imagined in many ways as a snake or a line of water or a stick. The cause of this is that the true nature of it (rope) was not ascertained earlier. If the true nature of the rope was known earlier, there would not have been such imaginations of it as a snake, etc. Here the illustration is that of one's own fingers (whose true nature is known and therefore are not imagined in any other way). In this way *Ātmā,* whose true nature is pure essence of knowledge only, existence and non-dual *(Ātmā)* and who is quite distinct from the the painful transmigratory characteristics related to one another as cause and effect, etc., this *Ātmā* is not ascertained in his true nature and is therefore imagined in infinite ways as *Jīva, Prāṇa,* etc. This is the established conclusion of all the Upaniṣads.

Comments

Now the cause as to why *Ātmā* is imagined as *Jīva* is being stated. Imagination as *Jīva* cannot be *Nitya,* if *Nitya* it will never go. But a cause has to be stated. Here, therefore, the illustration of rope is given. In the earlier stage when its true nature was not ascertained it was imagined in various ways as snake, etc., but in the case of one's own fingers, their true nature as fingers is known and therefore they are not imagined otherwise. The illustration is being explained with reference to *Ātmā.*

By the relation of cause and effect we have also to understand the idea that *Jīva* is the doer, the enjoyer, has attachment, hatred, etc. *Ātmā* when known in its true nature as without any false super-imposition is the pure essence of knowledge, without birth, death, etc., formless. He is without any characteristics common with others or spcial characteristics common with others He is pure existence. There is no misery for him—as he is non-dual *Sat, Cit, Ānanda.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

For this kind of established conclusion, the authority is that of all the Upaniṣads, viz., "where there is as it were duality", etc. These Śruti texts established the unreality of duality and its appearances and therefore it is authoritatively established that non-duality is Reality and all duality is caused by *Avidyā* (ignorance).

निश्चितायां यथा रज्ज्वां विकल्पो विनिवर्तते ।
रज्जुरेवेति चाद्वैतं तद्वदात्मविनिश्चयः ॥१८॥

niścitāyāṁ yathā rajjvāṁ vikalpo vinivartate.
rajjureveti cādvaitaṁ tadvadātmaviniścayaḥ. (18)

Translation

When the true nature of rope is ascertained, all imaginary illusions about it disappear, and one has the conviction that this is one unchanging rope only. Similiar is the conviction in the case of non-dual *Ātmā*.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

When there arises the conviction that this is rope only, all imaginary illusions as snake, etc., disappear and it is realised that this is the unchanging rope only. Similar is the conviction regarding *Ātmā* also. As described in the Śruti text "Not this, not this", the conviction about *Ātmā* arises—on account of the knowledge like sunlight generated by the scripture, establishing *Ātmā* as devoid of all phenomenal transmigratory characteristics. (These Śruti texts are) "*Ātmā* only is all this". "He is without any cause or effect without anything internal or external". "He is within and without and without a begining, without old age, death immortal, fearless one and without a second".

Comments

Ātmā is imagined as *Jīva*—that was described in a positive way. This conclusion is now stated in a negative way. When the conviction arises that it is rope, the ignorance dis-appears and with that, illusory appearances also disappear completely. In the same way when the conviction about *Ātmā* as described in Śruti texts arises,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

imaginations of *Ātmā* as *Jīva,* etc., which are due to *Avidyā,* disappear and what remains is the non-dual *Ātma-tattva.* Therefore imagination of *Ātmā* as *Jīva* is due only to *Avidyā.* All the phenomenal characteristics are superimposed on *Ātmā* (due to *Avidyā*). The negative description of *Ātmā* in Śruti generates the true knowledge. It is like sunlight and the conviction arises that (when false superimpositions disappear) what remains is one non-dual *Ātmā* only and all duality disappears.

"*Ātmā* alone is all this" means *Ātmā* is *Pūrṇa*—complete. He has no cause preceding him or no effect succeeding him. He is *Anantara,* i.e, without *Chidra* (holes) within him, i.e., he is one compact consciousness. He is one's own self *(Pratyak)* not *Bāhya.* He is not related to anything as cause and effect but is the substratum of that imagination of cause and effect. "Within, without and beginningless"—these three adjectives describe him as *Kūṭastha*—unchanging. That He is without birth, death, etc., is due to the fact that in reality he is *Pūrṇa.* But he is the substratum of *Avidyā* as there is no other substratum. It is said that *Avidyā* ultimately enters into him but this statement is made from the standpoint of one ignorant about the true nature of *Ātmā.* In Reality *Avidyā* has no power to enter into *Ātmā.*

प्राणादिभिरनन्तैश्च भावैरेतैर्विकल्पितः ।
मायैषा तस्य देवस्य यया सम्मोहितः स्वयम् ॥१९॥

prāṇādibhiranantaiśca bhāvairetairvikalpitaḥ.
māyaiṣā tasya devasya yayā sammohitaḥ svayaṁ. (19)

Translation

He *(Ātmā)* is imagined as *Prāṇa* and other infinite entities. This is all due to the *Māyā* of that luminous *Ātmā* by which he is deluded.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

If the established conclusion is that *Ātmā* is one only, how is it that *Ātmā* is imagined as these endless entities like *Prāṇa.* etc., which have the characteristics of the phenomenal world? This is being replied here. It is the *Māyā*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

of that luminous *Ātmā*. Just as a juggler conjures up an illusion and makes the entirely clear sky appear as if it is covered with trees having leaves and flowers, in the same way there is the *Māyā* of this luminous *Ātmā* by which he appears as if he is deluded. Gītā also says "My *Māyā* cannot be crossed over easily."

Comments

If *Ātmā* is non-dual, how is it that he is imagined as so many entities? The answer is that it is due to his *Māyā*. The illustration of a juggler is given. An ordinary common man is deluded by the illusion of the juggler; in the same way *Ātmā* also gets deluded himself by this *Māyā*. *Māyā's* association with *Ātmā* comes through delusion *(Moha)*. That cause of this *Māyā* is indicated by *Bhagavān* in Gītā when he says that "my *Māyā* cannot be crossed over easily."

प्राण इति प्राणविदो भूतानीति च तद्विदः ।
गुणा इति गुणविदस्तत्त्वानीति च तद्विदः ॥२०॥

Prāṇa iti prāṇavido bhūtānīti ca tadvidaḥ.
guṇā iti guṇavidastattvānīti ca tadvidaḥ. (20)

Translation

Ātmā is imagined as *Prāṇa* by those who know only *Prāṇa;* as *Bhūta*s (elements) by *Bhūta* knowers; as *Guṇas* by *Guna*-knowers; as *Tattvas* by *Tattva*-knowers.

(Saṅkara has not made any Bhāṣya on Kārikās 20 to 28 stating that it served no purpose. His remarks are stated at the end of Kārikā 28).

Comments

Which are those endless entities which are imagined as *Ātmā* due to the *Māyā?* These entities which are imagined as *Ātmā* are now illustrated.

(1) Some philosophers believe that *Prāṇa* or *Hiraṇyagarbha* or distinctly separate *Īśwara* is the cause of the universe. This is the opinion of *Prāṇavid* philosophers. They are identified us *Hiraṇyagarbhāḥ, Vaiśeṣikāḥ* and

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

such others. But the Kārikā says that this is only imagination. Ānandagiri adds that there is no authority for such belief as this is a belief of a man-made scripture and is contradicted by the *Apauruṣeya* Śruti. Further a distinctly separate *Īśwara* as 'creator' cannot be proved by any authoriy or logic.

Prof. Karmarkar adds that the *Prāṇavid* philosophers may be relying on *"Prāṇe Sarvaṁ Pratiṣṭhitaṁ"* (Chāndogya 1-11-4-5).

(2) Some others like *"Lokāyatikāḥ"* (Cārvākas) believe that the four elements*(Bhūtāni)* like earth, water, fire and air are the cause of the universe Ānandagiri adds that self-existence or existence from some other source of these elements is not proved; moreover those elements are non-sentient. They cannot create any sentinent entity. Even if it is supposed that *Cetanatattva* is produced by their mixture or compound, they themselves cannot grasp that *Cetanatattva* just as fire cannot grasp its own heat.

Prof. Karmarkar adds that perhaps these materialists put forward *Trivṛt-karaṇa,* or *Pañcīkaraṇa* as their authority. Gītā 9-25 also refers to this belief. Very often the fifth element sky is added to these four.

(3) The third theory is that of the *Sāṅkhyāḥ* who believe that the three *Guṇas— Sattva, Rajas,* and *Tamas* are the cause of *Mahat* and other tattvas. This theory cannot be sustained. If they are in equilibrium, then there will always be *Pralaya* and if the equilibrium is disturbed it will always remain disturbed. If there is some other entity causing this disturbance of equilibrium, or re-establishing equilibrium, we will have to find a cause for that entity and a further cause for that cause, etc., and this will lead to *Anavasthā. Guṇa* theory is referred to in Gītā chapter 16 and 17.

(4) The *Śaivas* believe that the three tattvas, viz., *Ātma, Avidyā* and Śiva, create the universe. This can not be sustained. If Ātmā is distinct from Śiva, he will be non-sectient like a pot. If he is identical with Siva, then the theory that the *tattvas* are three will be contradicted.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

पादा इति पादविदो विषया इति तद्विदः ।
लोका इति लोकविदो देवा इति च तद्विदः ॥२१॥

Pādā iti pādavido viṣayā iti tadvidaḥ.
lokā iti lokavido devā iti ca tadvidaḥ. (21)

Translation

As *Pādās* by *Pāda*-knowners, as objects by object-knowers, as *Lokas* by *Loka*-knowers; as Devas by Deva-knowers.

Comments

(5) Ānandagiri says that *Pādas* are *Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña,* etc., of *Ātmā* imagined for worldly dealings but that is not Reality as *Ātmā* has no parts. Prof. Karmarkar remarks that Gauḍapāda who dilates upon these four *Pādas* of *Ātmā* in the first chapter is not likely to intend *Viśva,* etc., as *Pādas* here and therefore suggests that *Pādas* may mean here *Prakāśavān, Anantavān, Jyotiśmān* and *Āyatanavān* as in Chāndogya (3-5-5 to 8) where Satyakāma is instructed by *Ṛsabha* in the *Pādas* of *Brahma.*

(6) *Viṣayas* are interpreted as objects of enjoyment like sound, etc., and some consider them as *Tattvas* as they are frequently enjoyed. Perhaps this may be the theory of *Vātsyāyana,* the author of *Kāmasūtra.* Ānandagiri cites a verse which says that *Viṣayas* are worse than poison. Poison kills when eaten but *Viṣayas* kill even when they are remembered. Cārvākas are also criticised here.

(7) *Paurāṇikas* says that *Lokas* like *Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Swaḥ* are the Reality. Prof. Karmarkar remarks that the *Lokas* may refer to *Devaloka, Varuṇaloka, Prajāpatiloka* or better still the *Devayānapath,* etc.

(8) The theory that *Devas* like Agni, Indra, and others are givers of fruits of our acts and not *Īśvara* is put forward by the worshippers of these *Devatās* as mentioned in the *Devatākāṇḍa* stated in Yāska's *Nirukta.* But the Devas do not give any fruit as they like but have to give it only according to the nature of our acts and thus they have no

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

better status than that of servants or officers. If they are independent and free to give any fruit then their prayer serves no purpose as even their devotees are seen as suffering miseries. Prof. Karmarkar refers to Gītā 9-25 where such worshippers are mentioned *Yānti Devavratā Devān.*

वेदा इति वेदविदो यज्ञा इति च तद्विदः ।
भोक्तेति च भोक्तृविदो भोज्यमिति च तद्विदः ॥२२॥

vedā iti vedavido yajñā iti ca tadvidaḥ.
bhokteti ca bhoktṛvido bhojyamiti ca tadvidaḥ. (22)

Translation

As Vedas by Veda-knowers, as sacrifices by sacrifice-knowers as enjoyer by enjoyer-knowers, as object of enjoyment by those who know such objects of enjoyment.

Comments

(9) The *Veda-Pāṭhakas* say that the four Vedas, viz., Ṛgveda and others are the *Tattvas.* But Vedas are made up of sounds we hear in worldly dealings. Words arranged in an unalterable specific order are admittedly the characteristic of the Vedas. This order is superimposed, in between speaking and hearing. As the Vedas are mere sounds with a superimposed order, they do not deserve to be called the Highest reality. The *Vaidikas* believe that Vedas are *Apauruṣeya* and the *Niḥśvasita* of God.

(10) The Yājñikās believe that sacrifices like *Jyotiṣṭoma,* etc., are the *Tattvas.* They are identified by Ānandagiri with Baudhāyana and others. But *Yajñas* are defined as *Dravya, Devatā* and *Tyāga.* Each of these three individually cannot be known as *Yajña* and *Samudāya* (their collection) is no single entity. Prof. Karmarkar recalls Gītā 3-13, 6-31, 4-23 and 4-24 in this connection.

(11) Sāṅkhyas believe that *Ātmā* is not the doer but only the enjoyer *(Bhoktā).* But if *Ātmā* becomes enjoyer his modification as *Bhoktā* is admitted and in that case *Ātmā* would be *Anitya.* If *Bhoktṛtva* is the nature of *Ātmā* then there would be no liberation. Prof. Karmarkar refers to Gītā 9-24 and 13-22.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(12) Some believe that food *(Bhojyam)* is the *Tattva.* Ānandagiri says that reference is made here to cooks but as the same kind of food like sweet, etc., is felt differently by others, food cannot be the Tattva. Prof. Karmarkar remarks that Ānandagiri refers to cooks in a lighter vein but the real reference may be to passages like Taittirīya 3-7 to 9, 2-1, 21-2, Chāndogya 1-3-6, etc., where everything is stated as established in Anna.

सूक्ष्म इति सूक्ष्मविदः स्थूल इति च तद्विदः ।
मूर्त इति मूर्तविदोऽमूर्त इति च तद्विदः ॥२३॥

sūkṣma iti sūkṣmavidaḥ sthūla iti ca tadvidaḥ.
mūrta iti mūrtavido' mūrta iti ca tadvidaḥ. (23)

Translation

As *Sūkṣma* (subtle) by *Sūkṣma*-knowers, as *Sthūla* (gross) by *Sthūla*-knowers, as *Mūrta* (possessed of form) by *Mūrta*-knowers and as *Amūrta* (form-less) by *Amūrta*-knowers.

Comments

(13) Some believe that *Ātmā* is having the size of an atom *(Aṇu)* but this view is not sustainable as we feel the consciousness of *Ātmā* all over the body. These atomists may be *Vaiśeṣikas.* Prof. Bhattacharya says that the reference may be to Vaiṣṇavas like Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva and others who believe that *Ātmā* is *Aṇu* but prof. Karmarkar criticises that view by remarking that according to *Vaiṣṇavas Jīva* is *Aṇu* and not *Paramātman.* Here the reference in the Kārikā is to the Highest Reality *(Jagatkāraṇa)* and not to *Jīva* (the individual soul).

(14) A section of *Lokāyatikas (Cārvākas)* believe that the *Sthūla* (gross) body is the Reality as we feel the conviction of "I-ness" in the body. But this view is not tenable as in spite of the body being there in the case of sleep or death there is no consciousness—no "*ahaṁpratyaya*". No consciosness is found in individual limbs taken separately

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

and the collection of limbs is no one single entity. The Jainas also believe that *Ātmā* is of the size of the body.

(15) Followers of *Maheśvara* or *Viṣṇu* believe that their god has a corporate body *(Mūrta)* and is either holding *Triśula* or a discus in hand. These people are the followers of *Āgama.* But their body would be made up of elements like ours which is not possible. If it is imagined that they have a body only when they are having their *Līlā,* then as it is not possible to imagine their having an *Anitya* body of elements, they cannot have any *Līlā* in absence of a body.

Prof. Karmarkar states that reference may be here to passages like those in Gītā 4-6 to 8*"Sambhavāmi Yuge yuge"*, etc., and refers to the definition of *Mūrta* in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2-3-2 to 3.

Prof. Karmarkar remarks that "Void" is not the natural meaning of *Amūrta.* The reference may simply be to those who do not believe in a personal God.

काल इति कालविदो दिश इति च तद्विदः ।
वादा इति वादविदो भुवनानीति तद्विदः ॥२४॥

kāla iti kālavido diśa iti ca tadvidaḥ.
vādā iti vādavido bhuvanānīti tadvidaḥ (24).

Translation

As Time, by Time-knowers, as directions by knowers of Directions; as disputations by those indulging in disputations; and as worlds by those who are knowers of worlds.

Comments

(17) Astronomers would say that Time is the Reality. But if Time is one entity then we cannot have its parts like hours, minutes, etc. If there are many Times, they lose their independence (as *Jagat-Kāraṇa).* Further time is associated with other things also, viz., time for rising of the sun, etc. Time is associated with activity also.

Prof. Karmarkar observes that *Vaiśeṣikas* believe that *Kāla* is *Nitya.* The reference in the Kārikā may also be to Gītā 11-32, 10-34 and Atharvaveda 29-53, 54. Gītā describes *Bhagawān* as Kāla and Mṛtyu.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(18) Some believe "Directions". i.e., space as Reality. Ānandagiri identifies them with *Swarodayavids*. They predict events by hearing voices of birds, etc., or by the movements of breath in nostrils. *Vaiśeṣikas* also regard space as *Nitya*.

(19) Some believe that *Vādas* like *Dhātuvāda, Mantravāda,* etc., are the Reality. They believe in alchemy, Mantras, etc. In spite of Mantras many are seen as having no effect of them, so it is all imagination. *Vāda* may also refer to knowledge derived by discussion and thus *Tārkikas* who discuss various things might have been meant.

(20) Some think that seven worlds like *Bhūḥ,* Bhuvaḥ, Svaḥ etc., or seven Pātālas like *Atala, Vitala,* etc., are the Reality. But they are not seen by anybody and moreover there is no unanimity about their numbers or conception.

मन इति मनोविदो बुद्धिरिति च तद्विदः ।
चित्तमिति वित्तविदो धर्माधर्मौ चि तद्विदः ॥२५॥

mana iti manovido buddhiriti ca tàdvidaḥ.
cittamiti , cittavido dharmādharmau ca tadvidaḥ (25).

Translation

As mind by mind-knowers, as *Buddhi* (intellect) by *Buddhi*-knowers, as *Citta* by *Citta*-knowers and as *Dharma* and *Adharma* by knowers of them.

Comment

(21) Some section of *lokāyatikas* believe mind to be the Reality. If mind is independent, then there would be no misery. If not independent,it is like a pot and not Ātmā. It is only an internal organ like a lamp and like a lamp it cannot be *Ātmā.*

Prof. Karmarkar refers to *Mano Brahma iti Upāsita.*

(22) *Bauddhas* believe *Buddhi* as Reality. But in sleep, *Buddhi* is absent. *Buddhi,* moreover, is an object like a pot perceived by the *Sākṣin* perceiver.

(23) *Vijñānavādin Bauddhas* believe that *citta,* i.e., *Vijñāna* without external objects is the Reality. This is not sustainable on grounds stated earlier. Prof. Karmarkar

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

rightly observes in connection with this Kārikā that according to *Bauddhas, Manas, Buddhi* and *Citta* are very often synonymous terms and as Gauḍapāda contemptuously refers to these *Vādas,* he himself could not have been a Buddhist himself. Prof. Bhattacharya's thesis is that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist. Prof. Karmarkar points out, "It is significant that Prof. Vidhuśhekhara has no remarks to offer on this point."

(24) *Dharma* and *Adharma* are known from injunctions and prohibitions in *Vedas* and they are the Reality according to *Mīmāṁsakas* but *Dharma* and *Adharma* differ according to difference in regions and times and therefore such inconsistent things cannot be Reality.

पञ्चविंशक इत्येके षड्विंश इति चापरे ।
एकत्रिंशक इत्याहुरनन्त इति चापरे ॥२६॥

pañcaviṁśaka ityeke ṣaḍviṁśa iti cāpare.
ekatriṁśaka ityāhurananta iti cāpare. (26)

Translation

Some regard twenty-five categories as Reality, others twenty-six, still others thirty-one, and still others say that Reality consists of Infinite categories.

Comments

(25) The *Sāṅkhyas* believe in twenty-five categories.

(i) *Pradhāna* as *Mūlaprakṛti.*

(ii) *Mahat, Ahaṁkāra* and five *Tanmātrās* as both *Prakṛti* and *Vikṛti.*

(iii) Five organs of intellect, five organs of action, mind and five *Mahābhūtas, Vikāra* of *Prakṛti.*

(iv) *Puruṣa.* Thus $1 + 7 + 16 + 1 = 25$ are the categories of *Sāṅkhyas.*

(26) According to the *Yoga* system of Patañjali, the categories are twenty-six—those very categories of *Sāṅkhya* and in addition *Īśvara.*

(27) According to Ānandagiri, *Pāśupatas* believes in thirty-one *tattvas.* Adding *Rāga, Avidyā, Niyati, Kāla, Kalā*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

and Māyā as six more to the twenty-five of *Sāṅkhyas,* they make up a figure of thirty-one.

Prof. Vidhuśekhara observes that others add five more to these thirty-one viz., *Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara* and *Vidyā* and make up a figure of thirty-six but as *Rāga, Avidyā, Niyati, Kāla* and *Kalā* are regarded as *Māyā vibhūti,* these thirty-six can be reduced to thirty-one.

Prof. Karmarkar differs from the above mentioned thirty-one and says that the thirty-one mentioned in Gītā 13-5 to 6 are referred to here. They are five *Mahābhūtas,* three *Ahaṁkāra Buddhi* and *Avyakta,* eleven made up of five *Karmendriyas,* five *Jñānendriyas* and *Manas,* other seven as *Icchā, Dweṣa, Sukha, Duḥkha, Saṅghāta, Cetanā* and *Dhṛti* (all making up a figure of thirty-one).

Prof. Karmarkar in his Introduction (pp. xli-xlvii) tries to point out the "sources" of Gauḍapāda Kārikās, using sources in a very broad sense. He has tried to show a number of similarities with ideas expressed in Gītā. Some of his references are convincing but a few of them are farfetched. In this Kārikā also, it is doubtful if Gauḍapada intended to refer to the thirty-one *Tattvas* as mentioned in Gītā 13-5 and 6. It is possible that the *Tattvas* referred to in this Kārikā are those of *Śaivas* and *Śāktas.* Gītā does not mention the figure thirty-one and adds that what is stated is in a summarised way *(Samāsena)* the *Kṣetra* with its modifications. "Summarised way" suggests that if a fuller statement is made adjustment of figures can be made accordingly.

(28) Some believe that categories are infinite.

Prof. Karmarkar refers to Gītā 10 40 to 41 where the *Vibhūtis* of God are described as endless.

Ānandagiri observes that all these disputants mentioning various figures dispute among themselves and their dispute is due to the ignorance of Reality.

लोकाँल्लोकविदः प्राहुराश्रमा इति तद्विदः ।
स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकं लैङ्गाः परापरमथापरे ॥२७॥

lokāṁllokavidaḥ prāhurāśramā iti tadvidaḥ.
strīpuṁnapuṁsakaṁ laiṅgāḥ parāparamathāpare. (27)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Pleasing people is known as *Tattva* by knowers of *Loka, Āśramas* are known as *Tattva* by knowers of *Āśramas,* the grammarians *(Laiṅgas)* call male, female and neuter as *Tattva* while some others know it as *Para* and *Apara.*

Comments

(29) *Loka* here means pleasing other people as Reality but people have different tastes and none, even *Īśvara,* can please all.

Prof. Karmarkar states these are democrats and believe in *Loka Sañgraha.*

(30) Dakṣa and other Smṛti-writers believe in the four *Āśramas—Brahmacarya, Gṛhastha; Vānaprastha* and *Sannyāsa. Āśramas* referred to here are different from *Āśramas* mentioned in Kārikā 3-16.

(31) *Laiṅgas* are identified by Ānandagiri with Grammarians. Prof. Karmarkar thinks it may refer to those who like Freudists believe that sex urge animates the world and that is the *Tattva.*

(32) Praśna Upanisad refers to *Para* and *Apara Brahma* (5-2). Para and Apara is referred to in Muṇḍaka 2-2-8.

सृष्टिरिति सृष्टिविदो लय इति च तद्विदः ।
स्थितिरिति स्थितिविदः सर्वे चेह तु सर्वदा ॥२८॥

sṛṣṭiriti sṛṣṭivido laya iti ca tadvidaḥ.
sthitiriti sthitividaḥ sarve ceha tu sarvadā. (28)

Translation

As creation by *Sṛṣṭivids,* as dissolution by *Layavids,* as sustenance by *Sthitivids* and all of these are always (imagined in respect of Ātmā).

Comments

(33) Paurāṇikas believe either in Brahmā (creator)

(34) Or Viṣṇu as sustainer

(35) Or Rudra (destroyer)

(36) All these are various imaginations on *Ātmā.* They appear in the stage of imagination but *Ātmā* as such is not imaginary. *Ātmā* is the substratum of all these imaginations.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Sāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Prāṇa, Prājña (Jīva- in sleep) *Bījātmā* (Causal Self) and its various effects are the different entities right upto *Sthiti.* All other worldly ideas also imagined by all the beings are like superimposition of a snake on a rope and they are superimposed on *Ātmā* who is free from all those attributes. All these distinctions are imagined by ignorance due to want of determination of the real nature of *Ātmā.* This is the meaning of these Kārikās (2-20 to 28) stated briefly. No effort is made to comment on each of these verses individually as it is futile.

Comments

Prāṇa or *Prājña* or *Bījātmā* is the causal Self and it is of the nature of modification. All others mentioned after *Prāṇa* do not differ in nature from *Prāṇa* as all of them are of the nature of modification. Others mentioned after *Sthiti* would include *Kula-dharma, Grāmadharma, Deśadharma,* etc. *Ātmā* has no such distinctions or their attributes. *Ātmā* is the substratum of all these imaginations. These imaginations are illusory and it is futile, says the Bhāṣyakāra, to discuss in detail these which are illusory.

यं भावं दर्शयेद्यस्य तं भावं स तु पश्यति ।
तं चावति स भूत्वाऽसौ तद्ग्रहःसमुपैति तम् ॥२९॥

yaṁ bhāvaṁ darśayedyasya taṁ bhāvaṁ sa tu paśyati.
taṁ cāvati sa bhūtva'sau tadgrahah samupaiti tam. (29)

Translation

Whichever entity is presented (by the teacher) to him (the pupil) (as reality), he (the pupil) sees that (entity) (as the reality or *Ātmā*). *Ātmā* assumes the form of that (presented) entity and protects him. Firm attachment to that entity takes hold of him (make him solely engrossed in it).

Sāṇkara-Bhāṣya

What more can be said in this connection? if the teacher or some reliable person presents to the pupil or enquirer an entity like *Prāṇa* stated here earlier or some other entity even not stated here stating that this is the final Reality, that

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

pupil or inquirer would take that presented entity as the *Ātmā,* viz., "I am this or this is mine". That entity then protects such believer. Such presented entity assumes the form of his *Ātmā* and protects him. That entity makes him believe that, that is the sole essence and keeps its meditator away free from all other ideas. There is firm attachment to that entity. That entity then takes hold of the meditator inquirer, (i.e.,) is realised by that meditator as the final Reality. He becomes identified with that entity.

Comments

People in this world have many kinds of imaginations. Some of them are illustrated. As it is impossible to exhaust them all, the essence thereof is briefly stated. A teacher may present an entity to the pupil as *Ātmā.* The pupil takes that entity as final Reality. That entity assumes the form of his *Ātmā* and protects that inquirer. He gets firmly attached to it and is prevented from thinking of any other idea. The inquirer gets identified with that presented entity.

Prof. Karmarkar construes the Kārikā a little differently. "According to Saṅkara the *Ātman* protects the *Sādhaka* and *Tadgraha* takes possession of him; according to our interpretation the *Sādhaka* guards the adopted *Bhāva* and obsessed by it reaches it". He takes the subject of two verbs *Avati* and *Paśyati as the same Sādhaka.* But he adds that the meaning is ultimately the same.

एतैरेषोऽपृथग्भावैः पृथगेवेति लक्षितः ।
एवं यो वेद तत्त्वेन कल्पयेत् सोऽविशङ्कितः ॥३०॥

etaireṣo'pṛthagbhāvaiḥ pṛthageveti lakṣitaḥ.
evaṁ yo veda tattvena kalpayet so'viśaṅkitaḥ. (30)

Translation

Even though *Ātmā* is not separate from these entities, *Ātmā* is imagined as if it were separate. One who knows this to be the real nature of things can interpret (the *Vedas*) without any hesitation.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Ātmā is not separate from these *Prāṇa* and other entities just as rope is not separate from such imaginary ideas as the snake, etc., but ignorant people firmly believe that *Ātmā* is separate. But according to those who know the truth, Prāṇa and other entities are all imagined (on *Ātmā*) as snakes, etc. are imagined on a rope and do not therefore exist apart from *Ātmā*. —this is the meaning. The Śruti also says, "All this is verily this *Ātmā*". Thus all these entities which are imagined on *Ātmā* like snake, etc., on a rope are unreal and not existing apart from *Ātmā* and *Ātmā* is uncontaminated and free from all these imaginations—he who knows this truth both from Śruti as well as reasoning can without any hestitation construe the meaning of the Vedas according to its divisions, viz., "This passage means this and that passage means that". One who does not know the nature of *Ātmā* is incapable of truly constructing the meaning of the *Vedas*. Manu (also) states that one who does not know *Ātmā* can not reap any benefit from his action.

Comments

According to the previous Kārikā when the inquirer is instructed by his teacher that this particular entity is the Reality, he, with firm belief in it, is prevented from having any other idea about Reality. Then a doubt may arise that such entity presented by the Teacher may be the Reality.

This Kārikā therefore says that *Prāṭa* and all other *Bhāvas* are mere imaginations and an imagined thing (like a snake for a rope) is not separate or distinct from its substratum. As imagined things do not exist apart from their substratum, it is only the ignorant who think that the imagined and the substratum are two distinct things. Those who know the truth do not see them as distinct. This is proved by Śruti as well as reasoning. The reasoning is all that is perceived is *Mithyā* and therefore things perceived in the waking state are as much illusory as those seen in dream . One who knows the Reality is not the servant of the *Veda* but whatever interpretation he gives as the true meaning of *Veda* is the Real meaning of *Veda*. The *Jñāna Kāṇḍa* of Veda directly

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

deals with *Advaita* (non-duality). *Karmakāṇḍa* leads to the same goal in stages by instructing about the goal and the means to realise it. The Śruti therefore says "All Vedas describe that Reality". The knowledge of the nature of *Pratyagātmā* is the essence of *Veda* and he who realises it knows the true meaning of *Veda.* Manu's words are cited here. The word *Kriyā* in Manu's verse means *Pramāṇa.* The benefit derived from acts like *Agnihotra* is the purification of mind and that ultimately leads, by stages to the knowledge of *Ātmā.*

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा।
तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥३१॥

svapnamāya yathe dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaraṁ yathā.
tathā viśvamidaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ. (31)

Translation

Just as dreams and illusions or a city in the air is seen (as unreal) similarly the universe (too) is seen by the wise (as unreal).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

It has been stated (earlier) that duality is unreal—that proposition was established by reason. This Kārikā now says that the same is known from the scriptural authority of *Vedānta.* Dreams and illusions are unreal and yet they appear to the ignorant as if they are real. An illusory city in the sky with dealings of men and women and full of spreadout marketable articles, houses, palaces, villages, etc., appears as real and then is seen immediately vanishing. Just as dreams and llusions are unreal, similarly the entire universe, this duality, is seen as unreal. Where? In the texts of *Vedānta* "There is no multiplicity here at all"; "Indra with his power of *Māyā* (assumes various forms); "In the beginning this was only *Ātmā".* In the beginning this was *Brahma."* "Fear arises when there is a second"; "There is nothing other than that". When everything has become for him *Ātmā* alone", etc. Wise people mean those learned who can see the true nature of things more acutely. Vyāsa Smṛti also says, "The duality is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

like a hole seen in the ground (in the place of rope) when it is seen in darkness. It is as unstable as a bubble seen in rain water, devoid of bliss, and ceasing to have any existence after it is destroyed.

Comments

This Kārikā is intended to show that the reasoning by which the unreality of duality is established is not only not fallacious but has also the support of the scriptural authority of *Vedānta.* The texts of *Vedānta* are cited in the *Bhāṣya.* Śruti text is also cited to prove the unreality of duality. The unstable sight of a hole in ground seen in place of a rope and which is likely to disappear shortly has its unreality even in its present condition when it is perceived. Duality is never blissful, it brings misery. and is subject to destruction. Thereafter it ceases to exist and there is no authority or proof to establish duality as ultimate reality.

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥३२॥

na nirodho na cotpattirna baddho na ca sādhakaḥ.
na mumukṣurna vai mukta ityeṣā paramārthatā. (32)

Translation

There is neither destruction nor birth; no *Jīva* who is bound or seeking means for release; none who is liberated or seeking liberation. This is the ultimate truth.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

This verse summarises the meaning of this chapter. When it is established that duality is unreal, and *Ātmā* alone is the ultimate Reality, the following conclusion arises, viz., all our dealings whether worldly or Vedic are included within the sphere of ignorance. Then there is neither any destruction or birth, no one is bound, i.e., transmigratory *Jīva* nor one seeking means for release; none seeking liberation nor one who is liberated. The ultimate Reality is that as birth and destruction do not exist there is none who is bound etc. If it is asked as to how there are no birth and destruction, the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

reply is that duality is unreal. The following Śruti texts established the unreality of duality, viz., "When there is as it were any duality." "One who as it were perceives multiplicity". "All this is verily *Ātmā* this is verily *Brahma*."There is only one without a second". "All that is verily this *Ātmā*".

Birth and destruction can be spoken of only in connection with an existing object, not of non-existing things like horns of a hare. Similarly that which is non-dual is never born or destroyed. To say that that which is non-dual is also subject to birth and death is contradiction in terms. It has already been pointed out that all our worldly experiences of duality in the nature of *Prāṇa,* etc., are only imagined on the substratum of *Ātmā* like a snake for a rope.

That which only appears due to illusion or error in a substratum is never actually born or subsequently dissolved into that substratum. In the mental imagination of a snake appearing on the substratum of a rope, the snake is not actually born and then destroyed in the substratum rope Had it been so, all other people having a similar faulty vision in dark would also see a snake but this is not so. To some the rope appears as a snake, to others as a stick, or a hole in the ground or a line of water. Therefore, the snake is not actually born or destroyed in the substratum). The sanke is also not born or destroyed in the mind of the perceiver (The obvious reason is that the snake is seen as an external object, if the birth of a snake is in the mind, how can it appear as an external object?). Further, it is not possible to say that the snake is born and destroyed simultaneously in the mind of the perceiver as also in the external substratum rope (The reason is that there cannot be simultaneously two substrata for the birth, etc., of the same thing, one and the same son cannot be born simultaneously of two mothers).

In the same way duality is not different from being mental imagination. Duality is not experienced in a state of mental control in *Samādhi* or in deep sleep. It is therefore established that duality is purely mental imagination. It has been well said, therefore, that duality does not exist and the ultimate truth is that there is no destruction (or birth), etc.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

It was established both by scriptural authority and reasoning that duality is unreal and the non-dual alone is the ultimate truth. This Kārikā summarises the conclusions that follow from that position. It is this; All our worldly dealings are within the sphere of ignorance. The unreality of duality according to Śruti is pointed out in the *Bhāṣya* by citing texts of Upaniṣads. If duality is unreal, there cannot be birth or death. Birth and death can be spoken of only in connection with a thing that exists not for a non-existing thing. Worldly intercourse is like the illusion of a snake on the substratum of a rope. This illusion or error *(Bhrama)* is *Mithyā* and *Mithyatva* is defined as that which appears in the substratum but does not exist in the substratum. In Bhrama the snake is not born in the rope. Had it been so, all others would see the snake but some see the rope as a snake, others as a waterline, or a stick, etc. The snake is not born in the mind because it is appearing externally in place of the rope. It cannot be born simultaneously in the mind and the rope as there cannot be two substrata simultaneously for the birth of the the same object. The duality is similar to the illusion of a snake on a rope and is merely mental imagination. This is being so the ultimate truth is that there is no birth or death, etc.

Objector: Well, through the medium of mind we may be seeing duality upside down but then there should be some unknown reverse and erect position of duality.

Reply: No. The snake seen by mental illusion never exists—the apparent snake has no such unknown real existence. A thing which is established as an illusion has no unknown real existence. There is no proof for that.

Śaṇkara-Bhāṣya

Objector: If this is the case, then it means that the scriptures are intended to prove negatively the unreality of duality and not positively to prove the non-dual position as there is contradiction (in employing the same proof to prove onething negatively and at the same time to use it for proving another thing positively). As you have proved negatively that duality has no proof for its existence (and the non-dual cannot be positively proved by the same means as pointed

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

out by us) then in that case you will have to conclude that there is Nihilism *(Śūnyavāda)*—for duality has no existence.

Reply: No. (There cannot be Nihilism). We have already established earlier that the illusion of a snake (for a rope) cannot be without any substratum. Why do you raise the same point over and over again?

Objection: Your illustration of rope and snake (to prove the existence of substratum) does not fit in, as the rope which is the substratum of the illusory snake is itself an imagined entity (being a part of duality).

Reply: This is not so. When the imagined entity disappers, the unimagined substratum (in our worldly dealings) is properly said to exist (of its own accord) for the simple reason that it was not imagined.

Objection: Supposing we say that *Ātmā* is as unreal as a snake seen in place of a rope as a snake (i.e., the unimagined substratum itself is as illusory and unreal as the snake seen as rope).

Reply: No *Ātmā* is absolutely (and invariably) unimagined and is like the unimagined *Sanmātra* (something existing) element of rope that existed even before the knowledge of unreality of the snake. Further it has been admitted that the imagining subject has its existence prior to the imagination: It is therefore not tenable to say that the subject (knower or substratum) is non-existent.

Comments

The objector says that scriptures, according to Śiddhāntin, prove the unreality of duality as a negative proposition. The same negative proof cannot be used to prove positively that only the non-dual exists and as the latter proposition is not proved, there would be nihilism (as duality is proved as unreal and the Non-dual is not proved). The Siddhāntin replies that duality is illusory and is like an illusory snake on the substratum of rope. The objector finds dissimilarities with the illustration of rope and snake. The objector says that according to Siddhāntin, the rope (substratum) is itself unreal, being part of duality. To this the Siddhāntin replies that in the illustration of rope and

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

snake, the rope is not known as a rope, but the Sanmātra element in rope (something existing) is the *Caitanya* who is the witness of *Bhrama* itself and that exists as the substratum and that is the real substratum when from the point of ultimate truth the rope, the snake and the entire duality are unreal.

Ātmā is the witness of all Bhrama not the object of *Bhrama.* Even before we realise that it is rope and not a snake, i.e., even in the state when illusion prevails, some unknown existing thing does exist before the perceiver as the unknown part of rope. Similarly, *Ātmā* also exists as *Sanmātra* substratum, even if the scriptures may not positively establish *Ātmā.*

Further reason is provided by the Siddhāntin for the Reality of *Ātmā.* The imagining person must exist prior to his imaginations. The imagining *Ātmā* must exist before he imagines illusory duality.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya:

Objector: If *Ātmā* needs no scripture to prove its existence and therefore if the scripture does not prevail in establishing the nature of *Ātmā* how can that scripture (which has no utility) remove from our mind the knowledge of duality?

Reply: There is no difficulty. Just as a snake is superimposed on a rope, similarly duality is superimposed on *Ātmā* due to *Avidyā* (ignorance). How? It is like this. Various imaginary notions are superimposed on *Ātmā,* viz., I am happy, unhappy, ignorant; born, dead, old, possessed of a body, am seeing, am manifested, or unmanifested, doer, enjoyer, united, seated, decreasing, increasing (or old), me and mine, etc. In all these notions, the presence of *Ātmā* persists as woven all throughout; as the notion of *Ātmā* never deviates at any time. It is like the notion of rope persisting when various ideas like a snake, waterline, etc., are superimposed on a rope. This being the case the nature of *Ātmā* who is the substratum for all these imaginary attributes, is established as selfevident and therefore the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

scripture has no function to accomplish in proving the existince of *Ātmā.* The real function of the scripture is to establish that which is not yet established. And the scripture does not serve as a proof or authority for establishing that which is already established. The fact is that *Ātmā* does not realise his own real nature on account of the specific impediments like the notions such as I am happy, unhappy, etc., which are superimposed on *Ātmā* by ignorance, Realisation of the true nature of *Ātmā* (who is without these attributes and is non-dual) is the real beatitude.

Comments

It was established that *Ātmā* is the substratum on which there is the illusion of duality; when duality is contradicted, *Ātmā* alone remains as its witness; and even before the rise of illusion *Ātmā* existed as self-evident. And therefore even if *Ātmā* does not become the object of any *Pramāṇa* (proof) there is no possibility of Nihilism.

Now the objector takes another kind of objection. "If the scripture does not prevail in proving the nature of *Ātmā* (who is self-evident), then the scripture has no utility. How can such scripture prove the unreality of duality?" The nature of the argument is this: In the illustration of rope and snake, rope is object of *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa* but *Ātmā* is not object of any *Laukika Pramāṇa.* If *Ātmā* is unknown by any then how can scripture remove duality from that unknown thing? We do not know from which place duality is to be removed.

The reply of the Siddhāntin is that duality is superimposed on *Ātmā* by ignorance and apart from removal of that ignorance by the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of *Ātmā,* nothing extra is needed for removal of unreal duality. The *Ātmā,* even though not the object of any *Laukika Pramāṇas,* automatically becomes self-evident as the substratum of the illusory duality on the rise of correct knowledge and duality is contradicted.

This *Bhrama* (illusion of duality) is superimposed *(Adhyasta)* on *Ātmā* by ignorance. What is its nature? I am happy

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

unhappy, etc. As *Ātmā* is the witness and remains as self-evident remnant after the removal of ignorance, the scripture is not required to establish the existince of *Ātmā* who is already established. The scripture only removes the impediments in the form of false notions about *Ātmā.* On removal of those impediments, the true nature of *Ātmā* is realised. It is the total removal of all miseries, and realisation of absolute Bliss, and this is the real Beatitude stated in the scriptures describing liberation.

Śāṅkare-Bhāṣya

The scripture removes the idea of the attributes of happiness (in *Ātmā*) etc., by producing the conviction that (the attributeless) Ātmā is "not happy", etc., through statements as "not this" "not this", " not gross", etc. Even though the presence of *Ātmā* is felt as persisting (in all states of consciousness) still along with this presence his attributeless nature also like "not happy" etc., is not felt when there are false notions like "having the attribute of happiness", etc. If such attributeless nature was also felt along with the bare presence of *Ātmā,* then those specific false notion in the form of "being happy", etc., which are superimposed on *Ātmā* would never arise—just as coldness can never be associated with fire whose specific quality is heat. The truth therefore is that specific attributes like "being happy", etc., are only imagined on attributless *Ātmā.* The scriptures describing *Ātmā* as "not happy", etc., are intended to remove the false specific notions of *Ātmā* having the attributes of happiness, etc. The knowers of *Āgama* say that the validity of the authority of the scripture is established as it proclaims non-existence of duality and negates all specific positive attributes which are superimposed on attributeless *Atmā.*

Comments

If *"Asukhitva"* is the true nature of *Ātmā,* why is it also not felt when the presence of self-evident *Ātmā* is felt? The reply is this. Just as in the illusion of snake for a rope, the element of "this-ness" is known but due to *Bhrama,* rope element is not known, similarly due to the incomprehensible

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

power of Avidyā, the bare presence of *Ātmā* flashes at all times but his nature of being attributeless is not known as false notions of *Sukhitva,* etc, are superimposed on *Ātmā. In this connection approval of Dravidacarya is cited. Even though scriptural statements do not establish the self-luminous and self-evident Brahma, still by negative descriptions like Asthūla,* etc., the scripture proclaims the non-existence of duality and removal of false specific positive attributes superimposed on attributeless *Ātmā* and it is in this way that there is the validity of scriptural authority.

Prof. Bhattacharya quotes here a Kārikā from Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhamakārika,* and comparing it with Gaudapāda's 2-32 Kārikā says that this is the essence of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Śaṅkara on Gauḍapāda 4-99 points out that when Buddha rejects the existence of external objects and asserts the existence of ideas only, his view may be a little near to the *Vedāntic* Truth of *Advaya Ātmā* but this vedāntic non-dual *Ātmā* where the knowledge of the seer is never absent and where there is a unification of pereiver, perception and perceived and which is changeless and permanent is not the theory of Buddha and this *Vedāntic* Truth can be known only from the Upaniṣadic texts. Ānandagiri says that the teachings of Buddha and Upaniṣads are not identical and there is no *Mata-Sāṅkarya.*

Prof. Karmarkar discusses the interpretation of Prof. Bhattacharya of "this is not stated by Buddha" in 4-99 and says that Prof. Bhattacharya's interpretation is farfetched. He refers to *Laṅkāvatāra* which states that Buddha promised to say but ultimately did not say. He adds that Buddha could not get out of the idea of causal relation and origination and therefore his theory is defective, as according to Gauḍapāda, *Ajātivāda* is the only proper solution.

भावैरसद्भिरेवायमद्वयेन च कल्पितः।
भावा अप्यद्वयेनैव तस्मादद्वयता शिवा ॥३३॥

bhāvairasadbhirevāyamadvayena ca kalpitaḥ.
bhāvā apyadvayenaiva tasmādadvayatā śivā. (33)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

This *Ātmā* is imagined both as unreal objects which are perceived and also as the non-dual. Unreal *Bhāvas* (like *Prāṇa,* etc.) are imagined on the non-dual itself. Therefore, non-duality is the happiest condition.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The reason for the proposition stated in the previous Kārika is now given. Just as in the rope are imagined unreal objects like a snake, water line, etc., or also the undual real rope itself. Similarly infinite unreal *Bhāvas* like *Prāṇa,* etc., which are not the ultimate truth are imagined to be *Ātmā.* For, when the mind is not active (i.e. steady in *Samādhi*) nobody can ever perceive any object. *Kūṭastha Ātmā* has no activity. Therefore objects which are apparently perceived by the activated mind can never be imagined to have real existence from the point of view of the ultimate truth. For this reason, *Ātmā* himself who is the substratum of all imaginations and who is the ultimate truth, is imagined, like the rope, to be the unreal *Bhāvas* like *Prāṇa,* etc., as also as the undual *Ātmā.* Though Ātmā is of the nature of pure existence and one homogeneous, those *bhāvas* like *Prāṇa,* etc., are imagined by this undual *Ātmā* himself (and therefore they appear as if they are real). For no illusion is perceived without a substratum. Therefore, as non-dual *Ātmā* is the substratum of all imaginations and as the presence of undual *Ātmā* never deviates (in any imagination), it is better to have the happy idea of unduality even in the state of imagination (i.e., even in phenomenal life). All imaginations, indeed, are the cause of misery. Like the imagination of a snake superimposed on a rope they are the cause of fear. Non-duality is free from fear and therefore causes happiness.

Comments

The objector doubts the proposition that there is no birth, death, etc., as stated in the previous Kārikā. For in the world of duality objects have common and special characteristics and they are found to have birth and destruction, etc.

The reply is this. The various *Bhāvas* are *Vyāvṛtta* or separate from one another, having special characteristics.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

One *bhāva* does not exist in another; as their nature deviates *(Vyabhicāra)* they are unreal as the illusory snake in the rope which also deviates (disappears) on correct knowledge. We cannot say that *Ātmā* is *Vyāvṛtta* separate from anything; it will mean a second thing from which *Ātmā* is separate. Similarly we cannot say that *Ātmā* is *Anugata* pervading in something else—that too involves the idea of a second thing. The *Ātmā* is therefore *Avyāvṛtta* and *Ananugatq*—complete homogeneous pure existence *Caitanya (Ānandagiri).* "We call *Ātmā Vyāpaka* from the point of view of the *Saṁskāra* of space, *Nitya* from the point of view of the *Saṁskāra* of the other objects (Swami Akhandananda). Śaṅkara in *Daśa-ślokī* says, We cannot even call *Ātmā* as one (as numeral one is contrasted against other numerals)—how can there be then anything else as second?

The *Bhāvas* are unreal and imagined but the presence of *Ātmā* is imagined as pervading them and therefore they appear as if they are real.

In the illustration of rope and snake, the reality of rope is to be taken as on the empirical level.

The unreal *Bhāvas* imagine themselves to be *Ātmā.*

The *Bhāvas* are not the real modifications (Pariṇāma) of *Ātmā. Ātmā* is *Kūṭastha* (Changeless) and they therefore cannot have real existence.

Ātmā is imagined in this way due to *Avidyā.*

The unreal *Bhāvas* like *Prāṇa* appear as real because of the real *Sattā* of the substratum which is *Ātmā.* Only real *sat* can be the substratum, not any unreal *Bhāva.* As *Sat Ātmā* is the substratum of all, the unreal *Bhāvas* like *Prāṇa,* etc., appear as real in *Vyavahāra*—worldly dealings.

As duality is the cause of fear, happiness, depression, etc., it is therefore better to think of non-duality even in our ordinary daily life.

Prof. Karmarkar remarks, "The *Advaya Ātmā* is responsible for imagining himself to be all sorts of things that

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

are non-existent and likewise for the imagined things themselves. *Ātmā* is always the same unchangeable and serves as the *Adhiṣṭhāna* for all *Kalpanā*.

The objector starts by saying that births and death are seen in the world of duality which should be real. The reply is that duality is unreal but appears as real because its substratum *Ātmā* is real. That is why in *Vyavahāra* we find duality appearing as real. From the point of view of ultimate truth *Advaya Ātmā* alone imagines himself as non-existent things.

नात्मभावेन नानेदं न स्वेनापि कथंचन ।
न पृथङ् नापृथक् किंचिदिति तत्त्वविदो विदुः ॥३४॥

nātmabhāvena nānedaṁ na svenāpi kathañcana.
na pṛthaṅ nāpṛthak kiñciditi tattvavido viduḥ. (34)

Translation

Multiplicity (which is imagined only) cannot be said to be identical with *Ātmā* (when examined in the light of the Absolute Truth); nor can it be said to have any independent existence by itself. (Being unreal) it cannot be said to be either separate, or non-separate. This is what is said by those who know the Reality.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Why is non-duality the happiest thing? Multiplicity i.e., when one thing is experienced as different from another thing causes misery. For, this phenomenal world—*Jagat*—consisting of *Prāṇa,* etc., which is imagined in the non-dual *Ātmā* who is the ultimate Reality—ceases to be a different thing when realised as identical with *Ātmā* the Absolute Reality—just as an imagined snake when known in light as a rope is no longer found to be a different entity. This (phenomenal world, i.e. the multiplicity) does not have any independent existence by itself in the form of *Prāṇa,* etc., the simple reason being that it is imagined like a snake for a rope. Similarly entities like *Praṇa* etc. are not separate from one another like a buffalo from a horse. Therefore, on the same reasoning, multiplicity

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

being non-existent, cannot be proved as identical (non separate) either from one another or from *Ātmā*. (The substance of this Kārikā is that as it is impossible to determine in any way the reality of multiplicity, there is only the non-dual *Ātmā*. This is what the *Brāhmaṇas*, who know *Ātmā*, realise as the Ultimate truth. The meaning is that as multiplicity is the cause of misery and is non-existent, non-duality alone is the happiest thing).

Comments

The objector asks—Is the multiple universe real because it is identified with real *Ātmā* or it is real because it has an independent existence in its own right? The reply is that the first alternative is not possible. The universe is *Jaḍa* (non-sentient) and *Ātmā* is sentient and the two being opposed to each other cannot be identical. The universe does not have any independent existence in its own right also—appearance is not reality—if it is real, then it would be *Ātmā* and there would be *Advaita*. Further different objects in multiplicity cannot be proved to be separate and independent from one another as they involve the idea of exclusion from one another—the two objects in order to be different from each other are mutually dependent on each other *(anyonyāśraya)*—they cannot have any independent existence from the point of ultimate truth which is independent. If then these multiple objects are taken as identical with (non-seperate from) one another, then a pot and cloth would be the same. From all this, we have to conclude that it is not possible to determine the existence of multiplicity from the standpoint of the ultimate truth and therefore non-duality is the happiest thing. Multiplicity involves the idea of separatness. That causes misery. In non-duality there is no fear. Duality imagined on *Ātmā* is like a snake imagined on rope. When the universe imagined on *Ātmā* is realised as *Ātmā*, duality has no independent existence. As duality is non-existent it cannot be said to be identical or separate either from one another or from *Ātmā*. This is what knowers of *Ātmā* realise. *Advaita* therefore is the happiest thing.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Prof. Vidhushekhara read *Nānyabhāvena* in place of *Nātmabhāvena* in the Kārikā to have a contrast with *Svena.* Prof. Karmarkar points out that the suggested reading is against all manuscript authority and does not bring out the true meaning.

वीतरागभयक्रोधैर्मुनिभिर्वेदपारगैः ।
निर्विकल्पो ह्ययं दृष्टः प्रपञ्चोपशमोऽद्वयः ॥३५॥

vītarāgabhayakrodhairmunibhirvedapāragaiḥ.
nirvikalpo hyayaṁ dṛṣṭaḥ prapañcopaśamo'dvayaḥ. (35)

Translation

Sages who are free from attachment, fear and anger and who have delved deep into the meaning of Vedas have realised this *Ātmā* as free from imagined attributes, cessation of *Prapañca* (phenomenal universe which is illusory) and non-dual.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

This perfect knowledge is praised here. This *Ātmā* is realised by sages, who are always devoid of attachment, fear, anger and all other defects, who are practising contemplation, who can discriminate between the real and the unreal, who have understood the essence of the meaning of Vedas. They realise *Ātmā* as free from all imagined attributes. They keenly grasp the meaning of *Vedānta. Ātmā* is cessation of the phenomenal universe which consists of duality and distinctions, and *Ātmā* is therefore non-dual. The supreme *Ātmā* can be realised by the learned who are free from defects, who keenly grasp the meaning of *Vedānta* and who are *Saṁyasins* (those in the fourth order and have renounced the world), not by others whose minds are impure with passion, etc., who adamantly adhere to their own systems, who are frivolous logicions.

Comments

How is it that the non-duality described here is not realised by all? The reply is that only those who are free from

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

defects like passion, etc., which obstruct true knowledge can have the experience of undual *Ātmā*. The praise in the Kārikā is intended to create a desire in true seekers to acquire means to realise it. All defects which obstruct correct knowledge are included in passion, etc. In some unqualified persons, there may be occasionally absence of passion; that is why the word "always" is used in the *Bhāṣya.* It is the discrimination between real and unreal that brings about absence of passion, etc. This includes the wellknown *"Sādhana-catuṣṭaya"* in *Vedānta. Ātmā* is not seen by eyes (Dṛṣṭa,)it means *"Ātmā* is realised." *Ātmā* is free from all imaginary attributes and therefore it is stated that there is cessation of phenomenal universe. But that does not mean that *Ātmā* is viod *(Śūnya),* Vaiśeṣikas and Nihilists are those who are referred to here as adamantly adhering to their systems and are called unqualified. (Ānandagiri).

तस्मादेवं विदित्वैनमद्वैते योजयेत्स्मृतिम् ।
अद्वैतं समनुप्राप्य जडवल्लोक आचरेत् ॥३६॥

tasmādevaṁ viditvainamadvaite yojayetsmṛtim.
advaitaṁ samanuprāpya jaḍavalloka āçaret. (36)

Translation

Having known *Ātmā* in this way, one should fix the idea of the non-dual *Ātmā* in his memory. Having realised non-duality he should behave in the world as if he is dull-witted.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

As the non-dual is of the nature of cessation of all evil, it is all bliss, devoid of fear. Therefore having known *Ātmā* in this way, one should fix the idea of *Advaita* in his memory, i.e., one should fix his memory on realisation of *Advaita* (closely investigate). Having realised that *Advaita,* i.e., having realised that "I am the Highest *Brahma",* free from hunger, etc., presently perceptible direct, unborn *Ātmā,* who is beyond all worldly intercourse, one should behave in this world like a dull-witted person. The meaning is that one shoul not boastfully declare before others that he is highly learned or realised or noble person.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Even if a person is learned and knows the essence of *Vedānta,* still if impressions of erroneous knowledge persist in him, he cannot firmly fix his mind on *Advaita.* This Kārikā puts it as a possitive rule that having known *Advaita* from the scriptures, he should ruminate and think it over and over again in his mind. He should behave like a dull-witted person in his worldly conduct. What is meant is that he should not publicly, boastfully exhibit his learning or declare that he is a realised soul or that he is great and noble.

निस्तुतिर्निर्नमस्कारो निःस्वधाकार एव च।
चलाचलनिकेतश्च यतिर्यादृच्छिको भवेत् ॥३७॥

nistutirnirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca.
calācalaniketaśca yatiryādṛcchiko bhavet. (37)

Translation

Avoiding all praise, salutations or even utterances like *Swadhā* (at *Śrāddha* rites) he should be a self-controlled ascetic. He may sometime think of his changing body as support, at other times think of unchanging *Ātmā* as his support and depend upon whatever is available by chance (to sustain his body).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya,

The way in which he should conduct himself in this world is being stated. He should avoid praise, salutations and all other activities, all desire for external objects and accept the life of a *Sannyāsin* of the highest order *(Paramahaṁsa)* who is a, wandering mendicant *(Parivrāj)*—this is the meaning. The Śruti also says "Having known this *Ātmā* etc". The Smṛti (Gītā) also says, "With their intellect fixed on That (Brahma), with that as their *Ātmā,* intent on that and having that as their supreme goal", etc. The word *"Cala"* in the Kārikā means the changing body as it changes every moment. The word *Acala* means Reality of *Ātmā* who is unchanging. When some time for ordinary activities like eating, etc., he forgets his repose in Ātmā which *Ātmā* Reality is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

his own real nature and support and which is as unchanging as *Ākāśa* (ether) and thinks himself in terms of his lower ego then at that time his changing body becomes his support. In this way he has a changing and unchanging support at times. But this learned man never looks to other external objects for his support. For his sustenance he should depend on chance, i.e., for sustaining his body he should have only the bare necessities of a few morsels of food or strips of cloth to cover his body, etc., which are available to him by chance.

Comments

"Why should he behave like a dull-witted person? Scriptures prescribe as essential acts like prayers, *Śrāddha* rites, etc. He has to live in this world and therefore should have some support". The reply is that he should have for his support alternatively his changing body and *Ātmā*. He has to sustain his body with food and strips of cloth. But he has to become a self-controlled ascetic. He should accept the life of the highest order of *Sānnyāsin* called *Paramahaṁsa* and should try to become a wandering mendicant *(Parivrāj)*. The Śruti and Smṛti texts are cited in this connection. "Having known this *Ātmā*" here means having known *Ātmā* at the initial stage and implies coming back from meditation to ordinary level. In such condition he forgets for sometime his repose in *Ātmā* and looks for the bare necessities for his body. Even then this learned man should not desire various external objects but for sustaining his body he should depend only upon bare necessities of life which are available to him by chance alone.

Prof. Karmarkar and Prof. Bhattacharya interpret *Calā-cala-niketa* in the Kārikā as without any fixed residence. Prof. Karmarkar thinks Śaṅkara's interpretation unsatisfactory. But Śaṅkara could not interpert it in any other way. The *Yati* has to aspire to become a *Parivrājaka*—wandering mendicant and he cannot have at any time a fixed abode or residence. There are four kinds of *Sannyāsins*—*Kuṭicaka, Bahūdaka, Haṁsa* and *Paramahaṁsa.* The last is the highest order and Śaṅkara says that the *Yati* should aspire to be *Paramahaṁsa* and a wandering mendicant *(Parivrājaka)*. The exact translation of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Calācala-niketa would be that he may sometimes have a changing and sometime a fixed abode—if *Niketa* is interpreted as a place of residence. Having interpreted *Yati* as *Paramahaṁsa* Parivrājaka, Śaṅkara could not think of any fixed abode for such a *Parivrājaka.* That is why he interprets *Niketa* as *Āśraya* or Support. In the initial stage, the *Yati* is most likely to come down to ordinary worldly level from the state of meditation, when he naturally thinks about sustaining his body with bare necessities. Ānandagiri, therefore, interprets "Having known this *Ātmā*" in the Śruti passage as having known *Atmā Āpātataḥ* i.e. in the initial stage and when he comes down in *Vyutthāna* to the ordinary worldly level.

तत्त्वमाध्यात्मिकं दृष्ट्वा तत्त्वं दृष्ट्वा तु बाह्यतः ।
तत्त्वीभूतस्तदारामस्तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो भवेत् ॥३८॥

tattvamādhyātmikaṁ dṛṣṭvā tattvaṁ dṛṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ.
tattvībhūtastadārāmastattvādapracyuto bhavet. (38)

Translation

Having seen the truth internally (within his body) as also externally (in the outside world like the earth, etc.) and having become one with Reality and taking delight in that alone, he should never deviate from that Reality.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Truth regarding external objects like the earth, etc., as well as the internal objects like the body, etc., is that all of them are as unreal as a snake imagined as a rope or like a dream, illusion, etc. The reason is that in this connection there is a Śruti passage, "All modification is a mere name, arising from speech", etc., while *Ātmā* is both within and without, unborn, without a cause, having no within or without, entire, all pervading like ether, subtle, unchanging, without attributes or parts and without action—as there is the Śruti passage which says, "That is truth, that is *Ātmā* that thou art". Having realised the Truth in this way, he should be one with that Reality, have delight in that alone and not in external objects like one who has not seen the Truth. That latter believes that his mind is the *Ātmā* and with his changing

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

mind he thinks that his *Ātmā* too is changing and sometimes feels that he has deviated from the Truth and has identified *Ātmā* with his body and thinks that he has fallen from knowing the Truth about *Ātmā;* but when his mind is concentrated he feels himself happy and thinks that he has become one with Reality. But the real knower of *Ātmā* is not like such a person. The reason is that *Ātmā* is of one changeless homogeneous nature and never deviates from his own nature. He should never deviate from the Truth that "I am Brahma", i.e., he should never deviate from his realisation about the essence of *Ātmā.* Smṛti passages say, "One who has realised the Self sees equally on a dog or a *Cāṇḍāla".* "Who sees the *Sama (Brahma)* in all beings" (Gītā).

Comments

Fixing of one's memory on the consciousness that "I am the supreme *Brahma* and there is nothing else apart from me" should be done constantly for all time without any lapse. All internal and external objects are imagined and therefore unreal and the substratum *Ātmā* alone is real—having experienced this, the experiencer becomes one with the ultimate Truth. His mind is fixed on that alone and is withdrawn from all external objects. He finds his abode in that supreme Reality. He is intent on realising that. All modifications are mere name and arise from speech alone. They are *Dṛśya* and illusory. The nature of the *Dṛṣṭā Ātmā* is described by the Śruti as both within and without, changeless, etc. As the realised soul is fully satisfied he has no attachment for external objects and he never deviates from this knowledge of the essence of *Ātmā.* As against this, the distorted knowledge of a half-baked person is contrasted. In the case of the former, as he has realised the Truth as his own Self, he never deviates from that. The ultimate Truth is always one and ever of the same nature Gītā also says that the pandits (wise men) are those who see the *Sama (Brahma)* who is one and ever of the same nature. In the other Gītā passage it is stated that he sees *Sama (Brahma)* in all beings-*Brahma* as permanent in objects which are impermanent. This passage also describes non-deviation from the nature of *Ātmā.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Gauḍapāda Kārikā – 3rd Chapter
Advaita (non-dual) Realiaty

HARI AUM

उपासनाश्रितो धर्मो जाते ब्रह्मणि वर्तते ।
प्रागुत्पत्तेरजं सर्वं तेनासौ कृपणः स्मृतः ॥१॥

upāsanāśrito dharmo jāte brahmaṇi vartate.
prāgutpatterajaṁ sarvaṁ tenāsau kṛpaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ. (1)

Translation

A *Jīva (Dharma)* who has taken to devotion lives in (i.e., is addicted to) only the *Kārya Brahma (Brahma* who is born in a manifested form). He imagines that before creation everything was only unborn non-dual *Brahma* (but after his own death, by virtue of devotion, he will obtain liberation by again merging in that unborn *Brahma).* On account of this erroneous thinking, the knowers of *Brahma* regard him as a man of inferior understanding.

Śaṅkkara-Bhāṣya

In that first chapter of the *Kārikās* regarding the determination of the meaning of *Aumkāra, Ātmā* was stated as the cessation of the phenomenal duality, all bliss and non-dual but this was only in the form of bare assertion. It was also further stated that when *Ātmā* is known, duality does not exist (1-18). In the second chapter on unreality (of duality), non-existence of duality was established by reasoning giving illustrations of dream, illusion, castle in the air, etc., as also on the grounds that duality is perceived *(dṛśya)* and is subject to birth and destruction, etc. Now if some one asks as to whether Non-duality is to be established only by scriptures or it is possible to establish it by reasoning as well, the reply is that it is possible to know it (non-duality) by reasoning also. The third chapter of the *Kārikās* on Non-duality is intended to show how that is possible.

In the last chapter the conclusion arrived at was that all objects in the realm of duality including the devotee and his object of devotion are illusory and only the non-dual *Ātmā* is the ultimate Reality. For, the *Jīva* who has taken to the line of devotion understands that his devotion is the means for attaining

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

liberation, that "I am the devotee, my object of devotion is *Brahma.* At present I am living in that *Kārya-Brahma* who is born in manifested embodied form (as *Saguṇa Brahma* or personal God) and after worshipping that manifested embodied *Brahma* I shall, after the dissolution of my body, attain to the unborn (non-dual) *Brahma.* Before creation, everything else and myself were unborn. Before creation I was (that unborn) *Brahma;* in the created state I am abiding in the created *Brahma* (in the manifested embodied form) and by virtue of my devotion I shall attain the state of the (same original unborn) *Brahma*—this is how the seeker devotee *Jīva* resorting to devotion understands. For this reason he is an inferior knower of *Brahma;* he is regarded as of poor and shallow intellect by those who know *Brahma* as eternal and unborn (unchanging). This is corroborated by *Śruti* passages such as the Upaniṣad of the *Talavakāra śāḳhā* of Sāmaveda (i.e., the Kena Upaniṣad) which says "that which cannot be explained by the speech but that by which speech is expressed—that alone you know as *Brahma,* not the one whom people worship".

Comments

The illusory nature of duality was established by reasoning; reality of non-duality is thereby implied. But this chapter shows that it is possible to establish non-duality by reasoning also. Before doing so the author condemns the notion of duality, i.e., the distinction between devotee and his object of devotion. *Jīva* is called *Dharma* as he is holding fast to his body *(Dhāraṇāt Dharmaḥ).* A *Jīva* resorting to devotion believes that he lives with a faith in the born *Brahma* who is in an embodied manifested form *(Kārya-Brahma* or *Brahma* with attributes—*Saguṇa Brahma* or personal God). He believes that before creation everything was unborn—thus that unborn thing was limited by time, i.e., remaining unborn only till creation. He resorts to devotion as means for liberation and believes that after the dissolution of his body, he will reach the same original (unborn) *Brahma.* Such a *Sādhaka* (seeker) has erroneous knowledge and therefore he is regarded as pitiable and of poor and shallow intellect by the knowers of *Brahma.*

In the first chapter *Ātmā* was described as *Prapañcopaśama* etc., and the non-existence of duality in the knowledge of *Ātmā*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

was barely asserted. In the second chapter, the illusory nature of duality was established by reasoning and illustrations. Now *Ādvaita* (non-duality) too is established by reasoning. There is a Śruti text which says that the intellect should not be led astray by logic but this passage only means that *Ātmā* cannot be known by uncontrolled logic but it is possible to use logic as a corroborating and co-operative factor and therefore this third chapter is begun to demonstrate *Advaita* even with the help of such logic. But to achieve that purpose, is the author's condemnation of a devotee relevant? That is pointed out. "Before creation, *Brahma* was unborn till creation. *Brahma* is then born in a manifested embodied form.By virtue of devotion I expect to be once again unborn *Brahma* by the *Tat-Kratunyāya* (by *Kratu,* i.e., *Saṅkalpa* or constant meditation one becomes one with the object of meditation)"—this is the belief of the devotee. This implies duality in the form of devotee and his object of devotion. But the Talavakāra Śruti clearly says that what is being worshipped *(Upāsya)* is not *Brahma.* That is why the author is condemning such notion of duality—i.e., seeing a devotee and the object of his devotion as different. The Kena Upaniṣad repeats the refrain five times, namely. "What is worshipped by people as the object of devotion is not *Brahma* as *Brahma* is not indicated by speech, hearing or mind, etc."

अतो वक्ष्याम्यकार्पण्यमजाति समतां गतम् ।
यथा न जायते किंचिज्जायमानं समन्ततः ॥२॥
ato vakṣyāmyakārpaṇyamajāti samatāṁ gatam.
yathā na jāyate kiṁchijjāyamānaṁ samantataḥ. (2)

Translation

(As for the above mentioned reasons, the *Upāsaka* was described as *Kṛpaṇa*—pitiable). I shall therefore now describe the unborn *Brahma* which is *Akārpaṇya*—of the nature of **non-pitiableness. It is without birth, It maintains its (unchanging) sameness all throughout. It appears as being born all around but in reality nothing is born at all.**

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara Bhāṣya

A *Jīva* who resorts to devotion is pitiable as he is not able to realise the unborn *Ātmā* who is both within and without. He considers himself pitiable, created and living in *Brahmā* born with a manifested form and believes that (by virtue of devotion) he will become (the unborn) Brahmā. (That is why he is pitiable). I shall therefore describe the unborn *Brahma* who is of the nature of non-pitiableness *(Akārpaṇya).* The Śruti texts describe the following as being of the nature of pitiableness-[¶] Where one sees another, one hears another, one knows another—that is limited, that is subject to death, that is unreal." "All modification is mere name arising from speech", etc. *Brahma* is just of the opposite nature. It is both within and without, unborn, of the nature of non-pitiableness, and called great *(Bhūmā).* After realising that, all pitiable (limitations) *i.e., Kārpaṇya* caused by *Avidyā* disappear. I shall state that it is *Ajāti,* i.e., birthless as its birth or cause is not known. It is always same everywhere, because in it there is no inequality on account of the presence of parts. Only a thing with parts can have disturbance in its parts and is then said to be born. But this is without parts and is always the same and therefore does not blossom into anything new through its parts. It is thus *Ajāti* and *Akārpāṇya.* Please hear from me that which does not undergo even the slightest change all around (in any manner), which does not turn out in anything new, which appears as if born only through ignorance like a snake on a rope, which is not born and is always unborn—that is *Brahma.*

Comments

After condemning the devotee, a dualist, who opposes *Advaita,* the author now postulates *Advaita.* All entities which are perceived, become the objects of sense organs and are subject to limitation and destruction and are therefore *Kṛpaṇa* and *Mithyā.* Śruti has described them as mere name, arising from speech, etc. *Brahma* is just of the opposite nature. It is without attributes and has no parts. It has fullness from all around. It has no cause and is not born as anything new. Nothing is born either as a thing or in time or in space. *Brahma* is all full, changeless *(Kūṭastha)* and what appears as born is due to ignorance and error like a snake on a rope.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैर्घटाकाशैरिवोदितः ।
घटादिवच्च संघातैर्जातावेतन्निदर्शनम् ॥३॥
ātmā hyākāśavajjīvairghaṭākāśairivoditaḥ.
ghaṭādivacca saṁghātairjātāvetannidarśanam. (3)

Translation

Ātmā is said to be like *Ākāśa* (ether) giving rise to *Jīvas* (embodied individual souls) in the same manner as *Mahākāśa* (great space) gives rise to *Ghaṭākāśa* (space enclosed in a jar); and (*Ātmā* further)rises in the form of aggregates (of bodies) as jars, etc., are produced from *Ākāśa.* This is the illustration for explaining the origination of *Jīvas* from *Ātmā.*

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

In the earlier *Kārikā* it was stated that the author would describe *Brahma* who is birthless and *Akārpaṇya.* He is now going to describe the reasoning and illustration to establish that proposition. The Supreme *Ātmā* is stated to be subtle, partless and all pervading like *Ākāśa* (space). Like *Ākāśa,* that same Supreme *Ātmā* is said to manifest Itself in the form of *Kṣetrajñas (Jīvas,* the embodied individual souls), as *Mahākāśa* (great space) manifests itself into *Ghaṭākāśas* (space enclosed in jars). (The similarity being the subtlety, partlessness and all pervasiveness of both)The second interpretation of the word Udita in this *Kārikā* is "has arisen, (appear as if born) and the first line of the *Kārikā* would then mean just as *Mahākāśā* appears as born into *Ghaṭākāśas.* Similarly Supreme *Ātmā* appears as born into embodied individual souls. The meaning is that the (so-called) birth of embodied individual souls from the Supreme *Ātmā* which is described in Vedānta texts is like the (so-called) birth of *Ghaṭākāśas* from *Mahākāśa* and therefore the said (so-called) creation is not real. Just as from the same *Ākāśa,* aggregates of physical objects *(Saṁghātas)* like pots, etc., are born, similarly from the Supreme *Ātmā,* which is like *Ākāśa,* are born physical entities like the earth, etc., as also impersonal (mental) aggregates (like pain, happiness) and related as cause and effect but that (so-called) creation is only an imagination like imagining an illusory snake in a rope. Therefore it is said that *Ātmā* is born in the form of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

aggregates like earth in the same way as pots, etc., are said to be born. When the Śruti desiring to instruct people of slow understanding describes creation from *Ātmā* then (at that time) admitting (for the time being) creation as a fact, this illustration of the pot arising from *Ākāśa* is given.

Comments

Brahma was mentioned in the last Kārikā. What is its nature? How is it that a multiplicity of *Jīvas* is perceived? The explanation is that *Ātmā* is all pervasive. It has no differentiating characteristics and just as *Mahākāśa* appears as manifested into *Ghaṭākāśas,* etc., similarly *Brahma* appears as manifested into a number of *Jīvas.* The various aggregates appear as if they are born of *Paramātmā.* As pots; etc., are born from the earth, similarly *Paramātmā* is said to manifest Itself in the form of aggregates like the Earth, etc. and when the Śruti desires (for instructing the ignorant) to describe the creation of *Jīvas,* etc., then this would be the proper illustration. *Ātmā* is without any internal breach or rupture as it is subtle, partless and all-pervasive like *Ākāśa.* As a matter of fact *Paramātmā* Himself is described in the form of *Jīva* as the Gītā says, "Know me as *Kṣetrajña* (the embodied individual soul)." The birth of *Jīvas* from *Paramātmā* is only apparent and not real. Reference may be made to *Brahmasūtra* 2-3-17 *"Na Ātmā aśruteḥ Nityatvācca tābhyaḥ"* where real birth of *Jīvas* from *Paramātmā* is denied as *Jīvas* are *Nitya, Aja,* etc. *Ātmā* is without any modification or real change. The illustration is to instruct the ignorant for whom in certain passages of Śruti, creation is, for the time being, admitted for a later better understanding.

घटादिषु प्रलीनेषु घटाकाशादयो यथा ।
आकाशे संप्रलीयन्ते तद्वज्जीवा इहाऽऽत्मनि ॥४॥
ghaṭādiṣu pralīneṣu ghaṭākāśādayo yathā.
ākāśe sampralīyante tadvajjīvā ihā"tmani. (4)

Translation

When the jars, etc., are destroyed, the space enclosed in the jars merges into *Mahākāśa.* Similarly the *Jīvas* merge in *Ātmā.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Just as with the creation of jars, etc., it is said that there is creation of *Ghaṭākāśa* and with the destruction of the jar there is a merging of *Ghaṭākāśa* into *Mahākāśa,* similarly *Jīvas* are said to be created with the creation of aggregates of bodies, etc. and with the destruction of those aggregates, the *Jīvas* are said to merge in the *Ātmā.* The meaning is that the said creation or destruction is not by itself, i.e., is not natural or real.

Comments

In the previous *Kārikā* the non-duality *(Advaita)* is shown as not contradicting some of the creation Śruti texts meant for instructing the ignorant). This *Kārikā* intends to show that *Advaita* is not contradicting some of the Śruti texts which talk of merging of *Jīvas* into *Ātmā.* The so-called birth and merging of *Jīvas* from and into *Ātmā* is due to the *Upādhi* (limitation or conditioning of bodies, etc.) and the same is not natural or real from the Absolute point of view. In this way, there is no inconsistency, or opposition to *Advaita.*

यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते ।
न सर्वे संप्रयुज्यन्ते तद्वज्जीवा : सुखादिभि : ॥५॥

yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhiryute.
na sarve saṁprayujyante tadvajjīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ. (5)

Translation

Just as when one *Ghaṭākāśa* is connected with dust or smoke, other *Ghaṭākāśas* are not similarly connected, In the same way the happiness or pain of one *Jīva* does not affect other *Jīvas.*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The dualists raise the following objection, viz., If there is only one *Ātmā* in all bodies, then the birth, death, happiness, etc., of one *Ātmā* would affect (have connection with) all (other) *Ātmās* and there would then result a confusion in the matter of actions and their rewards. To them this is the reply. Just as when one *Ghaṭākāśa* is connected with dust or smoke, all other *Ghaṭākāśas* etc., are not similarly connected with dust or smoke; in the same way when one *Jīva* is affected by happiness, etc., all other *Jīvas* are not similarly affected by happiness, etc.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Dualists object to *Advaita* because in that case there would be no settled order for births. deaths, happiness, actions and their rewards. That contention is refuted by stating that connection of happiness, etc., with different *Jīvas* is due to different *Upādhis* (limitations). The illustration of *Ghaṭākāśas* is given. When one *Ghaṭākāśa* is connected with dust, etc., others are not. *Ākāśa* is only one and the same, *Ghaṭas* are the *Upādhis*. Similarly *Ātmā* is one, different *Upādhis* of the mind due to *Avidyā* cause multiplicity in *Vyavahāra*. There is *Advaita* from the absolute point of view. Multiplicity of *Jīva* is admitted as *Vyavahāra*, i.e., the phenomenal reality only. But the latter is due to limitations *(Upādhis)* caused by *Avidyā*. If *Jīvas* are considered as different, by the illustration of *Ghaṭākāśas*, all other *Jīvas* are not similarly affected.But from the absolute point of view, if *Ātmā* is taken as one everywhere, happiness, pain, etc., are not connected with the attributeless. changeless *Advaya Ātmā*. This is made clear in the following passage of the *Bhāṣya* by refuting Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika theories.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection :— Supposing there is only one *Ātmā* in all bodies (then that *Ātmā* will be connected with the happiness etc. of all)?

Reply:— Yes. (there is one Ātmā); Have you not heard us saying that in all aggregates of bodies there is only one *Ātmā* like (the all-pervading) *Ākāśa*?

Objection:— But if there is only one *Ātmā*, then that *Ātmā* will be connected everywhere with happiness and misery.

Reply:— This contention cannot be taken by the Sāṅkhyas.

The reason is that Sāṅkhyas do not admit that happiness and misery, etc., are connected with *Ātmā* for they say that happiness and misery, etc., are inseparably associated with (i.e., are the attributes of) *Buddhi*, as *Ātmā* is of the very nature of knowledge, there is no available proof to imagine multiplicity of *Ātmā*.

Objection:— But if multiplicity of *Ātmā* is not admitted then the theory of the Sāṅkhyas that their *Pradhāna (Prakṛti)* acts for the good of others (i.e., distinct different *Ātmās* in each distinct body) would fail to have any application.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Reply:— No. Whatever the *Pradhāna* is supposed to act or bring about for the purpose of others cannot inseparably inhere in *Ātmā* (i.e., the *Bhoga* or *Mokṣa* accomplished by *Pradhāna* cannot be connected with *Ātmā;* they cannot be the attributes of *Ātmā).* If *Bandha* (bondage) and *Mokṣa* (liberation) were inseparably inhered in multiple *Puruṣas (Ātmās)* then the theory (of the Sāṅkhyas) that *Pradhāna* acts for fulfilling the purpose of others *(Puruṣas)* would be consistent with the theory of multiple *Puruṣas (Ātmās)* and inconsistent with the theory of One *Ātmā.* But Sāṅkhyas do not admit that the purpose, i.e., *Bandha* and *Mokṣa* are inseparably inhering *(Samaveta)* in the *Puruṣas*— their theory is that *Ātmās* are attributless and of the nature of pure consciousness. Therefore, mere existence of the (single) *Puruṣa (Ātmā)* is enough to support their theory that *Pradhāna* acts for the purpose of others (or other) and it is not necessary for them to postulate a multiplicity of *Puruṣas.*

Comments

If it is believed that *Ātmā* is everywhere one only and happiness misery, etc., are connected with that *Ātmā* then the objector says that the diversity in the world in the matter of happiness misery cannot be explained and the settled order *(Vyavasthā)* of the world would be disturbed. The reply of the *Siddhāntin* is that the *Vyavasthā* is consistent even with the theory that *Ātmā* is one only and all this apparent multiplicity is imagined due to *Avidyā.* In this connection the *Siddhāntin* refutes the theories both of *Sāṅkhyas* and *Vaiśeṣikas.*

Sāṅkhyas believe that *Puruṣas* are many and *Pradhāna* acts for their good and brings about their *Bandha* and *Mokṣa,* which they do not believe are the attributes of or inseparably inhered in *Puruṣas.* But *Bandha* and *Mokṣa,* the *Sāṅkhyas* believe, are the attributes of *Pradhāna* and not of *Puruṣas,* which are pure consciousness and attributeless. In order to maintain their theory that *Pradhāna* acts for others (or other) i.e., *Parārthya,* only the mere near presence of a single *Puruṣa* is required to support it. *Sāṅkhyas* have no other proof to establish the multiplicity of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Puruṣas which can be consistent with their other theories. They cannot say that mere *Parārthya* adds some extraordinary element in multiple *Puruṣas*—that would be saying something absurd (as the *Puruṣas* are attributeless) and it would be an *Apa-siddhānta* for *Sāṅkhyas*. So the theory of the multiplicity of *Ātmā* has to be **rejected. *Ātma* is one only and all pervasive like *Ākāśa*.**

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

For the aforesaid reasons, the theory of the *Sāṅkhyas* that *Pradhāna* acts for the purpose of others *(Parārthya)* cannot serve as an argument to imagine multiplicity of *Puruṣas*. *Sāṅkhyas* have no other argument to warrant the supposition that there is a multiplicity of *Puruṣas*. Only by the reason of the bare existence of the other *(Puruṣa) Pradhāna* itself is bound or gets liberated. The other (i.e., *Puruṣa)* is only of the nature of knowledge and is instrumental in the activity of *Pradhāna* only by his bare existence and that not on account of any specific special qualities (as in *Īśvara* according to Patañjali who is called *Puruṣa—viśeṣa*. For *Īśvara* too is a *Puruṣa* and can be instrumental for the activity of *Pradhāna* only by reason of his bare existence). For these reasons, it is sheer ignorance due to which the *Sāṅkhyas* imagine a multiplicity of *Puruṣas (Ātmās)* and thereby give up their adherence to the real meaning of the Vedas.

The Vaiśeṣikas and others assert that desire, etc., are inseparably inhering in *Ātmā*. That contention is also not valid, for the impressions *(Saṁskāras)* which are the cause of memory cannot have any inseparable inherent relation with *Ātmā* who has no space or parts (where those *Saṁskāras* could abide in *Ātmā)*.

Comments

For the *Sāṅkhya* theory that *Pradhāna* acts for others (or other) no special element in attributeless *Puruṣa* is expected nor is it necessary to imagine a multiplicity of *Puruṣas*. As *Bandha* and *Mokṣa* are attributes of *Pradhāna* and not of *Puruṣas*, the activity of *Pradhāna* can adequately be explained on the basis of a single *Puruṣa (Ātmā)*. Belief in many *Puruṣas* is, therefore, purposeless. Only through the instrumentality of the bare existence of *Puruṣa*, *Pradhāna* acts. Now the followers of Patañjali say that *Pradhāna*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

acts because it has the superintendence of *Īśvara*—not only because of the bare existence of *Puruṣas.* To this the reply is that even according to Parañjali, Īśvara is after all only a *Puruṣa Viśeṣa* and he too like other *Puruṣas* is of the nature of knowledge and it makes no difference in the position that for *Pradhāna* to act only the bare existence of *Puruṣa* (or *Īśvara*) is necessary. The real meaning of the Veda is *Advaita* and that is being given up by the *Sāṁkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas* and others.

Now the *Bhāṣyakāra* refutes the *Vaiśesika* view which mentions six categories independent from one another-*Dravya,* (substance) *Guṇa* (attribute), *Karma* (activity), *Sāmānya* (Generality), *Viśeṣa* (particular) and *Samavāya* (Inseparable inherence). Some add *Abhāva* (non-existence) as the seventh. *Ātmā* is also called a *Dravya* and has nine qualities or attributes, viz., *Buddhi* (intellect), *Sukha* (happiness), *Duḥkha* (misery), *Icchā* (desire), *Dveṣa* (hatred), *Prayatna* (effort), *Dharma* (merit), *Adharma* (demerit), and *Saṁskāra* (impression). All these inhere *(Samavetāḥ)* in an orderly fashion in each separate *Ātmā. Vaiśeṣikas* say that there must be many *Ātmās,* otherwise the different arrangement of these attributes in one *Ātmā* cannot be explained.

The *Siddhāntin* says:— Do these attributes, viz., intellect and others pervade the whole of the *Ātmā* like *Rūpa* (form) or they stick to one part of the *Ātmā* alone? The first alternative is not possible. If the attributes like knowledge pervade the whole of their place of abode, i.e., *Ātmā,* then because of their *Vyāpti* always in *Ātmā,* all *Ātmās* will simultaneously and without any successive stages have the experience of knowledge and all other attributes. In the second alternative, i.e, when the attributes are only in a part of *Ātmā*—the *Siddhāntin* asks—is this part of *Ātmā* real or unreal? If the part of the *Ātmā* is real then *Ātmā* would be like a *Jar* which is also a part, an effect (and therefore *Anātma*). If the part of *Ātmā* is unreal and imaginary, then knowledge and other attributes cannot be the attributes of *Ātmā.* Saṁskāra is also one of the nine attributes and is the cause of memory *(Smṛti). Saṁskāras* are also called *Bhāvanās* and they are intended to include other attributes also. It is not possible to say that these attributes inhere in *Ātmā* (i.e., have *Samavāya Sambandha* with

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Ātmā) and therefore the view of the *Vaiśeṣikas* that the nine attributes are of *Ātmā* has to be rejected.

Śaṅkara-Bhaṣya

The *Vaiśeṣikas* believe that memory (Smṛti) has its origin in the contact of mind with *Ātmā* but if that view is accepted then the rule that at the time when we directly perceive an object, there cannot be its memory would be violated (as according to *Vaiśeṣikas,* mind is in contact with *Ātmā,* there should be memory and in that case direct perception and memory would be simultaneous, which is not possible (as memory is always later) or all memories would arise simultaneously (for *Ātmā* and mind are in contact and therefore all other memories would also arise at one time. If the *Vaiśeṣikas* were to say that all *Saṁskāras* (impressions) do not arise *(Udbuddha)* at the same time and therefore all memories will not arise simultaneously, the *Siddhāntin* replies that there is no unanimity of the opinion that *Saṁskāra* and its arising *(Udbodha)* are both located in *Ātmā* and therefore the *Saṁskāra* which is *Udbuddha* (arisen) cannot be included in the apparatus by which memory arises and this being the case, all memories will arise simultaneously if the *Vaiśeṣika* view is accepted). Further *Ātmā* is of a different kind from mind and is devoid of any sense of touch, etc. and its contact with mind cannot be proper (for mutual contact is possible only in case of those who belong to the same kind and have the sense of touch, etc). If the *Vaiśeṣikas* were to argue that even though *Guṇa* (quality) and *Dravya* (subtance) are not of the same kind and have no sense of touch still *Guṇa* and *Dravya* have a contact. To this argument the *Siddhāntin* replies that in the view of *Vedānta (Pareṣām) Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, Samavāya,* etc., are not different from *Dravya* (but according to *Vaiśeṣika,* they are all different from one another). But if they are completely different from *Dravya* and also if desire *(Icchā)* and other attributes are different from *Ātmā,* then their relation with *Dravya* (and *Ātmā)* cannot be proved and a further contention of *Vaiśeṣika* that Guṇa is dependent *(Paratantra)* on *Dravya* and *Iccha* etc. are dependent on or in control of *Ātmā* will not be established.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

If the *Vaiśeṣikas* were to argue that they are related by *Samavāya Saṁbandha* (inherence) which is *Ayuta-Siddha* (inseparate and inherent relation), (and that will also establish that *Guṇa* etc., are dependent *(paratantra)* on *Dravya* and *Icchā* etc., are dependent on *Ātmā.)* The *Siddhāntin* says that this too is not possible. What is the meaning of the word *Ayuta-Siddha?* It can only be any of the following four: (1) related as not different in time (2) or not different in space (3) or not different in nature (4) or not capable of being united and separated. Out of these four alternative meanings of *Ayuta-Siddha* let us consider the first *Apṛthak-Kālatva,* i.e., both *Ātmā* and attributes like *Icchā,* etc., are inseparably united together at one time—then the objection would be attributes like *Icchā* are impermanent and *Ātmā* (who is *Nitya)* must necessarily precede those attributes. Therefore there cannot be their inseparable and inherent relation at one time *(Apṛthak Kālatva).* If *Ātmā* is *Ayuta-Siddha* (inseparably related) with attributes like *Icchā,* etc. (taking the meaning of *Ayuta-Siddha* as *Apṛthak-Kālatva)* then as Ātmā is *Nitya* and has *Mahattva* (greatness), those attributes also will have to be *Nitya* but *Nityatva* of those attributes like *Icchā* etc. is not desirable as *Ātmā* is *Cetana* (conscious) and if the attributes like *Icchā* (desires) etc. are *Nitya,* there would be no liberation (which is not desirable).

Comments

Vaiśeṣikas say:— let there be the contact of *Jñāna* and other attributes with *Ātmā* as *Saṁyoga (Asamavāyi kāraṇa)* and not as *Samavāya* (inherence) then at the time of actual perception, the rule that there cannot be *Smṛti* (memory) will not be violated and your objection would be untenable. The *Siddhāntin* replies that as *Saṁyoga* is the common factor, all kinds of memories would even then arise simultaneously. If the *Vaiśeṣikas* were to say that *Saṁskāra* (impression) and its arising *(Udbodha)* do not rise up simultaneously (at one time and therefore all memories will not arise simultaneously). The reply of the *Siddhāntin* is that there is no unanimity of opinion which says that *Saṁskāra* and its *Udbodha* (arising) abide in *Ātmā* and thus arisen *Saṁskāra (Udbuddha Saṁskāra)* cannot be included in the apparatus which

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

brings the above memory; for this reason, all memories would arise at the same time.

Further, objects which are of the same kind and have a sense of touch can have mutual contact, e.g., wrestlers, sheep, rope, and jar, etc. In the case of *Ātmā* and mind, etc., both these elements (being of the same kind and having a sense of touch) are lacking and therefore there cannot be any relation by the *Saṁyoga (Asamavāyi kāraṇa)* of *Ātmā* with *Buddhi* and other attributes.

If the Vaiśeṣikas were to argue that just as *Guṇa* (quality) and *Dravya* (substance), though are not of the same kind and have no sense of touch, are having a contact, similarly *Ātmā* too can have a contact with mind, etc.

The *Siddhāntin* says you cannot put forth this argument before we *Vedāntins.* According to *Vedānta,* there is only one Dravya (substance) which is pure existence and *Guṇa* and other *Padārthas* which the Vaiśeṣikas postulate are not acceptable to *Vedānta.* One and the same *San-mātra* substance appears by imagination in different forms according to *Vedānta*

The *Siddhāntin* says that if *Guṇa* and *Dravya,* etc., are completely different from one another, and *Ātmā* and mind, etc., too are completely different from each other, like Himalaya and Vindhya mountains, their contact is not possible at all, for want of which a further contention of the Vaiśeṣikas that attributes like *Icchā,* etc., are dependent on and under the control of *Ātmā* (i.e., their *Pāratantrya* to *Ātmā*) will not be proved.

Now the Vaiśeṣikas argue that if there be a contact of *Ātmā* with attributes not by *Saṁyoga* but by *Samavāya* inherence relationship *Pāratantrya* contention may remain intact.

Samavāya relationship is *Ayuta-Siddha* relationship which can be in either of the four ways: 1) *Apṛthak-kālatva;* 2) *Apṛthak-deśatva;* 3) *Apṛthak-Svabhāvatva;* or 4) not being capable of united or separated at any time.

The first alternative meaning of *Ayuta-Siddha* as *Apṛthak-kālatva* is discussed. If *Ātmā* and attributes like *Icchā* have inseparable common existence, i.e., no separate existence at any time then only there is *Apṛthak-kālatva* but *Ātmā* is *Nitya* and precedes *Icchā* etc., which are *Anitya. Ātmā* has *Mahattva* (greatness) and is *Cetana.* If *Icchā,* etc., are *Nitya,* there would be no liberation.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāsya

According to *Vaiśesika Samavāya* is a different *Padārtha* from *Dravya* and therefore, the *Vaiśeṣika* should point out another connecting link of *Samavāya* with *Dravya,* just as *Guṇa* and *Dravya,* to be connected, require the *Samavāya* as a connecting link according to *Vaiśeṣika.*

Vaiśeṣika cannot escape this objection by merely stating that *Samavāya* is a permanent relationship and therefore no other connective link is necessary. If that position is accepted, all those having *Samavāya* relationship will have a permanent contact re lationship with one another and if that is so there will not remain any such distinctions admitted by the *Vaiśeṣika* as *Dravya* and *Guṇa, Avayava* and *Avayavin, Kriyā* and *Kriyāvān* etc, as such distinctions will not then remain (on account of *Nitya sambandha).*

If all the six *Padārthas* of *Vaiśeṣika* like *Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa* and *Samavāya* are completely different from one another like Himalaya and Vindhya mountains, then their mutual contact is not possible as objects which have a sense of touch and which have no such of touch cannot have a mutual relationship as in the sense of a possessive case *(Ṣaṣṭhī Vibhakti). Icchā* and other attributes have a beginning *(Upajana = Utpatti)* and end *(Apāya)* and if *Ātmā* has such inseparable relationship with such *Anitya* attributes, *Ātmā* itself would be impermanent. There will be further two defects *(Doṣas)* in that position—*Ātmā* will have parts *(Sāvayavatva)* and will be subject to change *(Vikriyāvattva)* like the body etc.

In the case of *Vedānta,* just as *Ākāśa* is regarded as soiled with dust and smoke on account of the superimposition on it of them due to ignorance *(Avidyā),* similarly *Ātmā* too appears as having happiness misery, etc.; on account of the erroneous super-imposition caused by *Avidyā* of the limiting condition of *Buddhi,* etc. and as such the conception of bondage and liberation which are empirical *(Vyavahārika)* do not, in any way, contradict the *Vedāntic* thesis. All the disputants admit that empirical experiences are due to *Avidyā* and that such experiences are not of the nature of Supreme Reality. The conclusion, therefore, is that the imagination of logicians that there is multiplicity of *Ātmā* is baseless.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Out of the four alternative meanings of *Ayutasiddha,* we have pointed out that it cannot mean *Apṛthak-Kālatva* i.e, no separate existence in any time. Let us consider *Apṛthakdeśatva,* i.e., *Samavāya* of two objects which are never separate in space, the threads and the cloth made therefrom at one time did have separate existence and yet they are having *Samavāya sambandha* as *Avayava* and *Avayavin* according to Vaiśeṣika. So the meaning of *Apṛthak-deśatva* is defective. In the third alternative, *Apṛthak-svabhāvatva,* i.e., never having a different nature, the objects would be identical and not too different objects related with *Samavāya.* The fourth alternative, *Saṁyoga Vibhāga Ayogyatva*-not capable of being united or separated:— *Devadatta* and his hand (it may remain united or may be cut also) even though related as *Samavāya* is an illustration that negatives this alternative. It is thus found that none of the alternatives are without defect. *Vaiśeṣika* theory that *Samavāya* and *Dravya* are two distinct *Padārthas* should indicate a link between the two. Even in that case further link to connect it is required. In this way there is *Anavasthā* defect (absence of finality or conclusion.)

If *Samavāya* is a permanent relation, *Dravya, Guṇa,* etc., which have *Samavāya* relation will have no distinct existence and the *Vaiśeṣika* theory will not hold good. If *Samavāya* and other *Padārthas* like *Guṇa,* etc., are completely distinct from one another like Himalaya and Vindhya mountains, they cannot have any contact, on account of which Guṇa, etc., cannot be dependent on *Dravya (Paratantra)* which is the theory of Vaiśeṣika. The 6th possessive case shows dependence of the thing possessed and such dependence *(Pāratantrya)* of *Guṇa,* etc., on *Dravya* will have to be given up.

Further, *Icchā,* etc., are having a beginning and an end and so they cannot be the attributes of *Ātmā* as in the case with form *(Rūpa).* Being *Anitya* (impermanent) they cannot be the attribute of *Nitya* (Permanent) *Ātmā* as body, etc., cannot be the attribute of *Ātmā.* There are further two defects—*Ātmā* would then be with parts and subject to change *(Vikāra).*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

The *Vaiśeṣıkas* now argue that if *Ātmā* has no *Icchā,* etc., there would be no bondage for want of which there would be no liberation—thus the arrangement of bondage and liberation would be disturbed; for this purpose, there should be multiplicity of *Ātmā* to explain individual pleasure and pain.

The reply of the *Siddhāntin* is that we can explain the empirical worldly dealings as due to the superimposition of *manuṣyatva,* etc., caused by Ignorance *(Aṿidyā).* All disputants argue that in the Supreme Reality and liberation, empirical worldly dealings do not exist. Even in the Vedantic theory that they are all imagined we can comfortably explain multiplicity. The conclusion therefore is that the theory of multiplicity of *Ātmā* believed either by *Sāṅkhya* or *Vaiśeṣika* is logically defective and without any firm base.

रूपकार्यसमाख्याश्च भिद्यन्ते तत्र तत्र वै।
आकाशस्य न भेदोऽस्ति तद्वज्जीवेषु निर्णयः ॥६॥

rūpakāryasamākhyāśca bhidyante tatra tatra vai.
ākāśasya na bhedo'sti tadvajjīveṣu nirṇayaḥ. (6)

Translation

Form, function and name differ here and there but *Ākāśa* is not (thereby) divided into parts. The same is the conclusion with regard to individual *Jīvas.*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

If one and the same *Ātmā* is in all bodies how is it that worldly experiences appear to justify a multiplicity of *Ātmā* which you explain as due to *Avidyā?* To this objection our reply is this. Just as in this world, even though *Ākāśa* is one, on account of the *Upādhis* (limiting conditions) of a jar, water bowl or coverings there appear various forms in the *Ākāśa* like big or small, etc., similarly there appear different functions like carrying of water, containing water, sleeping arrangement, etc. and further there are different names, like *Ākāśa* enclosed in a jar *(Ghaṭākāśa), Ākāśa* enclosed in a water bowl, etc. All these various forms, functions, names, etc., are found in worldly dealings. All this variety of forms, etc., in Ākāśa is only a worldly usage and is not due to actual division of *Ākāśa* into parts—it is only due to the limiting conditions *(Upādhis)* of others, i.e, of the objects like jar,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

water bowl, etc. Just as this is so (in the illustration of *Ākāśa*) similarly *Ātmā* appears as various *jīvas* on account of the different *Upādhis* of bodies which are comparable to *Ghaṭākāśa*, etc. This is the conclusion arrived at by the wise.

Comments

Objection says that Advaita may be proved by citing Śruti but can it be proved by reasoning also? Different forms, functions, names, etc., can be explained on the basis of a multiplicity of *Ātmā*, not on basis that one and the same *Ātmā* in all bodies. Different *Jīvas* have different forms, functions, and names. To this objection the reply is given by the illustration of *Ākāśa*, different forms, etc., attributed to *Ākāśa* are only a worldly usage, it is not real. Similarly for one and the same *Ātmā*.

नाकाशस्य घटाकाशो विकारावयवौ यथा ।
नैवाऽऽत्मनः सदा जीवो विकारावयवौ तथा ॥७॥
nākāśasya ghaṭākāśo vikārāvayavau yathā.
naivā"tmanaḥ sadā jīvo vikārāvayavau tathā. (7)

Translation

Just as *Ghaṭākāśa* is neither a modification nor part of *Ākāśa*, similarly *Jīva* is never a modification or part of *Ātmā*.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

(Objector) The usage of different forms, functions, etc., in *Ghaṭākāśa*, etc., is true even from the absolute point of view (and it is not a mere empirical or worldly usage). To this the reply is that it is not so. The reason is that the *Ghaṭākāśa* is not a modification (actual transformation) of the real *Ākāśa (Mahākāśa)* in the way in which ornaments are the transformations of gold or foam, bubbles and ice are transformations of water. Or just as branches are a part of a tree in that way *Ghaṭākāśa* is not a part of *Mahākāśa*. Just as *Ghaṭākāśa* is not a transformation (effect) or part of *Mahākāśa* similarly *Jīva*, comparable to *Ghaṭākāśa* is neither the transformation nor part of *Ātmā* the highest Reality, comparable to *Mahākāśa*, as in the illustration given herein. For this reason, the empirical usage which regards *Ātmā* as multiple is illusory.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Mahākāśa is having no actual transformation or any parts. This illustration explains the empirical usage of multiplicity of *Ātmā*. The two illustrations of ornaments and of bubbles, etc., show actual transformation. The illustration of a branch of a tree is to show that the branch is an actual part. But *Jīvas* are not the actual transformations (effects) or parts of *Ātmā*.

The Upādhi of *Ghatākāśa* suggests the limitation or *Avaccheda* by *Ghaṭa*. Śaṅkara uses various illustrations like *Avaccheda, Pratibimba* or *Ābhāsa* to explain that *Jīva* is not different from *Ātmā* or *Brahma*. On this the later Śāṅkarites have developed *Avacchedavāda (Vācaspati), Ābhāsavāda (Vārtikakāra Sureśvara)* and *Pratibimbavāda* (author of *Saṅkṣepa Śārīraka)*. In *Avacchedavāda, Ghaṭākāśa (Ghaṭa-Upādhi-Avacchinna-Ākāśa)* intends to show that the multiplicity is due to different *Upādhis* (conditionings) and that *Jīva* is neither a modification *(Vikāra)* or part *(Avayava)* of *Brahma*. In *Pratibimba-vāda,* the sun reflected in water indicates that the material *(Upādāna)* of *Pratibimba* is illusory. In *Ābhāsavāda,* the illustration of *Sphaṭika* near *Japā kusuma* (red flower) is intended to show that *Ātmā* (or *Brahma*) is not contaminated by *Sukha, Duḥkha,* etc., caused by *Avidyā* just as *Sphaṭika* is not having the actual red colour of *Japā kusuma*—it is only an *Ābhāsa* or appearance. Śaṅkara's illustrations are not intended to be pressed beyond a certain point.

यथा भवति बालानां गगनं मलिनं मलैः ।
तथा भवत्यबुद्धानामात्माऽपि मलिनो मलैः ॥८॥
yathā bhavati bālānāṁ gaganaṁ malinaṁ malaiḥ.
tathā bhavatyabuddhānāmātmā'pi malino malaiḥ. (8)

Translation

Just as to the ignorant the sky appears soiled with impurities, similarly to the unwise *Ātmā* also appears contaminated by impurities.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

As the practice of attributing form, function and name *(Ākāśa)* is due to different conceptions of *Ghaṭākaśa,* etc., similarly the usage of births, deaths, etc. and consequent thereon

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the misery, action and their rewards, and impurities are attributed to *Ātmā* on account of the different *Upādhis* (limitations) of bodies only and they are not really associated with *Ātmā*. This sense is being established by an illustration in the verse. Just as the non-discriminating ignorant regard the sky impure and soiled by clouds, dust, smoke, etc., but to those who know the true nature (of *Ākāśa*), the sky is not impure, similarly the highest *Ātman*, the knower, is regarded as getting impure with individual miseries, acts and their rewards, and impurities by those who have no discriminating knowledge of *Pratyag-Ātmā;* not by those who have such knowledge of *Ātmā*. Even though a salty desert is falsely imagined by a nearby person as having the presence of water, foam, waves, etc., but it is not really so, similarly *Ātmā* also does not get impure with erroneously attributed miseries impurities, etc., by the unwise.

Comments

The objector says that even though *Jīva* is not a modification or part of *Brahma*, *Brahma* when entering the *Upādhi* is called *Jīvā*. But this is not possible as *Brahma* is all pure while *Jīvas* are impure and are many. To this the reply is that *Jīvas* are also not impure at all in reality. The multiplicity of *Jīvas* is due to the various *Upādhis*. Just as in the case of *Ākāśa* the distinctions of *Ghaṭākāśa, Mahākāśa,* etc., are due to different *Upādhis* and on the basis of which forms such as functions, names, etc., are used, same is the case with the *Jīva-bheda* (distinctions) and the usage of births, deaths, happiness, miseries, etc. Therefore, *Ātmā* is falsely regarded as associated with impurities like attachment, etc., but in reality *Ātmā* is absolutely pure. The inner *Pratyagātmā* is regarded as impure only by the ignorant. Even though, impurities are erroneously superimposed on *Ātmā* that is not so in reality.

Prof. Karmarkar remarks that the word *Buddha* in Abuddhanam cannot refer to Buddhists as they do not believe in *Ātmā* and their central doctrine is "Anattā" *(Anātmā)*.

मरणे संभवे चैव गत्यागमनयोरपि ।
स्थितौ सर्वशरीरेषु ह्याकाशेनाविलक्षणः ॥ ९॥

maraṇe saṁbhave caiva gatyāgamanayorapi.
sthitau sarvaśarīreṣu hyākāśenāvilakṣaṇaḥ. (9)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

In regard to both death, coming and going (by transmigration) and being posited in different bodies, *Ātmā* is in no way dissimilar to *Ākāśa* (which appears as divided into *Ghaṭākāśa, Maṭhākāśa,* etc.)

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The point is again elaborated. *Ātmā* in regard to births, deaths, etc., in different bodies should be known as not dissimilar to *Ākāśa* which is divided into *Ghaṭākāśa,* etc., and has creation, destruction, coming, going etc.

Comments

Objector:— A *Jīva* goes to heaven due to meritorious acts and to hell on account of evil acts. After being rewarded there, he is born again, thereafter he again goes to other regions. How is *Advaita* compatible with all that? The reply is that all this *Vyavahāra* of coming and going to and from this world and to others is due to *Avidyā. Ātmā* is similar to sky and has no possibility of coming and going.

Prof. Bhattacharya reads *Sthitaḥ* for *Sthitau.* The meaning does not differ. Prof. Karmarkar remarks that *Sthitau* goes very well with *Gati-āgamanayoḥ* particularly in the locative. *Avilakṣaṇaḥ* implies "not changing".

संघाताःस्वप्नवत्सर्वे आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः।
आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा नोपपत्तिर्हि विद्यते ॥१०॥
samghātāḥ svapnavatsarve ātmamāyāvisarjitāḥ.
ādhikye sarvasāmye vā nopapattirhi vidyate. (10)

Translation

All aggragates of bodies, etc, are like dream and are brought forth by the *Māyā* of *Ātmā;* whether they are superior or all are equal, there is no rational ground (to prove that they are real).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Aggregates of body, etc., which are like the jars, etc., in the illustration, are like the bodies, etc., seen in a dream or like the bodies conjured up by the illusion of a juggler i.e., they are put

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

forth by the *Māyā,* i.e., *Avidyā* of *Ātmā* and they do not exist in reality(i.e., from the point of view of Ultimate Reality). If there is any superiority of the aggregates of cause and effect in the case of bodies, etc. of gods over the bodies, etc., of birds and beasts or if there is equality of all the aggregates—there is no cause or reason which can be adduced to prove their actual creation or reality. *Upapattiḥ=Sambhavaḥ=Sadbhāvapratipādako hetuḥ.* As there is no such cause, they (the aggregates) are all of them due to *Avidyā* (ignorance) and they do not exist in Reality.

Comments

Objector:— If the *Saṅghātas* (the aggregates of bodies, etc.) are real, the difference created by them would also be real, and in that case the theory of *Advaita* does not fit in. Further, bodies, etc. of gods are fit to be worshipped and are superior and they cannot be unreal. To this the reply is that these aggregates are like bodies in a dream or like the illusion conjured up by a juggler. They are all due to *Māyā* of *Ātmā,* i.e., *Avidyā,* and are not real from the point of view of the ultimate reality.

Superiority of the bodies, etc., of gods or equality of all the aggregates is no argument to establish that they are actually created or that they are real. Some ignorant people may see the difference in those various aggregates but they all are made up of the five *Bhūtas* (elements) and therefore there is no reason to distinguish them and consider them real. Jugglers can conjure up illusions by *Maṇi, Mantra, Māyā, indrajāla* etc. Bodies of gods or birds and beasts—they are all *Dehas* and therefore unreal.

Prof. Karmarkar renders *Upapatti* as "reasonable explanation."

रसादयो हि ये कोशा व्याख्यातास्तैत्तिरीयके ।
तेषामात्मा परो जीवः खं यथा सम्प्रकाशितः ॥११॥
rasādayo hi ye kośā vyākhyātāstaittirīyake.
teṣāmātmā paro jīvaḥ khaṁ yathā samprakāśitaḥ. (11)

Translation

The sheaths, viz., the physical, etc., are explained in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad.* Of them, the Supreme *Jīva* is the *Ātmā* and we have already explained him as like *Ākāśa* (in GK 3-3).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śānkara-Bhāṣya

To show that the essence of *Ātmā* is without the birth, etc. Upanisadic texts are cited for adducing the evidence of Śruti. *Kośas* (sheaths) are five like *Annamaya* (physical), *Prāṇamaya* (vital), etc. They are called sheaths—the earlier mentioned being outer to the one mentioned immediately after. They are expounded in the *Taittirīyaka-śākhā-Upaniṣad.* The Supreme *Jīva* is the *Ātmā* of these sheaths, i.e., by this *Ātmā,* the innermost, all these five sheaths are regarded as having *Ātmā* and as he is the cause of their life *(Jīvana)* he is called *Jīva.* who is he? He is the Supreme *Ātmā,* who was described earlier as *"Brahma* who is existence, knowledge and Infinity". It has already been said that from this *Ātmā* the aggregates *(Saṅghātas)* characterised as the various sheaths called *Annamaya,* etc., *(Rasādayaḥ)* are set forth by the *Māyā* of *Ātmā* like the dream, illusion, etc., in the order of *Ākāśa* (and other elements). We have already explained this *Ātmā* as *Ākāśa* in GK 3-3*"Ātmā* is verily like *Ākāśa"*, etc. The meaning is that *Ātmā* cannot be known by reasonings of human intellect which follow the line adopted by logicians for establishing *Ātmā.*

Comments

So far *Jīva* is established as non-dual *Brahma* by reasoning. Now the purport of the *Taittirīya* śruti is stated. *Rasādayaḥ kośāḥ* are the five sheaths, viz., *Annamaya* (physical),*Prāṇamaya* (vital), *Manomaya* (mental), *Vijñānamaya* (intellect) and *Ānandamaya* (bliss). They are like the sheath of a sword, and as they cover the innermost *Jīva* they are known as sheaths. These five sheaths are one within the other, physical being the outermost and *Ānandamaya* the last inner sheath. The word *Jīva* is interpreted as their *Ātmā* which gives life *(Jīvana)* to these sheaths. This *Ātmā* is like *Ākāśa* (GK 3-3). *Ātmā* as expounded by *śruti* is different from the one tried to be explained by human intellect by logicians. In *Br. Sū. Bh.* 1-1-6 Śaṅkara gives an alternative interpretation of that *Adhikaraṇa,* corresponding to Gauḍapāda's view here. *Brahma* is not *Ānandamaya* but even behind *Ānandamaya kośa* as per the Śruti *"Brahma Puccham Pratiṣṭhā"*. Prof. Bhattacharya reads *"Sa yathā"* for *"Kham yathā"*. Prof. Karmarkar remarks that as no *Dṛṣṭānta* follows *"Sa yathā"* as is usual when the phrase *"Sa yathā"*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

is used, the correct reading *"Khaṁ yathā"* is the proper one. In the next Kārikā also there is *yathā Ākāśaḥ Prakāśitaḥ. Khaṁ Yathā* is therefore a better reading.

The meaning is that *Paramātmā* with His *Māyā* sets forth the *Kośas,* etc., as *Mahākāśa* appears to take the form of *Ghaṭākāśa, Mathākāśa,* etc.

द्वयोर्द्वयोर्मधुज्ञाने परं ब्रह्म प्रकाशितम् ।
पृथिव्यामुदरे चैव यथाऽऽकाशः प्रकाशितः ॥१२॥

dvayordvayormadhujñāne paraṁ brahma prakāśitam.
pṛthivyāmudare caiva yathā"kāśaḥ prakāśitaḥ. (12)

Translation

In the *Madhujñāna* (i.e, *Madhu Brāhmaṇa* of the Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad) in each of the various pairs which are described as *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma* the same Highest *Brahma* is identified (in each of the pairs) just as the same *Ākāśa* is shown to exist on the earth and in the belly.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Further, in the *Adhidaiva* (universe) as well as in the *Adhyātma* (individual) the luminous immortal *Puruṣa* who is within the earth, etc., as well as in the body who is knower is the Supreme *Ātmā* only (and therefore) all comprehensive (unlimited) *Brahma*—in this way the same *Brahma* is identified in each of the various pairs *(Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma)* till there is the realisation of the negation of duality. Where is this so stated? In *Madhujñāna* i.e., *Madhu Brāhmaṇa* (of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad). Here *Madhu* means nectar because it delights and therefore it means immortality or *Brahma Vidyā* (knowledge of *Brahma).* It says that just as in the phenomenal world there is the same *Ākāśa* both on the earth as well as in the belly, on the same reasoning (the same identical Brahma is there in all *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma* pairs described in the *Madhu Brāhmaṇa.)*

Comments

The *Taittirīya Śruti* expounds the identity of *Jīva* and *Brahma* by showing that one and the same *Svarūpa*-the *Pratyak Caitanya*- pervades in all the five sheaths when one experiences that "I am human" *(Annamaya),* "I am breathing" *(Prāṇamaya),* "I am

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Pramātā" (Manomaya), "I am the doer" *(Vijñānamaya),* "I am the enjoyer" *(Ānandamaya)* and that this *Pratyak Caitanya* is *Brahma* only.

In support of this, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śruti* is quoted. In the *Madhu Brāhmana,* in each of the various pairs of *Adhidaiva* and *Adhyātma* the Supreme *Brahma* is identified with *Pratyak Caitanya* by pointing out that It is exactly the same in each of those pairs. Thus the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śruti* and the *Taittirīya Śruti* expound the identity of *Ātmā* and *Brahma.* The Kārikā gives an illustration. In the *Adhidaiva,* the universe, and in *Adhyātma,* the body, the same luminous, conscious, immortal *Pūrṇa Puruṣa*—abiding inside the earth and the body—who is the knower—is the Supreme *Ātmā.* That knower is all-comprehensive unlimited *Brahma* only. As in the stage of *Apavāda* (negation of duality) we cannot talk of any *Adhyāropa* (in terms of superimposition of duality)—this exposition of Śruti is to be understood only at the stage when there is no realisation of the negation of duality. The word *Madhu* means nectar and thus it means immortality or *Brahma Vidyā.* In the phenomenal world there is the same *Ākāśa* on the earth as well as in the belly. On the same reasoning, there is the same *Brahma* in the *Adhidaiva* (cosmos) and *Adhyātma (Pratyag-Ātmā).*

In this connection, Prof. Karmarkar rightly observes that the pairs are *Adhidaiva* like *Pṛthivī, Āpaḥ,* etc. and *Adhyātma* like body, ***Retas, Vāk***, etc., and that Prof. Bhattacharya's interpretation of pairs as *Pṛthivī* and *Sarvāṇi Bhūtāni* is not correct.

जीवात्मनोरनन्यत्वमभेदेन प्रशस्यते ।
नानात्वं निन्द्यते यच्च तदेवं हि समञ्जसम् ॥१३॥

jīvātmanorananyatvamabhedena praśasyate.
nānātvaṁ nindyate yacca tadevaṁ hi samañjasam. (13)

Translation

The identity of *Jīva* and *Ātmā,* on account of their non-dual nature, is being praised and their multiplicity is being censured—(this praise and censure shows that their identity is the real *Śāstra Siddhānta)* and this is quite rational and acceptable.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

It was established by reasoning as well as by citing Śruti that there is identity of *Jīva* and Supreme *Ātmā*. This identity is being praised on account of their non-dual nature both by *Śāstra* (scriptures) and (eminent sages like) Vyāsa and others. Further, belief in the multiplicity which is natural among all ordinary people and which is advocated by logicians who are of faulty reasonings and who have turned away from scriptural authority— such belief in multiplicity is being censured. Such texts are, viz., "There is nothing other than That", "Fear arises from a second being." "One who makes even the slightest difference is overcome with fear", "All this is verity *Ātmā*" "One who sees in this *Ātmā* any multiplicity goes from one death to another death." These are the scriptural texts and there are other similar statements of the knowers of *Brahma*. This being so, i.e., this praise and censure, shows that identity of *Jīva* and *Ātmā* is the *Śāstra Siddhānta;* it is therefore rational, easily understandable and proper. False doctrines put forth by logicians are not easy of comprehension and do not deserve to be accepted.

Comments

A further argument is put forward to show that the purport of Śruti is to establish identity of *Jīva* and *Ātmā (Brahma).* The praise is in the form that one who realises *Brahma* as non-dual becomes *Brahma,* i.e., *Brahma Bhāva* is the *Phala* of the knowledge of this identity. The general rule is that whatever is praised is intended to be accepted. The statement of identity and the *Phala* of *Brahma Bhāva* show that *Ekatva* is praised. *Nānātva* (multiplicity) is censured and therefore it cannot be the purport of the *Śāstra.* Eminent sages like Vyāsa and Parāśara too have praised *Ekatva.* "One who realises that Vāsudeva is all (i.e. everything) is rare to find and he is a great soul". "Myself, Hari and all this is Janārdana—there is no other cause or effect than that". "Those who see multiplicity are deluded by ignorance". "What evil is not done by him, the thief, who has snatched away *Ātmā?*"

Thus duality is not supported by *Śāstra* and non-duality alone is its purport. Advocates of duality indulge in faulty reasoning: so

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

their doctrine is not rational and acceptable. Manu also says. "There are certain Smṛtis which have turned away from Vedic authority,there are others which are of faulty views-all of these are based on ignorance and yield no result after death." The views of dualists are irrational—they are *Vaiśeṣikas,* Vainãśikas (Buddhists) and others Duality is faulty as it has the faulty of mutual dependance, etc. *(Paraspara-Āśraya* etc.)

The passages cited from śruti are *Bṛ. Up.* 1-4-2, 4-3-23; *Kaṭha* 2-1-10 and *Tai.* 2-7-1. Further passages are cited by Śaṅkara in *Br. Sū. Bh.* 2-4-6; *Śvetāśvatara* Introduction and *Viṣṇu Sahasranāma Bhāṣya* verse 10, etc.

जीवात्मनोः पृथक्त्वं यत् प्रागुत्पत्ते : प्रकीर्तितम् ।
भविष्यद्वृत्त्या गौणं तन्मुख्यत्वं हि न युज्यते ॥१४॥

jīvātmanoḥ pṛthaktvaṁ yat prāgutpatteḥ prakīrtitam.
bhaviṣyadvṛttyā gauṇaṁ tanmukhyatvaṁ hi na yujyate. (14)

Translation

The separateness of *Jīva* and *Ātmā* which was declared in the *Karmakāṇḍa* (ritual) part was made before that part of the Upaniṣad which dealt with correct knowledge of *Ātmā* and as such the declaration (in the *Karmakāṇḍa* part) is to be understood only in a figurative sense, *(Gauṇam)* and made with an eye on the identity of *Jīva* and *Ātmā* to be stated in future (i.e., later on in the subsequent part of the Upaniṣad). That statement (regarding separateness) does not deserve to be taken in its primary *(Mukhya)* sense.

(*Note:* This meaning of the *Kārikā* is based on *Kārikā Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara as interpreted by Ānandagiri. In *Br. Sū. Bh.* 2-1-30, Śaṅkara interprets *Pṛthaktva* of *Jīva* and *Ātmā* with reference to *Chāndogya* 6-3-2-3 and here he does so with reference to *Karmakāṇḍa.* Because of slight difference in both the interpretations, Prof. Karmarkar is inclined to doubt that the *Kārikā Bhāṣya* may not be that of Ādi Śaṅkara. But the same phrase or a sentence in the same treatise is interpreted in more than one way. There is no special significance in his giving two different interpretations in his treatises).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objector:— The separateness of *Jīva* and Supreme *Ātmā* was declared by Śruti earlier in the *Karmakāṇḍa* (ritual) part before the Upanisadic texts dealing with the creation of the universe. These *Karmākāṇḍa* texts say that the Supreme *Ātmā* had multiple desires—He created with this desire or that desire. In the *mantra* part it is stated that the Supreme Being supported the heaven and the earth, etc. This being the case, when texts of the *Karmakāṇḍa* part show a conflict, how do you conclude that the identity *(of Jīva* and Supreme *Ātmā)* mentioned in the *Jñānakāṇḍa* texts is alone correct and acceptable?

Siddhāntin:—We reply as follows.The separateness (of *Jīva* and Supreme *Ātmā*) which was stated in the *Karmakāṇḍa (ritual)* part and which separateness was mentioned earlier, i.e., in *Karmakāṇḍa* and eaven before the Upaniṣadic texts dealing with the creation of universe—that statement of separateness in *Karmakāṇḍa* is not to be understood as real from the absolute point of view. The Upaniṣadic texts dealing with creation are "That from which all these beings emanate", "As small sparks arise from fire", "From that which is *Ātmā* the *Ākāśa* has come", "That saw", "That created heat", etc.

Objector:— How then are we to understand that?

Siddhāntin:— These references to separateness are to be taken only in a figurative sense. The separateness is to be understood in the same sense as the separateness of *Mahākāśa* and *Ghaṭākāśa.* This statement of separateness is to be understood as made with an eye on the future (later) statement of identity. When uncooked rice *Taṇḍula* is placed on fire we often say *Odana* (cooked rice) is being cooked. There the usage of *Odana* for *Taṇḍula* is figurative only.

Those texts which mention separateness (of *Jīva* and Supreme *Ātmā*) can never have thier primary *(Mukhya)* sense of separateness. Such texts which describe the separateness of *Jīva* and *Ātmā* echo the *Bheda-dṛṣṭi* (phenomenal experience of multiplicity) which is natural in the case of those persons who are under the spell of *Avidyā* (ignorance). Here in the Upaniṣads, texts dealing with creation and destruction only intend to establish the identity of *Jīva* and the Supreme *Ātmā*, as is being shown by such texts as "that thou art", "one knowing that I am

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

another and he is another does not know". The meaning is that the echoing of *Bhedadṛṣṭi* of the common people is made with an eye on the identity (of *Jīva* and Supreme *Ātmā*) to be established by Śruti later on in the Upaniṣads and therefore the separateness mentioned in such texts is only in a figurative (secondary) sense.

Or we can interpret this *Kārikā* in another way. In the Upaniṣads, before the creative texts "It saw", "It created heat", etc., there is a statement. "It is one without a second"-- this earlier text thus declares the identity (of *Jīva* and *Ātmā*). In the final texts later on, that identity is again stated "That is the Rality", "that is *Ātmā*", "that thou art". Therefore with an eye on that later conclusive text of identity, wherever in some texts separateness of *Jīva* and *Ātmā* is stated in between, such statements of separateness are to be understood only in a secondary sense as in "He is cooking *Odana*" (cooked rice), i.e., with an eye on the future event of the finished product (cooked rice).

Comments

The objector says that "texts talking of duality cannot be figurative as they are part of Śruti", *Utpatti* is interpreted as *Vyutpatti* or correct knowledge by *Ānandagiri.* The reply is that *Karmakāṇḍa* part of Śruti precedes the later Upaniṣadic part which gives correct knowledge and multiplicity mentioned in *Karmakāṇḍa* is, therefore, only in a secondary sense *(gauṇa)* with an eye on the future (later) texts of Upaniṣads which describe identity of *Jīva* and Supreme *Ātmā.* Such *Gauṇa* (Secondary) usage we find in our daily life also, e.g., when *Taṇḍula* (uncooked rice) is placed on fire for cooking, we often say "*Odana* (cooked rice) is being cooked. Here the use of *odana* for *Taṇḍula* is *Gauṇa.* The *Bheda* (duality) texts are not to be taken in their primary *(Mukhya)* sense but in a *Gauṇa* (secondary) sense. *Bheda* is neither *Apūrva* (extra-ordinary) (as it is *Pratyakṣa Siddha)* nor ***Puruṣārtha*** **(goal of life).**

The objector cites the *Mantra* where *Hiraṇyagarbha* is stated as supporting heaven and earth and here *Hiraṇyagarbha* means the Highest *Īśvara* according to the words of *Mantra* (as He supports the heavy earth and heaven) and the objector says that in

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

case of conflict between *Karmakāṇḍa* and *Jñānakāṇḍa,* there is no reason to give preference to *Jñānakāṇḍa.* The reply is given in terms of this *Kārikā.* Such texts talking of duality are to be understood in a figurative or secondary sense only. In the first place, *Bheda* is not *Apūrva* as it is *Pratyakṣa Siddha* while *Advaita* is *Apūrva* and has the support of reasoning; further *Advaita* texts came later and they form the conclusive opinion of the Śruti. So far as *Advaita* texts are concerned, it was stated even before there was any creation or multiplicity that "He is one without a second". Then it is stated that It created this and entered in it and thus *Jīva* is called the "entered *Brahma*". By this reasoning it is possible to know the "*Brahmatā*" of *Jīva.* The purport of the Upaniṣadic texts talking of creation is to show the non-duality of *sṛṣṭi* and *Brahma* from whom it came. Not only by reasoning we can establish *Advaita* as the purport of Śruti-this fact is emphasised in Śruti nine times as "that thou art". There are other texts negating duality, viz., 'Anyo'sau', etc. Thus the purport of Śruti is in the identity of *Jīva* and Supreme *Ātmā.* The Bhāṣyakāra gives a second interpretation also.

Prof. Karmarkar refers to *Chāndogya* 6-3-2-3 and Śaṅkara's interpretation of it in *Br.Sū.* 2-1-36. There it is stated that *Jīva* was already in existence along with the *Devatā* before creation, and this shows *Pṛthaktva* of *Jīva* and *Devatā* (Supreme *Ātmā).* He explains that this *Kārikā* passage is not to be interpreted literally in face of repeated *Ātmaikatva. Pṛthaktva* is to be understood figuratively as referring to the future state of creation by *Māyā.*

Prof. Karmarkar does not approve of the interpretation of *Kārikā Bhāṣya* here which refers to the conflict of *Karmakāṇḍa* and *Jñānakāṇḍa.*

Ānandagiri does refer to *Chāndogya* 6-3-2-3 at the end of his commentary but explains it differently. He says that the purport of the creation texts of the Upaniṣads is not in actually sketching out creation but to show the non-duality of creation and *Brahma.* He interprets *"Utpatti"* in the *Kārikā* as *Vyutpatti* or correct knowledge and says that *Karmakāṇḍa* texts are followed by the later Upaniṣadic texts which give correct knowledge and therefore the former texts are *Gauṇa* or secondary. Creation texts of Upaniṣads are explained by saying that their purport is not in delineating details and process of creation but to emphasise the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

non-duality of *Sṛṣṭi* and *Brahma* from and into which it appears to come and go, *Ekatva* of *Brahma* and *Jīva* is established by the *Chāndogya* text above which says that *Brahma* created from Itself *Sṛṣṭi* and entered it—thus *Jīva* is only "Entered *Brahma*" and thereby the Śruti implies *"Brahmatva"* of *Jīva.*

The fact that *Pṛthaktva* of *Jīva* and *Brahma* is explained as per Chañdogya text above in *Br.Sū.* 2-1-36 by Śaṅkara and in the *Kārikā Bhāṣya,* it is explained as per the *Karmakāṇḍa* is not a very significant factor in doubting that the *Kārikā Bhāṣya* is not that of Ādi Śaṅkara as is done by Prof. Karmarkar. *"Bhaviṣyad-vṛtti"* means keeping an eye on the future event—that future event is that of establishing the *Ekatva* of *Jīva* and *Ātmā* which is the purport of Upaniṣads and not the *Pṛthaktva* of *Jīva* in the future *Māyāvī* creation as it is the *Ekatva* which is to be emphasised here. Creation texts of Upaniṣad by their *Tātparya* (purport) and texts like *Tattvam Asi,* directly-all Upaniṣadic texts have their purport in *Ekatva* of *Jīva* and *Ātmā.* Therefore the real conflict is between *Karmakāṇḍa* emphasising *Pṛthaktva* and *Jñānakāṇḍa Ekatva.* The said texts pose no problem as their purport is in *Ekatva,* not duality, as explained by Ānandagiri. These texts are distinguished in the *Bhāṣya* from *Karmakāṇḍa* and *Mantravarṇa* texts which later texts are referred to as anterior to *"Utpattyartha-upaniṣad-vākyebhyaḥ Pūrvam".* Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri both imply that as against *Karmakāṇḍa* all the Upaniṣadic texts either indirectly by *Tātparya* or directly as in *Tattvam Asi* emphasise only *Ekatva* of *Jīva* and *Ātmā* which alone is the *Mukhyārtha* and *Pṛthaktva* is *gauṇa.* In *Br. Sū* 2-1-36, the discussion was about the *Anāditva* of *Saṁsāra,* of course from the phenomenal point of view. From the absolute point of view, causality and *Anāditva* are attacked in G.K. 4.14 and the *Bhāṣya.*

मृल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदिताऽन्यथा ।
उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथंचन ॥१५॥

mṛllohavisphuliṅgādyaiḥ sṛṣṭiryā coditā'nyathā.
upāyaḥ so'vatārāya nāsti bhedaḥ kathaṁcana. (15)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Creation is explained in (many) other ways in the Śruti by illustrations of earth, iron and sparks, etc., but that is only intended as a device for the purpose of making the intellect ultimately grasp (the *Ekatva* of *Jīva* and *Ātmā).* (Really speaking) no difference (between *Jīva* and *Para Ātmā)* is (intended to be) established (by those creation texts).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objector:— Before creation (it may be that) all this was unborn one and non-dual but after creation all this was born and the *Jīvas* are mutually separate (and thus after creation *Advaita* does not exist).

Siddhāntin:— That is not so. The reason is that the creation texts of the Śruti have different meaning (i.e., they are not to be interpreted literally). The objection raised here was already disposed of earlier. In *G.K.* 3-10, it has already been pointed out that all aggregates (of bodies, etc) are like object in dream and are set forth by the *Māyā* (illusion) of *Ātmā.* The birth and separateness, etc., of *Jīvas* are also explained as like the creation and differences of *Ghaṭākāśa,* etc. Those very creation texts of the Śruti are now again referred to here for the purpose of establishing the identity of *Jīvā* and *Brahma.* By giving the illustrations of earth, iron,sparks, etc., the creation is described in various different ways. We hold that this kind of describing the creation process is intended as a device to make the intellect grasp the identity of *Jīva* and *Paramātmā.* It is like the imagined legend of the conversation of *Prāṇa* and other sense organs like speech, etc., or like another legend where sense organs like speech, etc., were pierced with evil by the demons—these legends are (not to be taken literally but are) intended to show the special importance of *Prāṇa* (in comparison with other sense organs).

Objector:— You have not proved that your interpretation is proper.

Siddhāntin:— We say your objection is not correct. The reason is that in different *Śākhās* (recensions of *Vedas)* these legends of the conversation of *Prāṇa,* etc., are not narrated consistently but with many variations. If there was an actual conversation in reality, there should have been one single

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

consistent version in all the recensions, not several versions contradictory to one another. But we find that there are such versions. It is therefore proper to hold that unreal conversation texts of Śruti are not to be taken in their primary literal sense. The creation texts of Śruti are also to be understood similarly (i.e., not in their primary literal sense but we have to understand only their purport—*Tātparya)* (as creation texts of Śruti also describe the creation process in many varying and mutually centradictory versions).

Objector:— Supposing we explain the variations in the conversation texts as also the creation texts as referring to different creation cycles *(Kalpa-Sarga-Bheda)?*

Siddhāntin:— We say no. These conversation and creation texts have no other useful purpose except to serve as a device to make the intellect grasp their purport as pointed out. It is not possible to imagine any other useful purpose of these conversation and creation texts.

Objector:— Supposing we hold that these texts are intended for meditation (as the Śruti says that the meditator ultimately becomes one with the object meditated)?

Siddhāntin:— That cannot be the purpose of the Śruti. For, by that reasoning we may attain identity with quarrels, births and deaths etc. and such identity is not desirable. The conclusion therefore, is that the creation texts referred to are only intended as a device to make the intellect grasp the identity of *(Jīva* and) *Ātmā* and it is not proper to imagine any other meaning thereof. Therefore no difference (between *Jīva* and *Ātmā*) can be imagined on the ground of such creation.

Comments

Objector says that the literal meaning of the creation texts of Śruti would suggest duality and not *Advaita.* The reply is that they are not to be taken in their literal sense. By the method of the six distinguishing marks *(liṅgas)* like beginning *(Upakrama);* conclusion *(Upasaṁhāra),* etc., we have established one consistent purport, *(Tātparya)* of the texts describing illusory creation and pointed out that creation texts describe illusory creation and so they are not to be understood in their literal sense. Their illusory

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

nature was pointed out earlier. Here they are again mentioned to establish the identity of *Jīva* and *Paramātmā.* These creation texts are not to be understood literally because their versions vary and are mutually contradictory. In this connection two legends can be given. There is a conversation of *Prāṇa* and other sense organs, each claiming that it is the superior to all. But the sense organs are not sentient and therefore this legend cannot be taken literally—its intention is to establish the superiority of *Prāṇa,* for if *Prāṇa* departs from the body, the existence of other sense organs is jeopardised. This legend has varying versions. In the second legend gods started to perform a sacrifice to defeat demons. At that time the demons pierced with evil the other sense organs like speech etc., but here too *Prāṇa's* superiority was established. This legend is also not to be taken literally. Both these legends have their purport in pointing out the special importance of *Prāṇa.* Similarly the creation texts, too, are not to be taken literally-they are a device to make the intellect grasp the *Ekatva* of *Jīva* and *Brahma.* The objector says that sense organs are called *"Devatā"* and thus they may be *cetaṇa.* The reply is that it is without purpose and even as *Arthavāda* we cannot accept the *Prāmāṇya* (authoritativeness) of these texts as such conversation and creation texts are mutually contradictory. For example at one place it is stated that *Prāṇa* and sense organs went to *Prajāpati* for decision. At another, they started discussing independently. Sometimes they are stated as four, sometime more. In creation texts, sometimes the process is described as beginning from *Ākāśa,* sometimes from *Prāṇa,* sometimes without any order etc. The objector says that this variation may be referred to different creation cycles. The reply is that imagining that kind of *Vyavasthā* is without any purpose. In the first place, the very *Prāmāṇya* (authoritativeness as actual and real) of these creation texts etc., is not established—where is the question of making any *Vyavasthā* for them according different *kalpas* (creation cycles)? The objector now says let us suppose that the purpose of these creation and conversation *(Prāṇa saṁvāda)* texts is for meditation; for the meditator ultimately is identified with the meditated object. By meditating we may have the *Bhāva* of *Prāṇa* etc. To this the reply is that *"Dhyāna* (meditation) cannot be the purpose; for the *Prāṇa* and sense organs were quarreling and we

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

do not want to be identified with quarrel, similarly we do not want to be identified, with births and deaths etc., of the creation texts. These results are not desirable. The conclusion therefore is that *Prāṇa saṁvāda* texts have their *Tātparya* (purport) in establishing the special importance of *Prāṇa* and the creation texts have their *Tātparya* not in establishing the Reality of creation but to point out that they are only meant as a device to make us ultimately grasp the identity of *Jīva* and *Brahma.*

Illustrations of earth and Iron are given in Chāndogya 6-1-4-6 and of sparks in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2-1-20 and Kauṣītakī 3-3. *"Ādi"* refers to smoke from wet wood and everything as the breath of the Great Being in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-5-11 and to spider's web in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2-1-20 and in *Muṇḍaka* also.

आश्रमास्त्रिविधा हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टदृष्टय : ।
उपासनोपदिष्टेयं तदर्थमनुकम्पया ॥१६॥

āśramāstrividhā hīnamadhyamotkṛṣṭadṛṣṭayaḥ.
upāsanopadiṣṭeyaṁ tadarthamanukampayā. (16)

Translation

("Āśramāḥ" = Āśramiṇaḥ) Persons qualified for different *Āśramas* are of three varying levels of comprehension—low, middle and high. This discipline of meditation has been presented by the Śruti, out of compassion (for the middle and lower classes of people keeping in view their inferior level of comprehension).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objector:— If according to Śruti texts like "It is one only, the non-dual" etc. the supreme Ātmā alone who is eternal, pure and enlightened is the Ultimate Reality and all else is unreal then for what purpose has the Śruti prescribed the methods of meditation (or devotion) e.g. It is stated in Śruti that "O dear Maitreyī; *Ātmā* is to be seen" (In this text the word "Nididhyāsitavyaḥ" implies *"Dhyāna Vidhi* and *Upānsanā)" Ātmā* who is free from evil (is to be meditated upon) "He should make a *Kratu* (firm decision)" "He should be meditated upon as *Ātmā"* etc. The Śruti has, in addition, even prescibed *vedic karma* also.

Siddhāntin: Please hear the reason for this, The word *"Āśramāḥ"*,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

in the *Kārikā* means *(Āśramiṇaḥ)* persons qualified for different *Āśramas* (like the life of student, householder, *Vānaprastha* or recluse). It also includes people of different *Varṇas* (castes) and those who follow the paths prescribed for them by the scripture. For, the word *"Āśrama"* is used only in an illustrative sense. These people are placed in three classes. In what way? They are classed as of low, middle or high level of comprehension i.e. those whose intellectual capacity for enlightenment is low, middle or high. *Upāsanā* (meditation and or devotion) and even *vedic karma* (rites) are prescribed by the merciful Śruti out of compassion for those whose level of comprehension is either middle or low, not for those of high level of comprehension who have firmly realised that *Ātmā* is one alone and non-dual. The intention of Śruti is that these people of ordinary intelligence who follow the righteous path may ultimately acquire in due course the high level of comprehension. (We arrive at this conclusion because of) the following Śruti texts "That which cannot be thought of by the mind but by which the mind is able to think—know that alone as *Brahma,* not that which the people here worship (or meditate upon)" "That thou Art" "All this is *Ātmā* alone" etc.

Comments

Prof. Karmarkar would like to interpret *Āśramas* and three classes of people as those having the *Sattva, Rajas* or *Tamas* in them. Prof. Bhattacharya would like to read *Āśraya* instead of *Āśrama* in the *Kārikā.*

In the preceding *Kārikā,* it was pointed out that the creation texts do not contradict *Advaita;* in this *Kārikā* it is stated that the Śruti texts prescribing worship, meditation, Vedic rites etc. are also not contradicting *Advaita.*

From among those who follow the rules prescribed for various *Āśramas* and castes, those of low level of comprehension worship *Karya Brahma.* Those of the middle level worship or meditate upon *Kāraṇa Brahma:* but those of the highest level comprehension firmly realise the non-dual *Brahma.* From among these three classes of people—of low, middle and high intellectual level—the merciful Śruti has prescribed worship, meditation, vedic rites etc. for people of the middle and the low level of comprehension.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

In the text "*Ātmā* is to be seen" the "Dhyāna Vidhi" is indicated by the word *"Nididhyāsitavyaḥ"*. In "He should make *Kratu* (firm decision)" the word "he" means one who is qualified by practising "Sama, dama" etc. The word *upāsanā* in the *Kārikā* also includes Vedic rites. The word *Āśramāḥ* (i.e., *"Āśramiṇaḥ")* is illustrative and includes castes also. *"Mārgagāḥ"* according to Ānandagiri means *"Traivarṇikāḥ"*. Those of low comprehension worship *Kārya Brahma;* those of middle level worship *Kāraṇa Brahma. Advaita* is intended for those of high level. The grace of Veda in uplifting those of low and middle level will operate only if they are *"San-mārgagāḥ",* follow the righteous path. For those of high level of comprehension, *upāsanā* or *karma* is not necessary as they have no *abhimāna* (ego) either of any Āśrama or Varṇa.

स्वसिध्दान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम् ।
परस्परं विरुध्यन्ते तैरयं न विरुध्यते ॥१७॥

svasiddhäntavyavasthäsu dvaitino niscitä drdham.
parasparam virudhyante tairayam na virudhyate. (17)

Translation

The dualists are firmly set in arranging their doctrines and they contradict one another but this (our *Vaidika Siddhānta* of *Ajātivāda)* feels no conflict with them.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Realisation of non-dual *Átmā* is the true *Darśana* as it is established both by scripture and reasoning. And all other systems are false as they are devoid of vedic basis and correct reasoning. Moreover, the views of dualists are false because they are tainted with the defects of inordinate attachment and hatred. These dualists are firmly fixed in laying down rules for setting forth their conclusions; they follow the views of Kapila, Kaṇāda Buddha, Arhat *(Jina)* etc. "The view of our school alone is ultimate Reality—it cannot be otherwise"—in this way they are firmly attached to their views and when they find any opposing view, they hate it. In this way they are overcome by attachment and hatred on account of their partiality for their school and they mutually contradict one another, our *Vaidika* conclusion *(Siddhānta)* holding identity of all and *Ekatva* (unity) of *Ātmā* finds no conflict with them e g one finds no conflict with

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

one's hands or feet etc. (even if sometimes injury is caused by one limb to the body). In this way, the meaning is that knowledge of the *Ekatva* (unity) of *Ātmā* is alone the true *Darśana* (system of thought) as it is not tainted with the defects of attachment and hatred etc.

Comments

Objection:— *Advaita Darśana* is not contradicted by creation texts or Śruti prescribing *upāsanā* and *Vedic karma* (as per last two *kārikās*) but what about so many other schools of thought which oppose *Advaita Darśana?* The reply is that those systems obstinately stick to their views out of *Bhrānti* (error and ignorance). They are *"Bāhya"* i.e. devoid of any vedic basis and correct reasoning. The other reason why these other systems are false is that they have inordinate attachment for their way of thinking and hatred for others. Pride haughtiness etc, are their other defects. They mutually contradict one another. The *Advaita Darśana* is *Vaidika Siddhānta.* It holds identity of everything and *Ekatva* of *Ātmā.* And it finds no conflict with those other systems—it is like one not finding fault or feel hatred for one's own hand or foot even if sometimes there is an injury caused by that limb. Similarly, even if a small *upadrava* (distress) is caused by these dualists, the *Advaita Darśana* bears no hatred towards them.

अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तद्भेद उच्यते ।
तेषामुभयथा द्वैतं तेनायं न विरुद्ध्यते ॥१८॥

advaitaṁ paramārtho hi dvaitaṁ tadbheda ucyate.
teṣāmubhayathā dvaitaṁ tenāyaṁ na virudhyate. (18)

Translation

Advaita is the ultimate reality and duality is stated to be its effect *(Bheda = Kārya);* for the dualists, the duality exists in two ways—both as real and unreal. For this reason this (our *Advaita Vaidika Siddhānta*) does not pick up any quarrel with them.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Why for does the non-dualit not pick up any quarrel with the dualists? The reason is that *Advaita* is the ultimate Reality and multiplicity is considered only a *Bheda (Kārya)* i.e., the effect of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Advaita; for the Śruti says that "It is one without a second" and then adds that "It created fire" etc. (which shows that duality is the effect of *Advaita*). In this connection, there is reasoning also e.g. when there is no activity of the mind either in *Samādhi* or swoon or deep sleep, duality is not perceived. For this reason, it is stated that duality is only an effect of *Advaita.* So far as the dualists are concerned, they (the dualists) hold that duality exists both in the absolute sense and also in the phenomenal (or unreal) sense. The dualistic view of the dualists is due to their being deluded while our view of *Advaita* is devoid of delusion. For this reason, the non-dualist does not pick up any quarrel with them (the deluded persons). Our view is supported by Śruti which clearly states "Indra (i.e. the supreme Being) assumes many forms with his power of *Māyā* (illusion)" "There is nothing apart from *Brahma* which can be percieved." "This is like a man riding elephant in rut being challenged by a deluded person standing on the ground." Even though the deluded person says "I am riding an elephant, attack me with your elephant (if you can)—the (sane) man on the elephant does not attack that insane fellow (and ignores him)—without entering into any dispute with him. As from the point of view of absolute Reality the knower of *Brahma* is the very *Ātmā* (Self) of the dualists, for this reason, the non-dualist does not enter into any conflict with them (dualists).

Comments

Objector:— The conflict of *Advaita* and *Dwaita* is apparent on the very face of it as one deals with non-duality, the other with duality. How do you say that they do not conflict.?

Reply:— We have to analyse the real point of view of *Advaita. Dwaita* is illusory, *Advaita* is the absolute Reality. For the dualists, dualism is perceived in the absolute sense and also in the relative sense in worldly dealings. Non-dualist does not quarrel with them. *Dwaita* is the effect of *Advaita* as stated by Śruti "There is one only" and "It created fire". Now effect is non-different from cause and as cause alone is the Absolute Truth, according to Śruti *Advaita* alone is the Truth and it does not quarrel with its (illusory) effect (Śruti says *Advaita* is *"Tat Satyam"* and all modifications are only in name). *Advaita* is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

further proved by the absence of duality in *Samādhi,* swoon and deep sleep. *Jāgrat* is equally illusory like *swapna* according to the reasoning of having beginning and end. Thus *Dwaita* is the effect of *Advaita* and this true cause *(advaita)* does not conflict with its illusory effects—as *"Vācārambhaṇa"* text clearly proves that modifications are illusory. If inspite of this, the dualist believes he has a dispute, the non-dualist takes him as deluded and insane like the deluded person on ground challenging a sane person on elephant. Thus by analysing the view points of the non-dualist and dualists we conclude that the *Advaita* is not in conflict with *Dwaita.*

मायया भिद्यते ह्येतन्नान्यथाऽजं कथंचन ।
तत्त्वतो भिद्यमाने हि मर्त्यतामृतं व्रजेत् ॥१९॥

māyayā bhidyate hyetannānyathā'jaṁ kathañcana.
tattvato bhidyamāne hi martyatāmamṛtaṁ vrajet. (19)

Translation

The urborn (Absolute Reality) i.e.,*Advaita* becomes modified (manifold) through *Māyā* and in no other way under any circumstances. If it is modified in reality, the immortal would become mortal.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

If it is stated that duality is the effect of *Advaita,* then a doubt may arise that like *Advaita,* duality too may be the absolute truth. To dispel this doubt it is being stated that *Advaita* is the absolute truth and gets modified into *Dwaita* only by *Māyā* (illusion). It is like a person with a defective eye seeing many moons or one erroneously seeing the rope as a snake, water line or other different object. Modification of *Advaita* is not real as *Ātmā* is without any parts. Only an object having parts can undergo real modification by change in its parts, for example earth gets modified in various ways in jars etc. Therefore the unborn *(Brahma)* which is without parts never gets really modified. The meaning is that the Unborn can never get really modified in any way. If the modification is real, then the non-dual *(Brahma)* which by its intrinsic nature is immortal would become mortal (by such real modification). It is like fire (giving up its intrinsic nature of heat) adopting a cold nature (which is an impossibility). This

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

would amount to giving up one's own intrinsic nature which is not desired by any one as such a position is opposed to all means of proof. The unborn, changeless Reality—the *Ātmā*—is only modified through *Māyā* (illusion) and not in reality. Therefore *Dwaita* is not the ultimate Reality.

Comments

If *Advaita* is modified as *Dwaita,* then like the former the latter too may have a claim for Ultimate Reality. To this the reply is that this objection can be raised only if *Vivartavāda* (illusory modification) is not accepted. All duality is illusory like an erroneous perception of two moons etc. *Advaita Brahma* is without real modification as It is without parts, eternal and unborn—the opposite illustration is of earth getting really modified in jars etc. If a thing without parts is capable of being split up, it has to give up its intrinsic nature which is not possible. Thus the conclusion is the *Vivartavāda* and an illusory modification only of non-dual *Brahma.*

अजातस्यैव भावस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः ।
अजातो ह्यमृतो भावो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥२०॥

ajātasyaiva bhāvasya jātimicchanti vādinaḥ.
ajāto hyamṛto bhāvo martyatāṁ kathameṣyati. (20)

Translation

Some disputants desire (to postulate) the birth of the unborn *(Ātmā)* but how an entity which is unborn and immortal have the nature of mortality?

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Some expounders of upaniṣads, claiming themselves to be knowers of *Brahma* and talking too much desire to contend that the unborn Reality—the *Ātmā* which is by nature immortal really passes into birth but if It really passes into birth then it necessarily becomes subject to mortality. How can *Ātmā* who is by nature unborn and immortal be subject to mortality? *Ātmā* can never become subject to annihilation as that is a complete reversal of his intrinsic nature (The word *"Aja"* unborn has a double sense—i.e., having no cause from which It is born and having no effect to which It gives birth).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Having stated his own view, the author of the *Kārikās* now refers to the views of a section of *Brahmavādins* who hold that an unborn changeless, unoriginated and unoriginating immortal *Brahma* really passes on into birth as the universe; but how can an entity which is by nature *Aja* (unborn i.e. unoriginated and unoriginating) and immortal become subject to destruction? For Gītā says everything that has a birth has a death. If an immortal entity becomes mortal, it is a reversal of its intrinsic nature, which is not possible.

Prof. Karmarkar remarks that this *Kārikā* may be a criticism of worshippers of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa who are believed as Immortal and yet their birth Jayantīs are celebrated by their followers. But this criticism is far fetched. According to tradition, Nārāyaṇa is the Guru who gave to Gauḍapāda the knowledge described in the Kārikās and along with Rāma and Kṛṣṇa he too is traditionally considered a name or manifestation of Viṣṇu. Gauḍapāda salutes his Guru (G.k. 4-1) and is not expected to make any adverse criticism.

न भवत्यमृतं मर्त्यं न मर्त्यममृतं तथा ।
प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद् भविष्यति ॥२१॥

na bhavatyamṛtaṁ martyaṁ na martyamamṛtaṁ tathā.
prakṛteranyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati. (21)

Translation

The immortal does not become mortal and similarly mortal (does not become) immortal. Reversal of one's intrinsic nature never takes place under any circumstances.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

As in our worldly experience, the immortal never becomes mortal, nor the mortal immortal, therefore the reversal of one's own intrinsic nature i.e. deviation from one's nature never takes place under any circumstances—just as fire never gives up its intrinsic nature of being hot.

Comments

The proposition that objects never undergo a reversal of their intrinsic nature is being elaborated e.g. fire never gives up its own nature of being hot and never becomes cold, for otherwise it would amount to destroying one's own innate constitution.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

स्वभावेनामृतो यस्य भावो गच्छति मर्त्यताम् ।
कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ॥२२॥
svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvo gacchati martyatām.
kṛtakenāmṛtastasya katham sthāsyati niścalaḥ. (22)

Translation

In the case of a disputant, whose entity which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, in that disputant's system, such immortal nature of the entity is *Kṛtrima* (not natural or changeless). As it is *Kṛtaka* (not Changeless), how can that *Kṛtaka* (subsequently on merging into *Brahma*) once again become immortal (and changeless)?

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya

In the case of a disputant where an entity which is by its inherent nature immortal becomes mortal i.e. is truly and really born, in that disputant's case, his proposition that before creation that entity was by its inherent nature immortal (and changeless) is not valid (and cannot stand scrutiny). How then can an entity which is really born *(Kṛtaka)* (on merging into *Brahma*) become inherently immortal (and changeless)? In the case of an entity which is born *(Kṛtaka)* and then becomes "immortal", how can that "immortal" nature remain steady (changeless)? It can never remain changeless. Thus in the case of those disputants who believe that *Ātmā* is born (into *Jīva*), there can be no entity which is unborn *(Aja)* (and changeless)—in their case everything is mortal only. Thus in their case, there cannot be any state called *Mokṣa* (liberation).

Comments

The disputant argues "Before creation, *Brahma* as the cause is immortal and when *Brahma* becomes *Kārya* (effect) then It becomes mortal. As there is difference in their *Rūpa* (form)—let the cause *Brahma* be immortal and the *Kārya* (effect) be mortal. Then there is no inconsistancy."

The Reply is "Even before creation, the cause *Brahma* which is Itself fit to be Kārya *(effect)* that cause becomes mortal (as it loses its changeless nature) and thus your proposition that the cause *Brahma* remains immortal is valid and false. If this is so, a *Kārya* (effect) which is born and then subsequently merges into

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the cause *Brahma*—how can that *Kārya* which is *Kṛtaka* (born, liable to change) can ever become immortal? For the invariable concomitance is that whatever is *Kṛtaka* (born, made, liable to change) is impermanent and subject to destruction. Under these circumstances, anything which is born, made, subject to change, can never be *Aja Brahma* and thus for such disputants there cannot be any state of *Mokṣa* (liberation).

If *Amṛta Brahma* becomes *Martya* (effect) and that *Martya* (effect) by *upāsanā* again subsequently becomes *Amṛta Brahma*, then it means that this kind of immortality is changing its nature—sometimes *Amṛta,* sometimes *Martya.* How can such *Amṛta bhāva* remain steady?

A Śruti passage says "we drank Soma and became *Amṛta.*" But this *Amṛtā* is only relative and not genuine. For the Śruti also states that *Akṛta (Aja)* unmade, unborn, *Brahma* can never be attained by anything which is *Kṛta, Kṛtaka* (born, made,subject to change) i.e., Relative immortality is defined by *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (2-8-97) as upto *Pralaya (Ābhūtasamplavaṃ).* In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika* (4-2-13) Sureśvara says that all *Upāsanās* give only the *Adhikāra* for true and the highest knowledge and their reward is *krama mukti* only.

In the case of the disputant who believes that during the state of creation all effects i.e. the created entities are real, there does not arise the true knowledge that "I am the *Aja Brahma"* and thus there is no state of *Mokṣa* for him.

भूततोऽभूततो वाऽपि सृज्यमाने समा श्रुतिः ।
निश्चितं युक्तियुक्तं च यत्तद्भवति नेतरत् ॥२३॥

bhūtato'bhūtato vā'pi sṛjyamāne samā śrutiḥ.
niścitaṁ yuktiyuktaṁ ca yattadbhavati netarat. (23)

Translation

Whether what is being created is real or illusory—Both these views find support from the Sruti texts. But that alone is the true view which is the ascertained view of the Sruti and is also corroborated by reason and not the other.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Objection-From the point of view of those who believe that *Brahma* is *Aja* i.e. does not pass into creation (is unborn), the Śruti texts which support creation would have no justification or authoritativeness. *(Reply)* True, there are Śruti texts supporting

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

creation but they are intended to serve a different purpose. "Such texts are intended as a means or expedient for inculcating the sense of oneness in the mind of men of ordinary intelligence."—We have already stated this thing earlier. Even though we have dealt with earlier the above mentioned objection and its reply—here the intention is to prove that creation is unreal and in that connection the specific words in Śruti texts like "he created" "he became" would appear as contradicting our doctrine of unreality of creation—therefore in order to remove all doubts in that matter, the same contention and its reply are once again dealt with here.

The texts of Śruti regarding creation are similar—whether the creation is real or illusory or created by a magician. *(objection)* If words have both literal and a secondary meaning—it is proper to accept only the literal meaning.

(Reply) we say no. The reason is that accoring our view, the meaning of creation as real creation is unknown to us and we have already stated that no purpose is served by admitting real creation. All creation whether primary (as in the waking state) or secondary (as in the dream state) is only due to Ignorance *(Avidyā)* and there is no creation from the point of view of Reality. *"Ātmā* is both within and without and is *Aja* (unborn or changeless)" says the Śruti. So what the Śruti has firmly ascertained is that *Brahma* is only one, without a second, unborn (changless) and immortal and that is also supported by reason. We have already stated earlier that the import of Śruti is that only which is supported by reason. That alone is the real meaning of Śruti, there cannot be ever any other meaning.

Comments

The objector says that according to Śruti we should accept *Pariṇāma-vāda* (real transformation) and thus the act of real creation. The reply is that the Śruti passages can support both the views—that of *Pariṇāma-vāda* and the *vivarta-vāda* (illusory transformation) i.e. illusory creation. Therefore, Śruti texts should be construed from the point of view of *Advaita.* It is true that there are Śruti texts mentioning the act of creation but their purpose is different and is only to generate a sense of oneness in the mind of ordinary people. This purpose of the Śruti was already clarified by us earlier but here the same topic is raised for a

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

different reason. According to us, the act of creation is illusory while there are specific words of Śruti like "he created" "He became" etc. To remove this contradiction, this topic is raised again.

There is no adjective in the Śruti passages that the creation is "Real"; therefore these texts can support both the views of real and illusory creation. Generally the direct and not the Secondary meaning is accepted but here even if the direct meaning is accepted, according to our system, the creation is not real and even if phenomenally creation may be real, in our view creation is unreal unknown and not admitted and creation is not the import of the Śruti.

The main or primary creation in the waking state and the secondary creation in the dream state—both of these kinds of creations are due to *Avidyā* alone and therefore from the point of view of Absolute Reality there cannot be any creation. If an entity changes by itself or through another then it cannot give up its changing nature. If we see the thing in proper perspective, there is no act of real creation. The Śruti text firmly asserts that *Ātmā* is within, without and is unborn and changeless. The supporting reason is that *Brahma* is without parts and is all pervading. Therefore the import of Śruti is *Advaita* and not *Dwaita,* and the act of creation is only illusory.

The purpose of this *Kārikā* is to reject *Pariṇāma-vāda* and establish *Ajātivāda.* The rendering therefore, of *"Bhūtataḥ"* and *"Abhūtataḥ"* as "in reality" and "by way of illusion" fits in more in this context and therefore Śaṅkara's rendering in this way is correct. Prof. Vidhushekhar renders *"Bhūtataḥ"* and *"Abhūtataḥ"* as "from existent" and "from non-existent", relying on Ch.6-2-1 "All this was *Sat* before and "All this was *Asat* before ("Tai 2-7-1) is properly criticised by Prof. Karmarkar and Māṇḍūkya-Rahasya-Vivṛti as incorrect. Moreover *Sat* and *Asat* very frequently mean not necessarily 'existent' and non-existent' but manifested and non-manifested also. Further the context is clear. *"Māyayā Jāyate tu saḥ"* (3-24). It is born because of *Māyā;* also (3-34, 3-2 and 3-28)—these *Kārikās* in this chapter show the clear context. Prof. Karmarkar rightly criticises Prof Vidhushekhar in his notes but translates, by mistake perhaps, as is done by Prof. Vidhushekhar.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

The second line says that where the meaning of the Śruti is firmly ascertained and is also supported by reasoning—that meaning alone is to be accepted and no other.

Here one may question—if the Śruti's meaning is ascertained, where is the necessity of reasoning? Does the Śruti need any support of reasoning?

The reply is that by *'upakrama' "upasaṁhāra"* and other *liṅgas* the *Tātparya* of Śruti is firmly ascertained and by the support of reasoning, we mean that the reasoning is such which helps us in having an experience *(Anubhava)* of what the Śruti says. This reasoning is not unbridled *Tarka* like that of the *Tārkika.* The *Tātparya* of Śruti is in one non-dual unborn changeless immortal *Brahma* and the reasoning blessed by Śruti leads us to understand *Māyā, Ajāti,* similarity of *Jāgrat* and *Swapna* etc (Māṇḍūkya- Rahasya -Vivṛti).

How does the Śruti decide that the *Pariṇāma vāda* is to be rejected and that *Brahma* is *Aja, Advaya* and *Amṛta?* The following *Kārikā* states that:

नेह नानेति चाम्नायादिन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यपि ।
अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः ॥२४॥

neha nāneti cāmnāyādindro māyābhirityapi.
ajāyamano bahudhā māyayā jāyate tu saḥ. (24)

Translation

Veda describes *Ātmā* as "There is no diversity here", "Indra (appears many) because of *Māyā",* (therefore) the unborn *Ātmā* appears as born in many forms only through *Māyā.*

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya

How is it proved that this is the ascertained view of the Śruti? *(Reply)* If the creation were real then the multiplicity too would be real and therefore there would not then be any Śruti text declaring the unreality (of multiplicity). But in fact there are Śruti texts like "There is no diversity here" etc. negating the existence of multiplicity. Therefore an imaginary creation is for the time being supposed to help the seeker to understand the non-duality of *Ātmā.* This is similar to the fancied conversation of *Prāṇa* (and

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

other sense organs for the ulterior purpose of establishing the superiority of *prāṇa* over those other sense organs). In the Śruti text "Indra through *Māyā* appears as many", the word *māyā* is used and that establishes the unreality of creation.

(objection) The word *Māyā* is also used to denote knowledge *(prajñā)*

(Reply)

True-But the word *Māyā* is used to denote sense-knowledge only and as sense-knowledge is included in *Avidyā* (ignorance) there is nothing wrong in using the word *Māyā* as illusion. The meaning of the plural word *"Māyābhiḥ"* is "through sense-knowledge which is illusory". There is also the Taittirīya Upaniṣad text 3-13 which says "Though unborn he is born in various ways". Therefore he is born only through *Māyā*. The word *"Tu"* in the *Kārikā* is to denote certainty. Certainly, *Ātmā* is born only through *Māyā*. Not to pass into creation and being born as many-these two positions, being contradictory, cannot be predicted for the same *Ātmā*—like predicting that fire is both hot and cold. Further, realisation of non-duality of *Ātmā* produces the good result—(the removal of all miseries)—and therefore that non-duality of *Ātmā* is alone the ascertained meaning of the Śruti. The text (Īśa 7) says "when one realises the unity of *Ātmā*, how can there be any delusion or grief for him?" There is also the Śruti text which censures a person who sees multiplicity through real creation. "He passes from death to death" (who sees many in non-dual *Ātmā)* (Kaṭha 2-1-10).

Comments

In order to prove clearly the illusory nature of creation and thereby to establish the non-duality of *Ātmā*, the Śruti texts which firmly declare that position are cited. To the objection that if non-duality is to be established, then why is there any description of creation in Śruti? The reply is that creation is imagined to ultimately prove non-duality—like the imagined conversation of *Prāṇa* and senses to ultimately prove the superiority of *Prāṇa*. In the second Śruti text cited, *Māyā* means illusion. *Māyā* sometimes means *Prajñā* that is sense-knowledge. The Śruti uses here the word in plural *"Māyābhiḥ"*—it means sense-knowledge which is included in *Avidyā*. *Māyā* does not mean *Brahma Caitanya*.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

There is non-duality of *Ātmā* because the *Phala* mentioned in Śruti is removal of all miseries due to *Māyā* (Śwetā Up.) Therefore *Māyā* definitely means illusion. The *Phala* of realising unity of *Ātmā* is removal of delusion and grief. Those who see multiplicity are censured.

Māyā is one of the eleven names of *Prajñā (Nirukta Ni.* 3-9) and it means *Indriya-Janya-Prajñā,* not *Brahma Caitnya.* The latter is only one. In the text cited, plural "Māyābhiḥ" is used, so it cannot be *Brahma caitanya.*

Prof. Karmarkar says that because there are only two *"Iti"* used in the *Kārikā,* only two Śruti texts are cited and the second line of the *Kārikā* is the conclusion drawn by Gauḍapāda. Śaṅkara sees in the second line of the *Kārikā* the citation of Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3-13-1 *"Ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate".* The first text is Bṛ. Up. 4-4-9. The second text is R.V. 6-47-18 and Bṛ. U. 2-5-19. The third text according to Śaṅkara is Taị. Āra. 3-13-1.

संभूतेरपवादाच्च संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते ।
को न्वेनं जनयेदिति कारणं प्रतिषिध्यते ॥२५॥
saṁbhūterapavādācca saṁbhavaḥ pratiṣidhyate.
ko nvenam janayediti kāraṇaṁ pratiṣidhyate. (25)

Translation

By censuring the *(Upāsanā)* of *Saṁbhūti* (the first born *Hiraṇyagarbha* deity or *Kārya Brahma)* (the entire subsequent) creation is negated. "Who possibly can create this *Ātmā"*—by this Śruti text the cause (origin) of *Ātmā* is negated.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

"Those who meditate upon *Saṁbhūti* (the *Kārya Brahma* known as *Hiraṇyagarbha)* enter into blinding darkness"—by this Śruti text the meditation (upāsanā) of *Saṁbhūti* is censured; therefore all subsequent creation (evolving from *Saṁbhūti)* is negated. If *Saṁbhūti (Hiraṇyagarbha)* was actually really created, then meditation on him would not have been censured. *(objection)* The prohibition of meditation of *Hiraṇyagarbha* i.e., *Saṁbhūti* is intended to prescribe the combination of *Vināśa* i.e., *Karma* with the meditation on the deity *(Hiraṇyagarbha).* For

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

example another Śruti text states "those who meditate on *Avidyā* enter into blinding darkness"—here the censure of *Avidyā* i.e., mere *Karma* is intended to prescribe the combination of *Karma* with *Vidyā* i.e., meditation because the latter part of this *mantra* says that by *Avidyā (Karma)* one goes beyond death and by meditation on the deity one obtains (relative) immortality (Īśa 11).

Reply

It is true that the censure of *Saṁbhūti* is intended to prescribe the combination of *Karma* designated by the word *Vināśa* and *Devatā darśana* i.e. meditation on *Hiraṇyagarbha.* Still, just as *Vināśa* i.e. the *Karma* like *Agnihotra* etc. takes one beyond the death in the nature of activities of people due to their natural ignorance, similarly the combination of that *Agnihotra Karma* with meditation on the *Hiraṇyagarbha* deity, which is for the purpose of *Saṁskāra* i.e. purifying the mind, is intended to take one beyond the death in the form of attachment to rituals and their rewards and which is in the nature of double hankering for sons and fame which form the circle of ends and means. In this way, when that person is free from the death in the form of impurities characterised by the above-mentioned double hankerings for sons, fame etc. which form the circle of ends and means he becomes pure. Hence, the combination of *Karma* with meditation on deity—which is also *Avidyā*—is intended for taking one beyond this death. Thus when one has gone beyond the death in the nature of Avidyā characterised by such hankerings, has become non attached and is devoted to deliberation of Upaniṣads, there at once arises in him without further interval of time the knowledge of indentifying his Self with the Supreme Reality and therefore it has been said that there is a combination of the earlier *Avidyā* and the subsequently arising *Brahmavidyā* which is the means for attaining immortality as both are related to the same person. As the mention of combination is thus for a different purpose, *Brahmavidyā* alone is the means for absolute immortality and in view of this fact the negation of *Saṁbhūti* is only meant for censuring *Saṁbhūti.* Even though the said combination of *Karma* and meditation is meant for removing impurity of the mind, still it is not capable of being the means for attaining

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

absolute immortality *(atanniṣṭhatvāt).* Thus the censuring of *Saṁbhūti* is intended to show that *Saṁbhūti* has only a relative existence. From the point of view of Absolute Reality which is the oneness of *Ātmā,* this relative immortality of creation is negated. Thus the *Jīva* who is created by *Māyā* (illusion) and made to appear by *Avidyā* (ignorance) reverts back to this original nature of *Brahma* on the destruction of *Avidyā* and therefore the text says "who really creates *Jīva ?"* A snake which is superimposed on a rope by error (ignorance) and which disappears on proper knowledge is not created by anyone. Similarly, no one creates *Jīva.* The words *"Ko Nu"* in the text in the form of a question is intended to point out that there is no cause or origin of *Jīva.* The meaning is that *Jīva* is made to appear and disappear due to *Avidyā* and therefore there is no one who creates *Jīva.* The Śruti says (Kaṭha 1-2-18) "This *Ātmā* is not born of any cause nor is anything born of *Ātmā."*

Comments

This *Kārikā* gives another reason for rejecting dualism. In the word *Saṁbhūti, Bhūti* means prowess. As *Hiraṇyagarbha* who is *Kārya Brahma* or *Apara Brahma,* the first-born, has the best of prowess, he is called *Saṁbhūti.* When the most powerful *Saṁbhūti* is negated as unreal, all subsequent creation evolved out of *Saṁbhūti* is equally unreal. When the best wrestler is defeated, the inferior wrestlers are taken as defeated.

In the (Īśa 9) *mantra saṁbhūti* i.e. the first-born *Hiraṇyagarbha* or *Kārya Brahma* is censured and negated. This means that all creation subsequently evolved from *Hiraṇya-garbha* is equally negated and is unreal.

The objector points out another (Īśa 11) *mantra* and says that the real purpose is not to censure and negate *Saṁbhūti* but to prescraibe a *samuccaya* or combination of *Vināśa i.e., karma* and *upāsanā* of *Saṁbhūti (Hiraṇyagarbha* deity). In Īśa 12 *Avidyā* means *Karma* and *vidyā* is *upāsanā.* Thus, the Śruti prescribes *samuccaya* or combination of *karma* and *upāsanā* and not censuring of *Saṁbhuti.*

Reply:— Just as in *Agnihotra* ritual *Karma* takes one beyond death in the nature of all activities not sanctioned by scriptures,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

similarly this *samuccaya* of *vināśa* i.e., *karma* and *Devatādarśana* i.e. *upāsanā* of the deity takes one beyond death i.e., gives some *Saṁskāra* (purification) to the person making *samuccaya* of *karma* and *upāsanā.* This *saṁskāra* is in the nature of making him give up wanton behaviour, eating prohibited food etc.—just as the reward of regular *Agnihotra* ritual and *samuccaya* performed without desire for reward remove the impurity of *kāma*—hankering after sons, fame or from one desire to another, which is the circle of means and ends. By *samuccaya* the reward is not absolute immortality but only relative immortality. *(objection)* If absolute immortality can be attained only by *vidyā* i.e. *Brahmavidyā,* then how can the *Upaniṣad* prescribe a combination of *Avidyā* (which includes both *Karma* as well as *samuccaya* of *Karma* and *upāsanā)* with *Brahmavidyā?*

Reply:— After the *samuccaya* of *Karma* and *upāsanā,* the mind is ripe for taking the *upadeśa* of the *Upaniṣads.* On constant deliberation of *Upaniṣad* teaching there arises without much interval of time *Brahmavidyā* in that person. As *samuccaya* (of *karma* and *Upāsanā)* too is called *Avidyā* (as it does not yield Absolute immortality) and *Brahmavidyā* which soon arises in that person—both such *Avidyā* and *(Brahma) Vidyā,* are associated with or related to the same person. *Avidyā* was prior, *Brahmavidyā* was immediately subsequent—so both are stated together in the case of that *Mumukṣu* person. The word *"Saha"* in the *mantra* does not mean simultaneously in time but as related to the same person. But as neither *Vināśa (karma)* nor *Samuccaya* can give Absolute immortality, *Saṁbhūti (Hiraṇyagarbha* deity) is censured and negated.

Jīva is created by *Māyā* and put forth by *Avidyā* like a snake on a rope. When ignorance is removed, the snake disappears; similarly *Jīva* reverts to his original nature *Brahma;* thus there is no cause or originator of *Ātmā* nor is anything created by or from *Ātmā.* Thus causality is denied both ways.

Prof. Karmarkar criticises this long winded explanation of Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri and says that according to Gauḍapāda *Saṁbhūti* and *Saṁbhava* means the same thing and he negates

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

creation, relying on the Īśá *mantra.* Śaṅkara has to explain the entire passage and *Samuccaya* too—therefore there is this long explanation.

स एष नेति नेतीति व्याख्यातं निह्नुते यतः
सर्वमग्राह्यभावेन हेतुनाऽजं प्रकाशते ॥२६॥

sa eṣa neti netīti vyākhyātaṁ nihnute yataḥ.
sarvamagrāhyabhāvena hetunā'jaṁ prakāśate. (26)

Translation

As the Śruti states "This (Ātmā) is not this, not this." —and by this explanation negates all (the corporeal and incorporeal dualistic creation described by it earlier); by the reason of the incomprehensibility of *Ātmā,* the unborn *Ātmā* shines forth.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

By rejecting all the specific characteristics and by stating that the final instruction about *Ātmā* is that *"Ātmā* is not this, not this", the Śruti thinks that *Ātmā* is difficult of comprehension and therefore through other means the Śruti again and again tries to explain *Ātmā* and (in the final instruction) Śruti negates all the corporeal and incorporeal dualistic creation explained by it earlier, such creation being only superimposed on *Ātmā* (who is without specific characteristics or attributes). Anything which can be grasped has a birth and is the object of mental comprehension — the Śruti negates this and states that "this *Ātmā* is not this, not this"—Thereby the Śruti points out the incomprehensibility of *Ātmā.* The earlier description of the dualistic creation was only the means *(upāya)* to ultimately lead to the end *(upeya)* which is the realisation of *Ātmā.* As the ignorant was likely to take this means *(upāya,* description of dualistic creation) as the end (*upeya,* the final truth)—therefore in order that the *upāya* (means) may not be mistaken or taken as the *upeya* (the end, the final truth)—the Śruti negates the reality of the (earlier mentioned) *upāya* (means i.e. the superimposed dualistic creation on *Ātmā* who is attributeless)—the reason being that *Ātmā* is incomprehensible. Thereafter, one who knows that the means *(upāya)* is intended only to ultimately lead to the end *(upeya),* to such person the *upeya Ātmā* is revealed as one and changeless

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

and for him the Reality of unborn *Ātmā* who is both within and without shines forth of his own accord.

Comments

This is an additional argument to reject Duality. In Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2-3-1 *Brahma* was described as having two forms—*Mūrta* (corporeal) and *Amūrta* (incorporeal) but by negating all this earlier description which is intended only as a means to make the student ultimately realise the incomprehensible nature of *Brahma* the Śruti again and again gives the final instruction about *Brahma* in this form—viz. "This *(Ātmā)* is not this, not this" i.e. by negating the earlier dualistic creation which is only superimposed on *Ātmā* by *Avidyā*. The final instruction uses two negatives for rejecting all. This "Not this, not this" description is mentioned in Bṛhadāraṇyaka at 2-3-6, 3-9-26, 4-2-4, 4-4-22 and 4-5-15. The *Kūṭastha Ātmā* is not the *Viṣaya* or object of knowledge. *Ātmā* is *Nirviśeṣa* without any specific characteristics or attributes. After rejecting all *Mūrta* and *Amūrta* forms of *Brahma* mentioned earlier and by negating the superimposed duality on *Brahma,* what remains *(Avaśiṣṭa)* is the *Ātmā.* Whatever is *Dṛśya* (comprehensible), *Kārya* (effect) or can be grasped by mind or speech is all negated by the Śruti. The ultimate Reality i.e., *Ātmā* is stated as *Adṛśya* (incomprehensible)—by stating this final conclusion, all that falls in the class of *Dṛśya* (comprehensible) is established as unreal.

The reason why the Śruti again and again emphasises this final conclusion is that the ignorant should not by error understand what is stated as the means to an end as the end itself. The end i.e. the final Truth is that the *Upāya* is all imagined by *Avīdyā* and is unreal but the *upēya* the end, the ultimate Reality is *Sat* (existence) one and changeless. All that is superimposed on *Brahma* is unreal and like the snake superimposed on a rope is not different from the substratum on which it is superimposed. All *Mūrta* and *Amūrta* is superimposed and not different from the substratum *Brahma. Brahma* is *sat,* changeless *nitya* and *Dṛṣṭiswabhāva.* To one who knows this, *Brahma* reveals Itself. Everything which is described as *upāya* (means) is only imagined and is as unreal as a reflection.

It is stated that from the unreal *upāya,* the *upeya* (ultimate reality) is realised. The reason is that to realise *upeya,* an *upāya* is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

necessary but it is not essential that the *upāya* or means should be real. When the ultimate reality is realised, the distinction of *upāya* and *upeya* disappears. *Kārikā* 1-1-8 says "On knowing the Reality, there remains no duality". *Upāya* is intended only to remove all superimposed specific attributes on *Brahma.* "When *Avidyā* is removed there is no *Dwaita-dhī* (**Bṛhadāraṇyaka vārtika** 4-3-1806). All *Vedānta vākyas* reject the specific characteristics or attributes superimposed on *Brahma* e.g. *Akāya, Avraṇa, Aśabda, Adṛśya* etc. Thereafter *Ātmā* shines of his own *Prakāśa* as he is *swayaṁprakāśa.* Nothing else is necessary to illumine *Ātmā.* All Śruti passages describing creation can be explained as due to *Māyā* i.e., *Abhūtataḥ* (*Kārikā* 3-23).

सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतः ।
तत्त्वतो जायते यस्य जातं तस्य हि जायते ॥२७॥

sato hi māyayā janma yujyate na tu tattvataḥ.
tattvato jāyate yasya jātaṁ tasya hi jāyate. (27)

Translation

The Existent can have birth only through *Māyā*—not in reality. But in the case of the disputant who believes that the Existent is born in reality—he shall have to admit that the born is born again (and again endlessly).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Thus it has been established by hundreds of Śruti texts that the essence which is *Ātmā* is within and without, unborn, and non-dual, and that there is nothing besides this *Ātmā* that exists. By reason also (i.e. whatever is Dṛśya, Jadą etc., is unreal) the same is established. Now by another reason, the same conclusion is arrived at.

Objection

If the essence is that *Ātmā* is always incomprehensible, then it must be non-existent.

Reply

That is not so. Because we comprehend the effect. Just as we see the illusory effects created by the magician and we conclude

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

about the existence of the magician. Similarly we comprehend the birth of the universe, which is effect and like the pointing out the magician, this world-creation also leads us to the conclusion that the ultimate reality *Ātmā* is the substratum of the illusory world-creation. Because only from the really existing cause, the (illusory) world-creation is reasonable like the illusory effects like elephants etc. from the existing magician—illusory creation is not possible from a non-existent cause.

But there is no real birth (reation) possible from *Ātmā.*

(instead of interpreting *"sataḥ"* in the *Kārikā* as in the Ablative case, we can also interpret *"sataḥ"* as in the genetive case).

Or, as of the existing thing like a rope etc. an illusory birth of a snake etc. is possible but not a real birth (of a snake etc.). Similarly of the incomprehensible but existent *Ātmā* an illusory birth in the form of world-creation is justified like that of rope having an illusory birth of a snake. But of the *Aja* (unborn) *Ātmā* there cannot be a real birth.

But the disputant who holds that the ultimate Reality—the existing *Ātmatattva* is really born as world-creation, cannot assert that the *Aja* (unborn) Reality is born. If he predicates birth of the born (Reality), then he is faced with the absurd position of *Anavasthā* (Regress ad infinitum). Therefore (the birth of *Ātmā* is only illusory and not real and) it is established that *Ātmatattva* is *Aja* (unborn) and one only.

Comments

Ātmatattva is *Aja,* non-dual and is the ultimate Reality. Duality is imagined by *Māyā.* As *Ātmatattva* is always existent and one, its birth as universe is only illusory (due to *Māyā). Māyā* (illusion) can create inexplicable creations but the one existent ultimate Reality cannot be really born in multiple forms.

But a disputant who holds that *Brahma* is really born as universe, has to face the absurd contradiction that the unborn *Aja Brahma* is really born and if a born is born again there is *Anavasthā* (Regress ad infinitum).

Śruti postulates *Advaita* and negates *Dwaita.* But even by reasoning we can arrive at the same conclusion. *Kārikā* 3-23 states that what is firmly stated by Śruti and is also supported by reason

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

is the only proposition acceptable—not any other. Creation is *Jaḍa, Dṛśya*—therefore not the ultimate reality. This reasoning supports the Śruti firmly declaring *Advaita.*

Objection

If *Brahma* is incomprehensible—and no *Pramāṇa* can reach it then It is non-existent like the horns of hare.

Reply

Because of the *Kārya* (effect) in the form of universe it is possible to infer the cause of the universe. Nothing can be born of a non-existent cause. Even an illusory effect has an existent cause. There is the substratum of a real rope for the illusory creation of a snake therefrom. There is a real magician behind the illusory magical effects. i.e. magical effects prove the existence of a real magician.

"Sataḥ" in the *Kārikā* when interpreted as in the ablative case would make *Brahma* the (illusory) *Nimitta Kāraṇa* (instrumental cause) and when "sataḥ" in the *kārikā* is interpreted as in the genetive case, it would make *Brahma* as the (illusory) *Upādāna Kāraṇa* (material cause).

The conclusion is that there is only an illusory birth from or of *Brahma* who is Existent, without birth—as real birth contradicts the position that *Brahma* is *Aja* (unborn).

असतो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते ।
वन्ध्यापुत्रो न तत्त्वेन मायया वाऽपि जायते ॥२८॥
asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate.
vandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vā'pi jāyate. (28)

Translation

It is not possible to postulate the birth of the non-existent either through *Māyā* or in reality. The son of a barren woman is not born either through *Māyā* or in reality.

Sāṅkara Bhāṣya

In the case of those disputants who postulate *Asat—Niḥiswabhāva or Śūnya,* the Non-existent cannot be born either

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

through *Māyā* or in reality-as such a position is never seen or experienced. A son of a barren woman is never born in reality nor can he be conceived of as born through illusion like a snake on a rope. Therefore, the *Asat-vāda* (non-existent as the absolute or *Asat-khyāti* of *Naiyāyikas)* is far from being justifiable.

Comments

Disputants who believe in *Asat-khyāti* argue that even the non-existent can produce *Kārya* or effect. To them this *Kārikā* gives the reply. The *sad vāda* can be possible either through *Māyā* or in reality. But what is *Asat*—Non-existent—*Niḥswarūpa* can have no *swabhāva* and therefore it cannot be born either in reality or by *Māyā* as such a thing is never experienced. *Sad-vāda* is possible through *Māyā.* A barren woman's son cannot be born either by *Māyā* or in reality.

Naiyāyikas believe in *Asat-khyāti.* Their view is rejected here. Similarly *Asat-vādin* Buddhists are told that even *Asat* cannot be proved without a *Sākṣin.*

It is said that Mādhyamika Buddhists reject *sat* and also reject *Asat.* The reply of the *Vedāntin* is that even if *Māyā, swapna* etc. are unreal, we have to admit the reality of the *Māyāvī* Magician or the seer of *swapna* etc.

Even the Śruti (Ch. 6-2-1, 2) says that "One non-dual *sat* alone was there. How can *sat* be born of *Asat?"*

यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ।
तथा जाग्रद्द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ॥२९॥

yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manaḥ.
tathā jāgraddvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manaḥ. (29)

Translation

Just as in dream the mind vibrates through *Māyā* into the appearance of duality (of *grāhya-grāhaka* i.e. cognised and cogniser) so also in the waking state the mind vibrates through *Māyā* into the appearance of duality.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

How do you say that that (Absolute) Reality passes into birth only through Māyā? We reply; Just as a snake imagined on a rope

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

when seen as a rope is real, so also the mind, when seen from the standpoint of knowledge of the ultimate reality, the substratum *Ātmā*, is real. As cognised and cogniser, it vibrates in dream through *Mãyã* like a snake on a rope. So also in the waking state, the mind vibrates through *Mãyã* as it were (i.e. the vibration of mind is unreal as it is due to *Mãyã*).

Comments

This *Kãrikã* intends to establish that the ultimate Reality passes into birth only through *Mãyã.* The mind as seen from the standpoint of its substratum *Ātmã* is real. The vibration of mind through *Mãyã* is unreal. Both in *Jãgrat* and *Swapna,* the vibration of the mind is through *Mãyã* and is therefore unreal.

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं मनः स्वप्ने न संशयः।
अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रन्न संशयः ॥३०॥

advayaṁ ca dvayābhāsaṁ manaḥ svapne na saṁśayaḥ.
advayaṁ ca dvayābhāsaṁ tathā jāgranna saṁśayaḥ. (30)

Translation

There is no doubt that in dream the mind, though non-dual appears as dual. Similarly, there is no doubt that in the waking state also the non-dual mind appears as dual.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

(The imagined) snake when seen as rope—(the substratum), is identified with the rope. In the same way, the mind which is non-dual real and identical with *Ātmã* appears as dual in the dream—there is no doubt about that. In the dream, objects like elephant etc. are cognised and the sense organ like the eye etc. is the cogniser—both of them are not different from consciousness (mind). The same is the case with *Jãgrat.* The consciousness (mind), the highest Reality, is common to both the states *(Jãgrat* and *Swapna).*

Comments

Are there two causes for the appearance of duality—the mind and *Brahma?* Have you accepted duality *(Dwaita)?* The reply is no. The duality in the form of appearance as cogniser and cognised is only due to the vibration of the mind and is unreal.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

The mind as seen as identical with its substratum *Ātmā* is real and appears as dual due to *Māyā*. The same is the case with *Jāgrat*. The mind is non-dual when seen as identical with the highest Reality *Ātmā*. This highest Reality which is consciousness is common to both the states of *Swapna* and *Jāgrat*. Mind, like the snake on a rope, is itself *Māyā-Kalpita* but it is real when seen as identical with its substratum *Atmā*. Therefore there are not two causes like the Mind and *Brahma*. Duality appears on account of ignorance *(Māyā)*. Reference may be made to *Kārikā* 2-12 where it is stated that *Ātmā* imagines himself by himself through his *Māyā*—he alone cognises the various entities. This is the conclusion of *Vedānta*. See comments on *Kārikā* 2-12.

मनोदृश्यमिदं द्वैतं यत्किंचित्सचराचरम् ।
मनसो ह्यमनीभावे द्वैतं नैवोपलभ्यते ॥३१॥

manodṛśyamidaṁ dvaitaṁ yatkiñcitsacarācaram
manaso hyamanībhāve dvaitaṁ naivopalabhyate. (31)

Translation

All this duality comprising all the movable and immovable which is perceivable by the mind (is nothing but mind alone) and when mind becomes non-mind (i.e. ceases to act) duality assuredly is not experienced.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Just as a rope appears as a serpent similarly the mind alone appears erroneously as duality (as multiple objects)—this has already been stated. What is the authority for this proposition? For this is stated the inference, following the method of proving by agreement *(anvaya)* and difference *(vyatireka)*. How? The proposition is that all this duality which is erroneously perceived by the mind is mind only; for so long as there is mind (i.e. when the mind is acting) there is duality and when there is non-mind (i.e. when the mind ceases to act) duality is not experienced. When the mind becomes non-mind by *Nirodha* (by its being established in *Ātmā*) on acquiring the knowledge through discrimination, repeated practice and renunciation, like the disappearance of snake in the rope or (the mind ceasing to act) during deep sleep—duality is not at all experienced. Hence, on account of the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

disappearance of duality (when mind ceases to act) it is established that duality is unreal (and mind alone erroneously appears in the form of duality).

Comments

Duality is the creation of mind alone. Just as a rope erroneously appears as a snake, similarly duality is imagined by ignorance and is mind alone. The inference in the form of *Anvaya* (agreement) and *Vyatireka* (difference) is given. In an earthen pot, earth necessarily exists in the pot *(Anvaya)* similarly when mind is active, duality is experienced. In *Samādhi* and deep sleep duality is not experienced *(Vyatireka).* The proposition that all duality is the creation of mind is proved by this *Anumāna Pramāṇa.* If it is argued that in *samādhi,* deep sleep or a swoon there is no non- existence of duality—the reply is that the mind is the Pramāṇa and as long as there is mind, the duality is experienced and in the *Amanībhāva* duality is not experienced. Thus the proposition that duality is the creation of mind is proved.The *Prameya* is proved by the *Pramāṇa.*

Nirodha of mind in *Vedānta* is the withdrawal or disappearance of the mind in *Ātmā* through *Jñāna* attained by *Viveka* and *Vairāgya* and constant *Abhyāsa* (practice) and this *Nirodha* is to be distinguished from the mechanical *Citta-Vṛtti-nirodha* prescribed by *Patañjali.* Further deep sleep is not to be confused with *Samādhi.* In 3-34 and 3-35 *Nirvikalpa Samādhi* is distinguished from deep sleep.

आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन न संकल्पयते यदा ।
अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्यभावे तदग्रहम् ॥३२)

ātmasatyānubodhena na saṁkalpayate yadā.
amanastāṁ tadā yāti grāhyabhāve tadagraham. (32)

Translation

When the mind does not imagine on account of the comprehension of Truth which is *Ātmā,* then it (the mind) ceases to be the mind and becomes free of cognition for want of any object to be cognised.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

How does the mind become non-mind? It is now stated. Ātmā alone is Truth (like the clay, in the Śruti illustration) for the Śruti says—"All modifications are mere names arising out of speech; clay alone is real." This comprehension of the Truth that *Ātmā* alone is Truth—this knowledge is attained through the instruction given by the scripture and the preceptor. Having attained this knowledge, the mind ceases to imagine as there is nothing to be imagined. It is then like fire where there is nothing to burn. When the mind ceases to imagine, at that time it ceases to be the mind—it is non-mind. It becomes free of all cognition as then there is no object to be cognised.

Comments

How the mind becomes non-mind is being established. The objector may say that in *Samādhi* and deep sleep, the mind which is *Nitya* does continue to exist and thus there is no *Amanībhāva.* To this the reply is as follows. Mind's nature, from the practical point of view, is to imagine. But imagination requires an object to be imagined. But when the knowledge that everything is *Ātmā* is attained, there is nothing else to be imagined or cognised. Then the mind has no activity—no function and at that time if anything flashes, that is *Ātmā* alone. From the point of view of one who discriminates, there is then nothing like mind. In the illustration given by Śruti, in earthen pots, clay alone is real. Similarly *Ātmā* alone is the Truth woven all throughout and all modifications are unreal. When there is correct knowledge, there is determination that nothing else exists apart from *Ātmā* and then there remains nothing to imagine. It is like fire in the absence of any object for burning. When there is no object for imagination or cognition, imagination has no scope. From the point of view of a person with discrimination, the non-funotioning mind is non-mind.—this is *Amanībhāva.* Śruti text is chāndogya 6-1-4 and 6-8-7 says "Everything is *Ātmā.* It is the Truth."

Bhattacharya reads *"Agrahat"* in place of "Argaham" without change in meaning.

अकल्पकमजं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाभिन्नं प्रचक्षते ।
ब्रह्मज्ञेयमजं नित्यमजेनाजं विबुध्यते ॥३३॥

akalpakamajam jñānam Jñeyābhinnam pracakṣate.
brahmajñeyamajam nityamajenājam vibudhyate. (33)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

They (knowers of *Brahma*) proclaim that knowledge *(Jñāna)* which is unborn and without imagination is itself the knowable *Brahma.* Knowledge whose knowable is *Brahma* is eternal and from that unborn knowledge the unborn *(Ātmatattva)* is made known.

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya

If Duality is illusory (and therefore the mind is non-mind) how is one to realise one's own *Ātmatattva.*

The reply is stated. Knowers of *Brahma* proclaim that knowledge which is devoid of all imagination and therefore unborn—pure knowledge—is non different from the knowable *Brahma,* the ultimate reality. Śruti says "Knowledge is never absent from the knower like heat from fire". "*Brahma* is knowledge and Bliss" "*Brahma* is truth, Bliss and Infinity"—knowledge of which the object is *Brahma*—as of heat the fire, by that knowledge identical with *Ātmā,* the knowledge unborn *Ātmatattva* is known spontaneously and of its own accord. As is the case with the sun which is of the nature of constant illumination (not requiring any other light to illumine the sun). *Ātmatattva* is one homogeneous mass of eternal knowledge and it does not require any other knowledge to illumine that *Ātmatattva.*

Comments

Duality has been stated as illusory and the creation of mind. Non-functioning mind is called non-mind. Then without mind how is one to know one's own *Ātmatattva* which is to be seen by mind.The reply is Non-imagining unborn knowledge is non different from *Brahma.* It is this eternal unborn *Jñāna* whose object of knowledge is *Brahma,* that makes one know one's own unborn *Ātmatattva.* The above described *jñāna* does not require any other *jñāna* to illumine it as it is self-illuminating and identical with *swayam prakāśa Brahma.*

Śaṅkra construes *Brahmajñeyam* as one world of *Bahuvrīhi* compound—knowledge whose object is *Brahma.* Karmarkar reads *Brahma* and *jñeya* separately. Śaṅkara's construction is better as the Kārikā is intended to describe all throughout that *jñāna* which makes one know one's own *Ātmatattva* when mind

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

has become non-mind. It is therefore not necessary to split up *Brahmajñeyam* into two words *Brahma* and *jñeyam.*

The reply to the question as to how *Ātmatattva* is to be known is—by that *jñāna* which is one's own nature the *Ātmāvabodha* is made—no separate mind is necessary. This non imagining unborn *jñāna* is non different from *swayaṁprakāśa Brahma.* When there is fire, heat is never absent. Another Śruti passage says that *"Brahma* is *Prajñāna".* As this *Jñāna* is self-illuminating like the sun, it does not require any other instrument of knowledge to illumine it. The illustration of the constantly shining sun is given; sun does not require another light to illumine it. Day and night are from our terrestrial point of view but in the sun there is neither a day nor a night—there is constant shining. Similarly cognition and non cognition of objects is from the point of view of *upādhi* or the phenomenal point of view. From the point of view of ultimate reality *Brahma* there is no cognition or non cognition of duality as duality is illusory. Brahma is always of the nature of self—illuminating light, not requiring a separate mind to make it known.

निगृहीतस्य मनसो निर्विकल्पस्य धीमतः ।
प्रचारःस तु विज्ञेयः सुषुप्तेऽन्यो न तत्समः ॥३४॥

nigṛhītasya mánaso nirvikalpasya dhīmataḥ.
pracāraḥ sa tu vijñeyaḥ suṣupte'nyo na tatsamaḥ. (34)

Translation

But the working of the mind which is under control and which is free from imaginations and endowed with discrimination has to be known clearly. The working of the mind in deep sleep is altogether different and not like the one (i.e. the mind which is *Nigṛhīta, Nirvikalpa* and *Dhīmat).*

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

It has been stated that when there is knowledge that *Ātmā* alone is the Truth, the mind becomes *Niruddha,* controlled, tranquil like the fire without fuel and not imagining for want of any external objects.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

It has also been stated that when the mind thus becomes non-mind, duality is not experienced. *Yogins* should specially know the working of such mind which has discrimination *(Dhīmataḥ)* which is free from all imaginations *(Nirvikalpasya)* and is thus *Niruddha (Nigṛhīta,* under control).

Objection

Just as the working of the mind of a person in deep sleep is without any specific cognition in the same way the working of the *Niruddha* (controlled) mind too is without any specific cognition. This being the case, what is there to particularly know about the *Niruddha* mind?

Reply

Here we reply as under. Your objection is not correct. In deep sleep, the working of the mind is seized by delusion and darkness caused by ignorance and is possessed of many impressions which are the seeds of numerous harmful activities lurking within it. While the working of the *Niruddha* (controlled) mind is quite different and uncontrolled (by ignorance), and is tranquil being free from ignorance causing painful activities. This *Niruddha* mind burns all seeds of harmful activities by the fire of the knowledge that *Ātmā* alone is the Truth. In view of this, the *Niruddha* mind and the mind in deep sleep are not the same. The meaning is that it is worthwhile knowing the working or operation of the *Niruddha* mind.

Comments

The reward of *Jñāna* which is liberation is directly perceivable in this life like direct satisfaction from hunger and is not indirect like attaining heaven after death.

This is the additional reason why the nature of *Niruddha* mind should be known as its reward is directly perceivable in this life itself. *Niruddha* mind is distinguished from the mind in deep sleep. Chāndogya 6-9-2 and 6-10-2 says that in deep sleep the mind temporarily merges in *Sat (Ātmā)* but as it is possessed of seeds of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Vāsanā, it comes back to *Swapna* and *Jāgrat.* But in *Niruddha* mind—the seeds of *Vāsanā* are completely burnt by the fire of *Ātmabodha* and is free of all *Vikalpas* or imaginations. it is merged in *Ātmā* not temporarily as in sleep but completely. The *Niruddha* mind is established in *Ātmā* by *Viveka* or discrimination *(Dhīmataḥ).* It is distinguished from the mechanical yogic *Samādhi* as described by Patañjali and also from the mind in deep sleep. On account of *Samyag-jñāna,* in the absence of any imagination of external objects, the *Niruddha* mind becomes tranquil and controlled and its projecting forth activity is not possible as there is no prop or support for that. It becomes quiet like fuel without fire. In *Niruddha* mind, the very nature of mind— *manastva*—is withdrawn in *Ātmā,* mind ceases to act or vibrate and therefore duality is not experienced. This establishing of the mind in *Pratyag-Ātmā*—directly perceivable by the learned—is worthwhile knowing. In the *Bhāṣya,* in addition to the word *Avidyā, Moha* (delusion) is used so that *Avidyā* may not be construed as mere absence of *Vidyā* and the word *Moha* (delusion) should not be confused with *citta- bhrama* (derangement of the mind)—for that purpose the additional word *Tamaḥ* (darkness) is used. Saṅkara in 2-1-9 *(Brahma sūtra)* brackets Pātañjala *Yogic Samādhi* and deep sleep and says that in both there is *Avibhāga* of *Kārya* and *Kāraṇa* (i.e. mind rests in *Ātmā* temporarily) but as the *Mithyā-jñāna* (erroneous apprehension of Reality) is not removed in both of these states—there is again the *Vibhāga*—i.e. the mind becomes active and experiences duality when one awakes up from sleep or when there is *Vyutthāna* from *Pātañjala yogic Samādhi. Nirodha* of *vedānta* is brought about by discrimination *(Dhīmataḥ)* and burning of *Avidyā Bījas*—then only the mind becomes *Nigṛhīta* and *Nirvikalpa* and such *Nigṛhīta* mind is non-different from *Brahma* as is stated in the next *Kārikā.*

लीयते हि सुषुप्ते तन्निगृहीतं न लीयते ।
तदेव निर्भयं ब्रह्म ज्ञानालोकं समन्ततः ॥३५॥

līyate hi suṣupte tannigṛhītaṁ na līyate.
tadeva nirbhayaṁ brahma jñānālokaṁ samantataḥ. (35)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Mind is (temporarily) withdrawn in deep sleep but the controlled mind *(Nigṛhīta)* is not so (temporarily) absorbed. This *(Nigṛhīta)* mind is itself identical with fearless *Brahma,* with all pervading *(samantataḥ)* illumination of *Jñāna (Jñānāloka).*

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The reason why the working of the two kinds of mind (mind in deep sleep and the controlled mind) is different is being stated. The mind which is withdrawn into deep sleep turns into a seed-like condition, undifferentiated in particulars, of the nature of darkness and accompanied by seed-like impressions of all experiences during the state of *Avidyā* (Ignorance). But the mind which is *Niruddha* (controlled) by knowledge arising from discrimination and called *Niruddha* (in *vedānta)* is not (temporarily) withdrawn and does not turn into a seed-like condition and darkness. Therefore there is justification for making a distinction between the working of the mind in deep sleep and of the mind of a *Jñānin* which is under control. When that mind becomes free from the dual impurity of subject-object relationship, then it is identical with the highest non-dual *Brahma* Itself and for that reason it is fearless as there is absence of any fear in the form of perceiving any duality. It is tranquil fearless *Brahma.* The knower of That has no fear from anywhere. This is further explained. It is knowledge, the very consciousness which is the nature of *Ātmā.* It is that *Brahma* whose illumination is *Jñāna* i.e. it is one compact mass of *Vijñāna* (consciousness). All around *(samantataḥ)* means uninterruptedly all pervading like the *Ākāśa.*

Comments

Nigṛhīta (controlled) mind of a *Jñānin* is different from the mind in deep sleep. The *Nigṛhīta* mind does not experience any duality. The word *Avidyā* in the *Bhāṣya* includes *Asmitā* (egotism), *Rāga* (attachment) etc. In deep sleep, the withdrawal of mind is accompanied by *Vāsanās* (impressions). The controlled mind of the *Jñānin* is free from the dual impurity of subject-object relationship (perceiver and perceived) caused by ignorance. It is identical with *Brahma.* The knower of this *Brahma* becomes

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

fearless. Cf. Taittirīya 2-7 "He becomes fearless". *Brahma* is knowledge itself Cf. Taittirīya *"Satyaṁ Jñānaṁ Anantaṁ Brahma"*, (2-1). Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3-9-28-7" *Vijñānaṁ Ānandaṁ Brahma". Brahma* has no limitations, It is *Ananta, "Samantataḥ"* means all pervading.

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमनामकमरूपकम् ।
सकृद्विभातं सर्वज्ञं नोपचारः कथंचन ॥३६॥

ajamanidramasvapnaṁanāmakamarūpakam.
sakṛdvibhātaṁ sarvajñaṁ nopacāraḥ kathaṁcana. (36)

Translation

(*Brahma* is) unborn, without sleep, without dream, without name or form, having illumination at all times and omniscient. There is nothing to be done (with regard to that *Brahma).*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Brahma is both within and without, and is unborn as it has no cause which can give birth to it. We have already stated that the birth (of the *Prapañca* from *Brahma*) is due to ignorance like (erroneously) seeing a snake on a rope. That ignorance is destroyed by the knowledge of the Truth which is *Ātmā.* As *Brahma* is unborn, therefore It is without sleep (non-apprehension of reality or *Āvaraṇa*). Sleep means beginningless *Māyā* of the nature of Ignorance. When one awakes from that sleep, he experiences himself as non-dual *Ātmā.* For this reason, he is without dream (misapprehension of reality, *Vikṣepa*). Name and form are ascribed to *Brahma* on account of want of awakening (ignorance). When they are destroyed like the illusory snake on the rope, *Brahma* ceases to be nameable or have a form and therefore It is without name and form. The Śruti says "words turn back from That". Further it is always illumined, of the nature of uninterrupted light as It is free from apprehension or misapprehension or manifestation or non-manifestation.

Apprehension or non-apprehension are like day and night. Darkness is the nature of ignorance and that is the cause for the non-awakening. When that darkness is destroyed it is appropriately stated that *Brahma* is ever illumined being eternal,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

consciounsess and light. For this reason It is also of the nature of the sentient and light and thus omniscient. Such being the nature of *Brahma,* no action or disciplinary activity has to be prescribed (for one who has the correct knowledge of *Brahma*) apart from realising the true nature of *Ātmā.* Such activity like the practising of concentration is required only for those who are ignorant of the real nature of *Brahma. Brahma* is of the nature of eternity, purity, knowledge and freedom; and when *Avidyā* (ignorance) is destroyed there is no possibility at all of prescribing any disciplinary activity.

Comments

Brahma described in the foregoing *Kārikā* is now described in another way. When *Brahma* without any *upādhi* or conditioning is realised, no kind of obligatory activity remains to be done by the realised soul. As *Brahma* is not born of any cause nor does *Brahma* give birth to anything. *Brahma* is *Aja* (unborn). *Nidrā* (Sleep) means *Avidyā.* When *Jīva* (individual soul) with *upādhi* (conditioning) does not apprehend his real "I"—*Ātmā*—that is *Tirobhāva* and when he imagines that he is *Kartā* (the doer) it is *Āvirbhāva* (projection). In *Brahma* there is no such non-apprehension or misapprehension and therefore *Brahma* is constant Effulgence. Day and night are from the point of view of those who see the sun from the earth. From the point of view of the sun—the sun is uninterrupted effulgence and there is no day and night for the sun. Before the instruction of scriptures and the teacher—there is *Agrahaṇa* and thereafter *Grahaṇa* of *Brahma* but *Brahma* is ever effulgence. One who has realised *Brahma,* with Vedāntic *Nirodha* of mind is established in *Brahma.* For him there is no necessity of having the yogic disciplinary activity of concentration of mind. In the case of unconditioned *Brahma,* there is no scope for any ceremony, disciplinary activity or any obligatory act. Such activity like concentration of mind etc. is required for those who have not realised *Ātmā.* All phenomenal activity is possible only in the state of ignorance. When there is correct knowledge and ignorance is destroyed—there is no actual phenomenal activity for the realised person—what he does while alive is only the apparent continuity of what is negated as illusory; *(Baddhita anuvṛtti)* It is only the *Ābhāsa* of *Vyavahāra.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

The word *upacāra* in the *kārikā* is interpreted by Prof. Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya as "access-concentration"—one of the two kinds of *Samādhis* in *Buddhism* called *upacāra* and *Arpaṇā*. In the former the mind approaches its object like a bee sitting in a lotus and getting near honey. Prof. Vidhushekhar insists on seeing Buddhism in Gauḍapāda by merely catching the bare similarity of words and not the substance and his construtions is far from what is meant by Gauḍapāda.

Prof. Karmarkar interprets *upacāra* as "figurative language". He interprets the *Kārikā* as stating that the description of *Brahma* in the *Kārikā* is not to be taken in a figurative or secondary sense but it is to be taken in its primary sense.

But *"Upacāra"* does mean ceremony e.g. 16 *upacāras* in *Pūjā* or any kind of disciplinary activity like *yogic* concentration. For a realised soul, there is no obligatory act to perform, Gītā says *"Tasya Kāryaṁ Na Vidyate."* Śaṅkara also distinguishes Vedāntic *Nirodha* from yogic *"Citta-Vṛtti-Nirodha"* and in *Brahma sūtra Bhāṣya* 2-1-9 he brackets *yogic Samādhi* and deep sleep together saying that on waking up from both those two states there is experience of duality. Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophy believes in plurality of *Puruṣas,* real separate *Prakṛti* and the reality of *Prapañca* and *Kaivalya* means discrimination between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti.* For a realised soul, according to *Vedānta,* all duality is illusory and what continues to appear after realisation is only by way of *Baddhita anuvṛtti.* It is only the *Ābhāsa* of *Vyavahāra. Yogic* concentration is prescribed only for those who have not properly realised the non-dual *Brahma.* In the light of this thesis of *Vedānta, upacāra* here is rightly interpreted by Śaṅkara as any obligatory act or disciplinary activity like *Yogic* concentration. And such *upacāra* is not necessary for a realised soul.

Swāmī Saccidānandendra Saraswatī in his Māṇḍūkya rahasya-vivṛti observes on this *Kārikā*—"some people say that even after *tattvajñāna,* for tranquillity of mind and removal of *kleśa, yogic Samādhi* is necessary. But this is incorrect. If the mind exists, then there is no *tattvajñāna.* Only when the mind is negated (i.e., completely absorbed or established in *Brahma)* there is possibility of the correct knowledge of non-dual *Brahma. Vedānta* does not postulate the mere discrimination between,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

mind and *Ātmā (viveka* of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti)* as *tattvajñāna.* Therefore, after the distruction of *Avidyā,* there is no *Kartavyaśeṣa* for a realised soul, as *Brahma* is of the nature of eternity, purity, knowledge and freedom."

सर्वाभिलापविगतः सर्वचिन्तासमुत्थितः ।
सुप्रशान्तः सकृज्ज्योतिः समाधिरचलोऽभयः ॥३७॥
sarvābhilāpavigataḥ sarvacintāsamutthitaḥ.
suprasāntah sakṛjjyotiḥ samādhiracalo'bhayaḥ. (37)

Translation

(This *Brahma)* is beyond all expressions, beyond all thoughts, supremely calm, ever effulgent, unmoving, without fear and attainable by concentrated discernment *(Samādhi).*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The reason is now stated for describing *Brahma* as without name and form. *"Abhilāpa"* means speech, *Brahma* is beyond all expressions in words. "Speech" is here used in an illustrative sense and includes all external sense organs. Arisen beyond all intellect *"Cintā"* means that organ by which one thinks i.e. *Buddhi* (or mind). The meaning is that *Brahma* is beyond all internal organs, for the Śruti says that *"Brahma* is without *Prāṇa* and without mind and is pure". It is higher than *Akṣara (Avyakta)* which itself is higher than others. As It is devoid of all distinctions, It is supremely calm. It is eternal effulgence being of the nature of consciousness that is *Ātmā. Brahma* is described as *Samādhi* itself as It is attainable by concentrated discernment or It is called *Samādhi* because *Jīva* and its *upādhi* (conditionings) is established (absorbed) in this *Ātmā;* therefore *Brahmā* is called *Samādhi: Acala* means without any modifications and as It is without any modification.It is devoid of fear.

Comments

Knower of *Brahmā* (neuter) is identified with *Brahma* and therefore *Brahma* is described here in the masculine gender. *Brahma* is beyond all external as well as internal sense organs and is all purity. Without *Prāṇa,* without mind and superior to *Akṣara*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(Mundaka 2-1-1 is cited). *Brahma* is called all peace and *Samādhi. Kāṭhaka Śruti* 1-2-24 says "One who is not clam and is not *Samāhita* cannot realise *Brahma.*" *"Samādhi"* is not to be attained by any disciplinary activity. When the mind becomes non-mind i.e. when there is *Amanastā (Amanībhāva)*—that itself is *Brahma* or *Samādhi.*

Prof. Vidhushekhar says that the word *"Acala"* in this *Kārikā* refers to a particular kind of *Samādhi* called *Acala* in Buddhism. This is again his over-enthusiasm in dubbing Gauḍapāda as a Buddhist. *'Acala'* in the sense of "without modifications" fits in much better in the system of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and therefore Prof. Vidhushekhar's interpretation has to be rejected. This is the section in the *Kārikā* on *"Ātma- satyānubodha"*. Such *'Acala'* variety of *Samādhi* of Buddhists is irrelevant here. Here *Samādhi* means *Kūṭastha, Nitya, Paramārtha, Caitanya Ātmā* and not some process of *Samādhi.* No disciplinary activity is intended as Kārikā 3-36 says no *'upacāra'* or such activity is necessary or required.

ग्रहो न तत्र नोत्सर्गश्चिन्ता यत्र न विद्यते ।
आत्मसंस्थं तदा ज्ञानमजाति समतां गतम् ॥३८॥

graho na tatra notsargaścintā yatra na vidyate.
ātmasaṁsthaṁ tadā jñānamajāti samatāṁ gatam. (38)

Translation

In that *Brahma* there is nothing to take or nothing to give up. In It there is no mental activity. At that time *Jñāna* is established in *Ātmā,* Birthlessness and Sameness.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

As *Brahma* Itself is stated as *Samādhi* and without modifications and is fearless, therefore in that *Brahma* there is nothing to be taken or nothing to be given up. Where there is modification or an object of modification (change)—there only is the possibility of taking—apprehending or giving up—rejecting—but none of these two (acceptance and rejection) is possible in *Brahma.* The reasons are that there is no cause for modification in *Brahma* and *Brahma* is without parts. *(In Brahma)* There is no

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

mental activity *(Cintā).* No kind of mental activity is possible there as there is non-mind *(Amanastā* or *Amanībhāva);* how can there be any acceptance or rejection? When there arises the knowledge that *Ātmā* alone is the Truth, then for want of any object, *Jñāna* gets established in *Ātmā* alone like heat in fire. It attains to the state of Birthlessness. It further attains to the state of Sameness (changelessness). What was postulated in the beginning of this chapter "I shall now describe *Brahma* which is *Akārpaṇya, Ajāti* and *sama"* i.e. without narrowness, birth or change—that same postulation is now established in conclusion by means of reasoning and scriptural authority. It is birthlessness and changelessness on account of the knowledge that *Ātmā* alone is the Truth. Everything else is narrow, with limitation or deserves to be pitied. The Śruti says "O Gārgī! One who departs from this world without knowing this Imperishable One is a miser (narrow-minded)". Having realised all this knowledge, one has all his desires accomplished and he becomes a real *Brāhmaṇa* (established in *Brahma).*

Comments

In this *Brahma* without change or modifications there is no scope for any activity either of the Vedic or *Laukika* variety like *vidhi* (injunction) or *Niṣedha* (prohibition) i.e. acceptance or rejection. There is *"Amanībhāva"* and therefore these objects of mind have no scope in *Brahma.* Further there is no part in *Brahma.* In the beginning of this chapter in 3-2 *Brahma* was described as without limitation or narrowness *(Akārpaṇya),* without birth and without change *(Sama).* The same conclusion is now stated at the close of this chapter after giving the support of reasoning and scriptural authority.

Prof. Vidhushekhar wants to see in this *Kārikā* the Buddhist idea—he interprets *'Ātmasaṁtha'* as 'the mind resting in itself.' i.e. *Ātmā* does not mean here *"Brahma"* but 'itself', *Ātmasaṁstha* does not mean *Brahmasaṁstha* according to him and he adds that *Jñāna* which is *Ātmasaṁstha* is the same *Vijñaptimātra* of *Vijñānavādin* Buddhists.

But we may compare here Gītā 6-25 *"Ātmasaṁsthaṁ manaḥ kṛtva na kiñcid api cintayet"*—the same idea is in this *Kārikā.* Thus *Ātmā* in *Ātmasaṁstha* does mean *Brahma,* Moreover

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

reference here is to Śruti Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3-8-9 where the words *Kṛpaṇa* and *Brāhmaṇa* occur. *Akārpaṇya* is postulated in *Kārikā* 3-2 and reference to *Brāhmaṇa* in Bṛ. 3-8-9 and in *Kārikā* 4-85 *(Brāhmaṇyam Padam)* clearly indicates that Gauḍapāda discusses the Brahmanical upaniṣadic philosophy and not Buddhism. Moreover, *"Ātma-satyānubodha"* is the main topic in this section of this chapter and as stated in Gītā 6-25, *"Ātmasaṁstham"* here does possitively mean *"Brahma saṁstham"*. Vasubandhu's *Triṁśika* 28 *(Buddhist)* states that *Jñāna* without any support *(ālambana)* rests in *Vijñānamātra.* In this *Gauḍapāda kārikā,Jñāna* rests established in *Ātmā* or *Brahma* which is *Kūṭastha Nitya* changeless caitanya not *Kṣaṇika* (momentary) like the *Vijñāna* of the Buddhists.

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः ।
योगिनो बिभ्यति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः ॥३९॥

asparśayogo vai nāma durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ.
yogino bibhyati hyasmādabhaye bhayadarśinaḥ. (39)

Translation

This is verily a kind of *Yoga* where there is no touch with anything. It is difficult to be realised by ordinary *yogins.* Such *yogins* are afraid of it, for they see fear in it where in fact there is no fear.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Even though this is truly the essence of supreme reality and is well-known in the Upaniṣads and described there as *Asparśa-yoga,* as it is free from all kinds of touch in the nature of relationship with objects, still it is difficult to be realised by all *Yogins*—"all *yogins*" means *yogins* without the knowledge of *Vedānta.* This *yoga* can be attained only by those *yogins* who have made an effort to attain the knowledge that *Ātmā* alone is the Truth. Ordinary *yogins* see fear in this *yoga* where in fact there is no fear as they think that in this *yoga* there is destruction of *Ātmā.* They are without discrimination and therefore they are afraid of *Ātma-nāśa* (destruction of their *Ātmā*) in this *yoga* which in truth is free from all fear.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

If the doctrine of *Advaita* (non-duality) has its reward in making one realise *Brahma* the Supreme Reality, why is it not closely attended to and followed by all? The reply is that this essence of Supreme Reality is difficult of realisation by those who are addicted to a life of *Karma* and are *Bahirmukha* (interested in the external world only). This essence of Supreme Reality, *Brahma,* is one's Inner Self and as explained in the foregoing *Kārikās.*, It is *Kūṭastha Saccidānanda*—changeless existence, consciousness and bliss. It is attainable by *Tattva—jñāna*—correct knowledge—but dull-witted persons do not make any effort to know it. *Asparśa* means free from the touch of any impurity in the nature of sin, *Varṇa, Āśrama* etc. This itself is the *yoga* which unites *jīva* (individual Self) with *Brahma.* In the Upaniṣads, it is stated that *Ātmā* is not contaminated by any act sinful or otherwise. Ordinary *yogins* find it hard to practise *Śravaṇa, Manana* etc. Those of the *Vaidikas* who go on performing vedic rites think that their Brahminhood would be lost if they acquire this *Tattva- jñāna.* They see fear where there is no fear as their fear is due to their *Mithyājñāna*—erroneous apprehension of knowledge.

The phrase *Asparśa-yoga* has the most likely connection with *"Mātrāsaṅsarga"* mentioned in Bṛhadāraṇyaka (Mādhyandina text) 4-3-14 and with *"Mātrā-sparśa"* in Gītā 2-14. Further non-contamination i.e. non-touch by sinful acts etc. is mentioned in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-4-23 and by such knowledge one becomes *Abhaya* (fearless) as mentioned in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4.4.25. Without *"Ātma—satya—anubodha". Śvetāśvatara 3-8 says,* "there is no other path to go". *(Na anyaḥ Panthā Vidyate Ayanāya).*

This *Asparśayoga* is not any disciplinary kind of activity—but only the discernment of unborn non-dual Supreme Reality and is different from other kinds of yogic activities. In the ordinary *yoga,* in the *Vyutthāna* stage after *Samādhi* (concentration) there is touch *(sparśa)* of external objects; that is not so here in *Asparśayoga.*

It has been stated in the second *Vaitathya Prakaraṇa* at the end (2-38) that after realising the *Tattva,* one becomes *"Tattvībhūta"* and *"Tadārāma"* and he never deviates from that.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

or becomes *"Bāhya-ramaṇa"* (apprehending external duality). The same thing is described here as *Asparśayoga.*

मनसो निग्रहायत्तमभयं सर्वयोगिनाम् ।
दुःखक्षयः प्रबोधश्चाप्यक्षया शान्तिरेव च ॥४०॥

manaso nigrahāyattamabhayaṁ sarvayoginām.
duḥkhakṣayaḥ prabodhaścāpyakṣayā śāntireva ca. (40)

Translation

Those *yogins* (who have not had the highest knowledge—i.e. *Advaita-darśana*—as described earlier—and are, thus, of *Madhyama* or *Manda Dṛṣti,* have to depend on the control of mind (as a means for *Ātmajñāna* and) for attaining fearlessness, destruction of miseries, knowledge of *Ātmā* and eternal peace.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Those who regard the mind and sense organs as illusory like the erroneous appearance of a snake on a rope and therefore regard them as non-different from the nature of *Brahma* from the transcendental point of view—for such men who have become identical with *Brahma,* fearlessness and eternal peace—which is *Mokṣa* (liberation) is only naturally accomplished and do not depend upon any other disciplinary activity. We have already stated in *kārikā* 3-36 that no *"upacāra"* or any kind of ceremony or disciplinary activity is necessary (for such a *Tattvajñānin*), But for those other *yogins* who follow the righteous path but who possess a middling or inferior type of intellect and regard the mind as related to but distinct from *Ātmā* and are therefore without the knowledge that *Ātmā* alone is the Truth—for all such other *yogins* fearlessness is attainable only through control of mind—also, destruction of misery. For those without discrimination, destruction of misery is never possible as they regard their mind as related to *Ātmā* and that mind is active. Further knowledge of *Ātmā* is also dependent on the control of mind. Eternal peace also which is identical with *Mokṣa* (liberation) is similarly dependent on the control of mind.

Comments

Control of mind is the natural result of *Advaita-darśana* in the case of those of superior understanding. But in the case of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

those of inferior understanding, *Advaita-darśana* is dependent on the control of mind. Fearlessness is said to be *Ātma-darśana* as it is the cause of removal of all fear. All other *yogins* mean those engaged in performing Vedic rites and have attained purity of mind. *Kaivalya (Mokṣa)* in their case is dependent on *Manonigraha. 'Abhaya'* means freedom from error. The eternal peace which is then attained through the strength of knowledge is of the nature of the manifestation of pre-eminent bliss. In the case of those *Jīvan-mukta* sages, as they are already *Muktas* (liberated), no disciplinary activity or other means are required in their case. But for other *yogins* performing righteous acts and follow the right path—*Manonigraha* is necessary even though they somehow have a glimpse of *Tattvajñāna. Abhaya* itself is *Tattvajñāna.* That and destruction of misery depend on *Manonigraha.* Thus *Abhaya, Duḥkhakṣaya, Prabodha* and eternal *Śānti* depend on *Mononigraha* in the case of such *yogins.*

Prof. Karmarkar feels that this distinction between the *uttama* and *madhyama, hīnā yogins* is not warranted by the text of the Kārikā. But *"Na upacāraḥ kathañcana"* in 3-36 read with Gītā *"Tasya Kāryam Na Vidyate"* is consistent with the explanation given by Śaṅkara.

'Manonirodha' indicated here is not the *'citta-vṛtti-nirodha'* but constant meditation on *Ātmā* resulting in not realising anything other than *Ātmā.* Thus *Mokṣa* here is not produced or generated by any *Sādhanā* and is therefore not *Anitya.*

उत्सेक उदधेर्यद्वत्कुशाग्रेणैकबिन्दुना ।
मनसो निग्रहस्तद्वद्भवेदपरिखेदतः ॥४१॥

utseka udadheryadvatkuśāgrenaikabindunā.
manaso nigrahastadvad bhavedaparikhedataḥ. (41)

Translation

Control of mind can (only) be made by making an effort without tiring or disgust—it is like draining away the ocean drop by drop with the help of a blade of grass.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The control of mind (in the case of *Sādhaka Mumukṣu Yogin*) is possible only by non-disgust and untiring effort of mind like the activity of draining and making dry the ocean drop by drop with the help of a blade of grass.

Comments

Manonigraha is possible only with constant untiring effort, without wavering. If one feels disgusted by the thought that when he closes his eyes, he sees darkness and when he opens the eyes, he sees pots and other objects—he cannot have *Manonigraha.* The disgust should be overcome and untiring effort should be made.

In this connection the *Ṭiṭṭibha upākhyāna* of Hitopadeśa is cited by Madhusūdana Saraswatī in his Ṭīkā on Gītā 6-23. Gītā uses *"Anirviṇṇacetasā",* while *Kārikā* 3-41 uses the word *"Aparikhedataḥ"* meaning the same thing.

A couple of Ṭiṭṭibha (small birds) on seaside had their eggs swept away in the tide of the sea. The female bird took a vow to drain up the sea and began emptying it drop by drop with the aid of a blade of grass. Seeing that, other birds also helped her in this work. Sage *Nārada* was then passing by that way and when he found that female bird unwavering in her resolve, *Nārada* told *Garuḍa* (eagle, the conveyance of Lord *Viṣṇu)* to help her. When *Garuḍa* started emptying the sea by his huge wings, the sea was humbled and gave back the eggs to the *Ṭiṭṭibha* couple. With the same unwavering resolve the *Sādhaka* should make effort for *Manonigraha* without tiring or having disgust. Gītā 6-25 says that the mind should be controlled *"Śanaiḥ Śanaiḥ"and* with courage; and without disgust (6-23).

उपायेन निगृहणीयाद्विक्षिप्तं कामभोगयोः ।
सुप्रसन्नं लये चैव यथा कामो लयस्तथा ॥४२॥
upāyena nigṛhṇīyādvikṣiptaṁ kāmabhogayoḥ.
suprasannaṁ laye caiva yathā kāmo layastathā. (42)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

By following the (subsequently prescribed) means one should control the mind when it is distracted by desires and enjoyment as also when it is in a state of pleasurable sleep-like repose. For both these states—that of *Kāma* (desires) and *Laya* (sleep-like repose) are equally harmful.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Is mere untiring effort alone the means of controlling the mind? We say no. Along with untiring effort, one should control the mind which gets distracted by objects of desires and enjoyment and fix the mind on *Ātmā.* Further, *Laya* means sleep—as the mind gets repose there—and when the mind feels pleasure in such sleep-like repose, there is then no exertion, and one should control the mind from such a state of *Laya* also. If *Laya* is a pleasurable state, why should it be controlled? We reply that just as desires are harmful, similarly *Laya* (sleep-like repose) is equally harmful. For this reason, the mind should be controlled when it is in the *Laya* state in the same way when the mind is distracted by objects of desires.

Comments

Laya, Vikṣepa, Sukha and *Rāga* are the obstacles in attaining *Tattvajñāna* and all the four should be controlled by the means stated hereafter, otherwise, the *samādhi* does not become successful. With the help of those means and with *Śravaṇa, Manana* and *Nididhyāsana* the mind is controlled and with such *'Manonigraha'* there arises *Tattvajñāna.*

The five verses *Kārikās* 3-42 to 46 are cited and commented upon by Madhusūdana Saraswatī in his *Ṭīkā* on Gītā 6-26.

Madhusūdana

Upāya= Vairāgya and *Abhyāsa.* Distracted in *kāma* and *Bhoga* means having the mental modification of any of the kinds of *Pramāṇa, Viparyaya, Vikalpa* or *Smṛti.* After controlling the mind from such mental modifications, it should be established in *Ātmā. Kāma* is the desire in the thinking stage and *Bhoga* in its actual enjoyment stage. *Laya* is interpreted as sleep—At another place Madhūsudana interprets it as sluggishness due to over eating, or over exertion when the mind is unsteady. Even *"Supra-*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

sanna"—pleasurable sensation should be controlled, for in *Samādhi* all mental modifications are to be controlled.

दुःखं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य कामभोगान्निवर्तयेत् ।
अजं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य जातं नैव तु पश्यति ॥४३॥

duḥkhaṁ sarvamanusmṛtya kāmabhogānnivartayet.
ajaṁ sarvamanusmṛtya jātaṁ naiva tu paśyati. (43)

Translation

Having constantly remembered that all (duality) is misery, one should turn away from desires and enjoyment. Constantly thinking of the Unborn *(Brahma)* one does not see the aggregate of duality *(Dwaita-jāta).*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

What are those means? That is being now stated. All duality is the display of *Avidyā* (ignorance) and is all misery alone. Constantly remembering this, one should turn his distracted mind away from enjoyment of objects which is caused by desires, by developing the idea of aversion. Further from the teaching of scriptures and the preceptor one should continuously remember that all this is *Brahma,* then he never sees any thing to the contrary i.e. the duality, as duality does not exist.

Comments

Upāyas are *Vairāgya* (non-attachment or aversion) and repeated practice of *Jñāna (Jñānābhyāsa).* Aversion comes by seeing harm in duality. This will bring about abatement of all avidity for such objects of enjoyment. With the help of that the mind should be controlled from *Kāma* and *Bhoga.*

Duality is the display of *Avidyā* Cf. Bṛ. Up. 4-3-31, 4-3-20 etc. Gītā 5-22 says all *"Saṁsparśajāḥ Bhogāh"* lead to misery. **Buddhism** says everything is *Duḥkha* alone but Gauḍapada goes further and adds that after knowing that everything is misery—one should continuously remember the unborn *Brahma* and then alone he will cease to see the aggregate of duality *(Dwaita-jāta).*

Prof. Karmarkar states that *Kāmabhogān* in the *Kārikā* can be taken as *Kāmabhogān* (accusative plural) or *Kāmabhogāt* (ablative singular).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

लये संबोधयेच्चित्तं विक्षिप्तं शमयेत्पुनः ।
सकषायं विजानीयात्समप्राप्तं न चालयेत् ॥४४॥
laye saṁbodhayeccittaṁ vikṣiptaṁ śamayetpunaḥ.
sakaṣāyaṁ vijāniyātsamaprāptaṁ na cālayet. (44)

Translation

One should awaken the mind when it is in *Laya* (sleep-like repose); when it is distracted he should pacify it; when it is in the intermediate state, it should be known as containing dirt, with the seed of attachment (and should be brought back under control); and when it has attained equilibrium it should not be disturbed.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Thus with the repeated hearing of *Jñāna* (from scriptures and the Preceptor) and non-attachment—with these two means—one should awaken the mind when it is in sleep (sleep-like repose) and engage the mind in discretion *(Viveka)* which leads to the knowledge of *Ātmā. Citta* and *manas* mean the same thing. When the mind is distracted by desires and enjoyments, it should again be pacified. When it is awakened from *Laya* by repeated practice and also turned away from objects (of enjoyment) but has not yet attained the state of equilibrium and is in an intermediate state, containing dirt, full of passion, with seeds (of desires)—that state of mind should be carefully known. From that state also he should bring it to the state of equilibrium with effort. When it has reached the state of equilibrium, i.e. when it is on the way to reach equilibrium it should not be disturbed and turned towards objects of enjoyment.

Comments

By the double means of *Jñāna-abhyāsa* and *Vairāgya* the mind should be turned away both from *Laya* and *Vikṣepa* and in the intermediate state when the mind is still full of passion, one should practise *Saṁprajñāta Samādhi* attained through *Śravana, Manana* and *Nididhyāsana* and reach right upto the state of *Asaṁprajñāta Samādhi* and thus overcome all obstacles. *Jñāna-abhyāsa* means repeated practice of *Śravaṇa Manana* etc. By

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

realising that objects of enjoyment are fragile and subject to decay, he should not develop avidity for them and that is *Vairāgya*. *Laya* means sleep. In the intermediate state there still remains seed-like potentialities for passion and attachment. With effort he should first attain *Samprajñāta Samādhi* and then the *Asamprajñāta Samādhi.* This is *Sāmya*—for attaining equilibrium *(Sāmya)* with these two kinds of *Samādhis* he should realise attributeless *Brahma.*

Prof. Vidhushekhar reads *Śamaprāptam* for *samaprāptam. Yogācara* Buddhists cite Maitreyanāth *"Līnam cittasya gṛhṇīyād, uddhatam śamayet punaḥ! Samaprāptam upekṣeta tasmin ālambane punaḥ".* Prof. Vidhushekhar would like to force upon Gauḍapāda this Buddhist view but *'Manonigraha'* of Gauḍapāda is prescribed as a means for realising the unborn *(Aja)* non-dual *Brahma.* Further the reading *Sama* suits here much better than *śama* as *Kārikā* 3-2 says that this *Brahma* is *"Ajāti samatām gatam.".* Therefore the intention here is not only to have *"Śama"* or tranquility but to realise *Sama* which is equilibrium and another name of *Brahma* as stated in *Kārikā* 3-2 (Māṇḍūkya rahasya vivṛti p. 303).

नास्वादयेत् सुखं तत्र निःसङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत् ।
निश्चलं निश्चरच्चित्तमेकीकुर्यात्प्रयत्नतः ॥४५॥

nāsvādayet sukham tatra niḥsaṅgaḥ prajñayā bhavet.
niścalam niścaraccittamekīkuryātprayatnataḥ. (45)

Translation

One should not relish pleasure (when he is practising *Samādhi)* and with discernment he should remain free from all attachment. When the steady mind tries to turn towards objects of enjoyment, he should, by effort, unify that mind.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

When the *Yogin* is practising *Samādhi,* he should not relish the pleasure which he feels at that time. i.e. he should not taste its flavour. Why? He should understand with discernment that whatever pleasure he feels at that time is all false and imagined by Ignorance and therefore should remain unattached i.e. desireless. He should control his mind from the attachment to that pleasures; when the mind gets free from that attachment to enjoyment and

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

becomes steady and thereafter tries to move out towards objects of enjoyment, then with the aforesaid means he should control it and once again unify it with effort i.e. he should make the mind attain the state of pure consciousness and existence.

Comments

The pleasure felt while practising *Samādhi* is imagined by Ignorance and has to be avoided—one should not have attachment for that too. With discernment he should be non-attached and free from desires. When with the earlier stated means of *Vairāgya* etc. the mind has become steady but tries to move out towards objects of enjoyment, he should again practise *Saṁprajñāta* and *Asṁprajñāta Samādhi* and unify the mind in pure *Paripūrṇa Brahma.* Gītā 14-6 says that even *Sattvaguṇa* binds a person with the attachment to *Sukha* produced by it—therefore one should be *Niḥsaṅga Nispṛha* (without hankering).

यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः।
अनिङ्गनमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥४६॥

yadā na līyate cittaṁ na ca vikṣipyate puṇaḥ.
aniṅganamanābhāsaṁ niṣpannaṁ brahma tattadā. (46)

Translation

When the mind does not get into the state of sleep-like repose nor is distracted again (by desires and enjoyment), then it is without movement and does not present itself in the form of imagined objects. Such a mind attains the nature of *Brahma.*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

When the mind is controlled by the aforesaid means and does not get into the state of *Laya* or *Vikṣepa* (distracted by *Kāma* and *Bhoga*), then it becomes unmoving and steady like a flame of a lamp in a windless place. It does not present itself into any imagined objects. When the mind becomes of this nature—that mind attains the nature of *Brahma.*

Comments

The means are *Jñāna* and *Abhyāsa.* When the mind is controlled from the objects of enjoyment and does not get into the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

state of *Laya* or *Vikṣepa.* 'Steady' means without any *Rāga* or *Vāsanā.* This mind when it thus attains the state of non-mind *Amanastā* i.e. *Amanībhāva* then that mind itself is *Brahma.*

In Māṇḍūkya—rahasya—vivṛti p. 306 Swamī Saccidānandendra Saraswatī distinguishes *'Mononigraha'* of Pātañjala *yoga* from *'Mononigraha'* of *Vedānta* in Gauḍapāda. Here in Gauḍapāda, following the *Upadeśa* of *Śāstra* and *Ācārya,* there is the *Nirūpaṇa* of the nature of the essence of reality, that everything is unborn *Brahma—Mononigraha* is stated as an effort and means to attain to that *Vastutva;* and just as the superimposed snake becomes identical with the rope, similarly mind is realised as identical with *Brahma*—this is the *Samādhi* in *Vedānta* and not *Dhāraṇā Dhyāna* and *samādhi*—(the three called *saṁyama*) of Pātañjala yoga.

Madhusūdana Saraswatī in his Ṭīkā on Gītā 6-26 cites and comments upon five Gauḍapāda Kārikās 3-42 to 46. He interpretes some of the words in a little different way. *"Kāma"* means objects of enjoyment in the thinking stage and *"Bhoga"* means those objects in the stage of enjoyment. When duality is remembered, the *Upāya* is *Vairāgya.* Forgetting duality is the best *Upāya. "Laya"* means sleep or latter part of sleep or repose due to over eating or over exertion. In the *Sakaṣāya* stage, which is the intermediate stage, the mind becomes *stabdha* (benumbed), on account of the strong *Vāsanās* of *Rāga* and *Dweṣa.* Such a state should be known by discretion *(Viveka).* When the three viz.—*laya, Vikṣepa* and *Kaṣāya* are removed—the Sama *Brahma* is attained. Gītā also says that *Brahma* is *Sama* and *Nirdoṣa.* Such *Sama avasthā* should not be disturbed. In *Samādhi* one should not relish pleasure but by *Prajñā (viveka)* he should know it as imagined by ignorance. Or *Prajñā* may mean *Savikalpa*—modification of mind in the form of pleasure—so along with such *Prajñā,* that relish for pleasure should be discarded. But the natural bliss experience in the *Vṛtti-Śuñya* stage cannot be avoided.

स्वस्थं शान्तं सनिर्वाणमकथ्यं सुखमुत्तमम् ।
अजमजेन ज्ञेयेन सर्वज्ञं परिचक्षते ॥४७॥

svastham śāntam sanirvāṇamakathyam sukhamuttamam.
ajamajena jñeyen sarvajñam paricakṣate. (47)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

It is resting in Its self, peaceful, with *Nirvāṇa,* indescribable, highest Bliss, unborn and identical with unborn knowledge, and omiscient—this is Its nature they say.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The aforesaid highest Bliss (of the nature of *Asaṁprajñāta Samādhi)* viz. the knowledge that *Ātmā* alone is the Truth—is resting (established) in Its own self, peaceful i.e. which is the cessation of all miseries. It is *Nirvāṇa* or *Kaivalya* (liberation). It is indescribable as its object is very uncommon. It is the highest Bliss and is experienced only by *yogins.* It does not get born like other pleasures of objects and is therefore unborn. It is non-different from the unborn knowledge (is *Brahma-rūpa*) and omniscient. This is how It is described by *Brahmavid* men.

Comments

Citta becomes or culminates into *Brahma* in the *Asaṁprajñāta Samādhi* and here the opinion of *Brahmavid* men is cited. That *Brahmarūpa* is described here. It is non-different from the *Jñeya.* It is the highest *Purūṣārtha.* It is established in itself i.e. "in its own greatness" as the Upaniṣad says. In *Mokṣa,* there is the highest Bliss and cessation of all evils. It can be experienced by one's own self and not by others and therefore it is indescribable. All cannot experience It—only *Yogins* can. It is unborn, identical with unborn knowledge and is omniscient.

Prof. Karmarkar cites here Gītā 5-24 to 26, Gītā 6-27 to 28 and Gītā 2-71 to 72 which contain similar passages.

न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः संभवोऽस्य न विद्यते ।
एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किंचिन्न जायते ॥४८॥
na kaścijjāyate jīvaḥ saṁbhavo'sya na vidyate.
etattaduttamaṁ satyaṁ yatra kiñcinna jāyate. (48)

Translation

No *Jīva* is ever born. There is no cause which can give birth to it. That is the highest Truth where nothing whatsoever is born.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

All these expedients like *Manonigraha* etc., creation of the universe in the form of clay and iron etc., similarly all kinds of devotional practices are prescribed only as means for realisation of the nature of the ultimate Reality and therefore these various expedients are not to be taken as ultimately real. The ultimate truth is that no *Jīva* known as the doer or the enjoyer is ever born in any way. Therefore there is no origination or cause of non-dual *Ātmā* who is unborn by nature. As there is no cause for Its birth therefore no *Jīva* is ever born. Of all the relative truths in the form of various expedients mentioned earlier, this is the ultimate truth—in that Supreme Truth *Brahma* nothing—not even the mighṭiest thing is ever born.

Comments

If these various expedients like *Mononigraha, Śruti, Upāsanā* etc. are real, then the principle of non-duality is negated. Therefore it is said that these expedients have only a *Vyāvahārika* reality—phenomenal reality, not the ultimate reality and these expedients are prescribed only as means for the realisation of the Ultimate Reality. Just as reflections, though unreal, are the means to know the real objects of which they are reflections.

For *Kārikās* 47 and 48, the Upaniṣadic authorities are *"Acintyam, avyapadeśyam" (Māṇḍūkya 7); "Vijñānam Ānandam Brahma"* (Bṛ. Up. 3-9-28-7) and Gītā 6-27.

Brahma is described as *"Satyasya satyam"* (Bṛ.Up.2-1-20); *"Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma"* (Tai.Up. 2-1).

Here ends the third *Prakaraṇa* called "Advaita" of Gauḍapāda Kārikās.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

FOURTH CHAPTER
ALĀTA-ŚĀNTI

Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda Kārikās
on
MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANIṢAD
With Bhāṣya, Comments etc.

अथालातशान्तिप्रकणम् (athālātaśāntiprakaraṇam)

ज्ञानेनाऽऽकाशकल्पेन धर्मान्यो गगनोपमान् ।
ज्ञेयाभिन्नेन संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥१॥
jñānenā"kāśakalpena dharmānyo gaganopamān.
jñeyābhinnena saṁbuddhastaṁ vande dvipadāṁ varam. (1)

Translation

I bow to that best among men (bipeds) who fully realised the *Dharmas (Jīvas)* comparable to sky by the *Jñāna* non-different from *Jñeya,* and which is almost like the sky.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

(Saṅkarācārya, in the beginning of this *Prakaraṇa* points out the relation and *saṅgati* of the earlier three *Prakaraṇas* culminating into this fourth *Prakaraṇa).* The assertion of *Advaita* made by the Śruti was based on the authority of the Śruti, by determining the meaning of *Auṁkāra* (in the first chapter). The same *Advaita* was established (in the second chapter) by proving the unreality of all difference appearing on account of the experience of external objects. Again this same *Advaita* is now directly established on the authority of the scripture and reasoning and it has been concluded at the end (of the third chapter) that this *(Advaita)* is the ultimate Truth. There are certain dualists and nihilists who oppose this philosophy of *Advaita* which is the true meaning of Śruti. They are mutually contradicting one another and their Philosophy is tainted by the trouble arising out of their attachment to their own views and their hatred towards the views of others. On account of this it has been indicated that the philosophies of those opponents are false. The *Advaita* philosophy is praised as the true philosophy as it is free from any of those vitiating features. In this chapter, it has

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

been pointed out in detail the erroneous nature of the philosophies of those opponents on account of their mutual contradictions; and by their rejection and adopting the method of *Āvīta (Vyatireka)* inference (by pointing out the contrast and difference) the *Advaita* philosophy is ultimately established as the final conclusion. For this purpose, this fourth chapter called *Alāta-Śānti* (by the symbolical illustration of "quenching" of the fire-brand) is begun.

In the first verse of this chapter there is a salutation to the proclaimer of the tradition of *Advaita* philosophy by identifying him with the nature of *Advaita* Reality itself. Obeisance is made to the Teacher at the commencement of a scripture to bring about the undertaking to a successful end. *"Ākāśa-Kalpa"* in the *Kāṛikā,* means similar to *Ākāśa,* i.e. only slightly different from *Ākāśa* (i.e. almost like *Ākāśa*). By such *Ākāśa-Kalpa Jñāna* (Knowledge) he (the teacher) knew all *Ātmans (Dharmas)* resembling the Sky (i.e. all-pervasive and partless) as non-different from the *Jñeya (Ātman)*—like fire and its heat or like sun and its light. *Jñeya* (knowable) is non-different from his own nature of *Ātman.* (i.e. he knew the identity of *Jñāna, Jñeya* and his *Ātman* with all other *Dharmas (Ātmans)* (referred to in plural on account of imagined *upādhis).*

This teacher is God *Nārāyaṇa* Himself to whom I offer my obeisance. He is best among bipeds i.e. best among men, Lord *Puruṣottama.* That is the intention. By making obeisance to the Instructing Teacher in the beginning, this chapter establishes the philosophy of Ultimate Reality which is without any kind of distinction between knowledge, knowable and the knower and which refutes all other opposing theories.

Comments

If auspicious salutations are made at the beginning, middle and the end of books, then they become more prevalent. With this intention, *Aum* is uttered at the beginning of this book, at the end of this book there is a salutation to the Highest Divinity and here in the middle of this book there is also a salutation to the Highest

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Divinity identified with this Instructing Teacher. In the *Bhāṣya,* the relation of the succeeding chapter with the preceding one, is shown. Dualists believe in differences. Nihilists who are separately mentioned believe that there is no *Ātmā (Nairātmyavāda).* By *Rāga* and *Dweṣa,* other *Kleśas* like *Avidyā, Asmitā* and *Abhiniveśa* are also implied. *(Kleśas* which are the cause of suffering are five-Ignorance, egotism, attachment, aversion and fear of death). *Āvīta-Nyāya* is the same as *Vyatireka-nyāya.* e.g. whatever is created is impermanent. This is affirmative relation of *Hetu* and *Sādhya.* After knowing this impermanence the negative relation is of this nature. "whatever is not impermanent is not created." This negative relation is also necessary to be shown to remove the doubt that the *Hetu* given is fallacious. Even though *Advaita* is established by reason and known from Śruti, without refuting other opposing theories there may remain a partial doubt about *Advaita.* For this purpose, other opposing theories are refuted here and thus this chapter is symbolically called the quenching of the fire-brand.

Āvīta is the same as *Avita* and means *Vyatireka* method of inference; that which is more clear is called *Vīta* and whatever is not *Vīta* is *Avīta.*

Salutation to the Teacher in the beginning is for successful end of the undertaking as also for removal of opposition and conflicts.

Jñāna is called *Ākāśa-Kalpa,* slightly different from *Ākāśa* (as the word *"Kalpa"* meaning slightly less is used). *Ākāśa* and *Jñāna* both are all pervasive and partless but *Ākāsa* is *Jaḍa* (non-sentient) while *Jñāna is self-luminous. "Dharmān" (Ātmans)* is used here in plural as multiplicity is taken as imagined due to the *upādhi* (conditioning) of *Avidyā.*

Ānandagiri cites here a tradition. Ācārya Gauḍapāda went to Badarikāśrama in Himālayas and there propitiated Lord Nārāyaṇa who was encamping there with *Nara* and performing *Tapas.* Lord *Nārāyaṇa* being pleased, instructed *Gauḍapāda* in this Supreme knowledge and therefore Lord *Narāyaṇa* as *Parameśvara* is being saluted in this first *Kārikā.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

The word *Dharma* means *Ātman* according to *Śaṅkara* and "elements of existence" according to Prof. Bhattacharya who insists on seeing Buddhist Philosophy in Gauḍapāda. But *'Dharma'* and *'Dharmin'* are held as identical in Vedānta and therefore there is no difference in the ultimate sense. The word *"Dwipadām Varam"* is interpreted as referring to Lord *Nārāyaṇa* or to the immediate teacher of Gauḍapāda or Śuka according to Vedāntic Tradition. Prof. Bhattacharya says it refers to Gautama Buddha. It is true that Gautama Buddha is frequently referred to as *"Dwipadām Varaḥ"* etc but that phrase is also applied to many Hindu Gods like *Gaṇeśa* etc or to *Naiṣadha,* Dhṛtarāṣṭra etc—so it does not carry us farther. Here *Jñāna* and *Jñeya* are held as identical with Brahma and "Brahma cannot be said to have been realised by Buddha as stated in this Kārikā. *Jñāna* and *Jñeya* are held as identical, as pointed out by Prof. Karmarkar, because both are *"Jarā-maraṇa-nirmukta", "Amalina" "Abhinna"* and *"Anādi"*.

In this chapter Gauḍapadā uses many Buddhist philosophical terms and develops his philosophy of *Ajāti-vāda.* The main reason for using Buddhist terms seems to be as suggested by Dr. Mahadevan, that Gauḍapāda intends to address the Buddhist audience and talking in their language and terminology he distinguishes his philosophy of *Ajāti-vada* and *Nitya Advaya* ***Paramārthatattva*** which is without any distinction of *Jñāna Jñeya* and *Jnātṛ* and to prove that ***Bhrama*** or error cannot be without a real substratum or *Adhiṣṭhāna.* Main thesis of Buddhism is *Kṣaṇika vijñāna* and the doctrine of *Pratītya-samutpāda* equated with *śūnyatā* by the *mādhamika* which is rejected by Vedānta. The symbolic illustration of *Alāta* (fire brand) is used to explain the *Spandana* of *Vijñāna* which is illusory.

Dharmas (i.e. Ātmans) are compared to *Ākāśa* to prove their pervasiveness partlessness and pure nature according to Vedānta. Buddhists compare *Dharmas* to *Ākāśa* to prove their *"śūnyatva".* The purpose of comparison with *Ākāśa* is different in Vedāntic and Buddhist philosophy.

It is possible to interpret the Kārikā to mean "whosoever you I or any one else, knows the identity of *Jñana Jñeya Jñātṛ* is best among men". But as Śaṅkara says, this verse is intended as a *Maṅgala* salutation to the Guru. *Nārāyaṇa* is mentioned as first in

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the *Śaṅkara-Guru-paramparā* verses and the pilgrimage to the *Āśrama* of *Nara Nārāyaṇa* in Himalayas is still prevalent.

Nāgārjuna pays obeisance to his master Buddha as "Vadatāṁ varaḥ" Prof. Karmarkar observes that Gauḍapāda goes one better and calls his master (Guru) Nārāyaṇa or Śuka as *"Dwipadām Varaḥ"* Instead of calling Gauḍapāda a Buddhist, it is more reasonable to say that Gauḍapāda was addressing a Buddhist audience, deliberately using Buddhist technique, arguments and phraseology and distinguishing his own Upaniṣadic doctrine from Buddhist tenets. The fourth chapter of these Kārikās is specifically intended to address opponents and distinguish Vedānta from the systems of the Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and various schools of Buddhists. Use of the terminology and technique similar and familar to opponents is thus not out of place.

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः ।
अविवादोऽविरूद्धश्च देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥२॥

asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitaḥ.
avivādo'viruddhaśca deśitastaṁ namāmyaham. (2)

Translation

I bow to that *Yoga* (discipline, method of Realisation) called *Asparśa* (free from all touch) which brings happiness to all, which is beneficial, which is taught by scriptures.

Śānkara-Bhāṣya :

Now obeisance is made to that Yoga taught in the Advaita philosophy. *Asparśa yoga. Sparśa* means touch or relation. That *Yoga* which has no touch or relation at any time with anything is called *Asparśa yoga* and it is the same as the nature of *Brahma.* The meaning is that this *yoga* is well known among the knowers of *Brahma* as *Asparśa yoga.* It brings happiness to all beings. Some *yoga* (discipline) which though (ultimately) brings great happiness is associated with pain (in the earlier stages) like *Tapas* (austerity). But this *(Asparśa yoga)* is not such. It promotes happiness of all beings. Similarly, there is happiness in the enjoyments of worldly objects of sense but that is not of a beneficial nature. But this *yoga* brings happiness and is also beneficial, for it never changes its

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

nature at any time. Further, it is without any dispute. i.e. it never indulges in taking this or that side and enters into quarrelsome disputes. Why? Because it is non-contradictory. I pay my obeisance to that *Śāstra* which teaches this kind of *yoga.*

Comments

In the first verse of this chapter, there is obeisance to Guru. In this second verse there is obeisance to the *Śāstra* which teaches this *Asparśa yoga. Asparśa* means there is no touch or relation with any object i.e. it is non-dual *Brahma* which is *Advaita,* without a second and therefore, *Bhāṣyakāra* renders *Asparśa yoga* as *Brahma-swabhāva.* It does not contradict or oppose any one as it is the effulgence of one's own *Ātmā* which is not opposed to any one.

This is the *yoga* of *Jñāna-mārga* according to the *sampradāya* of knowers of *Brahma* (A.G.).

According to *Śaṅkara, Asparśa yoga* means *Brahma swabhāva.* Prof. Vidhushekhar on p.98 of his English edition admits that Sankara's interpretation of *Asparśa yoga* both here and in *Kārika* 3-39 cannot be rejected and he justifiably cites Gītā 2-14 *(Mātrāsparśastu Kaunteya śītoṣṇasukhduḥkhadāḥ)* and Gītā 5-27 *(sparśān kṛtvā bahir bāhyān).*

It is very likely that these passages of Gītā along with certain others in the Upaniṣads have given to Gauḍapāda the idea of the term *Asparśayoga.*

But being an advocate of the theory that either Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist or that he adopted Buddhist tenets in Vedānta, Prof. Vidhushekhar speculates that *Asparśa yoga* refers to the ninth or the last of the nine *dhyānas* or meditation called *Anupūrva-vihāra* or the successive states of *dhyāna* which Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts,—that *Asparśa yoga* is *"Asukha yoga"* as it cannot be attained with ease *"(Durdarśa"* in Gauḍapāda*).*

Prof. Karmarkar rightly observes that this is a "special pleading"—that *Asparśa yoga* is not directly traceable in Buddhist literature and that there is no specific statement that Buddha taught it.

There is apparent contradiction in *Asparśa* and *yoga* and there is similar apparent contradiction in Gītā 6-23 defining *yoga* as *"Duḥkha-saṁyoga-viyoga."*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Apart from Gītā 2-14, 5-27 and 6-23, Swāmī Saccidānandendra in his Māṇḍūkya —rahasya—vivṛti cites Bṛhadāraṇyaka Māndhyandini Pāṭha (Veṅkateśwara Press Ed) 4-3-14 where *Ātmā* is called *"Avicchittidharmā"* and has *"Mātrā-asaṁsarga"*; **then *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 4-4-23 says that one knowing *Brahma* is not smeared (i.e. touched) by evil act.** ***(Na lipyate Karmaṇā*** *Pāpakena);* Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-6-15 *"Tat Kena Kaṁ Paśyet—tat kena Kaṁ spṛśet"*. These passage of Gītā and Upaniṣads directly describe Brahma as untouched by anything and Gauḍapāda need not go to non-vedic Buddhist works for the term *Asparśa yoga.*

Further *"Anupūrva-vihāra"* in Buddhism is one of the states of *Dyāna* i.e. a part of the process, while Gauḍapāda here describes *Asparśayoga* as the final goal—the Absolute **Brahma—to whom obeisance is made here. Here the *stuti* is of *Advaita-darśana.***

As Advaita is the transcendental Reality and *dwaita* is phenomenal reality, there is no *Virodha* (dispute) between *dwaita* and *Advaita* and therefore *Advaita* is described by Gauḍāpada as *"Avivāda* and *Dwaita* is described by Gauḍapāda as the *Bheda* of *Advaita.* As there is nothing else apart from *Brahma—advaita* is described as *Aviruddha* (cf. *Kārikā* 3-7" *Tairayaṁ Na virudhyate).*

Prof. Vidhushekhar cites *Āryasamadhirāja* and the use of the word *Avivāda* and *Aviruddha* in Buddhism and as Prof. Karmarkar observes, Prof. Vidhushekhar "comes to the amazing and unwarrented conclusion that *Asparśa yoga* was not originally taught in the Brahmanical system of *Yoga".* Various passages from Gītā and the Upaniṣads cited above disprove this statement of Prof. Vidhushekhar.

Tapas is beneficial but initially painful; sensual pleasure is pleasant but ultimately harmful. But *Asparśa yoga* is both beneficial and blissful. This *Aupaniṣadic Darśana* is based on universal experience deduced from the analysis of the three states and sound reasoning;—not based on individual experience gained in several stages of ***samādhi*** coupled with reasoning as described in Buddhism" (Māṇḍūkya-rahasya vivṛti).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः केचिदेव हि ।
अभूतस्यापरे धीरा विवदन्तः परस्परम् ॥३॥

bhūtasya jātimicchanti vādinaḥ kecideva hi.
abhūtasyāpare dhirā vivadantaḥ parasparam. (3)

Translation

Some disputants postulate the passing into birth of an existing entity; others; proud of their intelligence, quarrelling among themselves, assume that birth takes place from a non-existing entity.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

How do the dualists wrangle among themselves? We now reply. Some disputants-only followers of the Sāṅkhya system, not all dualists—postulate that only an existing entity passes into birth. Some others like Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, considering themselves intelligent i.e. feeling proud of their intellect, assume that only a non-existing entity passes into birth. The meaning is that they quarrel among themselves with a desire to establish their victory over their opponents.

Comments

Gaudāpada has stated that the *Advaita—darśana* is *Avivāda.* To establish this, he illustrates the mutual quarrels among the dualists. The Sāṅkhyas are *sat-kārya-vādins* or *Pariṇāmavādins* who assume that only an existing entity the *Kāraṇa*—evolves into *a Kārya.* **This is also the view of Vaibhāṣika Buddhists. Vaiśeṣikas. Naiyāyikas and Sautrāntika Buddhists believe in the *Asatkāryavāda* or *Ārambhavāda,* assuming that the *Kārya,* not existing in *Kāraṇa*—is newly born but connected with its *Kāraṇa* by *Samavāya-sambandha.***

Gauḍapāda states in the next Kārikā that both these sets of disputants destroy the postulates of their opponents and establish *Ajāti* i.e. non-origination.

भूतं न जायते किंचिदभूतं नैव जायते ।
विवदन्तो द्वयाःह्येवमजातिं ख्यापयन्ति ते ॥४॥

bhūtaṁ na jāyate kiñcidabhūtaṁ naiva jāyate.
vivadanto dvayāḥ hyevamajātiṁ khyāpayanati te. (4)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

That which is (already) existent cannot pass into birth; and that which is non-existent can never (at any time) pass into birth. The dualists, disputing in this way, establish *Ajāti* (non-origination either of the existent or non-existent).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

What do they establish, thus refuting each others' positions by putting forth conflicting postulates? We reply. An existing entity cannot pass into birth as it already exists—like *Ātmā.* Putting forward this argument, the *Asat-Kārya-vādin* refutes the Sāṅkhya postulate that an existing entity passes into birth (i.e. an existing *Kāraṇa* evolves into *Kārya).* Similarly by stating that a non-existing entity can never have any birth e.g. like the horns of a hare, the *satkāryavādin Sāṅkhya* refutes the postulate of the *Asat-Kāryavādin* who states that a non-existing *Kārya* is newly born. Thus contradicting each other, the dualists refute the postulates of each other about the passing into birth of an existing or non-existing entity and thereby establish *Ajāti*-the non-origination as a matter of course.

Comments

There can be only two positions—a birth can take place either from an existing or a non-existing entity. As both these positions are refuted by disputants opposing each other, *Ajāti* i.e. non-origination is established as a matter of course.

Many manuscripts have the reading *"Dwayāḥ"* (dulalists) in the second line of this *Kārikā.* A few manuscripts have the reading *"Advayāḥ"* which may be explained in this way that the dualists support the position of *Adwaitins* (i.e. *Ajāti*) and thus unwittingly become *Adwayas* i.e. *Adwaitins.* Prof. Vidhushekhar reads *"Adwayāḥ"* for *Dwayas* and states that *"Adwayāḥ"* are Buddhists who do not hold any of the two *(Dwaya)* views whether a thing exists or does not exist i.e. reject the two extreme views and he interprets this *Kārikā* as adopting the *"Adwaya"* Buddhists' view which rejects the two positions mentioned in the preceding *Kārikās* and thus establishing *Ajāti*-non-becoming of things.

This interpretation of Prof. Vidhushekhar cannot be accepted. The reasons are :

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

1) Root *"Vivad"* (to dispute) has been used in *Kārikās* 3, 4 and 5 in one sense only "disputing". In Kārikā 4, it must mean the same thing-"disputing." Buddhists cannot be supposed to be disputing among themselves.
2) Majority of manuscripts have the reading *"Dwayāḥ"*.
3) As pointed out by Swami Saccidānandendra in Māṇḍūkya Rahasya **Vivṛti** pp. 323-4 the concept of *Ajāti* of Gauḍapāda is different from the Buddhist concept of *Ajāti* "According to Buddhists, there is *Anutpatti* of *Dharmas* because of *Pratītya-Samutpāda*—this is their *Swabhāva* which is the same as *naiḥswābhāvya* (essencelessness) and for establishing this ***Niḥswābhāvya*** the Buddhists reject *Jātivāda* and talk of *Ajāti.*

On the contrary, Gauḍapāda who is a Vedāntin rejects *Naiḥ-swābhāvya* and establishes the *swabhāva* of Brahma as *Aja* and *Amṛta* (4-8).According to him there is *Ajāti* (non-oigination) of the universe from Brahma who is by ***Swabhāva*** *Aja* and *Amṛta. "Adwaya"* according to Vedānta is non-difference of *Jīva* and *Brahma. "Adwaya"* according to Buddhists is the theory of "non-two" i.e. neither of the two extreme views of "is" or "is not" (4).Gauḍapāda never uses the word *Adwaya* in the Buddhist sense which avoids the two extremes of whether a thing exists or a thing does not exist; on the contrary, according to Gauḍapāda, *"Adwaya"* is called *"Brāhmaṇya pada"* in 4.85 and not as a Buddhist concept of is or is not. According to Gauḍapāda *Brahma* is positive *"sat" "sad-bhāvena hyajaṁ sarvam" Kārikā* 4-57. The word *Adwaya* is used by Gauḍapāda in 2-33, 2-35, 4-45, and 4-85 in the sense of "without a second" and he uses *"Adwaita"* also in 2-18 and 3-18 in the sense of "without a second". For him there is no distinction between *"Adwayāḥ"* and *"Adwaitinaḥ"* and there is no trace of the Buddhist meaning of *"Adwayāḥ"* in any of the 215 Kārikās.

ख्याप्यमानामजातिं तैरनुमोदामहे वयम् ।
विवदामो न तैः सार्धमविवादं निबोधत ॥५॥

khyāpyamānāmajātiṁ tairanumodāmahe vayam.
vivadāmo na taiḥ sārdhamavivādaṁ nibodhata. (5)

Translation

We approve the non-origination *(Ajāti)* proclaimed by them.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

We donot have any dispute with them. Our *Ajātivāda* is free from any dispute.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

(The disputants have unwittingly established *Ajātivāda* by attacking *Jātivāda* from different angles. Like the respective theories of the disputants, why not does the *Siddhāntin* reject the *Ajātivada* also? This Kārikā is a reply to that). The disputants have established in this way the *Ajāti* (non-origination) and we approve that by stating "Let it be so". We do not wrangle with them by taking this side or that,—just as they quarrel among themselves by taking sides. Oh pupils! Please therefore understand that we have given our approval to that Ultimate Reality where there is no dispute.

Comments

As *Ajāti* is established by disputants attacking the *jātivāda* postulates of one another,we have to make no special effort to establish *Ajāti* which is already established by elimination. As the *Advaita Vastu* is non-different from the apparent multiplicity and thus all inclusive, the *Advaitavādin* has no cause for dispute.Prof. V. Bhattacharya thinks that the principle of *Ajāti* is borrowed by Gauḍapāda from Buddhists and interprets *"Advayāḥ"* is *Kārikā* 4 as done by Buddhists (see comments on *Kārikā* (4) but Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2-5-19 states that *Brahma* is *Apūrva* (without cause) *anapara* (without a second) and ***anantara*** (without an effect). Gauḍapāda thus need not go to Buddhists for *Ajātivāda* and *Vivartavāda "(Ajāyamano Bahudhā", Māyayā Jāyate tu Saḥ)* Kārikā 3-24 and Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3-13).

अजातस्यैव धर्मस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः ।
अजातो ह्यमृतो धर्मो मार्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥६॥

ajātasyaiva dharmasya jātimicchanti vādinaḥ.
ajāto hyamṛto dharmo martyatāṁ kathameṣyati. (6)

Translation

The disputants (i.e. *Satkāryavādins* and *Asatkāryavādins)* desire to prove the *Jāti* (i.e. origination) of an entity which is *Ajāta.* (Without any origin or cause and which does not pass into any birth i.e. effect). How indeed can an entity which is in this way *Ajāta* and immortal can ever pass into mortality?

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya .

(Who are those disputants? Who assert the passing into birth of the *Ajāta* entity? We reply). All those who assert that an entity is born either of an existing cause or a non-existing cause. We have already given our comments on this *kārikā* while discussing chapter 3 *Kārikā* 20.

Comments

Both *Sat-Kāryavādins* and *Ast-Kāryavādins* assert the passing into birth of the entity ***Brahma*** which is inherently *Aja* (without birth or cause or without its passing into birth i.e. effect). *Jāti* means change in an entity which passes into birth. This argument of Gauḍapāda is also intended to refute those Vedāntins who assert that *Brahma* in reality passes into birth as this universe.

न भवत्यमृतं मर्त्यं न मर्त्यममृतं तथा ।
प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद्भविष्यति ॥७॥

na bhavatyamṛtaṁ martyaṁ na martyamamṛtaṁ tathā.
prakṛteranyathābhāvo na kathañcidbhaviṣyati. (7)

स्वभावेनामृतो यस्य धर्मो गच्छति मर्त्यताम् ।
कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ॥८॥

svabhāvenāmṛto yasya dharmo gacchati martyatām.
kṛtakenāmṛtastasya kathaṁ sthāsyati niścalaḥ. (8)

Translation

(These two *Kārikās* are also by way of reply to Vedāntins who assert that *Brahma* really transforms or alters itself into the multiple universe i.e. it is also a reply to the *Brahma-pariṇāmavādin* Vedāntist).

(As the nature of *Brahma* is constant and unchanging) *Brahma* who is immortal can never become mortal. Similarly an effect which is born and thus has its nature of being mortal can never become immortal. The inherent nature can never change under any circumstance. In the case of those disputants whose Ultimate Reality which by nature is immortal becomes mortal by passing into birth—how can the *Mokṣa* (liberation) of such disputants which is acquired by performance of certain *Karma* (or by *Jñānakarma-Samuccaya*) and designated as Immortality can retain its changeless nature of Immortality.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

(The meaning of these verses is explained in the comments on chapter 3 *Kārikās* 21 and 22). These verses are repeated here to show the approval of *Ajātivāda* which is established on account of the mutual quarrel of the disputants.

Comments

Kārikās 6-7-8 here are practically the same as chapter 3 *Kārikās* 20, 21 and 22. Only the word *"Bhāva"* is changed into *"Dharma"*. Prof. Karmarkar feels that no hiatus would be felt even if these *Kārikās* are dropped here. It is difficult to say who changed *Bhāva* into *Dharma.* The *Nyāya* is—whatever is *Kṛtaka,* born or made or acquired is impermanent. *Mokṣa* which is secured by any act is therefore *Anitya.* How can **this** so called Immortality remain changeless and steady?

सांसिद्धिकी स्वाभाविकी सहजा अकृता च या ।
प्रकृतिः सेति विज्ञेया स्वभावं न जहाति या ॥९॥

sāṁsiddhikī svābhāvikī sahajā akṛtā ca yā
prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvaṁ na jahāti yā. (9)

Translation

(The meaning of that *Prakṛti* is stated). *Prakṛti* should be known as that which never changes its inherent nature. e.g. *Sāṁsiddhikī* (acquired by superhuman faculties like *Aṇimā* etc), *swābhāvikī* (inherent nature of an entity). *Sahajā* (brought into being along with the birth), *Akṛtā* (not created by anybody) or that which does not change its inherent nature.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

Even in mundane entitites, the inherent nature of an entity *(Prakṛti)* never changes. e.g. superhuman powers acquired by yogins who are inspired sages viz. faculties like *Aṇimā* (power of becoming small) etc. In the case of such *Yogins,* those superhuman powers never change either in past or future. *Prakṛti* is like that. Similarly the inherent nature of an entity like the characteristics of heat and light in the case of fire—such nature also does not change either in space or time. Similarly that which is brought into existence along with the birth of a being like the characteristic of flying in the sky in the case of birds. Likewise any

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

other nature not created by anybody e.g. nature of downward flowing in the case of water. Further, any other characteristic which does not give up its inherent nature—all these are known in worldly matters as *Prakṛti*. Thus even in mundane entities which are unreal (from the transcendental point of view) *Prakṛti* does not change its nature. What to talk of that *Prakṛti* of the nature of immortality in the case of the Ultimate Reality which by its inherent nature is unborn *(Aja)*? The meaning is that such *Prakṛti* never changes i.e. never has any origination (passes into birth).

Comments

Definition of *Prakṛti* is given as that inherent nature which never changes. Giving various illustrations of mundane entities, by *Kaimutika Nyāya* it is stated-the Ultimate Reality which is *Aja* and *Amṛta* can never give up its inherent nature and have any origination or pass into birth. *Saṁsiddhi* means the superhuman faculty acquired after practising yoga along with all its auxiliary parts. In the case of such siddhas, powers like *Aṇimā* never lapses. That which never changes its nature e.g. Pot never gives up *Ghaṭatva* and cloth its *Paṭatya*.

Mādhyamikas also say *"Prakṛteḥ* ***Anyathābhāvo*** *nahi jatūpapadyate"* (M.K.15.8) but what they really mean is that *bhāvas* (entities) have no such positive *Prakṛti* i.e. they are essenceless. In Upaniṣad-darśana, *Bhāva (Jīva)* is of the *Swabhāva of Aja* and *Amṛta*. According to Mādhyamikas *Prakṛti* means *anutpāda, Pratītyasamutpāda* and *Naiḥswābhāvyam* (essencelessness). (cf. Māṇḍūkyarahasya vivṛti p.25 and the citation therein of Candrakīrti)

जरामरणनिर्मुक्ताः सर्वे धर्माः स्वभावतः ।
जरामरणमिच्छन्तश्च्यवन्ते तन्मनीषया ॥१०॥

jarāmarananirmuktaḥ sarve dharmāh svabhāvataḥ
jarāmaraṇamicchantaścyavante tanmanīṣayā. (10)

Translation

(Gauḍapāda now incidentally describes the inherent nature of the *Jīva*.)

All *Ātmās* are by nature not subject to old age or death. But those who desire old age and death for them deviate from their true nature on account of their thought of them.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

But what is the *Āśraya* (substratum) of that *Prakṛti* whose defect is mentioned in such imagination? This is being stated. All *Dharmas* i.e. *Ātmans* are free from being subject to any kind of change (modification or mutilation) due to old age, death, etc. and this is so because of their inherent nature. As such is the nature of *Dharmas (Ātmans),* those (disputants), who as it were wish that the *Ātmans* have old age and death like falsely imagining serpent on a rope—such disputants so imagining deviate from their nature. The meaning is that by thinking of births and deaths they are constantly possessed of that defective thinking.

Comments

Viṣaya in *Bhāṣya* means *Āśraya* (substratum). *Ātmans* are by nature without any kind of change, modification, alteration or mutilation. If a disputant erroneously imagines any modification in *Ātman* due to old age and death, he unconsciously gets possessed by that false impression *(vāsanā)* and as it were gets deviated from *Ātman's* true nature, Modification due to old age and death is only illustrative. Intention is to include all kinds of modifications. *Ātmā* is described as *Ajara, Amara, Amṛta* in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-4-25. Those who by ignorance imagine old age, death etc for *Ātmā* suffer *Saṁsāra* and as stated by Muṇḍaka 1-2-7 they once again go to i.e. suffer old age and death and endlessly move in *samsāra. "Tan-manīṣaya"* means *"tad-bhāva-bhāvitāḥ* and this phrase reminds us of the same phrase *"Tat-bhāva-bhāvitāḥ"* in *Gītā* 8-6.

कारणं यस्य वै कार्यं कारणं तस्य जायते ।
जायमानं कथमजं भिन्नं नित्यं कथं च तत् ॥११॥

kāraṇaṁ yasya vai kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ tasya jāyate.
jāyamānaṁ kathamajaṁ bhinnaṁ nityaṁ kathaṁ ca tat. (11)

Translation

(After having incidentally referred to the inherent nature of *Ātmā,* Gauḍapāda now states the defect in the **Sāṅkhya** view of *Satkāryavāda* as pointed out by the Vaiśeṣika). In the case of that disputant (i.e. Sāṅkhya) according to whom *Kāraṇa* is *Kārya* and therefore *Kāraṇa* (cause) is born as *Kārya* (effect)—how can that

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(Pradhāna) which is born *(*as *Mahat* and other elements) remain *Aja* (not passing into birth)? And how can that *(Pradhāna)* which is thus spilt remain *Nitya* (constant and unchanged)?

Śaṅkara-bhaṣya :

The Vaiśeṣika now points out the defect in the Sāṅkhya doctrine which postulates birth (evolution) of an existing cause. In the case of that disputant (Sāṅkhya) the cause *(Kārana)* like the earth, the material cause gets transformed in the form of *Kārya* (effect). The meaning is that in that disputants (Sāṅkhyas) case the existing cause viz. *Pradhāna* is born (gets transformed) in the form of *Kārya* (effect) like *Mahat* and other elements. If *Pradhāna* is born in the form of *Mahat* etc then how can it be called *Aja* (not passing into birth)? There is contradiction in saying that *Pradhāna* is born and at the same time *Aja* (not passing into birth). Sāṅkhyas call *Pradhāna Nitya* (constant, unchanged). If *Pradhāna* is dissected—broken or split in one part, then how can it be *Nitya* (eternal, constant)? Pots etc which are made up of parts and subject to get split in one part are never found to be *Nitya* (permanent) immutable in worldly experience. Split in one part and at the same time *Aja* and *Nitya*—this kind of contradictory proposition is made by the Sāṅkhya. This is the meaning.

Comments

If *Pradhāna* is born as Mahat etc then it cannot be *Aja* (not passing into birth) and *Nitya* (constant, permanent, unchanged). Similarly *Sattva-Rajas-Tamas* which are the *Avayavas* of *Pradhāna* and are called *Nitya* by Sāṅkhya can never remain *Nitya* if they are born in the form of *Mahat* etc. Thus the contradiction is—*Pradhāna* is born and if so how can it be *Aja* (not passing into birth) and if *Pradhāna* is split (into *Mahat* etc) how can it be *Nitya?* cf. Sāṅkhya Kārikā 9 *Kārya* is *sat* "before its birth" (Sāṅkhya is *Satkāryavādin).*

कारणाद्यद्यनन्यत्वमतः कार्यमजं यदि ।
जायमानाद्धि वै कार्यात् कारणं ते कथं ध्रुवम् ॥१२॥

kāraṇādyadyananyatvamataḥ kāryamajaṁ yadi.
jāyamānāddhi vai kāryāt kāraṇaṁ te kathaṁ dhruvam. (12)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

If *Kārya* (effect) is non-different form *Kāraṇa* (cause) then *Kārya* would be *Aja* (like the *kāraṇa Pradhāna),* and how can the *Kāraṇa* (cause) remain *Aja* as it is non-different from *Kārya* which is born?

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

This *Kārikā* is intended to further clarify the meaning of what is stated already. If the *Kārya* is non-different from the *Aja kāraṇa (Pradhāna)* according to you, then the *kārya* has to be maintained as *Aja.* This leads to contradiction as *Kārya* then becomes *Aja* (unborn) in your case. Further if *Kārya* and *Kāraṇa* are non-different; then the *Kāraṇa (Pradhāna)* which is non-different from the *Kārya (Mahat* etc) which is born—how can that *Kāraṇa (Pradhāna)* remain permanent and unchanging? One cannot imagine a part of hen as being cooked and the other part as laying eggs.

Comments

If cause *(Pradhāna)* and effect *(Mahat* etc) are non-different, which do you mean non-different?

1) Is *Kārya* non-different from *Kāraṇa?* or
2) Is *Kāraṇa* non-different from *Kārya?*

In the case of the first alternative *Kārya* becomes *Aja* (unborn). In the second alternative *Kāraṇa (Pradhāna)* cannot remain permanent and unchanging. *Pradhāna* cannot at the same time be *Aja* (unborn, unchanging) and at the same time *Jāyamāna* (passing into birth). Illustration of hen is given. In *Māyāvāda* of the *Siddhāntin,* even though it is maintained that *Kārya* is non-different from *Kāraṇa,* the Siddhāntin does not maintain that *Kāraṇa* is non-different from *Kārya*—as *Brahma* as *Nitya* and *Prapañca* is *Anitya.*

Prof. V. Bhattacharya suggests an amendation in *Kārikā* text, reading *"yad-ananyatwam"* for *"Yadyananyatvam".*

Even though the Vedāntins are also in a sense of *Sat-karyavādins* and they maintain that *Kāraṇa Brahma (Nitya)* gets transformed into *Kārya Prapañca (anitya)* still the defects alleged by Vaiśeṣikas do not apply to the Vedānta theory as *Brahma* gets transformed into *Prapāncą* due to *Avidyā* as stated in the kārikā

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

3-27 that *"Sat (Brahma)* can pass into birth by *Māyā* only and not in reality", and this *Māyā* is *Anirvacanīya. Brahma* is beyond speech and thought and we cannot even describe *Brahma* as *Sat.* Kārikā 4-60 says that there is no *"Śabda-Pravṛtti"* to describe *Brahma—"Varṇā Yatra na vidyante vivekastatra nocyate"—Brahma* is *Śabda-agocara.*

अजाद्वै जायते यस्य दृष्टान्तस्तस्य नास्ति वै ।
जाताच्च जायमानस्य न व्यवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१३॥
ajādvai jāyate yasya dṛṣtāntastasya nāṣti vai.
jāṭācca jāyamānasya na vyavasthā prasajyate. (13)

Translation

In the case of that disputant who maintains that an effect can be born of an entity which is *nitya* and not born-*Aja*—for him there is no illustration (admitted by both sides) to prove his *Anumāna.* If an effect is born of an entity already born (of another)—there would then be *Anavasthā* (regressus ad infinitum).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

(This is another additional defect in the Sāṅkhya theory). Further, in the case of that disputant who maintains that an effect can be born of a *Nitya* (permanent and unchanging) cause there is no illustration (admitted by both sides). For want of such illustration, it is established in other words that nothing can be born from an *Aja* entity. If it is contended that an effect can be born of a cause which itself is born of another, then in that case there would be *Anavasthā* (regressus ad infinitum) as that cause would be born of another and that last one from still another and so endlessly—the meaning is that there would be *Anavasthā* defect.

Comments

Sāṅkhya maintains that from *Aja Pradhāna* effects like *Mahat* etc are born. But for such a postulate there is no illustration (admitted by both sides) to prove their theory by proper *Anumāna* (inference). The illustration should be such which is admitted by both the disputant and the Siddhāntin. If it is contended that from the *Jāta* cause the *Jāyamāna* effect is born, then there would be

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the defect of *Anavasthā.* The requirement of illustration is emphasised as the Sāṅkhya system prides itself on being based on *Anumāna* (inference) and there can be no proper *Anumāna* without an admitted illustration. Brahma-sūtras designate Sāṅkhya as *"Anumāna"* B.S. 1-1-18, 2-2-1 etc). So far, defects are shown in the *Satkārya-Vāda* of Sāṅkhya. The *Asat-Kāryavāda* of Vaiśeṣikas is not elaborately dealt with as according to Gauḍapāda it is to be summarily rejected. Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the effect was non-existent before its *utpatti* but is connected with the *Sat* cause by *Samavāya Sambandha.* Nothing can be born of *asat, Śaśa-visāṇa,*; therefore the Vaiśeṣikas have to perforce admit that existing *Paramāṇus* get transformed into *Dwyaṇukas* etc.

हेतोरादिः फलं येषामादिर्हेतुः फलस्य च ।
हेतोः फलस्य चानादिः कथं तैरुपवर्ण्यते ॥१४॥

hetorādiḥ phalaṁ yeṣāmādirhetuḥ phalasya ca.
hetoḥ phalasya cānādiḥ kathaṁ tairupavarṇyate.

Translation

In the case of those disputants, the effect *(Phala* i.e. *Deha)* gives birth to cause *(Hetu* i.e. *Karma)* and the cause gives birth to the effect, how can they describe the beginningless *(Anādi)* of both cause *(Phala* i.e. *Deha)* and cause *(Hetu* i.e. *Karma)?*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

Ācārya Gauḍapāda refers to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śruti 4-5-15 "where for him everything has become *Ātmā* etc." which declares absence of duality from the transcendental point of view, and relying on that he says—where the effect *(Phala)* that is the aggregate of the body (senses) etc gives birth to (produces) the cause *(hetu)* that is merit and demerits etc. Similarly where the *Hetu* i.e. merit and demerit etc give birth (produce) the aggregate of the body etc *(Phala).* In this way those disputants who maintain the birth *(Ādimatva)* of both *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha)* by describing their mutual *Kārya-Kāraṇa bhāva* (being the cause and effect of each other)—how can they declare the beginninglessness *(Anāditva)* of both *hetu* and *Phala?* This is contradictory. *Ātmā* is *Nitya* (eternal) and *Kūṭastha* (changeless) and cannot be the cause or effect of anything *(Hetu-phalātmatā* means *Karma-deha-rūpatā).*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Dualists have refuted the positions of each other and have established the birthlessness of *Ātmā* and that position is approved of by us the *Advaitins.* Now the refutation of dualism itself which is declared by Sruti gets confirmation from the experience of the learned. The Kārikā points out the contradiction in the position of the dualists who declare the mutual birth of *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha)* from each other and yet their maintaining the *Anāditva* of *Hetu* and *Phala.*

It should be noted that as stated in the opening remark of the Bhāṣyakāra on this Kārikā, the position described here is from the transcendental point of view *(paramārthatah).* But causality is admitted from the phenomenal point of view as stated in Brahma-sūtra 2-1-35" *Na Karmavibhāgāditi cenna anāditvāt" Saṁsāra* is accepted as *Anādi* and with causality from *Vyavahārika* point of view like seed and sprout and therefore *Karma* and *Deha* are the cause and effect of each other—but from the transcendental point of view *(Paramārthatah) Ātmā* is *Nitya,* without parts, changeless, without any *Kārya-Kāraṇabhāva* and Dualism with its *Kārya-Kāraṇa-bhāva* is rejected by Sruti as stated by the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text 4-5-15 and reasoning and experience of the learned. It is not possible to say that *Hetu* and *Phala* have *Ādi* (both birth or *Pariṇāma)* from *Ātmā* and are *Anādi* as they have their *upādāna* (material cause) in *Anādi Ātmā* and thus avoid contradiction. —because *Ātmā* is partless, changeless and *Nitya* and any *Pariṇāma* (transformation) is inconceivable in *Ātmā.*

हेतोरादिः फलं येषामादिर्हेतुः फलस्य च ।
तथा जन्म भवेत्तेषां पुत्राज्जन्म पितुर्यथा ॥१५

hetorādiḥ phalaṁ yesāmādirhetuḥ phalasya ca.
tathā janma bhavetteṣāṁ putrājjanma pituryathā (15)

Translation

Those according to whom *Phala (Deha)* is the cause of *Hetu (Karma)* and *Hetu* is the cause of *Phala,* for them the contradiction is like the birth of father from the son.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

How do they say something contradictory? We state;those who maintain that *Hetu* is the cause of *Phala* from which *Hetu*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

itself is born—for them the contradiction is like the birth of the father from the son.

Comments

We have proved that if both *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha)* have a beginning, then the *Anāditva* (beginning lessness) of *Saṁsāra* is contradicted. Now we are going to prove that even causality —*Kārya–kāraṇa–bhāva* of *Hetu* and *Phala* is contradicted. For that the illustration of the birth of the father from the son is given—the mutual *Kāraṇatva* of *Hetu* and *Phala* from each other is as good as saying that the father is born of the son.

संभवे हेतुफलयोरेषितव्यः क्रमस्त्वया ।
युगपत्संभवे यस्मादसंबन्धो विषाणवत् ॥१६॥

saṁbhave hetuphalayoreṣitavyaḥ kramastvayā.
yugapatsaṁbhave yasmādasaṁbhandho viṣāṇavat. (16)

Translation

In the case of the origin (birth) of *Hetu* and *Phala* you must state the order in which one succeeds the other (i.e. you must state that which precedes is the cause and that which succeeds is the effect). If both *Hetu* and *Phala* arise simultaneously (at the same moment) then there can be no relation between them as of cause and effect (where the preceding one is the cause and the succeeding one is the effect). It is like the two horns (of a cow) arising simultaneously (and have no relation of one being the cause and the other the effect).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

If you believe that the aforesaid contradiction is not justified, then you must point out the order of succession between the rise of *Hetu* and *Phala viz.* which precedes and which succeeds. If their rise is simultaneous, then there would be no relation of cause and effect between them—just as there is no relation of cause and effect between the right and the left horns of a cow (which arise simultaneously).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Objector :

We actually see *(Pratītyā)* the rise of both *Hetu* and *Phala*. How can we reject them?

Siddhāntin: Hetu always precedes and *Phala* always succeeds. If by *Pratīti,* you want to establish their rise then by the same *Pratīti* you must state their order of succession.

फलादुत्पद्यमानः सन्न ते हेतुः प्रसिध्यति ।
अप्रसिद्धः कथं हेतुः फलमुत्पादयिष्यति ॥१७॥

phalādutpadyamānaḥ sanna te hetuḥ prasidhyati.
aprasiddhaḥ katham hetuḥ phalamutpādayiṣyati.(17)

Translation

As your cause which is brought into being from the effect is not established how such unestablished cause give birth to the effect?

Śāṅkara-Bhāsya :

How are the cause and effect not related to each other? From an effect which is itself unborn your cause is brought into being, like something born from non-existing horn of a hare—such cause cannot have its birth from such an effect; and how can your unestablished cause which is like non-existing horn of a hare produce the effect? Nobody has seen any relation of cause and effect between two non-existing things like horns of a hare which are not dependent on each other for their existence. Nor is the relation of support and supported possible between them *(Adhāra-ādheya-bhāva).*

Comments

The rule is that the cause precedes the effect and therefore this order between the cause and effect should be established. As in your case, cause and effect are interdependent for their very being, the relation of cause and effect is not established. As Sāṅkhya is *sat-kāryavādin* and holds that an effect can be produced only by an existing cause—how can *hetu* be born of an *Phala* and then from such an unestablished *hetu* how can *sat Phala* be born? Just as *Kārya-Kāraṇa-bhāva* is not established between them, similarly even *Adhāra-ādheya-bhāva* (the relation of.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

supporter and supported) also cannot be established between them—as both of them are non-existing like horns of a hare.

यदि हेतोः फलात्सिद्धिः फलसिद्धिश्च हेतुतः ।
कतरत् पूर्वनिष्पन्नं यस्य सिद्धिरपेक्षया ॥१८॥

yadi hetoḥ phalātsiddhiḥ phalasiddhiśca hetutaḥ.
katarat pūrvaniṣpannaṁ yasya siddhirapekṣayā. (18)

Translation

If your cause is brought into being from the effect and the effect is brought into being from the cause, which of the two is in existence first so that the other can be brought into being after depending on it.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

We have pointed out the defect of want of relation *Asambandhatā-doṣa)* in *Kārya-Kāraṇa-bhāva* (relation as cause and effect) between *Hetu* and *Phala.* Still if you maintain that *Hetu* and *Phala* are interdependent for their existence, then you must state as to which of the two—*Hetu* and *Phala*—has its existence first so that on that which is existing first, the other's existence is established.

Comments

Ānandagiri refers here to the Śruti—"one gets good birth by performin good deeds etc" and observed that the Sāṅkhya cannot rely on this Śruti to justify the impossible proposition of the relation of cause and effect between *Hetu (Dharma* and *Adharma)* and *Phala (Deha).* Śruti cannot be cited to prove impossible propositions.

अशक्तिरपरिज्ञानं क्रमकोपोऽथवा पुनः ।
एवं हि सर्वथा बुद्धैरजातिः परिदीपिता ॥१९॥

aśaktiraparijñānaṁ kramakopo'thava punaḥ.
evaṁ hi sarvathā buddhairajātiḥ paridīpitā. (19)

Translation

Inability to reply, want of knowledge and the violation of the order of succession (between cause and effect)—these factors have led the wise to brilliantly set forth the theory of non-origination *(Ajāti).*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

If you think that it is not possible to say, then it is your inability, want of knowledge, wrong judgement regarding Reality, your bewilderment. Or again the order of succession which you have stated viz. that the cause has its being from the effect and the effect from the cause—this leads to the violation of the recognised principle of what should be prior and what the posterior between the two. Thus, as the relation of cause and effect cannot be proved between *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha)*, the learned (Buddhaiḥ) have established the theory of non-origination *(Ajāti)* by pointing out the fallacious positions of disputants as shown by disputants attacking one another.

Comments

You cannot state which is prior and which is posterior between *Hetu* and *Phala* as they are interdependent. As you cannot reply, this is a flaw in argument *(Nigraha-sthāna)* known as *"Apraṭibhā"* in logic. As the recognised order of succession is violated it is another flaw in argument known as *"Pratijñāhāni"*. Thus *Sat-kāryavādins* and *Asatkāryavādins* have by attacking the positions of each other helped the learned in establishing the theory of non-origination *(Ajāti)*.

The words *"Aśakti"* and *"Aparijñāna"*, in the *Kārikā* have been differently interpreted by Śaṅkara, Prof. Karmarkar and Prof. V. Bhattacharya. According to Śaṅkara, *"Aśakti"* means inability to reply to the flaw pointed out by the Siddhāntin and *"Aparijñāna"* means want of Judgement regarding Reality *(Tattvāviveka)*.

According to Prof. Karmarkar, the first line of this Kārikā is a refutation of the *Asatkāryavāda* of the Vaiśeṣikas. *"Aśakti"* here means the absence of any power in the *Kāraṇa* to produce the particular *Kārya*; *"Aparijñāna"* may mean *"Pūrvāparāparijñāna"* in *Kārikās* 4-21. i.e. want of knowledge of the mutual relation of *Kāraṇa* and *Kārya*.

According to Prof. V. Bhattacharya, *"Aśakti"* has reference to Kārikā 4-3 where two types of disputations are mentioned one maintaining *Satkāryavāda* and the other *Asatkāryavāda*. He says that *"Aśakti"* and *"Aparijñāna"* should be interpreted as in Buddhist works. *Aśakti* means as explained by Candrakīrti, no

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śakti or power can be proved to exist in any originated or unoriginated *Padārtha.* *"Aparijñāna"* has reference to Nāgārjuna's *"Pūrvāparakoṭi-parīkṣa"* in his *Mulamadhyamaka Kārikā* and means *Pūrvāparāparijñāna.*

The word *"Buddhaiḥ"* in the *Kārikā* is interpreted by Prof. Bhattacharya as Buddhist. According to Śaṅkara, it means *"Paṇḍitaiḥ"* and according to Prof. Karmarkar as in 4-42 and 4-54 to *"Tattva-darśibhiḥ"* and *"Manīṣiṇaḥ"*

Prof. Karmarkar observes that Gauḍapāda is concerned with establishing Ajāti while Śaṅkara on the other hand emphasises *Vivarta* and *Māyāvāda*—though he admits that both *"Ajāti"* and *"Vivarta"* are different aspects of the same proposition.

But Gauḍapāda specifically describes *Vivarta* in 3-16 *"Jīvaṁ Kalpayate Pūrvam* etc" and specifically refers to *Māyāvāda* in 3-24 *"Ajāyamāno Bahudhā māyayā jāyate tu saḥ"* and in 4-57 *"Samvṛtyā jāyate sarvam".* Thus in fact, there is no difference in the view of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and there cannot be any difference as Gauḍapāda is described by Śaṅkara as *Parama-guru* and *Sampradāyavid Ācārya.*

बीजांकुराख्यो दृष्टान्तः सदा साध्यसमो हि सः ।
न हि साध्यसमो हेतुः सिद्धौ साध्यस्य युज्यते ॥२०॥

bījāṁkurākhyo dṛṣṭāntaḥ sadā sādhyasamo hi saḥ.
na hi sādhyasamo hetuḥ siddhau sādhyasya yujyate. (20)

Translation

The illustration of seed and sprout is itself in the category of *Sādhya* (a thing yet to be proved). A reason i.e. illustration which is still in the category of "to be proved" cannot be urged for establishing another proposition which is equally yet to be proved.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

Objector : We have maintained the relation of cause and effect between *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha)* and by merely catching those words you are practising a deceptive trick and make a mockery of our position by stating that it is like the birth of a father from the son or the want of relation is like the horns of a hare, etc. We do not maintain the coming into being of *Phala* from a non-existing *Hetu* or of *Hetu* from a non-existing *Phala.* We

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

believe in the relation of cause and effect between *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha)* like the illustration of seed and sprout.

Siddhāntin : For us the illustration of seed and sprout is itself in the category of *Sādhya* i.e. a thing yet to be proved.

Objector : The illustration of seed and sprout is beginningless as is directly visible.

Siddhāntin : No. The prior among them is as much with a beginning as the posterior one. Just as the latest born sprout has its beginning in the seed, that seed has its beginning from its earlier sprout and in this way seeds and sprouts have a beginning in their preceding order. Thus each prior sprout and prior seed is with a beginning. As this rule applies to every one of them, the entire class of seed and sprout is Ādimat (has a beginning). Therefore, neither any seed or sprout has *Anāditva* (beginninglessness).The same principle applies to *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha).*

Objector : Suppose we say that the series of seeds and sprouts as a unit is without beginning?

Siddhāntin: No. It is not possible to take the series as a unit as beginningless. You have not postulated the series of seeds and sprouts as a unit apart from individual seeds and sprouts—nor have you postulated such series as a unit for *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha),* even though you are talking of *Anāditva.* It is therefore justifiably stated (in the Kārikā) "How can you describe the *Anāditva* (beginninglessness) of *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha)*"? Further in view of what we have stated in Kārikās 4-14 and 4-16 earlier regarding your invalid reasons, we say that there is no deceptive trick practised by us. Experts in logic never use an illustration *(Hetu)* which is in the category of "Yet to be proved"—for establishing a proposition which is also in the same category of "yet to be proved". The word *Hetu* (reason) in the Kārikā is intended to mean "illustration" as the context requires Illustration and not reason.

comments

The objector says that there is no mutual interdependence of *Hetu* and *Phala* because of the illustration of seed and sprout. This kārikā is a reply to that contention. The *Māyāvādin* vedāntists never accept any real *(Pāramārthika) Kārya kāraṇa-bhāva.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

पूर्वपरापरिज्ञानमजातेः परिदीपकम् ।
जायमानाद्धि वै धर्मात् कथं पूर्वं न गृह्यते ॥२१॥

pūrvaparāparijñānamajāteḥ paridīpakam.
jāyamānāddhi vai dharmāṭ kathaṁ pūrvaṁ na gṛhyate. (21)

Translation

Want of knowledge of what is prior and what is posterior clearly establishes non-origination. How is it that from an originated entity (which is known) its antecedent cause is not known?

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

How the learned have established *Ajāti* (non-origination) —that is being stated. Want of knowledge of what is prior and what is posterior between *Hetu* and *Phala* has established the principle of *Ajāti.* An originated entity is known but how is it that its antecedent cause is not known? Surely one who knows an originated entity should know its antecedent cause which produced it as the relation of producer and produced is unavoidable. Therefore what is stated establishes *Ajāti.*

Comments

If the fixed order of what is prior and what is posterior is known then *Jāti* (origination) is established; and if this order is not known then the principle of *Ajāti* (non-origination) is established. If the *Kāṛya* is known, the *Kāraṇa* should also be known as their mutual relation is fixed. Want of knowledge of what is *Kārya* and what is *Kāraṇa* establishes *Ajāti.*

स्वतो वा परतो वाऽपि न किंचिद्वस्तु जायते ।
सदसत्सदसद्वाऽपि न किंचिद्वस्तु जायते ॥२२॥

svato vā parato vā'pi na kiṁcidvastu jāyate.
sadasatsadasadvā'pi na kiṁcidvastu jāyate. (22)

Translation

Nothing whatever is originated either from itself or from something else. Nothing whatever is born whether it is existent, non-existent or existent-non-existent.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

For the following reason, nothing whatsover is born. An originating entity cannot originate from itself and something

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

else, or from both itself—and—something else. —No existent or non-existent or existent non-existent can ever be born i.e. an entity can be born in no way whatsoever. Just as a pot cannot be born of itself—the pot, an entity cannot be born of its own self which itself has not come into existence. Similarly an entity cannot be born of something else e.g. a piece of cloth from a pot or from one piece of cloth another piece of cloth. Nor from both (itself and something else combined) as there is contradiction e.g. a pot or a piece of cloth from a combined thing like a pot and piece of cloth.

Objector: A pot comes into being from clay and a son is from of the father.

Siddhāntin : True. There is an erroneous belief of birth and its so called designation as such by the deluded. Such designation and belief are examined by the discriminating people—whether they are real or unreal when so examined. Entities like pot, son etc which are objects of such designation and belief are words only as the Śruti says all modifications beginning with speech are mere words (names) only. An existent thing cannot be born (again) like father or clay. A non-existent can also not be born as it is non-existent like the horn of a hare. A thing which is both existent non-existent (combined) cannot be born as it is impossible for two contradictory things to be together. Thus it is established that no entity is ever born. Those (Buddhists) who maintain, on the other hand, that the very fact of birth is being born again, in their case the cause the effect and the act of birth all the three form one unit and there is only momentary existence of entities—these views of Buddhist are far removed from reason. After a thing is cognised as "it is this", it ceases to exist the very next moment; as such there is therefore no experience of that thing and for want of experience, no memory of that thing is possible (thus the Buddhist view is not reasonable).

Comments

An entity has no origination or birth. All the six possible alternatives are examined and Gauḍapāda establishes *Ajāti.*

"*Jāti* and *Saṁsāra* and its *Anāditva* are admitted from the *Vyavahārika* (phenomenal) point of view but not from the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Pāramārthika (transcendental) point of view. Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-4-25 emphasises identity of *Ātmā (Jīva)* and *Brahma.* Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-4-25 also states that by the knowledge of *Brahma* one becomes fearless *Brahma. Anāditva* of *Hetu (Karma)* and *Phala (Deha)* is rejected from the *Pāramārthika* point of view. Kārikās 3-9, 3-10, 3-15, 3-19, 3-24 and 3-26 point out that the *vyavahāra* is due to *Māyā* and *"Upāyaḥ so Avatārāya"* (3-15) i.e. scriptural texts describing creation are only a device for making one grasp the ultimate Reality. The waking state *(Jāgrat)* is admitted from the *Vyavahārika* point of view for worldly dealings. But out of the three states *Jāgrat swapna* and *suṣupti Jāgrat* is only one part of the three states. By the examination of all the three states the *pāramārtha satya* i.e. *Nitya, Śuddha, Buddha Muktaswabhāva. Brahma* is realised and this is stated in the first chapter. In the second chapter *(vaitathya)* the Māyikaṭva of *Jāgrat* and *swapna* is indicated. In the third chapter it is shown that *Ajāti* and *Māyika Jāti* are one and the same thing. In the fourth chapter the *Kārya Kāraṇabhāva* from the *Pāramārtha* point of view is rejected and *Ajāti* is established by *Avīta-nyāya* i.e. indirect way" (cf. Māṇḍūkya Rahasya vivṛti pp 339-41).

An entity has no originaion or birth. All the six possible alternatives are examined and Gauḍapāda establishes *Ajāti.*

The six alternatives are:

1) An existent cannot be born of itself like pot from a pot. It involves the flaw of *Ātmāśraya.*
2) Nor an existent can be born from some other existent like a piece of cloth from a pot. You cannot say that an existent can be born of an existent only if there is capacity *(yogyatva)* of giving birth in that prior existent, as apart from birth no such separate capacity is known to exist.
3) A thing cannot be born from both itself and another as it involves contradiction.
4) If a thing is *Sat* (existent) it already exists and needs no birth.
5) If a thing does not exist, naturally it is not born.
6) A thing both existent and non-existent cannot have a birth as the very proposition involves contradiction.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

These alternatives are pointed out to those who maintain as real and distinct the cause, the effect and the act of birth and here all the six alternatives are rejected.

Regarding those Buddhists who maintain that the cause, the effect and the act of birth are all in one single moment only *(Janiḥ eva Jāyate)*and believe in the Kṣaṇikatva (momentariness) of everything, the Bhāṣyakāra points out that in the first moment one knows "it is this". For its experience *(anubhava)* at least a second moment is necessary and for the memory of the past experience a third moment is necessary. Thus the Buddhist doctrine of *Ekatva* of cause and effect and act of birth as well as the theory of momentariness of everything has got to be discarded—otherwise *anubhava* and *Smṛti* cannot be explained and thus any kind of *vyavahāra*—worldly activity would be impossible.

हेतुर्न जायतेऽनादेः फलं चापि स्वभावतः ।
आदिर्न विद्यते यस्य तस्य ह्यादिर्न विद्यते ॥२३॥

heturna jāyate'nādeh phalaṁ cāpi svabhāvataḥ.
ādirna vidyate yasya tasya hyādirna vidyate. (23)

Translation

From the *Phala (Deha)* which has no beginning *(Ādi)* the *Hetu (Karma=Dharma Adharma)* cannot be born, so also from a beginningless *Hetu* the *Phala* cannot be born. Birth of either *Hetu* or *Phala* cannot be of its own nature *(swabhāva)* i.e. without any apparent cause. An entity which has no *Kāraṇa* (beginning) cannot pass into birth *(Ādi=Janma).*

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

Further, by maintaining the beginninglessness *(Anāditva)* of *Hetu* and *Phala* you have to perforce admit that neither the *Hetu* nor the *Phala* passes into birth.

Objector: How is it that by maintaining that *Hetu* has its birth from *Phala* and *Phala* from *Hetu*—it follows that both *Hetu* and *Phala* do not pass into birth?

*Siddhāntin:*From a *Phala* without beginning *(Ādi) Hetu* is never born. You do not assert that from an unborn i.e. beginningless

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Phala the *hetu* is born. Similarly from its very nature *(swabhāva)* i.e. without any *Nimitta* or apparent cause either a *Hetu* or *Phala* can not pass into birth (have a *Janma*). Therefore, as you assert *Anāditva* of *Hetu* and *Phala,* you have to accept that neither *Hetu* or *Phala* ever pass into birth (have a *Janma*). An entity which has no *Kāraṇa* (*Ādi* = beginning) cannot have *Ādi* = *Janma* (cannot pass into birth). Only an entity which has a *Kāraṇa* (beginning) can have *Ādi (Janma,* passing into birth)—not an entity without a *Kāraṇa*

Comments

From an *Anādi Phala,* the *Hetu* cannot have its birth; if such a birth is believed, then there would be unending births. There would be a similar flaw if *Hetu* is asserted as *Anādi.* No *Hetu* or *Phala* is ever born by its own nature and without a *Nimitta* or apparent cause. If such birth is asserted, it would be only *Ākasmika* accidental and causeless which is not possible. The word *Ādi* in *Kārikā* has two meanings (1) *Ādi* = cause or beginning. (2) *Ādi* = *janma,* passing into birth. An entity without cause does not pass into birth. *Ātmā* who is without cause *(Aja)* does not pass into real birth as *Prapañca* (universe).

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमन्यथा द्वयनाशतः ।
संक्लेशस्योपलब्धेश्च परतन्त्रास्तिता मता ॥२४॥

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvamanyathā dvyayanāśataḥ.
saṁkleśasyopalabdheśca paratantrāstitā matā. (24)

Translation

Subjective cognition *(Prajñaptī)* must have an objective cause *(Nimittatva,* in the form of external objects); otherwise both *Prajñapti* and *Nimitta* would cease to exist. There would be then no diversity *(Dwaya)* of cognitions, further, on account of the experience of pain other philosophical systems assert the existence of external objects.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

In order to support what is already stated (viz.that an entity has no real birth) an objection is put forth (and then replied.) The objection is raised by *Bāhyārthavādin* Buddhists) *Prajñapti* means *Prajñāna,* subjective cognition. *(Prajñapti* is not *Brahma* here

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

which is also called *Prajñāna),* i.e. subjective cognition of objective *Nimitta* i.e. causes like sound etc. This subjective cognition has an external cause or object which is distinct and separate from the subjective cognition itself. This is being asserted (by the *Bāhyārthavādin* Buddhist). No subjective cognition of notions like sound etc can be without external objects, as all cognitions have corresponding external objects. If that is not so and if subjective cognitions are without external objects there would be absence of diversity and manifoldness *(Dwaya)* of cognitions of sound, touch, blue, yellow red etc. But such diversity and manifoldness (of cognitions) do exist as being directly perceived. Therefore because of the perception of this diversity and manifoldness, there is assertion of the existence of external objects as distinct and apart from subjective cognition in the system of philosophy of other *(Paratantra* i.e. *Bāhyārthavādin* Buddhist).

As subjective cognition has only luminosity as its nature this diverstiy and manifoldness is not possible without the manifold support *(Ālambana)* of external objects like blue, yellow etc and this diversity cannot be explained as merely a variety of the (luminous) nature (of the subjective cognition) itself. Crystal does not have a variety (of colours) without resort to the special (external) causes *(upādhi)* like blue etc. It is like that. Further because of the following ground the system of philosophy of others assert the existence of the external object as distinct and apart from their subjective cognitions. *Saṅkleśa* means pain. We do experience pain caused by burns due to fire etc. If an external object like fire which is the cause of pain like burns etc were not there, apart and distinct from subjective cognition, pain like burns etc would not have been experienced. But we do experience such pain. We therefore assert the existence of external objects. We cannot explain pain etc by merely admitting the existence of subjective cognition alone. For such pain is not experienced elsewhere (eg. by applying sandal paste).

Comments

In this *Kārikā,* the view of the *Bāhyārthavādin* Buddhist is stated. He asserts the existence of external objects apart and distinct from their subjective cognitions on two grounds : (1) the diversity and manifoldness of cognition (2) the experience of pain due to burns etc from external causes like fire etc.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

The word *"Paratantra"* in the Kārikā means, according to *Śaṅkara,* the system of Philosophy of others i.e. *Bāhvārthavādin* Buddhist according to the context.

According to Prof. V. Bhattacharya, the word *Paratantra astitā* means "the existence of *Prajñapti* and experience of *Saṅkleśa* depends *(Para-tantra)* on external objects".

Prof. Karmarkar rejects this explanation on the ground that the question here is about the existence of *Bāhyārtha* and not on whether that existence is dependent or independent. *"Paratantra"* is one of the three *Lakṣaṇas* of a thing according to Buddhists "Paratantra" (dependent), *Parikalpita* (imagined) and *Pariniṣpanna* (perfect).

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमिष्यते युक्तिदर्शनात् ।
निमित्तस्यानिमित्तत्वमिष्यते भूतदर्शनात् ॥२५॥

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvamiṣyate yuktidarśanāt .
nimittasyānimittatvamiṣyate bhūtadarśanāt. (25)

Translation

Subjective cognition has an objective cause (in the form of external objects) when seen from the point of view of logical reasoning; but the so-called objective cause is no cause when seen from the point of view of the highest Reality.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

You wish to assert that subjective cognition has an objective cause (in the form of external objects) as seen from the point of view of logical reasoning viz. (1) variety of cognitions and (2) experience of pain etc. Alright. Maintain this position that logical reasoning requires you to adopt this view (viz. that subjective cognition should have corresponding external objects).

Objector : What follows from that?

Siddhāntin : You assert pot etc as the substratum external cause from the logical point of view on the grounds of the variety of subjective cognition etc but we deny the existence of that substratum, the objective cause, like the pot etc. How? From the point of view of the highest Reality. When the real nature of clay is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

known, the pot does not exist apart from clay—just as a house has a separate existence from a buffalo. Similarly, cloth does not exist separately apart from the threads. Threads do not exist apart from fibres. In this way, on investigating anterior and anterior causes after causes we come to a stage where words and external objects denoted by them cease to exist and we do not find the existence of external objects.

Or external objects do not exist as corresponding external causes because of *"Abhūta-darśanāt"*—i.e. because of the erroneous seeing of external objects like erroneously seeing a serpent on a rope. Thus (your so-called) objective cause is no cause at all. (This interpretation is according to the reading in the Kārikā viz. *"Abhūtadarśanāt"* in place of the earlier interpreted reading *"Bhūtadarśanāt").* The reason is that external objects disappear when there is no erroneous vision. In the state of sleep, Yogic *Samādhi* or in the state of liberation, there is absence of erroneous vision and there is no experience of the existence of external object apart from *Ātmā.* Whatever is seen by an insane person, is not regarded as such by a sane person. In this way we have replied to the arguments of (1) variety of cognitions and (2) experience of pain.

Comments

Siddhāntin says that the *Bāhyārthavādin* Buddhist is a dualist, believes in logical reasoning, and relies on only what apparently appears to him. In the reading *"Bhūtadarśanāt", Bhūtadarśana* means *Paramārtha darśana* i.e. from the point of view of the highest Reality established by logical reasoning.

The other reading is *"Abhūtadarśanāt"* i.e. because of the erroneous seeing of external objects like erroneously seeing a serpent on a rope. The real substratum is *Jñāna* and when seen as *Jñāna,* external objects do not exist from the point of view of the highest Reality and therefore we cannot say that external objects are the *Ādhāra*—a Substratum, of the subjective cognition. In states of sleep, *Samādhi* or liberation external objects apart from Ātmā are not experienced. When there is no *Bhrānti* or erroneous vision, external objects are not seen. For the *Tattvadarśin,* apart from the flashing of *vijñāna* there is nothing else. Only from the phenomenal *(Vyavahāra)* point of view, like dream, there is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

variety of cognitions and experience of pain etc and that is only part of *Vyavahāra*

चित्तं न संस्पृशत्यर्थं नार्थाभासं तथैव च।
अभूतो हि यतश्चार्थो नार्थाभासस्ततः पृथक् ॥२६॥

cittaṁ na saṁspṛśatyarthaṁ nārthābhāsaṁ tathaiva ca.
abhūto hi yataścārtho nārthābhāsastataḥ pṛthak. (26)

Translation

The mind does not touch the external object or even the reflection of external object. As stated above, the external object has no real existence and the reflection of external object is not different from mind.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

Because there is no external cause, therefore the mind does not touch the external objects which are supposed to be the external substratum. The reason is stated. (Even though the mind illumines external objects, it does not touch them) similarly the mind also does not touch the reflection of external objects. For, as stated above even in the waking state, as in the dreaming state, external objects like sound etc are unreal. Even reflection of external object is not different from mind. As in dream, even in the waking state, mind alone appears like external objects like pot etc.

Comments

Objection : Each cognition has the substratum of external object—that is our experience. Even from *tattva-dṛṣṭi,* in the absence of object of knowledge, there is no knowledge at all.

Reply : The flashing *(sphuraṇā)* of *vijñāna (citta)* does not require an object (i.e. it is not *sa-karmaka)—vijñāna* is not so known as *sakarmaka.* The root "to know" is regarded as having an object from the imagination that an activity should have some *phala* (reward). *Citta* touches neither external objects (which are unreal) nor their reflections *(arthābhasa).*

निमित्तं न सदा चित्तं संस्पृशत्यध्वसु त्रिषु।
अनिमित्तो विपर्यासः कथं तस्य भविष्यति ॥२७॥

nimittaṁ na sadā cittaṁ saṁspṛśatyadhvasu triṣu.
animitto viparyāsaḥ kathaṁ tasya bhaviṣyati. (27)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

The mind does not come into contact with the cause (external objects) for all the three ways of time *(adhvasu)* — in past present or future. How can there be any causeless reverse i.e. *Bhrānti* (i.e. reflected appearance of external objects) if there is no cause—*Abhrānti* i.e. real (external object) itself? (i.e. without the cause, there cannot be its reverse or reflection—*avabhāsatā)*

Śāṅkara-Bhasya :

Objector : Well! Even if there are no external objects like pot etc, the mind does have the vision of the appearance of the external object—this vision of appearance of a *Padārtha* is called *Viparyāsa,* the reverse of the real *Padārtha.* If there is this *viparyāsa* (the reverse), there must somewhere be its *aviparyāsa* (real *Padārtha* which is the opposite of that reverse) and you must point out where is that real of the *viparyāsa* (reverse, the appearance of external object i.e. if there is appearance of *Padārtha,* there must somewhere be the real of that *Padārtha* according to the *Anyathā-khyāti* of *Naiyāyikas.)*

Siddhāntin :

We reply. The mind never comes into contact at any time with external objects—either in the past, present or future *(Triṣu Adhvasu).* If the mind has at any time come into contact with real external object, then only there would be a real *Aviparyāsa* (opposite of the reverse *viparyāsa).* Then in that case, in reference to real pot existing somewhere, when (at another place) that real pot is absent but there is its appearance, we can say it is the *viparyāsa* (reverse) of the real pot. But here, the mind does not come into contact with an external object at any time, there is therefore no question of an external object existing anywhere. As there is no cause *(Nimitta* i.e. *Aviparyāsa)* or a real external object, there cannot be its *viparyāsa* (reverse) also i.e. the mind (as stated earlier) does not come into contact either with an external object (which does not exist) nor with its *Avabhāsa* (appearance). It is just the nature of the mind viz. that without the existence of any external object, the mind itself appears like external objects.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

Objector: Even though as you say that *Jñāna* is not *saviṣaya,* still by error we have the perception of *viṣaya.* According to *Anyathā-khyāti* of Naiyāyikas, when by error we see an appearance of a *padārtha* then there is always a real *Padārtha* somewhere of which we see the appearance. *Anyathā-khyāti* says that if there is *Bhrānti* of serpent on a rope there must be the existence of a real serpent *(Abhrānti)* somewhere. For every *Bhrānti* (error) there is a corresponding *Abhrānti* (real thing) somewhere. So, if the mind comes into contact with erroneous appearance, there must be its opposite i.e. the real external object somewhere.

Siddhāntin : If the mind has at all come into contact in past present or future with an external object, then only that real *Padārtha* can be *abhrānti* for its *Bhrānti* (erroneous appearance). But as the real external object does not exist at any time, how can there be its *Viparyāsa* (erroneous appearance). How can there be causeless *viparyāsa*? Then how do we see the appearance of external objects? The reply is that it is the very nature of the mind i.e. *Avidyā* by which the mind appears as different objects. In other words, the mind does not come into contact either with a real external object or its reflected appearance—it is the *swabhāva* or *Avidyā* by which the mind itself appears like external objects.

As in *Kālatraya,* the mind does not come into contact with external objects, there cannot be their *vāsanā* and so *Anyathā-khyāti* cannot be alleged here. Further there is no absolute rule that all *Bhrānti* is preceded by its *Abhrānti,* According to Vedānta, all *Bhrānti* of external objects is due to *Avidyā.*

Here *swabhāva,* in *Bhāṣya,* means *Avidyā.* A *Bhrama* (error) which is *saviṣaya* is due to *Avidyā* (ignorance).

तस्मान्न जायते चित्तं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते ।
तस्य पश्यन्ति ये जातिं खे वै पश्यन्ति ते पदम् ॥२८॥

tasmānna jāyate cittaṁ cittadṛśyaṁ na jāyate.
tasya paśyanti ye jātiṁ khe vai paśyanti te padam. (28)

Translation

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(Even though the external objects do not exist, the mind sees only the appearance of external objects therefore) the mind does not pass into any birth (as objects), similarly the objects seen by the mind are not (actually) created. Those who perceive the birth can as well be said to see the foot prints of birds in the sky.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

From Kārikas 24 to 27, beginning with *"Prajñapteḥ Sanimittatvam"*, Ācārya Gauḍapāda has approved the arguments of *Vijñānavādin* Buddhists who have refuted the view of that section of Buddhist who asserts the existence of external objects. Even though the external objects do not exist, *Vijñāna* appears as external objects —taking this argument of *vijñāṇavādin,* against those asserting the reality of external objects, and approving it, the Ācārya now proceeds to refute the conclusion of *vijñānavāda.* This is done by Kārikā 28 beginning with *"Tasmāt"*. The *vijñānavādin* has asserted that external objects do not exist but mind appears as external abjects; we (the *siddhāntin)* have approved of that position from the absolute (transcendental) point of view *(Bhūta darśanāt).* So according to us, the mind does not actually pass into any birth as appearance of external objects but this appearance is only without such birth of the mind. Therefore the mind does not originate into any object. The external object is not born (therefore the mind too is not born into any object).

For this reason, the *Vijñānavādin* Buddhists who believe in the actual production (birth) of the mind as external objects and also further assert that the mind is momentary, full of pain essenceless and non-self (also mutually distinct, mutually similar etc) they forget that it is impossible for the mind to observe its own nature as asserted by them and therefore their position is like those who claim to know the footprints of birds in the sky. These *Vijñānavādins* are therefore more audacious than other dualists. Those Buddhists who are Nihilists *(Śūnyavādins)* who perceive the visible universe and yet assert the non-existence of everything and further assert the non-existence of their own *śūnyatā siddhānta* their own *Pakṣa*—are still more audacious and they resemble those who claim to contain the vast sky in their palms.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

According to Siddhāntin, there is no actual birth or production of *Vijñāna* into or as external objects. Appearance of *Vijñāna* as external objects is not *"tāttvika"*, real, as the external objects are *Dṛśya* like red, yellow etc and whatever is *Dṛśya* is unreal according to Siddhāntin as maintained in earlier chapters of the Kārikā. But *Vijñānavādin* Buddhists believe in the actual origination of mind as external objects and further assert that *Vijñāna* is momentary, full of pain, essenceless *(śūnya)* and non-self (also each *vijñāna* is distinct from the other and mutually similar etc. But *Vijñāna* itself cannot see its own *Dharmas* like momentariness, painfulness, essencelessness, non-self nature etc i.e. *Vijñāna* cannot be the seer of its own nature as Dṛśya etc. *Vijñāna* or the mind cannot understand its own, nature. *Vijñānavādin's* conclusions are therefore as good as the position of one who claims to see footprints of birds in the sky.

The *Śūnyavādin Mādhyamika* Buddhist is still more audacious. He maintains the non-existence of everything including his own Siddhānta and denies the existence of the perciever who sees this non-existence; but how can one see his own non-existence? Such *Mādhyamika,* says the Ācārya, is as audacious as one who wants to contain the vast sky in his palms. There cannot be the existence of the knower and his absence at one and the same point of time. Even *"Abhāva"* or absence of a thing has a knower who perceives this *"Abhāva"*.

अजातं जायते यस्मादजातिः प्रकृतिस्ततः ।
प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद्भविष्यति ॥२९॥

ajātaṁ jāyate yasmādajātiḥ prakṛtistataḥ.
prakṛteranyathābhāvo na kathaṁcidbhaviṣyati. (29)

Translation

(According to some disputants) the unborn is said to pass into birth. But for this very reason non-origination is its *Prakṛti* (nature); there would not be under any circumstances a change of that nature into something else.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

We had earlier asserted that *Brahma* is one and unborn and by the aforesaid Kārikās the same is established. This Kārikā summarises that conclusion. Disputants have imagined that the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

unborn *Citta* or *Brahma* has origination; as the unborn is born, therefore non-origination *(Ajāti)* is the *Prakṛti* (nature) of that unborn *Brahma,* and as *Ajāti* is the *Prakṛti* (nature), that *Prakṛti* in the form of *Ajāti* can never change into anything else (like *Jāti* or origination) under any circumstances.

Comments

It has been established earlier that *Brahma* is *Kūṭastha* (changeless) and one and this is Its nature; because of this nature as one and changeless, the apparent origination can only be due to *Māyā.* As *Brahma* is unborn, *Ajāti* is its *Prakṛti* and Prakṛti never changes under any circumstances; if Prakṛti changes, then there would be *swarūpa-hāni* of *Brahma.* Therefore the *Siddhānta* is that there is *Ajāti* (non-origination) of *Brahma* and what appeaprs as originated is only due to *Māyā* cf. *"Ajāyamāno bahudhā māyayā Jāyate tu saḥ" (Kārikā* 3-24). *"Samvṛtya Jāyate sarvam"* (4-57) *"Janma māyopamaṁ teṣām"* (4-58).

अनादेरन्तवत्त्वं च संसारस्य न सेत्स्यति ।
अनन्तता चादिमतो मोक्षस्य न भविष्यति ॥३०॥

anāderantavattvaṁ ca saṁsārasya na setsyati.
anantatā cādimato mokṣasya na bhaviṣyati. (30)

Translation

If the world creation is beginningless (as asserted by some disputants, then in that case) it would never come to an end. If *Mokṣa* (liberation) has a beginning, then it will never be eternal.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

Here is another flaw in the argument of those disputants who hold that there is real bondage and liberation for *Ātmā.* For, if the worldly existence of *Ātmā* i.e. his bondage is beginningless *(anādi),* then this bondage will have no end at all. i.e. such an end of bondage cannot be established by logical reasoning. In worldly experience, a beginningless entity is never known to have any end.

Objection : The seed and sprout are related as cause and effect and there is continuity as a flow which is beginningless and we see a break in this continuity.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Reply : This kind of argument has been disposed of earlier in our comments on Kārikā 4-20. The continuity as a flow has never been recognised as constituting a single unit and as such neither any seed nor any sprout has *anāditva* (beginninglessness).

Similarly, if liberation is attained after the acquisition of knowledge (and has thus a beginning) then that liberation can never be eternal. For, a pot which has a beginning has also an end.

Objection : Suppose we say that liberation is not a positive substance and is as negative as the utter destruction of a pot *pradhvaṁsābhāva*; then being a negative that utter destruction which has a beginning, it can also be endless. (Similarly after destruction of bondage, liberation can be eternal).

Reply : In that case your postulate that liberation has a positive existence, will be contradicted; and if liberation is not having a positive existence, it can never have any beginning like the horns of a hare (a non-existent cannot have any beginning).

Comments

There is another argument to establish that *Kūṭastha* (changeless) *Brahma* is the only Reality. If *Saṁsāra* is *Anādi* it will remain endlessly like *Ātmā* who is both *Anādi* and eternal. Seed and Sprout as a continuous flow is not recognised as a single unit and therefore all seeds and sprouts are with a beginning and therefore with an end. Whenever there is a beginning there is an end. Illustration of utter destruction *(Pradhvaṁsābhāva)* which has a beginning but no end cannot apply in the case of liberation as liberation has a positive existence while utter destruction is negative.

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।
वितथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥३१॥

ādāvante ca yannāsti vartamāne'pi tattathā.
vitathaiḥ sadṛśāḥ santo'vitathā iva lakṣitāḥ. (31)

सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वप्ने विप्रतिपद्यते ।
तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृता : ॥३२॥

saprayojanatā teṣāṁ svapne vipratipadyate.
tasmādādyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ. (32)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

That which does not exist in the beginning and also in the end is also non-existent in the present. Such objects even though similar to illusions are regarded as if they are real.

The service giving purpose of such entities in the waking state is contradicted in the dream state. Therefore, as these entities have both a beginning and an end, they are recognised by the wise as unreal.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

In the second chapter of these Kārikās *(Vaitathya Prakaraṇa)* these verses are commented upon. Here they are repeated in connection with the subject of bondage of *saṁsāra* and liberation.

Comments

Objection : What is wrong in supposing that liberation can have a beginning and also an end?

Reply :— An entity which does not exist in the beginning and also in the end is unreal and is as good as an illusion.

Objection : Mokṣa, even if it has a beginning, has a service giving purpose and so it cannot be like illusion of a mirage-*Mokṣa* gives pleasure.

Reply : Such service giving purpose of *Mokṣa* is contradicted in dream.

Thus, the conclusion is that any object which has a beginning and an end is illusory and unreal.

सर्वे धर्मा मृषा स्वप्ने कायस्यान्तर्निदर्शनात् ।
संवृतेऽस्मिन् प्रदेशे वै भूतानां दर्शनं कुतः ॥३३

sarve dharmā mṛṣā svapne kāyasyāntarnidarśanāt.
saṁvṛteśmin pradeśe vai bhūtānāṁ darśanaṁ kutaḥ (33)

Translation

All objects in dream are unreal as they are seen within the body. In such a limited space, how can there be the perception of real objects.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

Meaning of Kārikā 4-25b is being explained in detail in twelve verses beginning from this verse. Kārikā 4-25b says that the cause (existence of external objects) is in fact no cause (i.e. there is no real existence of external objects) from the point of view of the highest Reality.

Comments

Siddhāntin says that waking state is as unreal as the dream state for reasons which are common to both. Both the states have a beginning and an end (cf. 4-31). As objects in dream are within the restricted place of the body, similarly objects in waking state are just in one small part of the body of the *virāṭ*. As objects in dream are in their proper place and are yet illusory, similarly objects in the waking state are equally illusory as they cannot be real in *Brahma* who is one partless and homogeneous. Verses 33 to 44 of this chapter, expand the meaning of what is stated in verse 4-25 b. The only Reality is *saṁvid* i.e. *vijñāna* or *Brahma.*

न युक्तं दर्शनं गत्वा कालस्यानियमाद्गतौ ।
प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्तस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ।।३४।।

na yuktaṁ darśanaṁ gatvā kālasyāniyamādgatau.
Pratibuddhaśca vai sarvastasmin deśe na vidyate. (34)

Translation

It is not possible for the dreamer to actually go out and see objects for want of the required time to go and see them and when awakened, he does not find himself at the place seen in dream.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

The meaning is that the time required for going to and coming back from a place in the waking state is definite and fixed. But in dream such definite and fixed time is absent.

Comments

For going to another country seen in dream, the time available to the dreamer is not enough. On waking he does not find himself at the place seen in the dream. Similarly it is not possible for one to go by *Arcirādi* Marga and see *Brahma* who is beyond space and time. Similarly one experiencing *Deha-bhāva*,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

cannot experience *Brahma-bhāva,* for after experiencing *Brahma* who is full and unlimited, one does not feel *Deha—bhāva.*

मित्राद्यैः सह संमन्त्र्य संबुद्धो न प्रपद्यते ।
गृहीतं चापि यत्किंचित्प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥३५॥

mitrādyaiḥ saha saṁmantrya saṁbuddho na prapadyate.
gṛhītaṁ cāpi yatkiñcitpratibuddho na paśyati. (35)

Translation

Whatever conversation a dreamer had in dream he finds all that unreal on waking up. Moreover, whatever things have been acquired by him in dream he does not perceive as possessed by him when reawakened.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya :

All conversations a dreamer had in dream with his friends are found unreal when he is reawakened. Whatever gold and other objects a dreamer acquires in dream are not found as possessed by him on reawakening. His going to foreign countries in dream is also found to be unreal on his waking up.

Comments

Just as there is discrepancy in the experiences in the dream state and therefore dream objects are illusery, similarly there is discrepancy in the experiences in the waking state also and those objects are equally illusory.

Before *Brahmajñāna,* one feels that he has to adopt certain *sādhanas* have conversations with teachers etc but on awakening i.e. on having the enlightenment of *Brahmajñāna* he realise that he is *Nitya-mukta* and therefore desire for liberation *Sādhanas* etc are all due to ignorance. Whatever he does in his phenomenal existence and in *Vyavahāra*—having clothes, eating food etc—is not felt by him as done by him-he feels "I am doing nothing". As there is nothing to be acquired by a *Samyag-darśin, sādhanas* like *śravaṇa* etc are only required till the removal of *Ajñāna* that *Jīva* is not *Brahma.*

स्वप्ने चावस्तुकः कायः पृथगन्यस्य दर्शनात् ।
यथा कायस्तथा सर्वं चित्तदृश्यमवस्तुकम् ॥३६॥

svapne cāvastukaḥ kāyaḥ pṛthaganyasya darśanāt.
yathā kāyastathā sarvaṁ cittadṛśyamavastukam. (36)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

The body in the dream is unreal as another body which is quite distinct from it is perceived. As the body, so also everything perceived by the mind is unreal.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

The body perceived in the dream as wandering is unreal as another body quite distinct from it is seen at the place where the dreamer is sleeping. Just as the body perceived in dream is unreal, so also everything perceived by the mind is unreal, including objects perceived in the waking state. The reason is that all these objects are cognised by the mind. The import of this chapter is to show that objects seen in the waking state are equally unreal as they are similar to those perceived in the dream.

Comments

The body perceived in the dream as wandering here and there is unreal as another body quite distinct from that body wandering in dream is seen as sleeping in the bed.

Similarly in the waking state a monk moving in his Ochre robes is respected or hated—all this is unreal as this experience is distinct from the experience when he has attained *Brahma-śarīra* i.e. the experience of liberation. Thus, experiences in the dream as well as the waking state are equally unreal as both are merely states of mind only.

ग्रहणाज्जागरितवत्तद्धेतुः स्वप्न इष्यते ।
यद्धेतुत्वात्तु तस्यैव सज्जागरितमिष्यते ॥३७॥

grahaṇājjāgaritavattaddhetuḥ svapna iṣyate.
yaddhetutvāttu tasyaiva sajjāgaritamiṣyate. (37)

Translation

As the experience in the dream is similar to that in the waking state, it is thought that the waking state is the cause of the dream; and as the waking state is the cause of the dream, the waking experiences appear as real to him (i.e. the dreamer) alone (and not according to others).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya :

The experiences in the waking state are unreal for this additional ground. Just as there are visible objects in the waking

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

state similarly there is subject-object relationship (of visible objects) in the dream. For this reason, the waking state is imagined as the cause of the dream state. But for this very reason that the waking state is the cause of the dream state, the waking experiences appear real to the dreamer only and not to others. Just as the dream appears to the dreamer as a common real experience of all those abiding in his dream world but in fact that so called common real experience appears as real to the dreamer alone and not to others. Similarly, as the waking state is the cause of the dream state, what appears as the real common experiences in the waking state are in fact not real common experiences of others—just as the dream experiences appear real to the dreamer alone, similarly waking experiences appear real to the person experiencing them alone and not to others.

Comments

Swapna is perceived as similar to *Jāgarita.* Therefore, *swapna* is the *Kārya* of *Jāgarita* and *Kārya* and *Kāraṇa* are of the same nature; just as *swapna* experiences appear real to the dreamer alone so also the *Jāgarita* experiences appear real only to him experiencing them i.e. they are equally unreal. You cannot argue that as *Jāgarita* experiences appear as common real experiences to many others seen existing in the waking state; as similar is the case with the dream state—there also a number of persons exist in the dream world and the dreamer imagines that his dream experiences are common to all those existing in the dream world but in fact, those dream experiences appear as real to the dreamer alone. Similarly, as *Jāgarita* is the cause of *swapna* and *Kārya* and *Kāraṇa* are of the same nature *Jāgarita* experiences are as unreal or *Mithyā* as dream experiences—even though he imagines that they are common to many others in *Jāgarita*—they in fact are felt as real only by the *Jāgarita* experiencer alone.

उत्पादस्याप्रसिद्धत्वादजं सर्वमुदाहृतम् ।
न च भूतादभूतस्य संभवोऽस्ति कथंचन ॥३८॥

utpādasyāprasiddhatvādajaṁ sarvamudāhṛtam.
na ca bhūtādabhūtasya saṁbhavo'sti kathañcana. (38)

Translation

(So far as the enlightened person is concerned) origination or

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

birth of anything is not established at all and therefore it is said (by *vedānta)* that all this is unborn. There is no birth of an unreal from the real under any circumstances.

Śaṇkara-Bhāṣya.

(Objection) Merely because the waking state is the cause of the dream, it cannot be said that objects in the waking state are as unreal as objects in the dream. Dream is of a fleeting nature while the waking state is of a lasting nature.

Reply. True, this is with regard to those who have no discrimination. But so far as persons with discrimination are concerned, there is no origination (birth) of anything established at all; thus for want of such origination(birth), all this is known as unborn *Ātmā* in *Vedānta,* as the Sruti says *"Ātmā* is both within and without and unborn". If you would urge that from the real *Jāgarita,* the unreal *swapna* is born—then your contention would not be tenable; for in our worldly experience there is no birth of a non-existent from an existent. Horns of a hare are never known as being created from anything.

Comments

It is true that the dream is of a short duration and *Jāgarita* is more lasting. But from this difference, *Jāgarita* appears as real to the non-enlightened, not to one with discrimination. Again, it cannot be argued that from the real *Jāgarita,* the unreal dream is created; for a non-existent cannot be produced from an existent. *Vedānta* therefore states that all this is *Ātmā* alone, within and without and unborn.

असज्जागरिते दृष्ट्वा स्वप्ने पश्यति तन्मयः ।
असत्स्वप्नेऽपि दृष्ट्वा च प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥३९॥

asajjāgarite dṛṣṭvā svapne paśyati tanmayaḥ.
asatsvapne'pi drstvā ca pratibuddho na paśyati. (39)

Translation

Having seen unreal objects in the waking state and getting deeply impressed by them, one sees the same thing in the dream, and having seen unreal things in dream sometimes he does not also see in the dream objects seen in the waking state).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

(Objection) You have stated that the dream is the effect of the waking state. Then how do you say that there is no cause and effect relationship? *(Anutpāda)*

Reply

Please hear in what sense we explain the cause and effect relationship in this case. One imagines and sees an unreal object like a serpent on the rope in the waking state and being deeply impressed by it and getting absorbed in it he imagines and sees in the dream the dream object with subject-object relationship. Similarly having seen objects in dream, he does not see them in the waking state. The word "and" in the *Kārikā* is intended to indicate that sometimes having seen objects in the waking state he does not also see them in the dream. It is therefore in this sense that the waking state has been described by us as the cause of the dream and not from the point of view of the ultimate Reality.

Comments

The Siddhāntin has rejected origination of any kind including cause and effect relationship. The objector asks that in this case, how can the Siddhāntin say that *Jāgarita* is the cause of *Swapna?* The reply is that one sees unreal objects in *Jāgarita* and being impressed by them he sees the same in *swapna.* But he does not necessarily see objects seen in *swapna* on waking nor does he always see objects seen in *Jāgarita* when he dreams. We can only say that generally *swapna* is due to the *Vāsanā* of *Jāgarita* but from the point of view of the ultimate Reality there is no cause and effect Relationship. The objector's contention that as objects in *Jāgarita* are real, those in the *swapna* are also real because of cause and effect relationship.—This contention is given a reply to in this *Kārikā.* The *siddhāntin* says that we never maintain that *Jāgarita* is *Paramārtha Sat.*

नास्त्यसद्धेतुकमसत्सदसद्धेतुकं तथा ।
सच्च सद्धेतुकं नास्ति सद्धेतुकमसत्कुतः ॥४०॥

nāstyasaddhetukamasatsadasaddhetukaṁ tathā.
sacca saddhetukaṁ nāsti saddhetukamasatkutaḥ. (40)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

The unreal cannot be the cause of the unreal nor can unreal be the cause of the real. the real cannot be the cause of the real and how can the real be the cause of the unreal?

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

From the point of view of the Ultimate Reality there cannot be in any way the cause and effect relation of any entity. How? Horns of a hare cannot be the cause of a flower in the sky—a non-existent cannot be the cause of a non-existent. Similarly an existent like a pot cannot be the effect of a non-existent like the horns of a hare. Further, an existent like a pot cannot be the effect of another existent like a pot or another existing entity. And how can a non-existent be the effect of an existent? There is no possibility of any other variety of cause and effect relationship apart from these (four varieties).The meaning is that for people who are discriminating the cause and effect relationship of any entity cannot be proved.

Comments

Cause and effect relationship of *Jāgarita* and *Swapna* is stated from the "*Vyavahāra*" i.e. phenomenal point of view but from the point of view of *Tattvadṛṣṭi* causality cannot be established. The four views (1) unreal producing unreal (2) unreal producing real (3) real producing real (4) and real producing unreal are rejected as ***Brahma*** is *Catuṣkoṭi-Varjita.*

In 4-22 it is stated that nothing is born either from itself or another. In this 4-40 the same is stated rejecting causality. The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 21-12 is similar to this 4-40 and that view is approved of here by Gauḍapāda to prove his *Ajātivāda.* But *Mādhyamikas* stop after stating that there is no *Jāti* of anything but the *Mādhyamika* Buddhists do not establish any *Paramārtha-tattva* after rejecting *Jatī* or origination as is done by Gauḍapāda. In *siddhānta,* the *Aja sat Brahma* has *Māyika Janma* as *Jagat* but *Pāramārthika Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* is rejected—thus the *siddhāntin* view is not contradicted by *Ajātivāda.*

विपर्यासाद् यथा जाग्रदचिन्त्यान् भूतवत् स्पृशेत् ।
तथा स्वप्ने विपर्यासाद्धर्मांस्तत्रैव पश्यति ॥४१॥

viparyāsād yathā jāgradacintyān bhūtavat spṛśet.
tathā svapne viparyāsāddharmāṁstatraiva paśyati. (41)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Just as in the waking state one comes into contact with inconceivable objects as though they are real, on account of want of discrimination, similarly in dream one perceives through want of discrimination objects there itself (i.e. in dream).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

This *Kārikā* is intended to remove any possibility of causal relationship between *Jāgarita* and *swapna,* which both are unreal. Just as one imagines in the waking states through want of *viveka* (discrimination) inconceivable objects like serpent on a rope as though they are real objects, similarly one through want of discrimination imagines and as if perceives objects like elephant horse etc but such objects are seen in the dream only and they are not produced from the waking state.

Comments

This is another reason why there is no causal relationship between *Jāgarita* and *Swapna.*

उपलम्भात् समाचारादस्तिवस्तुत्ववादिनाम् ।
जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैरजातेस्त्रसतां सदा ॥४२॥

upalambhāt samācārādastivastutvavādinām.
jātistu deśitā buddhairajātestrasatām sadā. (42)

Translation

The wise *Advaitins* preach the doctrine of *Jāti* (origination) to those who are afraid of the doctrine of *Ajāti* (non-origination) because of the perception of those objects and because of their faith in the virtuous life like observance of *Varṇāśrama Dharmas.*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

The wise *Advaitins (Buddhaiḥ)* have preached the doctrine of origination, because the external objects are perceived, and also because of their faith in the virtuous life like observance of *Varṇāśrama Dharmas.* On account of these two reasons, those who are habituated in speaking of the reality of external objects, who are strongly attached to that belief, and who are endowed with faith but yet are dull-witted, to these persons is preached

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the doctrine of *Jāti* (origination) as a device to later on lead them to the doctrine of *Ajāti* (non-origination). *Jāti* is not preached to them from the ultimate point of view but only with a view that in due course after the study of *Vedānta* they will automatically have the proper discrimination about the unborn non-dual *Ātmā*. Such people have faith in the vedic lore but are of inferior intelligence and they are afraid of the doctrine of *Ajāti* (non-origination) and being without the proper sense of discrimination they think that it involves the destruction of *Ātmā*. It has already been stated earlier that such scriptural statements describing the origination (creation) of the universe is meant only as a device to ultimately lead them to the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality.

Comments

Following the rule of first *Adhyāropa* (super-imposition) and then its *Apavāda* (rejection), men of inferior intelligence are lead to the knowledge of the ultimate reality eg. *Brahma sūtra* 1-1-2 says *"Janmādyasya yataḥ"* referring to *Taittirīya Up.* 3-1; Gītā 10-8 says "I am the source of all" etc. From *tattvadṛṣṭi*, there is no causal relationship but creation of the universe is described by the scriptures to lead *Avivekin* to *Viveka*. For, if it is recognised that everything has proceeded from *Brahma*, then one gets the determination that there is no *Jagat* apart from *Brahma*. By the grace of the study of *Vedānta* texts in their proper context, one gets the firm *Viveka* and the knowledge of the changeless non-duel Reality. It is for this purpose that scriptures preach creation—not because there is any *Jāti*—creation or origination-from the point of view of ultimate reality.

The word *"Samācāra"* has been interpreted as "the prevailing etiquette" and as "common practice" by Prof. Bhattacharya. Śaṅkara equates it with leading a virtuous life as prescribed by *Dharmaśāstra* including *varṇāśrama dharmas* where *"Samāeāra"* practically means *"Sadācāra"*.

The word *"Buddhaiḥ"* is rightly interpreted as "by the wise, the enlightened" like the use of the word *"Manīṣiṇaḥ"* elsewhere. Prof. Viduushekhar Bhattacharya, on account of his special theory, sees a reference here to Gautama Buddha.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

अजातेस्त्वततां तेषामुपलम्भाद्भियन्ति ये ।
जातिदोषा न तेत्स्यन्ति दोषोऽप्यल्पो भविष्यति ॥४३॥

ajātestrasatāṁ teṣāmupalambhādviyanti ye.
jātidoṣā na setsyanti doṣo'pyalpo bhaviṣyati. (43)

Translation

Those who are afraid of the doctrine of *Ajāti* (non-origination) and on account of the perception (of external objects as though they are real) deviate (from *Advaita* and accept duality)— in their case the evil consequences of their belief in *Jāti* (origination) do not prove effective and the evil involved would be negligible.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Those who are afraid of *Ajāti* on account of perception of external objects as though they are real and on account of *Samācāra* (they lead life according to *Varṇāśrama Dharmas)* and therefore deviate from the belief in unborn and non-dual *Ātmā* and accept duality in the case of such people afraid of the doctrine of *Ajāti* (non-origination) but who are men of faith and are leading a virtuous life—the evil consequences of their belief in *Jāti* (origination) do not prove effective; the reason is that they follow the path of discrimination. Even if there is evil, that is very small. The small evil is due to their non having realised the Ultimate Reality.

Comments

The *Taittirīya Śruti* says that if any one sees even a small *vikāra* in *Brahma*—i.e. has *Bhedadṛṣṭi*—he will be overtaken by fear. If that is so why should those who are afraid of *Ajāti* not have evil consequences? The reply is that such people who are men of faith, lead a virtuous life, follow vedic precepts, are *Sādhakas* and follow the path of discrimination—in their case the evil consequences are not effective. The *Veda* itself has prescribed for them vedic *karma* and *upāsanā* for *citta-śuddhi* and *Krama-mukti* by taking compassion on them. Gītā says "one who is *Kalyāṇakṛt* has no *durgati*" "My devotee never perishes (9-11)". They do not have the evil consequences because of their belief in origination as they ultimately know the *Paratattva.* But the small evil is there

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

viz. *Garbhāvāsa* and another birth—as there is censure of *Bheda dṛṣṭi* in Śruti.

उपलम्भात् समाचारान्मायाहस्ती यथोच्यते ।
उपलम्भात् समाचारादस्ति वस्तु तथोच्यते ॥४४॥

upalambhāt samācārānmāyāyāhastī yathocyate.
upalambhāt samācārādasti vastu tathocyate. (44)

Translation

Just as an Illusion-elephant is said to exist (in reality) on account of its being perceived and its behaving in a manner common (to a real elephant), similarly (external) objects are said to exist (in reality) on account of their being perceived and on account of the common practice of treating them (as existing in reality).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya:

Objection: If there is perception and a common practice of treating external objects as real, then there does exist duality.

Reply: No. The rule that "perception" and "common practice" prove the reality of external object is not found as necessarily valid (as in the case of an Illusion—elephant). We are seeing an illusion-elephant and it behaves in the same manner as a real elephant. It can be tied with a rope, can be climbed upon and can have similar activites which are connected with a real elephant. Even though unreal, it is still called a (really existing) elephant. Similarly duality consisting of diversity is said to be really existing on account of "perception" and the common practice (of treating it as real). The meaning therefore, is that "perception" and "common practice" cannot be put forward as valid reasons for proving the real existence of duality.

जात्याभासं चलाभासं वस्त्वाभासं तथैव च ।
अजाचलमवस्तुत्वं विज्ञानं शान्तमद्वयम् ॥४५॥

jātyābhāsaṁ calābhāsaṁ vastvābhāsaṁ tathaiva ca.
ajācalamavastutvaṁ vijñānaṁ śāntamadvayam. (45)

Translation

Vijñāna (consciousness) has only the appearance of being born, appearance of moving and appearance of being a substance,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

but it is really unborn *(Aja),* unmoving *(acala),* not having the characteristic of a material substance *(avastu)* and is all peace and non-dual.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Now is stated that ultimate Reality which is the substratum of the erroneous cognitions like origination (real creation of external objects, causuality etc) *"Jātyābhāsam"* means having the appearance of being born e.g. when we say "Devadatta is born".

"Calābhāsam" means having the appearance of moving e.g. when we say "Devadatta is going". *Vastvābhāsam"* means having the appearance of being a material substance with certain qualities e.g. when we say "Devadatta is fair and tall". Devadatta appears as if born, moving, tall and fair but from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality It is unborn unmoving and not having the characteristic of being a material substance—that which is of this nature is *Vijñāna* (conscisusness). As It is without *Jāti* (origination) etc. It is all peace, and for this very reason It is non-dual.

Comments

Gauḍapāda distinguishes here his theory of *Vijñānavāda* from the Buddhist theory of *Vijñānavāda.* In the *Vijñānavāda* of Buddhists, *Vijñāna* is momentary, and has some kind of birth. This is referred to by Gauḍapāda in Kārikā 4-28. In Vedānta, *Vijñāna* is *Aja, Acala, Avastu, Śānta* and "non-dual". Gauḍapāda says *vijñāna* is *Advaya* i.e. without a second, without anything apart from *Vijñāna.* According to Buddhists, the word *"Advaya"* means without the two extremes of "is" and "is not". According to Gauḍapāda *Vijñāna* i.e. *Ātmā* is positively *"Sat". "Sadbhāvena hyajam sarvam" Kārikā* 4-57. Thus, common phraseology does not mean identical tenets. In *Vedānta,advaita* and *Advaya* mean the same thing. *Advaya* or *Advaita* in *Vedānta* means "without a second" i.e. there is nothing apart from non-dual *Aja Brahma.*

एवं न जायते चित्तमेवं धर्मा अजाः स्मृताः ।
एवमेव विजानन्तो न पतन्ति विपर्यये ॥४६॥

evaṁ na jāyate cittamevaṁ dharmā ajāḥ smṛtāḥ.
evameva vijānanto na patanti viparyaye. (46)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Thus the mind is not subject to birth nor are the entities *(Ātmans)* ever born. Those who know this truth will never fall into any error.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya:

On account of the above mentioned reasons, the mind is not subject to any birth. Similarly, *dharmas* i.e. *Ātmans* are also said to be unborn by those who have realised *Brahma. Dharmas (Ātmans)* are stated in plural out of courtsey in a secondary sense on account of the perception of a variety of bodies etc even though *Ātmā* is non-dual. In this way only, those who know the *Vijñāna (Brahma)* as free from birth etc. non-dual and as the essence of the self and who have given up all desires for external objects—such persons never fall into error i.e. never fall once again in the ocean of the darkness of Ignorance *(Avidyā).* The *Śruti* also says "where is delusion or grief for the one who realises non-duality?"

Comments

Brahma is of the nature of *Cit.* (consciousness) and is *Aja*—this was established earlier and is now stated by way of *upasamhāra. Citta* is the same as *caitanya, Brahma. Vijñāna* also means *Brahma.* The *phala flof knowing the identity of Ātmā* and *Brahma* is stated viz. such knower never falls again in the ocean of the darkness of *Avidyā.*

ऋजुवक्रादिकाभासमलातस्पन्दितं यथा ।
ग्रहणग्राहकाभासं विज्ञानस्पन्दितं तथा ॥४७॥

ṛjuvakrādikābhāsamalātaspanditaṁ yathā.
grahaṇagrāhakābhāsaṁ vijñānaspanditaṁ tathā. (47)

Translation

Just as the movement of the firebrand appears as straight, crooked etc, similarly the vibrations of *vijñāna* appear as perception perceiver etc.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya:

There above mentioned Ultimate Reality is further explained. Just as in our worldly experience, a fire-brand when put in motion has the appearance of being straight, crooked etc similarly the vibrations of *vijñāna* (consciousness) have the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

appearance of perception, perceiver etc has the appearance of subject-object. Motion or vibration is really speaking no motion or vibration—it only appears to have vibrations due to *Avidyā*. *Vijñāna* is *Acala* (immovable) and cannot have real vibrations. It has been earlier described as immovable and unborn.

Comments

Vijñāna has been described earlier as *acala, aja, Jatyābhāsa, calābhāsa* etc in Kārikā 4-45. This is now explained by an illustration, *Vijñāna* vibrations *(spandana)* are only *vivarta* i.e. without giving up its original form or nature, there is an appearance of various unreal forms. But in reality *vijñana* is partless, all pervading *(vibhu)* without any motion and therefore its vibrations are only in appearance. The illustration of the fire-brand is given in details in Kārikās 47 to 52.

अस्पन्दमानमालातमनाभासमज यथा ।
अस्पन्दमानं विज्ञानमनाभासमजं तथा ॥४८॥

aspandamānamālātamanābhāsamajaṁ yathā.
aspandamānaṁ vijñānamanābhāsamajaṁ tathā. (48)

Translation

When the fire-brand is not in motion, it does not present any appearances and is unoriginated (i.e. does not appear as changing into various forms). Similarly, when *Vijñāna* is not vibrating, it presents no appearances and is unoriginated.

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya.

The same fire-brand when it is not in motion, does not take forms whether straight or crooked, does not present appearances and is unoriginated; similarly, the vibrations of *vijñāna* appear on account of *Avidyā* and when *Avidyā* disappears, *vijñāna* does not appear to vibrate and is without the appearance of birth, forms etc and remains *Aja* (unborn) and *Acala* (motionless).

Comments

Vijñāna is described as *Śānta* in Kārikā 4-45. This is being explained by the illustration of the fire-brand when not in motion. *Vijñāna* appears to vibrate on account of *Avidyā.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

अलाते स्पन्दमाने वै नाभासा अन्यतोभुवः ।
न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्दान्नालातं प्रविशन्ति ते ॥४९॥

alate spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvaḥ.
na tato'nyatra nispandānnālātaṁ praviśanti te. (49)

Translation

When the fire-brand is in motion, the appearances do not come from elsewhere, nor do they go out of the motionless fire-brand, so also they do not enter into the (motionles) fire-brand.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Moreover, when that fire-brand is in motion, the appearances, straight or crooked, do not come to that fire-brand from elsewhere, nor do they go outside from the motionless fire-brand; so also they do not enter the fire-brand when not in motion.

Comments

The reason is given why the appearances, straight or crooked, of the fire-brand in motion are *Mithyā* (unreal)—as it is not possible to ascertain their substance. They do not come from elsewhere. When *Alāta* is motionless, they do not leave *Alāta* and go out of *Alāta,* they also do not enter *Alāta,* as *Alāta* is not their *upādāna* (material cause) and so they cannot have their *laya,* absorption, in *Alāta.* If movement of *Alāta* was the *Nimitta Kāraṇa* and *Alāta* the *upādāna Kārāṇa,* then even in absence of motion *(Nimitta Kāraṇa)*—the straight and crooked appearances would continue to appear as when the Potter *(Nimitta-kāraṇa)* is absent, the pots do not disappear, but straight or crooked appearances do not appear when *Alāta* is motionless-therefore the appearances are *Mithyā.*

न निर्गता अलातात्ते द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ।
विज्ञानेऽपि तथैव स्युराभासस्याविशेषतः ॥५०॥

na nirgatā alātātte dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ.
vijñāne'pi tathaiva syurābhāsasyāviśeṣataḥ. (50)

Translation

The appearances do not come out of the fire-brand as they are not of the nature of a substance. The same is the case with *vijñāna* as there is no difference in the nature of appearances in both cases.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

More over, these appearances do not come out of the fire-brand as they are not of the nature of a substance like a house etc. They have the absence of the nature of a substance. i.e. of being a *vastu* or real substance. Only a real substance can have entry or exit (into or out of another) not anything which is unreal. So also in *vijñāna,* the appearances of *Jāti* (birth) etc are unreal, as in both cases (of *Alāta* and *vijñāna)* appearances are of the same nature.

Comments

"Absence of being a substance" is the reason why the entry or exit of those appearances of *Alāta* from or into anything else is impossible, Movement can only be of a substance *(Dravya)*—not of adravya according to *Naiyāyikas.* The same is the case with *Vijñāna.*

विज्ञाने स्पन्दमाने वै नाऽऽभासा अन्यतोभुवः ।
न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्दान्न विज्ञानं विशन्ति ते ॥५१॥

vijñāne spandamāne vai nā"bhāsā anyatobhuvaḥ.
na tato'nyatra nispandānna vijñānaṁ viśanti te. (51)

Translation

When *Vijñāna* is vibrationg, the appearances do not come from anywhere else, nor do they go out of the motionless *Vijñāna;* so also they do not enter the *Vijñāna.*

न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानाद् द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ।
कार्यकारणताऽभावाद्यतोऽचिन्त्याः सदैव ते ॥५२॥

na nirgatāste vijñānād dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ.
kāryakāraṇatā'bhāvādyato'cintyāḥ sadaiva te (52)

Translation

The appearances do not come out of *vijñāna* as they are not of the nature of a substance. As they are not of the relation of cause and effect, they are always beyond comprehension.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

(On 51st and 52nd Kārikās);—Everything in the case of *vijñāna* is similar to the fire-brand. But in the case of *vijñāna* the special feature is that *vijñāna* is motionless. How are the appearances of origination etc caused in motionless *vijñana?* As

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

there is no relation of cause and effect, the relation of product and produced cannot be established (between *vijñāna* and the appearances) and therefore they are always beyond comprehension. The purpose of the whole of discussion is this. Just as the mere fire-brand is associated with various forms straight, crooked etc. even though these appearances, straight, crooked etc are unreal, similarly mere *vijñāna* is associated with birth etc even through these appearances of birth etc are illusory.

Comments

Appearances do not come to *vijñāna* from outside as that is not the *Pratīti,* particularly as *vijñāna* is motionless, they cannot come out of *vijñāna* as *vijñāna* is not their *upādāna;* they cannot enter into *vijñāna* as they have no motion, they not being of the nature of a *Dravya.* As there is no relation of cause and effect between them and *vijnāna,* they are beyond comprehension.

द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य हेतुः स्यादन्यदन्यस्य चैव हि ।
द्रव्यत्वमन्यभावो वा धर्माणां नोपपद्यते ॥५३॥

dravyaṁ dravyasya hetuḥ syādanyadanyasya caiva hi .
dravyatvamanya bhāvo vā dharmāṇāṁ nopapadyate. (53)

Translation

A substance may be the cause of another substance. A category (like *Guṇa)* which is not a substance *(Dravya)* may be the cause of another category which is not a substance. But the *Dharmas (Ātmans)* cannot possibly be either a substance or any category other than substance.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The essence of *Ātmā* is established as unborn and one. Those who imagine the relation of cause and effect in that *Ātmā* will have to admit that only a substance can be the cause of another substance. Further that which is a catagory (like *Guṇa)* other than a substance can be the cause of a category (like *guṇa)* other than a substance. But a thing cannot be the cause of its own self. Further, a category (like *Guṇa)* cannot be independently the cause of anything in our worldly experience. *Ātmans* cannot be called a substance or a category (like *Guṇa)* other than a substance. Therefore *Ātmans* cannot be the cause or effect of.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

anything. As *Ātmā* is neither a substance nor a category other than a substance Ātmā cannot be either the cause or effect of anything.

Comments

It has been stated in the preceding *Kārikā* that "there is no relation of cause and effect"—this is now being established. As *Ātmā* is unborn and one, he has no division in him as *Avayava* (part) and *Avayavin* and as *Ātmā* is one, there is no relation in him of *Guṇa* (attributes) and *Guṇin.* Those who imagine the relation of cause and effect have to admit that a substance can be the cause of another substance or a category like *Guṇa* (other than a substance)can be the cause of a category like *Guṇa* (other than substance) eg. *tantuguṇa* like whiteness can be the *Paṭaguṇa* like the whiteness in *Paṭa.* But a thing cannot be the cause of its own self. But *Ātmā* is *Nirguṇa,* one and partless. A *guṇa* which is *adravya* cannot be independently the cause of anything. *Ātmā* is neither *Dravya* or a category other than *Dravya* (like *Guṇa).*

Further *Ātmā* is mere pure existence *(Sanmātra)* and is therefore non-different from any substance and therefore *Ātmā* cannot be the cause or effect of anything. Therefore, because of having *Adravyatva* and *ananyatva, Ātmā* cannot be the cause or effect of anything.

In the *Kārika Ātmans (Dharmas)* is used in plural because of the *Upādhi* and therefore this plural is in a secondary sense. Śaṅkara interprets *"Dharmāḥ"* in this *Kārikā* as *Ātmans.* In the next *Kārikā* the word *"Dharmas"* is used in the sense of entities or external appearances and it is so interpreted by all. Karmarkar interprets *"Dharmās"* in this Kārikā (4-53) also as entities. Śaṅkara wants to emphasise the nature of *Ātmā* as *Aja,* one, partless, *adravya, Nirguṇa,* and *Sanmātra.* In Gauḍapāda Kārikās the word *"Dharma"* is used in both the senses—of *Atmā (Jīva)* and entities or external objects or appearances.

एवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्चित्तं वाऽपि न धर्मजम् ।
एवं हेतुफलाजातिं प्रविशन्ति मनीषिणः ॥५४॥

evaṁ na cittajā dharmāścittaṁ vā'pi na dharmajam.
evaṁ hetuphalājatiṁ praviśanti manīṣiṇaḥ. (54)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Thus the appearances of external objects are not caused by the *citta* nor is *citta* originated from these appearances of external objects. In this way, the wise have accepted the doctrine of non-origination of cause and effect.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

On account of the above mentioned reasons, *citta* (mind) is verily of the nature of cnsciousness which is self. The external objects are not born of *citta* nor is *citta* originated from external objects—for all external objects are mere appearances of *vijñāna* (consciousness). In this way neither the cause is born of the effect, or the effect from the cause and thus the wise have come to the conclusion that there is no origination of cause and effect relation. The knowers of *Brahma,* therefore, maintain that there is absence of cause and effect relation with regard to *Ātmā.*

Comments

When the Potter wants to make a pot, he first has a desire in his mind, then the pot is created and that finished article pot in turn creates its cognition in the mind. This kind of process is not possible in the case of *vijñāna* as *vijñāna,* is non-different from anything, from the point of view of the learned. What was concluded earlier that there is no cause and effect relation between *"Dharma-adharma"* and *"Dehādi"* is being emphasised here on the ground that *vijñāna* has *"ananyatva".* "The above mentioned reasons" referred to in the *Bhāṣya* are *"Nirvikāratva" "adravyatva" "aprasiddhatva"* etc and thus *citta* is only *Ātma-vijñāna. Dharma = Jīva = citta* is not born of *Paramātman.* The reflection called *Jīva* is merely the original (of the reflection) viz. *Brahma* itself. In this *Kārikā, "Dharmas"* mean external objects, not *Ātmans.*

Vijñānavādin Buddhists appear to hold that *Dharmas* are born of *citta* c.f. Kārikā 4-28. Gauḍapāda's *Vijñānavāda* differs from them as stated here. Karmarkar points out that the use of *"Manisinah"* here shows that *"Buddhaiḥ"* in 4-19 and 4-42 also refers to the wise and not to Gautama Buddha as stated by Bhattacharya. He adds that "Buddhists are *Advayavādins* and could not have preached *Ajātivada".* Even though *Mādhyamikas*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

preach *"anutpāda"* they do not postulate any positive substratum like *Brahma* for that illusory appearance of creation. Śaṅkara has pointed out that *Bhrama* (error) cannot be *"Niradhiṣṭhāna"* (without a substratum).

यावद्धेतुफलावेशस्तावद्धेतुफलोद्भवः ।
क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे नास्ति हेतुफलोद्भवः ॥५५॥

yāvaddhetuphalāveśastāvaddhetuphalodbhavaḥ.
kṣīṇe hetuphalāveśe nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ (55)

Translation

As long as one is haunted by the idea of cause and effect, so long there is the rise of cause and effect. When the haunting of cause and effect disappears, there is no rise of cause and effect.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

Now is being stated what happens to these who hold fast to the belief in cause and effect. "I am the performer of *Dharma* and *Adharma* which are the cause, *Dharma* and *Adharma* (meritorious and evil acts) are mine, and as their reward *(Phala)* in due course of time later on, I shall be born in some body of a living being and have enjoyments"—in this way as long as one holds fast to the belief in cause and effect i.e. superimposes the idea of causality on *Ātman*—till that time there is the rise of cause and effect i.e. there is an uninterrupted operation of *Dharma—adharma* (as cause) and its reward *(Phala).* But when that haunting of the idea of cause and effect arisen on account of *Avidyā* is made to disappear by the knowledge of non-duality-like the curing of one who is possessed of evil spirits with the power of some sacred formula—then on the destruction of the idea of causality, cause and effect cease to exist.

Comments

From the point of view of *Tattvadṛṣṭi,* neither effect is born of the cause or vice versa. But for those who are *Mumukṣu* it is stated that it is the haunting of the idea of causality that gives rise to cause and effect.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

यावद्धेतुफलावेश : संसारस्तावदायतः ।
क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे संसारं न प्रपद्यते ॥५६॥

yāvaddhetuphalāveśaḥ saṁsārastāvadāyataḥ.
kṣīṇe hetuphalāveśe saṁsāraṁ na prapadyate. (56)

Translation

As long as there is the haunting of the idea of cause and effect so long the condition of transmigration (worldly existence) is lengthened; when that haunting of the idea of cause and effect vanishes, one does not become subject to worldly existence.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

What is the danger if there is presence of cause and effect? We reply that as long as the haunting of the idea of cause and effect is not removed by the right knowledge, till that time the condition of transmigration (succession of births and deaths) is lengthened. But when the haunting of the idea of cause and effect vanishes, worldly existence ceases to exist as then there is no cause for that to exist.

Comments

When the haunting of the idea of cause and effect vanishes, worldly existence ceases to exist for want of its cause.

संवृत्या जायते सर्वं शाश्वतं नास्ति तेन वै ।
सद्भावेन ह्यजं सर्वमुच्छेदस्तेन नास्ति वै ॥५७॥

saṁvṛtyā jāyate sarvaṁ śāśvataṁ nāsti tena vai.
sadbhāvena hyajaṁ sarvamucchedastena nāsti vai. (57)

Translation

All this is seen as born on account of the empirical experience (due to *Avidyā),* therefore nothing which appears so born is permanent. As everything is one with the unborn ultimate Reality which is of the nature of Existence, there is therefore nothing like destruction.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya:

(Objection): You say that apart from the unborn *Ātman,* there is nothing else. Then how is it that you are talking of the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

origin and destruction of cause and effect and of the succession of births and deaths *(saṁsāra)*

(Reply): Please hear. *Saṁvṛti* means concealment i.e. the empirical experience due to *Avidyā.* All this is born of that *Saṁvṛti* (concealment giving rise to illusory empirical experience) and therefore in this domain of Ignorance nothing is eternal. Therefore it is stated that this *saṁsāra* (empririal world) has the quality of origination and destruction; and therefore it is said that this condition (of *Saṁsāra,* i.e. succession of births and deaths) is lengthened (for the ignorant). As one with the Ultimate Reality which is Existence—everything is unborn *Ātman* and therefore there is no destruction for absence of birth. Thus the meaning is that there is no birth or destruction of cause and effect.

Comments

(Objection): You say that *Ātman* is changeless and non-dual, then how can you explain birth and destruction?

(Reply): From the point of view of Ultimate Reality, everything is one with the unborn changeless *Ātman. Ātman* cannot have birth or destruction as *Ātman* is *Kūṭastha* (changeless) and there cannot be the birth and destruction of any one else as *Ātman* is *Advitīya* (non-dual). But everything is seen as born due to *Saṁvṛti* which is the domain of *Avidyā* and the empirical experience due to *Avidyā* and in that domain of *Avidyā* nothing is eternal. For the one who is *vivekin* the rope is known as rope only but the deluded imagines it as a serpent, is afraid and runs away from it. Thus one sees it as a rope, the other as a serpent. The word of the discriminating person is contradicted by the word of one who is deluded. In the same way, the knowledge of the *vivekin* regarding the changeless non-dual *Ātman,* the Ultimate Reality, is seen as contradicted by the words of one having empirical experience of births and deaths, but in Reality there is no *virodha.* For one is the experience of Ultimate Reality, the other is only the illusory experience due to *Avidyā.* Prof. V. Bhattacharya thinks that in this Kārikā the *Śāśvatavāda* and *Ucchedavāda* of the Buddhists are refuted. He reads

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

"swabhāvena" for *sadbhāvena.* Prof. Karmarkar thinks this Kārikā refutes those who believe *saṁsāra* as *Anādi* like *Bijānkura,* adding that Buddhists believe in this kind of causality in *Pratītya-samutpāda.*

धर्मा य इति जायन्ते जायन्ते ते न तत्त्वतः ।
जन्म मायोपमं तेषां सा च माया न विद्यते ॥५८॥

dharmā ya iti jāyante jāyante te na tattvataḥ.
janma mayopamaṁ teṣāṁ sā ca māyā na vidyate. (58)

Translation

The entities *(Dharmas)* which are imagined as being born are not born in reality. Their birth is comparable to illusion and that illusion, too, does not exist.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

Those *Ātmans (Jīvas)* and other entities which are imagined as born and which are mentioned earlier are designated as *Saṁvṛti* i.e. of empirical existence due to *Avidyā.* They are born on account of *Saṁvṛti* and not in reality. As the birth of those entities mentioned earlier is due to *Saṁvṛti,* it should be understood that their birth is comparable to *Māyā* or illusion.

(Objection) Is *Māyā* then (a separate) entity?

(Reply) No. That *Māyā* (illusion) does not exist. *Māyā* is the name given to a thing which does not (really) exist.

Comments

The statement that "everything is born due to *saṁvṛti*" is being elaborated. Birth due to *saṁvṛti* is not real. It is comparable to *Māyā* i.e. illusion. Even though there is *Pratīti* i.e. perception of a thing—it does not really exist that is *Māyā* (illusion). *Māyā* therefore does not really exist.

Prof. Karmarkar thinks that *Dharmas* here may refer to 75 divisions of Reality admitted by the Buddhists which are popularly said to be born. Gauḍapāda says they are not really born.

यथा मायामयाद् बीजाज्जायते तन्मयोऽङ्कुरः ।
नासौ नित्यो न चोच्छेदी तद्वद्धर्मेषु योजना ॥५९॥

yathā māyāmayād bījājjāyate tanmayo'ṅkuraḥ.
nāsau nityo na cocchedī tadvaddharmeṣu yojanā. (59)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

As from an illusory seed is born an illusory sprout—that sprout is neither permanent nor subject to destruction. The same is to be construed with regards to all *Dharmas* (entities, *Jīvas).*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

Now is being stated how the birth of these *Dharmas* (entities, *Jīvas)* is comparable to illusion. As from an illusory seed of mango, an illusory mango sprout is born—that sprout is neither permanent nor subject to destruction as it does not exist (really). In the same way we have to construe the births and deaths etc of the *Dharmas.* The meaning is that from the point of view of Ultimate Reality it is not possible to speak of the birth or death of these *Dharmas* (entities, *Jīvas).*

Comments

The statement that "the birth and death of *Dharmas,* is illusory" is explained by an illustration.

नाजेषु सर्वधर्मेषु शाश्वताशाश्वताभिधा ।
यत्र वर्णा न वर्तन्ते विवेकस्तत्र नोच्यते ॥६०॥

nājeṣu sarvadharmeṣu śāśvatāśāśvatābhidhā.
yatra varṇā na vartante vivekastatra nocyate. (60)

Translation

When all *Dharmas* (entities) are unborn, there is no question of calling them either eternal or non-eternal; where words cannot describe them there is no scope for discriminating them (either as eternal or non-eternal).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

The meaning is that from the point of view of Ultimate Reality, there is no application of designations like eternal or non-eternal to *Ātmans* who are *Aja* (unborn) and are of the nature of eternal one homogeneous pure consciousness. That which describes a thing is called *"Varṇas"* (words). (In the case of *Ātman)* words are incapable of describing the nature of *Ātman.* Discrimination like "it is this or that", eternal or non-eternal, cannot portray the nature of *Ātman.* The Śruti says "where the words turn back (i.e. cannot reach)" etc.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Prof. Karmarkar adds here that Buddhists speak of 72 *Saṁskṛta Dharmas* and 3 *asaṁskṛta Dharmas,* the former are *Śāśvata* and the latter are *aśāśvata.* Gauḍapāda says that when everything is *Aja* this classification is meaningless.

Comments

Ātman cannot be portrayed as eternal or non-eternal, the reason is that, as stated by Śruti, Ātman is not within the reach of words. This is elaboration of 4-57 *"Sadbhāvena hyajam sarvam".*

यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ।
तथा जाग्रद्द्वयाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ॥६१॥

yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṁ cittaṁ calati māyayā.
tathā jāgraddvayābhāsaṁ cittaṁ calati māyayā (61)

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं चित्तं स्वप्ने न संशयः ।
अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रन्न संशय : ॥६२॥

advayaṁ ca dvayābhāsaṁ cittaṁ svapne na saṁśayaḥ.
advayaṁ ca dvayābhāsaṁ tathā jāgranna saṁśayaḥ. (62)

Translation

As in dream, the mind through *Māyā* presents the appearance of duality so in the waking state mind through *Māyā* presents the appearance of duality. No doubt, the mind though non-dual presents the appearance of duality in dream. In the same way in waking state, the mind, though non-dual, no doubt presents the appearance of duality.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Even though from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality the non-dual *Ātman* is pure consciousness, *Ātman* is attempted to be described by words only because of the vibration of mind (due to *Avidyā).* From the point of view of the Ultimate Reality, *Ātman* is beyond such description.

Comments

The objector says— you state that *Ātman* is beyond the reach of words—you cannot describe *Ātman.* Then how are you lecturing on *Ātman* with these words? The reply is given here.

The description of *Ātman* is merely the *citta-spandana* i.e. vibration of the mind. This duality in the form of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva (subject-object relationship) is due to ignorance. It is not *Ātman* who is described by words but the *citta spandana* which is empirical experience due to *Avidyā*. This subject-object relationship is common to both the dream and the waking state. These verses are practically the same as 3-29 and 3-30 with slight change of expression, the meaning being the same. The repetition of these verses is for the purpose of replying to the objection taken above.

स्वप्नदृक्प्रचरन् स्वप्ने दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् ।
अण्डजान् स्वेदजान्वाऽपि जीवान्पश्यति यान् सदा ॥६३॥

svapnadṛkpracaran svapne dikṣu vai daśasu sthitān.
aṇḍajān svedajānvā'pi jīvānpaśyati yān sadā. (63)

Translation

The dreamer while moving about (in his dream) in all the directions sees various creatures born of eggs, perspiration etc (but they have no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

There is this other reason why duality which is describable by words has no real existence. The dreamer, while in his bed, moves about (in his dream) in all the ten directions and sees located there various creatures born of eggs, perspiration etc. ("If that is so, what is intended to be proved?" That is stated in the next Kārikā).

Comments

The creatures so seen in the dream have no separate existence apart from the mind of the dreamer—this is the context, carried forward in the next verse. Creatures are classified in four varieties—those born of eggs, perspiration, womb and the soil.

स्वप्नदृक्चित्तदृश्यास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् ।
तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं स्वप्नदृक्चित्तमिष्यते ॥६४॥

svapnadṛkcittadṛśyāste na vidyante tataḥ pṛthak.
tathā taddṛśyamevedaṁ svapnadṛkcittamiṣyate. (64)

Translation

They are the objects or sight of the mind of the dreamer. They do not exist apart from that mind and this mind of the dreamer is the object of perception of the dreamer only.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

The creatures (seen in dream) are the objects of sight of the mind of the dreamer. These creatures have no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer. The mind itself is imagined as taking diverse shapes of a variety of creatures. And that mind of the dreamer also is the object of perception of that dreamer alone. Therefore, apart from the dreamer there is no such distinct thing called the mind.

Comments

Objects seen in dream are not having a separate existence from the mind that sees them and the mind seeing the dream objects, has also no separate existence from the dreamer. Thus, the dreamer, his mind and the objects seen in dream are all one and the same only.

चरञ्जागरिते जाग्रद्दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् ।
अण्डजान् स्वेदजान्वाऽपि जीवान्पश्यति यान्सदा (६५)

carañjāgarite jāgraddikṣu vai daśaṣu sthitān.
aṇḍajān svedajānvā'pi jīvānpaśyati yānsadā. (65)

जाग्रच्चित्तेक्षणीयास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् ।
तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं जाग्रतश्चित्तमिष्यते ॥६६॥

jāgraccittekṣaṇīyāste na vidyante tataḥ pṛthak.
tathā taddṛśyamevedaṁ jāgrataścittamiṣyate. (66)

Translation

The man in the waking condition while moving about (in the waking condition) in all the ten directions sees a variety of creatures like those born of eggs, perspiration etc. These creatures are the objects of sight of the waking mind and have no existence apart from that waking mind and that waking mind itself is the object of perception of the waking man alone. (and thus the waking man, his waking mind and the objects seen by that waking mind are all one and the same).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

The objects seen by a waking man (in his waking condition) are not having an existence apart from his waking mind like the creatures seen in the dream which are not separate from the dreaming mind. The waking mind seeing those objects has no separate existence from the waking man as it is the object of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

perception of the waking man alone like the dreaming mind which is not separate from the dreamer.

Comments

"Creatures seen in the dream" mean objects having subject-object relation. Duality only is describable by words. It is only the vibration of the mind—*citta-spandana*-and that is *Māyā.* It has been stated in 4-28 that *citta* is not born really into external objects. Objects seen have no separate existence from mind and mind has no separate existence from *Ātman.* When there is Vibration of the mind, there is duality which does not really exist. When there is no *citta-spandana* it is all *Ātman.* Both *Jāgrat* and *swapna* are unreal from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality which is *Ātman* who is one and non-dual.

उभे ह्यन्योन्यदृश्ये ते किं तदस्तीति नोच्यते ।
लक्षणाशून्यमुभयं तन्मतेनैव गृह्यते ॥६७॥

ubhe hyanyonyadṛśye te kiṁ tadastīti nocyate.
lakṣaṇāśūnyamubhayaṁ tanmatenaiva gṛhyate. (67)

Translation

(The *citta* and the *Jīvas)* they both are the objects of perception of each other. Which of the two exists independently of the other? The wise(reply to this question and) say "none of them". Both of them are devoid of characteristics which are the means to correct knowledge. The reason is that the one is cognised only through the other (or they are seen as thought of by the *citta* itself—"*cittatayā eva").*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Both the mind and the *Jīvas* (external objects seen by the mind) are the *Dṛśya,* objects of perception of each other i.e. each one of them is perceived through the other. *Citta* (mind) exists as dependent on and in realation to objects perceived by the mind and the *Jīvas* etc perceived by the mind and the *Jīvas* etc. perceived by the mind exist as dependent and in relation to the mind. Therefore, they are perceived as through or in relation to each other. Each of them—*Citta* and *caitya*—is the object of perception of the other. It is therefore said that neither of them exists really. When it is asked whether *citta* or *caitya* exist really, the wise reply that neither of them exists really. The decision of

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the wise is that in dream neither the external objects like elephant etc or the mind that perceives them exists really; and same is the case with the waking state. How? *Lakṣaṇā* means *Pramāṇa*, "means to the correct knowledge". Both *citta* and *caitya* are devoid of characteristics which are the means to the correct knowledge (i.e. they have no proof of their real independent existence, the existence of each being dependent on and in relation to the other only). Both *citta* and *caitya*—each is an object of perception of the other, is cognised by the thought of the *citta* itself *(cittatayā Eva)*. One cannot have the cognition of the pot without the thought of the pot nor can he have the thought of the pot without the cognition of the pot. The meaning is that it is not possible to distinguish between them as to which is *Pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) and which is *Prameya* (object of knowledge).

Comments

(Objection) You have stated that both *citta* and *caitya* i.e. *Dṛśya* and its cognition—are imagined and unreal. But they are in fact cognised in subject object relationship. How is that?

(Reply). Citta and *caitya* (mind and objects perceived by the mind) i.e. *Drśya* and its cognition are mutually dependent on and in relation to each other. Neither has an independent existence—apart from being dependent on and in relation to the other. The *Ghaṭajñāna* is not the *pramāṇa* of *Ghaṭa* or *Ghaṭa* the *pramāṇa* of *Ghaṭajñāna*. Both are *anyonyāśraya* i.e. dependent on each other and have no independent existence. We cannot distinguish between them as to which is the *Pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) and which is *Prameya* (object of knowledge). As the existence of both *citta* and *caitya* is thus dependent on each other, there is no *pramāṇa* for their independent existence, therefore they are *Kalpita*. Then how is it that we see *citta* and *caitya* in subject object relationship? The reply is that it is the *cittatā-doṣa*. The *Dṛṣṭā Dṛṣṭi* and *Dṛśya* are all mutually dependent and their *Bheda* is imagined by ignorance. Their Bheda is not Pramāṇika.

यथा स्वप्नमयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥६८॥

yathā svapnamayo jīvo jāyate mriyate'pi ca.
tathā jīva amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca. (68)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

यथा मायामयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥६९॥
yathā māyāmayo jīvo jāyate mriyate'pi ca.
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca. (69)

यथा निर्मितको जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि वा ।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥७०॥
yathā nirmitako jīvo jāyate mriyate'pi vā.
tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca. (70)

Translation

As a *Jīva* in dream is born and also dies, so also these *Jīvas* (in the waking state) appear and then disappear. As a *Jīva* created by a magician is born and also dies, so also these *Jīvas* (in the waking state) appear and then disappear.

As a *Jīva* created by the power of *Mantras* etc (sacred formula etc) is born and also dies, so also *Jīvas* (in the waking state) appear and then disappear.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

Māyāmaya Jīva is a *Jīva* created by a magician. *Nirmitaka Jīva* is a *Jīva* created by the power of *Mantra* (sacred formula), herbs etc. All creatures like those born of eggs etc seen in dream or created by a magician or created by the power of *Mantras* herbs etc—they appear as born and then as dead; similarly men etc (seen in the waking state) have no real existence and are mere imagination of the mind.

Comments

Dṛśya and its *Darśana* being mutually dependent and not having an independent existence of their own are unreal and *Kalpita.* But then how do we see them as born and dead. The reply is given by the three illustrations of *Jīvas* created by the power of *Mantras* etc. It is wellknown that even though there is no real existence of *citta* and *caitya* in dream, we find births and deaths there. The three verses show that from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality, births, deaths etc have no real existence. It is *cittatā-doṣa,* the defect of *citta,* which perceives imaginary projected appearances. *Citta* also is not anything apart from *cit.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

The *vyavahāra* of *citta* and *caitya* is due to *saṁvṛti.* The conclusion is the *Ajātivāda* which is stated in the next verse 4-71, which is the same as 3-48.

न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः संभवोऽस्य न विद्यते ।
एतदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किंचिन्न जायते ॥७१॥

na kaścijjāyate jīvaḥ sambhavo'sya na vidyate.
etaduttamaṁ satyaṁ yatra kiṁcinna jāyate. (71)

Translation

No *jīva* is ever born, no origination (of any *Jīva)* takes place. This is the highest truth where nothing whatever is born.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

It is already stated that in the realm of empirical reality births and deaths of *Jīvas* are like the births and deaths of *Jīvas* in dream etc. The highest truth from the point of view of Ultimate Reality is that no *Jīva* is ever born etc. The rest is already explained in 3-48.

Comments

This is a reply to those who believe that births and deaths are real.

चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवद्द्वयम् ।
चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥७२॥

cittaspanditamevedaṁ grāhyagrāhakavaddvayam.
cittaṁ nirviṣayaṁ nityamasaṅgaṁ tena kīrtitam. (72)

Translation

The duality which has subject object relationship is only the vibration *(spandita)* of the mind. (From the point of view of the Ultimate Reality) the mind is unrelated to any object and is therefore declared (by the wise) as eternal and without attachment.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

The entire world of duality is having the relation of perceiver and perceived (subject object relationship) and is merely the vibration of the mind. From the point of view of Ultimate Reality

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

the mind is really unrelated to any object and is *Ātman* only. Being unrelated to any object, it is eternal and without attachment, *Śruti* also says that the *Puruṣa* is without attachment. The meaning is that because it is unrelated to objects, the mind is without attachment.

Comments

Saṁvedana=Saṁvid=Jñāna appears as *Dṛśya* only when it becomes related to imagined *Dṛśya.* This *Samvedana*—is non-different from the *Dṛṣṭā*—this was already explained earlier by the illustrationof the dream. Here it is now stated that the *Samvedana* i.e. *Jñāna* does not really come in touch with or is related to any object. *NirviṣayaJñāna, Samvedana* or *citta* is *Ātman* only, being eternal and without attachment.

योऽस्ति कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नास्त्यसौ ।
परतन्त्राभिसंवृत्या स्यान्नास्ति परमार्थतः ॥७३॥

yo'sti kalpitasaṁvṛtyā paramārthena nāstyasau.
paratantrābhisaṁvṛtyā syānnāsti paramārthataḥ. (73)

Translation

That which exists in the imagined phenomenal experience does not exist in reality. It may exist according to the technical phraseology of other schools of philosophy (like Vaiśeṣikas) but in reality it does not exist.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

(Objection) You say that *citta* is unrelated to objects and is without attachment. But this non-attachment of *citta* is not possible as there do exist external objects, like the teacher, scripture, pupil etc.

Reply. There is no fault in this. The object like scripture etc is of the nature of imagined phenomenal experience which serves as a means *(upāya)* for realising the Ultimate Reality but in reality it has no existence. It has already been stated that when the Ultimate Reality is known, duality does not exist. From the usage (technical phraseology) prevalent in other schools of philosophy (like Vaiśeṣikas) it may appear as existent but when scrutinised

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

from the point of view of Ultimate Reality, it does not exist. It is therefore, properly stated that the *citta* is without attachment.

Comments

If citta is *nirviṣaya,* what about the existence of teacher, scripture, pupil! The reply is that objects like scripture etc are imagined phenomenal experience but they serve as *upāya* (means) for the realisation of the Ultimate Reality—which is *(upeya).* In the other schools of philosophy e.g. of Vaiśeṣikas, six *Padārthas* from *Dravya* to *Samavāya* are mentioned but when properly scrutinised from the point of view of Ultimate Reality, the definitions of these *Padārthas* indicate that there is *Parasparāśrayatva*-mutual dependence. Their independent existence is not established. Therefore, they are only illusory. In reality *citta* is *Nirviṣaya*(unrelated to object) and therefore *Ātmā* alone eternal and without attachment; scripture etc include the distinctions of knower, knowledge and the object of knowledge—they are in the realm of imaginary or illusory phenomenal experience.

Prof. V. Bhattacharya reads *"Paratantraḥ Abhisaṁvṛtya"* and further interprets *Paratantra* as such kind of truth which depends on another, Śaṅkara explains *Paratantra* as other schools of philosophy. Prof. Karmarkar, accepting Śaṅkara's interpretation, adds that the word *Paratantra* is used in *Nyāyasūtra* for another school of philosophy and there is no need to resort to the technical Buddhist meaning as suggested by Prof. Bhattacharya. He adds that Buddhists accept two kinds of truth—*Saṁvṛti* and *Paramārtha*—but according to Śaṅkara truth is one only—*Saṁvṛti* of phenomenal experience is illusory or imagined *(Kalpita,* as stated here by Gauḍapāda). Śaṅkara interprets *kalpita,* (in *Kalpitābhisaṁvṛtyā)* as imagined as a device to ultimately lead the pupil to the Ultimate Reality—cf. *Upayaḥ So'vatārāya* 3.15.

अजः कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नाप्यजः ।
परतन्त्राभिनिष्पत्त्या संवृत्या जायते तु सः ॥७४॥

ajaḥ kalpitasaṁvṛtyā paramārthena nāpyajaḥ.
paratantrābhiniṣpattyā saṁvṛtyā jāyate tu saḥ. (74)

Translation

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Ātmā is called unborn when speaking from the point of view of the imagined phenomenal experience but in reality *Ātman* cannot be even described as unborn. *Ātman* is stated as born according to the phenomenal experience and as per the established conclusions of other schools of philosophy.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

(Objection) If scriptures etc are in the realm of phenomenal experience, then the description of *Ātman* as *Aja* is also a part of that *Saṁvṛti*(phenomenal experience).

Reply: Yes, that is so, *Ātman* is described as *Aja* from the point of view of the imagined phenomenal experience which includes scripture (teacher,pupil) etc. From the point of view of Ultimate Reality, *Ātman* cannot be described even as *Aja* (unborn). *Ātman* is described as Aja only to combat the established conclusions of the other schools of philosophy which describe *Ātman* as born—Ātman is called born only in phenomenal experience. Therefore, the idea that *Ātman* is *Aja* cannot be related to *Ātman,* the highest Reality (as that idea itself is part of the illusory *Saṁvṛti).*

Comments

If scriptures are part of *Saṁvṛti* even the description of *Ātman* as *Aja* is also part of *Saṁvṛti.* It is only by error *(Bhrānti)* that the *Pariṇāmavādins* describe *Ātman* as born etc. and it is only for combating that view that *Vedānta* is obliged to use the phrase *Aja* for *Ātman.* Therefore if scriptures are part of *Samvrti,* description of *Ātman* as *Aja* is also a part of *Saṁvṛti.* But the question is — can the usage of the term *Aja* is not possible in the case of *Paramārtha Viṣaya?* or the nature itself of Atman as indicated by the term *Aja* is imaginery? The latter is not the case, as for every imagination there must be the substratum of the imaginer. You can doubt anything but can not doubt doubter. An imaginery *Sastra* can give the knowledge of unimagined *Atman* as the reflection can give us the knowledge of the original image.

Prof. V. Bhattacharya in this Kārikā also has an imaginary reading like *"ParatantraAbhiniṣpattyā"* as Buddhist works have such readings. He first assumes that there is Buddhism in these Kārikās and then suggests imaginary readings in conformity with Buddhist works. Prof. Karmarkar rightly disagrees in this

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

interpretation. The above mentioned interpretation is as per *Śaṅkara* and Ānandagiri. Saccidānandendra in Māṇḍūkya-Rahasya-Vivṛti (p. 406 and p. 419) says *Lokasaṁvṛti* or Laukikasaṁvṛti is due to *Avidyā* while *Kalpitasaṁvṛti* is an *Upāya* — imagined for *Paramārtha-darśana* like teacher. *Śāstra* etc. Reference may be made to *Laukika* etc in 4-87.

अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते ।
द्वयाभावं स बुद्ध्वैव निर्निमित्तो न जायते ॥७५॥

abhūtābhiniveśo'sti dvayaṁ tatra na vidyate.
dvayābhāvaṁ sa buddhvaiva nirnimitto na jāyate. (75)

Translation

A man has only a persistent belief in the unreal duality but there is no existence of that duality. One who is qualified knows the absence of duality as this false presistent adherence to the belief in unreal duality—the cause-has ceased.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

As objects are unreal, man has only a persistent belief in the reality of unreal duality. There is no existence of that duality. The cause of birth is only the false persistent adherence to the belief ir duality. There remains no cause for birth, once he knows the absence of duality—as this persistent false adherence to the belief in unreal duality—which is the cause—has ceased.

Comments

(objection) : Knowledge comes from Śāstra but Śāstra is part of *Saṁvrti.* How can *Mokṣa* come from that knowledge?

(Reply): If duality were real, the medicine for removing its effect should necessarily be real. But as duality is unreal and there is only false persistent adherence to it only, even unreal *Upāya in* the form of Śāstra can create correct knowledge regarding reality. *Apunarāvṛtti* is the *Phala* of *Paramārthajñāna* as Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-4-6 says that knower of *Brahma* becomes one with *Brahma*.

यदा न लभते हेतूनुत्तमाधममध्यमान् ।
तदा न जायते चित्तं हेत्वभावे फलं कुतः ॥७६॥

yadā na labhate hetūnuttamādhamamadhyamān.
tadā na jāyate cittaṁ hetvabhāve phalaṁ kutaḥ. (76)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

When one does not get associated with superior inferior or middling causes, the mind becomes free from birth. How can there be an effect without a cause?

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

Religious duties of castes and stages of life, performed by a qualified person without desire for reward are called Superior Dharmas and are the cause of birth as Devas (divine beings) etc and in them there is predominance of *Dharma.* Those *Dharmas* which are partly mixed with evil acts are of a mixed middling variety and lead to birth as human beings etc. Evil activities are of the nature of *adharma* and lead to birth of birds etc. When one realises one non-dual essence of Self which is devoid of all (false) imaginations, he does not have to suffer births—of superior inferior or middling varieities—which are falsely imagined on account of *Avidyā* (ignorance). Children see impurity in the sky but the discriminating does not see that. In the same way when the mind is not getting born in the shapes of divine beings etc which are in the nature of rewards for Superior inferior and middling varieities of Dharma, i.e. when there is no cause, there is no effect as when there is no seed there is no sprout etc.

Comments

This Kārikā is an elaboration of what is stated before that without a cause there is no effect. In the absence of *Nimitta* (cause) in the nature of false persistent belief in the reality of unreal duality there is no birth.

अनिमित्तस्य चित्तस्य यासनुत्पत्तिः समासद्वया ।
अजातस्यैव सर्वस्य चित्तदृश्यं हि तद्यतः ॥७७॥

animittasya cittasya yā'nutpattiḥ samā'dvayā.
ajātasyaiva sarvasya cittadṛśyaṁ hi tadyataḥ. (77)

Translation

The non-origination of the mind which is always unoriginated is free from the cause (false persistent belief in unreal duality) and remains the same (i.e. without distinctions) and non-dual (even before the rise of correct knowledge the unoriginated mind remained the same non-dual). The reason is that it i.e. duality and birth are the objects perceived by the mind (and are therefore unreal).

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya:

It has been stated that without a cause the mind does not originate. Of what nature is that non-origination of the mind? It is stated. The non-origination of the mind which is called *Mokṣa* (liberation)—of the mind which has no cause as the cause in the form of births due to religious duties and evil practices has ceased on account of the realisation of Ultimate Truth—this non-origination of the mind remains always in all conditions the same i.e. without distinctions and also non-dual. Even before, the mind was unoriginated and all non-dual. Even before the realisation of correct knowledge, the non-origination of the mind always remained the same and non-dual as duality and birth are mere objects perceived by the mind; and origination of mind will never be there again or was there ever before. That non-origination is uniformly of the same changeless nature.

Comments

In the earlier Kārikā it is stated "at that time, the mind is not originated". This may imply that at some other time there may be origination of the mind. This Kārikā removes that doubt. The non-origination of the mind is uniformly of the same changeless nature in all stages, at all times, as duality and birth are only *Cittadṛśya* (Objects perceivaed by the mind and unreal). Even before the rise of correct knowledge, the non-origination of *citta* was the same and non-dual. Even when there is false and erroneous perception of silver in a shell, the shell remains the shell and its appearance as silver is unreal. Similarly *Saṁvid, Jñāna* or *citta* remains without distinctions and non-dual *Brahma* even at the time when there is false imaginations of births etc. Therefore the *citta* is *aja* (unborn) not only in the state of *Mokṣa* (liberation) but even when it is coloured by the false imaginations of jars etc.

Prof. Karmarkar changes the order of the quarters of this Kārikā to make the meaning clearer.

बुद्ध्वाऽनिमित्ततां सत्यां हेतुं पृथगनाप्नुवन्
वीतशोकं तथाऽकाममभयं पदमश्नुते ॥७८॥

buddhvā'nimittatāṁ satyāṁ hetuṁ pṛthaganāpnuvan.
vītaśokaṁ tathā'kamamabhayaṁ padamaśnute. (78)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

Having in this way grasped the true causelessness and not finding any other cause (for birth etc) one attains to that state (of liberation) which is free from grief,desire and fear.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

By the above-mentioned reasoning one grasps the true causelessness because of the absence of duality which is the cause of births etc and he does not find any separate cause like religious acts etc which makes him have births as divine beings etc. He therefore becomes free from worldly yearnings and attains that fearless state which is free from all desires, grief etc, free from ignorance. He is not born again.

Comments

This Kārikā elaborates the statement that having realised the absence of duality, he has no cause for births. This state of causelessness indicates absence of duality and it is the true Ultimate Reality without any beginning or end. One attains to that state where there is no cause for Saṁsāra and therefore no further births.

Prof. V. Bhattacharya reads *"Anāpnuvat"* for *"Anāpnuvan"* and relates it with *citta.* Reference may be made to *Īśa* 7 (when one sees oneness with Brahma what delusion or grief is there)? Muṇḍaka 3-1-2 (seeing the greatness of the Lord, he becomes free from grief) Muṇḍaka 3-2-2 (all his desires are dissolved) Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-4-3 (one knowing *Brahma* becomes fearless and becomes one with *Brahma).*By the knowledge of Ultimate Reality there is absence of cause for *Saṁsāra.*

अभूताभिनिवेशाद्धि सदृशे तत्प्रवर्तते ।
वस्त्वभावं स बुद्ध्वैव निःसङ्गं विनिवर्तते ॥७९॥

abhūtābhiniveśāddhi sadṛśe tatpravartate.
vastvabhāvaṁ sa buddhvaiva niḥsaṅgaṁ vinivartate. (79)

Translation

Owing to the persistent belief in unreal (duality) the mind engages itself in thinking of similar (unreal objects); having realised the absence of reality (in those unreal objects) it returns to its pure state becoming unattached (to unreal objects).

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya.

In unreal duality, the mind firmly believes in its reality. This

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

is false persistent belief in unreal objects. On account of this delusion caused by ignorance, the mind engages itself in thinking of similar unreal objects. When the mind realises the absence of dual objects, it turns back from that persistent belief in unreal objects, being unattached and not having any expectation.

Comments

When one has realisation of undual *Ātman* and understands the absence of duality, on knowing that absence (of unreal objects) the mind becomes unattached, does not become similarly engaged and attains to repose.

निवृत्तस्याप्रवृत्तस्य निश्चला हि तदा स्थितिः ।
विषयः स हि बुद्धानां तत्साम्यमजमद्वयम् ॥८०॥

nivṛttasyāpravṛttasya niścalā hi tadā sthitiḥ.
viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṁ tatsāmyamajamadvayam. (80)

Translation

When the mind has turned away from (unreal duality) and is not engaged in it, its state becomes firmly unchangeable. This is the sphere of men of wisdom. It is undifferentiated (Sameness) birthless and non-dual.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

When the mind has turned away from objects of duality and not got engaged in (similar) other dual objects, then on realising their absence, the state of mind becomes motionless, steady, of the nature of *Brahma.* This state of the nature of *Brahma* has the characteristic of being one homogeneous non-dual consciousness. This condition is within the scope of men of wisdom who have known the Ultimate Reality and that state is the highest, undifferentiated birthless and non-dual.

Comments

The reason why they attain to the fearless state is stated. *Mokṣa* is the fearless state within the scope only of the wise and beyond all imaginations. The literal meaning of *"Buddhaiḥ"* is men of wisdom. Prof. V. Bhattacharya interprets the word *"Buddhaiḥ"* both here and elsewhere as referring to Gautama Buddha as per his adherence to his special theory.

The unattached mind is the same as non-dual *Brahma* cf Kārikās 4.77, 4.88 and 4.80

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नं प्रभातं भवति स्वयम् ।
सकृद्विभातो ह्येवैष धर्मो धातुस्वभावतः ॥८१॥

ajamanidramasvapnaṁ prabhātaṁ bhavati svayam.
sakṛdvibhāto hyevaiṣa dharmo dhātusvabhāvataḥ. (81)

Translation

That (which is the province of men of wisdom) is free from birth, sleep, dream and is self-blazing. This *Ātman (Dharma)* is always illumined from its very essential nature.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

Again, what is the nature of that which is the province of the men of wisdom? It is stated. It shines of its own accord, it is not like one dependent for light on the sun etc, it is self blazing. It is always illumined. *Dharma* i.e. *Ātman* is of this characteristic. *Ātman* is so from its very essential nature.

Comments

Prof. V. Bhattacharya, as usual, interprets *"Dharma"* in the Buddhist sense as *"Sarvabījaka Ālayavijñāna* or *Āśraya Parāvṛtti"*. Further he reads *"Dharmaḥ Dhātuḥ Swabhāvataḥ"* further changing it into *"Dharmadhātuḥ swabhāvataḥ"*.

Ānandagiri explains *"Dharma"* as *(Ātman)* supporting, *(dhāraṇāt)* and *"Dhātuḥ"* means the entity in which at the time of sleep all that is imagined is thrown *(dhiyate) "Dhātuswabhāvataḥ"* therefore means *Vastuswabhāvataḥ* (because of its essential nature).

The Kārikā describes the nature of *Kūṭastha Ātman.* The wording of the Kārikā is the same as in 1-16 *"Anādimāyayā supto ajam anidram aswapnam advaitam budhyate tadā"*.

Śaṅkara himself uses the phrase *"Vijñānadhātuḥ"* in Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 1-3-29. This *Dharma* or *Ātman* is self-shining—see Muṇḍaka 2-2-10 *(Tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam). The word Dhatuḥ* is used in this Kārikā in the Vedantic sense and not in the Buddhist sense. The ending *"Dhātuḥ swabhāvataḥ"* does not make any change in the meaning. *Saccidānandendra* explains that in Buddhism *"Dhātuḥ"* is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

equated with *"śūnyatā"* and it cannot have the characteristics of being *Aja, anidra, aswapna* etc. (cf. *Madhyānta vibhāga sūtra* 1-15, 16)

सुखमाव्रियते नित्यं दुःखं विव्रियते सदा ।
यस्य कस्य च धर्मस्य ग्रहेण भगवानसौ ॥८२॥

sukhamāvriyate nityaṁ duḥkhaṁ vivriyate sadā.
yasya kasya ca dharmasya graheṇa bhagavānasau. (82)

Translation

On account of the apprehension of some object of duality or the other, happiness is concealed and misery is always made manifest. This self-illumined *Ātman* (is therefore not realised by common man even though taught by teachers and scriptures several times).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

How is it that even though this Ultimate Reality is taught in this way, the people cannot grasp it? It is stated. Because of the false persistent belief, influence of intense adherence to some object of duality or the other, bliss is easily concealed. This concealment is directly caused by the perception of duality and does not require any intervening cause. Similarly misery is manifested. The knowledge of Ultimate Reality is difficult to be attained. *Ātman* is non-dual and self-shining. It is for this reason that even though frequently taught, it is not possible to be grasped. The *Śruti kāṭhaka* 1-2-7 says "The teacher of *Ātman* is matter of wonder and equally so is the proficient pupil".

Comments

You say that *Ātman* is self-shining; then why does it not shine before all? The reply is that when one or the other object of duality is apprehended that alone is enough to conceal bliss, no other intervening cause is necessary; and misery is brought forth. That is why even when frequently instructed, common man does not realise *Ātman*. That is why the *"Deva"* self-shining *Ātman* does not appear to the common man in its true nature.

Prof. Bhattacharya takes *Bhagawān* with the next Kārikā which does not appear proper. *"Sukham"* and *"Duḥkham"* are

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

interpreted as adverbial phrases by Prof. Karmarkar. Concealment of *Ātman* is his false apprehension.

अस्ति नास्त्यस्ति नास्तीति नास्ति नास्तीति वा पुनः ।
चलस्थिरोभयाभावैरावृणोत्येव बालिशः ॥ ८३॥
asti nāstyasti nāstīti nāsti nāstīti vā punaḥ.
calasthirobhayābhāvairāvṛnotyeva bāliśaḥ. (83)

Translation

Childish people conceal the above mentioned *Bhagawān* by asserting his nature as (Existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence or absolute non-existence) Is, Is not, Is and Is not, Is not Is not—from their notions of moving, steady, both moving and steady and free from both.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Even learned men have tenacious belief in the nature of subtle ideas as Is, Is not etc regarding the Supreme Reality and such beliefs act as concealment of that Reality. What to talk of the inferior intellect of confounded men? This is being elaborated. One disputant predicates that *Ātman* exists, Another i.e. a *Vaiñasika* Buddhist asserts that he is non-existent. The *ardha-vainãśika Digambara* Jain asserts that he is and is not. The absolute nihilist asserts "Nothing, nothing". There, the notion of existence regarding *Ātman* is associated with moving (change) as it tries to keep aside seperate or to distinguish *Ātman* from impermanent objects like Jars etc. The notion of non-existence is steady, as it never changes and is always the same un-differentiated notion. The notion that he is both existence and non-existence is both moving and steady, and notion of negation is predicting absolute non-existence. In this four-fold variety viz. moving, steady, moving and steady and negation with the notions of existence non-existence etc all disputants who are childish and non-discriminating conceal the *Ātman*. If a learned man not realising the essence of the Ultimate Reality can be designated as childish. what to talk of a person who by nature is confounded.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

The four alternative theories.

Asti-cala	..	some *Vādin (Śaṅkara) Vaiśeṣikas (Ānandagiri)*
Nāsti sthira	..	*Vaināśika (Śaṅkara) vijñānavādin (Ānandagiri) vijñānavādin and Lokāyatika saccidānandendra*
Asti-Nāsti-ubhaya	..	*Digambara Jains (Śaṅkara)* and *Ānandagiri*
Nāsti-Nāsti-Abhāva	..	*Atyanta-śūnyavādin (Śaṅkara)* and *Ānandagiri*

Prof. Karmarkar states that *Asti-Nāsti* refers to *Vaiśeṣika* and *Digambara* both according to *Śaṅkara* while *Ānandagiri* refers it to *Digambara* only.

Prof. V. Bhattacharya refers *Asti* to *Vedāntins* as they cite *"Asti iti eva upalabdhavyaḥ"* but this interpretation does not appear to be correct as *Gauḍapāda,* a *Vedāntin,* cannot call *Vedāntin* a *"Bāliśa".* Perhaps Prof. Karmarkar is right when he says *"Asti"* is one of the six Bhāvavikāras and therefore believes that *Asti* refers to those who believe in *Vikāras* in *Ātman* beginning with *Asti.* Further instead of applying *cala, Sthira, Ubhaya* and *Abhāva* respectively in the same order to *Asti, Nāsti, Ubhaya* and *Abhāva,* Prof. Bhattacharya changes the order and relates *Asti* with *Sthira* and *Nāsti* with *cala*—this is all arbitrary and unconvincing. Perhaps Gauḍapāda does not think of any particular schools but refers in general to these 4 *Koṭis* or theories—as surmised by Prof. Karmarkar. According to *Ānandagiri "Asti"* is *"Cala"* as this theorist believes in the Parināma of *Ātmā* on account of happiness, misery etc. "Nāsti" is steady as there is no kind of *Viśeṣa* or differentiation in it.

कोट्यश्चतस्र एतास्तु ग्रहैर्यासां सदाऽऽवृतः ।
भगवानाभिरस्पृष्टो येन दृष्टः स सर्वदृक् ॥८४॥

koṭyaścatasra etāstu grahairyāsāṁ sadā"vrataḥ.
bhagavānābhiraspṛṣṭo yena dṛṣṭaḥ sa sarvadṛk (84)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

These are the four alternative theories regarding the nature of *Ātman* and on account of tenacious adherence to (one or the other of) them, *Ātman* is always remain concealed (from them). But he who knows *Ātman* as untouched by them (these theories) is omniscient.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

What is then the nature of the Ultimate Reality whose knowledge makes learned man free from childishness? There are four alternative theories about *Ātman* mentioned in the works of controvertialists who are fond of disputes viz. *Asti, Nāsti* etc. By their tenacious adherence to one (or the other) of these theories the nature of *Ātman* always remains concealed from the grasp of these proud disputants. But the *Ātman* is untouched by any of these four alternate theories like *Asti Nāsti* etc i.e. is free from all imaginations like *Asti Nāsti* etc. A wise man who knows *Ātman* as the *Aupaniṣada Puruṣa* stated in *Vedānta,* is omniscient and *Pandita* in the real sense i.e. the real knower of the Ultimate Reality.

Comments

The topic of alternate theories which conceal the nature of *Ātman* is now summed up and it is concluded that the knower of the real essence of *Ātmā* becomes omniscient and one who has accomplished everything. "The word *Bhagāvān* is used by *Upacāra* for paying homage and by the *Gauṇī Vṛtti,* in a secondary sense, from the point of view of the *Saṁsārī "Jīvas" (Māṇḍūkya Rahasya vivrti.)*

प्राप्य सर्वज्ञतां कृत्स्नां ब्राह्मण्यं पदमद्वयम् ।
अनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं किमतः परमीहते ॥८५॥

prāpya sarvajñatāṁ kṛtsnāṁ brāhmaṇyaṁ padamadvayam.
anāpannādimadhyāntaṁ kimataḥ paramīhate. (85)

Translation

When he has attained complete omniscience which is the non-dual state befitting a true *Brāhmaṇa* and which is without beginning middle or end, what else can he desire?

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Having attained to that state of complete omniscience mentioned earlier, which is a state befitting a true *Brāhmaṇa* the

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

person attaining to that state is The *Brāhmaṇa*. *Śruti Bṛhad.* 4-4-23 says "this is the eternal glory of the *Brāhmaṇa*". In this non-dual state of *Brāhmaṇya,* there is no beginning, middle or end. Having attained to that state what else remains to be desired? After the realisation of *Ātman,* all his other struggles are purposeless. As Gītā says in 3-18 "He has nothing to gain by engaging himself in various worldly activities".

Comments

"Having attained to that state" means having realised that *Ātman* is *Catuṣkoṭivarjita*" beyond the fourfold alternate theories. He is the real *Brahmaṇa, Brahmavid,* who has directly known *Brahma,* attained the goal. His greatness is homogeneous without increase or decrease. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 4-4-12 says that "having realised *Ātman* why should he—wishing what thing make his body feverish and for what desire?"

The phrase *"Brāhmaṇya Pada"* clearly shows that Gauḍapāda preaches the *Vedānta* doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* and not the tenets of the Buddhists. Prof. Bhattacharya has to say inconveniently that even Buddhists held *Brāhmaṇas* in good respect like *śramaṇa* and thus *Brāhmaṇa* means Buddha here!

विप्राणां विनयो ह्येष शमः प्राकृत उच्यते ।
दमः प्रकृतिदान्तत्वादेवं विद्वान्शमं व्रजेत् ॥८६॥

viprāṇām vinayo hyeṣa śamaḥ prākṛta ucyate.
damaḥ prakṛtidāntatvādevaṁ vidvāñśamaṁ vrajet. (86)

Translation

This discipline of the *Brāhmaṇas* is called their natural tranquility. Their control is due to the fact that they are by nature controlled. Knowing in this way the learned attains to tranquility.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

The discipline of the *Brahmaṇas* i.e. their humility or disciplined behavior is natural. They have established themselves in the true nature of *Ātman.* Thus their tranquility is all natural and not artificial. Their control also is theirs by nature only as *Brahma* is all peaceful and tranquil. In this way having known *Brahma* who by nature is tranquil, the knower of *Brahma* attains to natural peace and tranquility which is the nature of *Brahma* i.e. he is established in the nature of *Brahma.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

The discipline of the *Brahmavid,* the *Brāhmaṇa* is natural to him and he is not to be goaded to it even by the *Śāstra.* He is not to be charged with such duty by *Śāstra* or teacher. His peace, tranquility and control are also natural to him. When *Brahmasūtra* 3-4-28 prescribes *Śama, Dama* etc it is for the students of *Brahma-vidyā,* the seekers, the *Mumukṣus*—not for those who have already realised *Brahma,* as such *Vidvān* has no *"Kartavya"* left to be done. This natural tranquility of The *Brāhmaṇa* is *Brahma-swarūpa".*

सवस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वयं लौकिकमिष्यते ।
अवस्तु सोपलम्भं च शुद्धं लौकिकमिष्यते ॥८७॥

savastu sopalambhaṁ ca dvayaṁ laukikamiṣyate.
avastu sopalambhaṁ ca śuddhaṁ laukikamiṣyate. (87)

Translation

The duality (in the empirical state) with the (external) object and its perception is called *Laukika* (worldly and *Jāgarita).* The duality without (external) object but with perception is called *Śuddha Laukika* (pure worldly and *swapna).*

Śāṅkara-Bhāsya

In this way have been shown the various schools of proud disputants full of defects due to attachment and hatred; they mutually contradict one another and are the cause of relative empirical existence *(Saṁsāra).* From their own logic it has therefore been pointed out that they are false doctrines and it has been concluded that the *Advaita* alone is the correct knowledge which is by nature peaceful, free from the defects of attachment or hatred, and also free from the alternate fourfold theories (of is, is not, both or neither). Now is begun the topic explaining the author's vedāntic method of arriving at the correct knowledge. The word *"Savastu"* means *"Saṁvṛti"* i.e. objects perceived in the empierical state with the help of external sense organs. *"Savastu"* means accompanied with objects. *"Sopalambham"* means accompanied by perception. It refers to an empirical experience including scripture, teacher etc, with subject object relationship, the duality, all worldly experience, called *Laukika* and *Jāgarita.* In *vedānta Jāgarita* (waking state) has these characteristics. The

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

word *"Avastu"* means that kind of experience where there is no *Saṁvṛti* i.e. where there is experience without the help of external sense organs. Also *"Sopalambham"* means perception as if there are objects even though there is absence of objects. This is called—*Śuddha Laukika* (pure worldly), the dream state which is more subtle than the gross waking state. It is common to all creatures.

Comments

"Ātmatattva" was indicated by the refutation of other schools. Now is shown the *Vedāntic* method, connecting this chapter with the first *Āgma Prakaraṇa* where the Ultimate Reality is known after the analysis of the three states of *Jāgrat, swapna* and *suṣupti.* This *vedāntic* method is by the process of superimposition and then rejection *(Adhyāropa* and then *Apavāda)* by eliminating the illusory *Padārthas* of the three states and realising the pure *Turīya. Jāgarita* is the empirical experience, gross, with external objects perceived (by external sense organ) as graced by *Indriya Devatās* like the sun etc. In *Swapna* there is no *Saṁvṛti* i.e. the experience is without the use of external sense organs. *"Śuddham"*—pure—subtle, without external objects. *"Śuddha Laukika"* is *swapna,* the dream state. *"Laukika"* means these experiences are common to all beings. These states are admitted in *vedānta* as they are held in *vedānta* as the *Upāya* means or graded steps for arriving at the correct knowledge.

अवस्त्वनुपलम्भं च लोकोत्तरमिति स्मृतम् ।
ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च विज्ञेयं सदा बुद्धैः प्रकीर्तितम् ॥८८॥

avastvanupalambhaṁ ca lokottaramiti smṛtam.
Jñānaṁ jñeyaṁ ca vijñeyaṁ sadā buddhaiḥ prākīrtitam. (88)

Translation

The Duality without object and without perception is called *Lokottara* (beyond worldly experience—*suṣupti).* Knowledge, object of knowledge and the specially knowable are always proclaimed by the wise.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Lokottara—beyond worldly experience—is without object and perception, without subject-object relationship and it is

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

therefore beyond worldly experience. Worldly experience is with subject-object relationship and where there is absence yet which is the seed of all future activities—is called *Suṣupti*—state of deep sleep. That knowledge by which the Ultimate Reality is known along with the means to realise it—i.e. the analysis of the experience in *Jāgrat (Laukika), swapna (śuddha Laukika)* and *suṣupti (Lokottara)*—that knowledge alone is called *Jñāna.* The objects of knowledge *(Jñeya)* are these very three states (of *Jāgrat, swapna* and *susupti).* Apart from these three there cannot be any other object of knowledge. They include every entity falsely imagined by different proud disputants. Specially knowable *(Vijñeya)* is the Ultimate Reality called *Turīya* (the fourth) real, unborn and the essence of *Ātman.* The wise, the knower of Ultimate Reality, the knower of *Brahma* have always proclaimed these—beginning from *Laukika* upto *Vijñeya* (from experience in *Jāgrat* upto the Highest knowledge *Turīya* Ātman).

Comments

From *Kārikā* 4-87 onwards, *Gauḍapāda* has given his own *Vedāntic* method. He uses Buddhists terms and is aware of Buddhist thought and works but he is keen to distinguish his *Vedāntic* tenets from those of the Buddhists. The method of realising *Brahma* as indicated in the first *Āgama* chapter is reiterated here—by analysing the experiences in the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep and then to know their *Sākṣin* the *Turīya Ātman. Gauḍapāda's Laukika, Suddha Laukika* and *Lokottara* correspond to *Lankāvatāra's Laukika Lokottara* and *Lokottaratama.* Prof. Karmarkar, disargreeing with Prof. Bhattacharya, remarks that the *Lokottaratama jñāna* of Buddhists could not be the *Uttama Jñāna* which according to *Gauḍapaḍa* is *"Kincin Na Jāyate"* (3-48, 4-71)—and thus this is not merely a difference only in nomencleture but even in tenets.

In line two of this Kārikā (4-88) Prof. Bhattacharya interprets *Jñeya* as mere object in the ordinary sense of the term—not the three states as interpreted by Śaṅkara.But *"Jñeya"* is used for Brahma in 3-53 and thus *Jñeya* cannot mean a mere object of knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term.—by knowing *Jñeya* the person becomes *sarvajña.*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

"Buddaiḥ" is interpreted as Buddhists by Prof. Bhattacharya which is hardly convincing says Prof. Karmarkar. Saccidānandendra has cited *Mhb. Mokṣa Dharma* 249-10, 11 "This is the real successful life particularly of a *Brāhmaṇa* where the goal is *Ātmajñāna* and tranquility. By realising this one becomes *Buddha*—what else is the definition of *Buddha?"* Thus the word *"Buddha"* was not necessarily applied to Gautama *Buddha* even in the *Mahābhārata.* This was much earlier than the use of the word *Buddha* by *Gauḍapāda. Gautama Buddha* proclaimed *Anattā (anātmā)* while *Mahābhārata* in the verse cited insists on *Ātmajñāna.*

ज्ञाने च त्रिविधे ज्ञेये क्रमेण विदिते स्वयम् ।
सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महाधियः ॥८९॥

jnāne ca trividhe jñeye krameṇa vidite svayam.
sarvajñatā hi sarvatra bhavatīha mahādhiyaḥ. (89)

Translation

When knowledge and the threefold objects of knowledge are known gradually there arises omniscience on all sides in the one of the highest intellect.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

The word *Jñāna* means the knowledge regarding the three states *(Laukika* etc referred to in 4-87, 88). The word *Jñeya* means those three states themselves which are the objects of knowledge. (They may be known in an order). First knowledge is of the gross state of *Laukika (Jāgrat).* Thereafter, in its absence comes the *Śuddha Laukika (swapna).* In its absence also comes the third *Lokottara (suṣupti).* In this order, in the absence of these three states (i.e. when the prior state merges in the succeeding one) when the Supreme Truth, the fourth, non-dual, unborn, fearless *(Ātman)* is realised,—then there automatically arises omniscience *(Sarvajñatā)* which is identical with *Ātmaswarūpa* (nature of the self), *Sarvajñatā* means being *sarva* and *Jña* (All and knower). This he becomes in this very life and he is the man of the highest intellect, as he realises that which transcends all objects of empirical existence. This *Sarvajñatā* (omniscience) remains with him everywhere for all times. When once the knowledge (of Ātman) is realised, there is no question of its getting deviated. The knowledge of one realising the Supreme Reality is not subject to

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

generation and deviation like the knowledge of proud disputants.

Comments

Śurti says that when *Ātman* is realised everything becomes known (i.e. there is *sarvajñatā)*—after the merging of the three states when *Turya* is realised. This *Turya* is non-dual, *Kūṭastha* (changeless) and fearless (as there is no relation with *Avidyā).* The *Phala* of this knowledge is automatically *Ātmaswarūpa* in this very life (there is no going by *Arcirādimārga* etc.). This is the highest intellect as he has realised the transcendental Reality. When by the grace of *Sruti* and *Acārya,* this knowledge is realised there is no deviation from it and the *vidvān* attains to *Paripūrṇajñapti-rūpatā. Saccidānandendra* says that the word *"Trividhe"* in the *Kārikās* applies both to *Jñāna* and Jñeya; both are referred to as *"Trividhe"* (by madhya-maṇi-nyāya). *Jñāna* is non-dual but is said here as three-fold only by *Upacāra* as *Manokṛtirūpa* (modification of the mind). Karmarkar observes that the idea of a *Brahmavid* being *Sarvajña* is quite common and refers to Gītā 15-19 where the word *"Sarvavid"* is used.

The order of realising *Turīya* is mentioned. The *vedana* of the three *Sthānas (Jagrat, swapna* and *suṣupti)* means the merging of the prior *sthāna* into the succeeding one. Even though there is disappearance of one *sthāna* when it merges in the other—the *sthānin* in all the three states remains identical as *cinmātraswarūtpatā* (pure consciousness). When in this way the—*asparśa*—non-touch of the qualities of the various *sthānas* is firmly understood—there is then no *sthanitva* also and in the absence of three *sthānas,* the Ultimate Reality, *Turya,* non-dual, unborn fearless *Ātman* devoid of subject-object-relation is realised, as explained in the first *Āgma Prakaraṇa* of these *Kārikās.*

हेयज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयान्यग्रयाणतः ।
तेषामन्यत्र विज्ञेयादुपलम्भस्त्रिषु स्मृतः ॥९०॥

heyajñeyāpyapākyāni vijñeyānyagrayāṇataḥ
teṣāmanyatra vijñeyādupalambhastriṣu smṛtaḥ (90)

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Translation

In the first palce *(Agrayāṇataḥ)* the following four things should be known—*Heya* (what is to be abandoned) *Jñeya* (what is to be realised) *Apya* (what is to be acquired) and *Pākya* (by avoiding which maturity is to be attained). Out of these four, except *(anyatra)* that which is to be realised *(Vijñeyāt)* viz. the Ultimate Reality free from four fold theories, there is *upālambha* (perception, which is mere imagination due to *Avidyā)* of the other three.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

As the states viz. *Laukika* etc. are described as objects to be known in an order, there may arise a doubt that these three states might be real from the point of view of Ultimate Reality—to dispel this doubt, it is stated that the three states *Laukika* etc. which are waking, dream and deep sleep states are *Heya*—things to be abandoned as erroneously superimposed on *Ātman* like a serpent superimposed on a rope. *Jñeyam* i.e. that which is to be realised is the Ultimate Reality which is free from the four-fold theories (mentioned in 4-83). *Āpyāni* i.e. things to be acquired by a recluse who has renounced the threefold desires and they are wisdom, childlike behaviour (free from fraud arrogance etc) and silence. Defects to be avoided for attaining maturity *(Pākyāni)* are imperfections like attachment, hatred, delusion etc. All these *Heya, Jñeya, Āpya* and *Pākya* are to be known by a recluse as means for the realization. The word *"Agrayāṇataḥ"* means in the the first place. Out of these four viz. *Heya, Jñeya, Āpya* and *Pākya,* expect that which is to be realised *(jñeya* or *vijñeya)* which is the Ultimate Reality, *Brahma,* the other three (viz. *Heya, Āpya* and *Pākya)* are perceived and are mere imagination due to *Avidyā.* Sages who are knowers of *Brahma* do not regard these three (Heya *Āpya* and *Pākya)* as real from the point of view of Ultimate Reality.

As the three states *(Jāgrat-swapna-suṣupti)* are stated as objects to be known, a doubt arises that they might be real. This *Kārikā* is to remove that doubt and it further describes the various accessories for obtaining Realization. *Pāṇḍitya* means knowing the essence of *Vedānta* and it is *Śravaṇa* due to

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

intelligent investigation of the undual Reality. *Bālya* is child like behaviour free from fraud arrogance etc and it is making close scrutiny with arguments of the meaning of what is "heard". *Mauna* means the *Karma* of a *Muni* and that is constant reflection of that *Jñāna* which is called *Nididhyāsana.* These are *Āpya* things to be acquired. If *Jñeya* Brahma alone should be called *Vijñeya,* why are all the four *(Heya-Jñeya-Āpya* and *Pākya)* called *Vijñeya?* The reply is that in the first stage, they are so mentioned as an *Upāya* (means) for Realisation. As stated in the *Bhāṣya* on 4-92 the *Jñeyatva* of *Ātmā* is only *Vyāvahārika.* This *upāyatva* viz. *Vijñeyatā* of *Brahma* is *"Bhūtapūrvagatyā".* In Māṇḍūkya 7 *Brahma* is called *Vijñeya* and this *Vijñeyatva* itself which implies *Tripuṭi* of knower knowledge and known is before Realisation. *Upāyaḥ so'vatārāya"* (3-15). *"Agrayāṇataḥ"* is no doubt an obscure phrase used to denote "in the first place". The word *yāna* is used in the sense of *"Gati"* as in *"Devayāna" Pitṛyāna* so *"Agrayāṇa"* means *"Agre gati"* i.e. before proceeding further or at the first stage, in the first place *(Prathamataḥ).* Obscure phrases are sometimes deliberately used here as well as in Brahmasūtra, Pātañjala yogasūtras etc to keep away disputants or disbelievers.

We have given above the interpretation of this *Kārikā* as given by Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri. Prof. Karmarkar and Prof. Bhattacharya have their own independent separate interpretations of the various words in this *Kārikā.*

Heya — (Śaṅkara) The three states *laukika (Jāgrat)* etc.

(Bhattacharya) *Paratantraswabhāva* as stated by Asaṅga.
(Karmarkar) things to be abandoned as stated by *Niṣedhavākyas,* according to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.*

Jñeya — (Śaṅkara) *Brahma,* Ultimate Reality, free from fourfold theories cf. *Śvetā* 1-12.
(Bhattacharya) *Parikalpitaswabhāva* in Buddhism. (Karmarkar) things to be knwon from *Vidhi*

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Āpya — (Śaṅkara) Pāṇḍitya, Bālya, Mauna of Bṛhdāraṇyaka 3-5-1.
(Bhattacharya) *Dharmadhātu* which is *Parinişpanna* in Buddhism.

(Karmarkar) *Swargaloka* according to Pūrvamīmāṁsā.

Pākya — (Śaṅkara) *Kaşayas* like *Rāga, Dweşa Moha* etc.
(Bhattacharya) to be matured by discipline for self and others.
(Karmarkar) *Pākyas* are various sacrifices according to Pūrvamīmāmsā.

Agrayāṇataḥ — (Śaṅkara) In the first place, *Prathamataḥ*
(Bhattacharya) From *Mahāyāna* Buddhism
(Karmarkar) From Pūrvamīmāmsā.

Mahāyāna of Buddhism is not referred to as Agrayāna, and other technical Buddhist interpretations of Bhattacharya do not fit in the avowedly vedāntic Upanişadic theory of Gauḍapāda. Karmarkar's interpretation is ingeneous but Gauḍapāda has not discussed Pūrvamīmāmsā anywhere, in his Kārikās earlier and thus it is far-fetched. In this doubtful position it is safer to follow Śankara who knows the meaning of his own *Sampradāyavid Paramaguru Ācārya* much better than modern Pandits far removed from Gauḍapāda.

प्रकृत्याऽऽकाशवज्ज्ञेयाः सर्वे धर्मा अनादयः ।
विद्यते न हि नानात्वं तेषां क्वचन किंचन ॥९१॥

prakṛtyā" kāśavajjñeyāḥ sarve dharmā anādayaḥ
vidyate na hi nānātvaṁ teṣāṁ kvacan kiṁcana. (91)

Translation

All entities *(Dharmas)* should be known as beginningless by their nature and are like the sky. There is no multiplicity of any kind anywhere in their case.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

Seekers of liberation should know that all *Dharmas* i.e. *Ātmans* are by nature like the sky, subtle, without blemish and all-pervading and beginningless i.e. eternal. In order to dispel the doubt because of the use of plural, it is stated that in their case there is no multiplicity anywhere of any kind, even of the Slightest kind.

Comments

Gauḍapādācārya now concludes his work by expounding the nature of the Ultimate Reality which is free from the four fold alternative theories. The word Dharma is used by the Ācārya—in the Kārikās-in the sense of *Ātman* as well as for external objects but according to the context here *Dharmas* means *Ātmans*. The plural of *Ātman* is used on the basis of their imagined multiplicity. Anywhere means denial of multiplicity due to space time or condition. Of the Slightest kind means denial of multiplicity due to subject object relation or part and whole relation.

आदिबुद्धाः प्रकृत्यैव सर्वे धर्माः सुनिश्चिताः ।
यस्यैवं भवति क्षान्तिः सोऽमृतत्वाय कल्पते ॥९२॥

ādibuddhāḥ prakṛtyaiva sarve dharmāḥ suniścitāḥ.
yasyaivaṁ bhavati kṣāntiḥ somṛtatvāya kalpate. (92)

Translation

All *Dharmas (Ātmans)* are by their nature enlightend from the very beginning and are well ascertained. One who has no need to seek further knowledge *(Kṣāntiḥ)* is alone capable of attaining to immortality.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The knowableness of *Dharmas (Ātmans)* is stated only from the point of view of illusory empirical experience and not from the point of view of Ultimate Reality, for they are by their very nature illumined, of the nature of eternal enlightenment like the sun, being of the nature of eternal lights. All Dharmas mean all *Ātmans*. There is no need to ascertain their nature, their eternal nature is well-ascertained. They are not of any doubtful nature as "they are like this or not like that". When a seeker of liberation, in the abovementioned way, has for ever no need to seek further knowledge for himself or for others—just as the sun for ever has

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

no need for any external light either for itself or for others, then alone he becomes capable of attaining to immortality i.e. liberation—*Kṣānti* means having no need to seek further knowledge.

Comments

There is no knowableness of *Dharmas (Ātmans)* in the primary sense of that word—it is only from the point of view of *Saṁvṛti* i.e. the illusory empirical experience. Their nature is not in any doubt as the same is very well ascertained from the beginning. *Ātman* is always illumined. One who has no need to seek any further knowledge for himself or other is capable of securing Immortality. The second line of the *Kārikā* gives the *phala* of the knowledge of *Ātman.*

Prof. Bhattacharya interprets Buddha in the Kārikā as *Bodha* or *Tathāgata.* Prof. Karmarkar says that Gauḍapāda is here objecting to the Buddhist view that some Buddhas are *Ādibuddhas* and others attain to Buddhahood gradually. Gauḍapāda says that all *Ātmans* are *Adi-buddhas*—there is no distinction among them—even plural is used from the illusory empirical point of view.

आदिशान्ता ह्यनुत्पन्नाः प्रकृत्यैव सुनिर्वृताः ।
सर्वे धर्माः समाभिन्ना अजं साम्यं विशारदम् ॥९३॥

ādiśānta hyanutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ.
sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajaṁ sāmyaṁ viśāradam. (93)

Translation

All the *Dharmas* are by nature all peace, unoriginated and ever liberated (or free from attachments). They are of the same nature and not distinct from one another. The Ultimate Reality is therefore unborn, sameness and pure *(viśāradam)*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

Further, there is no need for any effort to make *Ātman* peaceful as all *Ātmans* are eternally peaceful, unoriginated by nature, of the nature of the eternal tranquility. All *Dharmas (Ātmans)* are of the same nature, not distinct from one another. As the essence of *Ātman* is unborn, sameness and pure therefore there is no need to make any effort for peace or liberation. As

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Ātman is eternally of the same nature, there can be no purpose for making any effort to bring about any change in that.

Comments

As it was stated that the seeker of liberation attains to the Immortality—there may be a doubt that immortality is adventitious and coming later on as a new comer. This Kārikā dispels that doubt. If *Ātman* is not of the nature as stated in the kārikā then *Mokṣa* has no meaning as *Puruṣārtha*; whatever is attained to by any *Karma* is *Anitya*—cessation of misery of *saṁsāra* or rise of happiness if achieved by any *Karma* is surely transient.

Ātman is *Śānta* (cf. Māṇḍūkya 7 *"Śantaṁ Śivam* etc"). *Ātmatattva* is of the same nature, non-dual, *nitya-suddha Buddha-Mukta-swabhāva,* all-peace and nothing is needed to make it peaceful.

As opposed to *Kṛpaṇa, Viśārada* is rendered as self confident by Prof. Karmarkar. *Nirvṛta* may mean blissful or liberated. *Viśārada* is used in opposition to *Kṛpana*—the latter is censured in 3-1 and 4-94. *Bhāṣyakāra* renders *"Viśārada"* as pure and *"Sunirvṛta"* as completely serene, unattached, composed. Liberated *(upahita swabhava), Visārada* is one who is pure as he is proficient in correct knowledge.

वैशारद्यं तु वै नास्ति भेदे विचरतां सदा ।
भेदनिम्नाः पृथग्वादास्तस्मात्ते कृपणाः स्मृताः ॥९४॥

vaiśāradyaṁ tu vai nāsti bhede vicaratāṁ sadā .
bhedanimnāḥ pṛthagvādāstasmātte kṛpaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ . (94)

Translation

There is no purity *(Vaiśāradyam)* for those who wander about in the world of duality. Those who assert duality lower themselves on account of the idea of separateness and they are called men of poor judgement *(Kṛpaṇāḥ)*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

They alone who have realised the Ultimate Reality as expounded here are called persons having the best of Judgement; all others are of poor judgement. The reason is that the latter lower themselves on account of their idea of separation; they obstinately assert duality and are preoccupied with empirical experience. Who are they? The reply is—those who assert that

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

there is multiplicity—"the dualists". They are therefore men of poor judgement, are wretched, as they wander about in duality and have therefore no idea of the purity (of *Ātman).* They always cling to the path of duality which is only imagined by Ignorance.

Comments

The *Ācārya* now censures the ignorant in order to inspire seekers of liberation.

Prof. Bhattacharya observes that in Buddhism *Vaiśāradya* is of four kinds (1) highest knowledge of all things (2) knowledge of destroying human passions (3) knowledge about destroying impediments (4) knowledge of the right way leading to salvation.

Prof. Karmarkar says that *Kṛpaṇa* means pitiable while *Viśārada* mainly points out to the bold belief in *Advaita. Gītā* refers to *Kārpaṇya Doṣa* in 2-7. Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3-8-10 calls one who dies without knowing *Akṣara (Brahma)* is *Kṛpaṇa* while one who dies knowing the *Akṣara* is the real *Brāhmaṇa.*

अजे साम्ये तु ये केचिद्भविष्यन्ति सुनिश्चिताः ।
ते हि लोके महाज्ञानास्तच्च लोको न गाहते ॥९५॥

aje sāmye tu ye kecidbhaviṣyanti suniścitāḥ ,
te hi loke mahājñānāstacca loko na gāhate. (95)

Translation

Those who are firmly convinced that *Atman* is unborn and sameness are in this world persons of highest wisdom. Common men cannot understand this.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

Now with reference to that Ultimate Reality which was stated as beyond the understanding of men of poor intellect who are without learning, outside the knowledge of Vedānta, narrow-minded and of little knowledge. Those persons who are firmly convinced that the ultimate Reality is unborn and of the same nature—that it is this way alone-they alone in this world are called persons possessing the highest wisdom. They alone know the essence of the supreme Reality—be they women or others. The path which such people have followed cannot come within the grasp of other people of ordinary intelligence. Even Gods are

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

perplexed with regard to the path, when they desire to follow the footsteps of one who has become the self of all beings, who is the benefactor of all and who has left no marks of footprints behind him. (Mahābhārata Mokṣa 239-23); their track like the marks of footprints of birds flying in the sky cannot be tracked."

Comments

Having censured the ignorant, the *Ācārya* now praises the learned. They alone are called in this world persons possessing the Highest wisdom who have the knowledge of changeless *Brahma* that is without distinctions—a firm conviction without non-apprehension or misapprehension. The ignorant are those who have no sense of *viveka* (discrimination), no knowledge of *Vedānta,* cannot understand the proper meaning of the text of Śruti. Even ladies and others can acquire correct knowledge. But this correct knowledge is not easily acquired even by Gods. The track of one who has known Reality is not traceable like the marks of footprints of birds flying in the sky as such knower of Reality has not to go anywhere—he is *gantavyapada-rahita.* Muṇḍaka 3-2-5 says that those knowers of Reality mingle with the whole universe *(Sarvam Eva Āviśanti).*

अजेष्वजमसंक्रान्तं धर्मेषु ज्ञानमिष्यते ।
यतो न क्रमते ज्ञानमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥९६॥

ajeṣvajamasaṅkrāntaṁ dharmeṣu jñānamiṣyate.
yato na kramate jñānamasaṅgaṁ tena kīrtitam. (96)

Translation

The unoriginated knowledge is not regarded as coming from outside to the unoriginated entities *(Ātmans)*—as knowledge does not cross over (to *Ātmans).* It is called unrelated (to objects).

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

How is it called the highest wisdom? In the Dharmas *(Ātmans)* which are unborn, unoriginated, immovable there is knowladge which too is unborn, unoriginated and immovable like the heat in the Sun and thus that knowledge is not regarded as crossing over to *Ātman* like one object crossing over to another. As knowledge does not cross over to another entity or object, therefore knowledge is regarded as unattached (unrelated to any object) and is like the sky.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

(Objection) What is to be known is *"Ajam, Sāmyam"*. One who has that conviction is the knower. The knowledge is that conviction. With all this threefold distinction, how do you call that knowledge the Highest wisdom?

Reply:

The *Jīvas* are the reflections of consciousness *(Cit pratibimbas);* their knowledge is changeless *Bimba-kalpa Brahma,* of the nature of knowledge. The *māna-meya-bhāva* (distinction of knower, known etc.) is imaginary. Thus those who have this knowledge of Reality are persons possessing the Highest wisdom. In Vedānta, knowledge is regarded as untouched *(asaṅga)* as there is no Viṣaya for *Jñāna* and there is nothing else besides *Brahma.* In *Mukti* the mind is stated as without any *viṣaya. Atman* is untouched and of the nature of eternal knowledge *(Nitya-vijñapti-rūpa).*

Knowledge does not come in and go out of *Ātman* like an attribute as believed by the Naiyāyikas. There is no relation of an attribute and a possessor of attribute between *Jñāna* and *Brahma. Brahma* and *Jñāna* are identical. *Brahma* is of the nature of *Jñāna-Nitya-vijñapti rūpa.*

अणुमात्रेऽपि वैधर्म्ये जायमानेऽविपश्चितः ।
असङ्गता सदा नास्ति किमुतावरणच्युतिः ॥९७॥

anumātre'pi vaidharmye jāyamāne' vipaścitaḥ
asaṅgatā sadā nāsti kimutāvaraṇacyutiḥ . (97)

Translation

If the ignorant entertains even the slightest atom-like difference, then there is for him no state without attachment, much less can he have the removal of the veil (concealing the nature of *Ātman).*

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

As in the case of other disputants, when the ignorant i.e. a person without discrimination believes that there arises the slightest difference either internal or external in *Ātman* (the entity)—then he does not attain to the state without attachment—much less can he have removal of the veil i.e. the destruction of the bondage.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

As stated by the *Ācārya, Brahma* is the changeless Reality. In other systems of philosophy, *Jñāna* is *Saviṣaya* i.e. is related to objects and thus *Jñāna* is not untouched in their case. But if like the ignorant people it is admitted that there is any birth of an object, then as a consequence there of *Jñāna* is related to that object and thus there is no state of unattachment of *Jñāna.* That being so there is no possibility of the destruction of the bondage. *Jñāna* which is born, being related to an object, is not permanent and the liberation, if so achieved, is liable to change. "The slightest difference" as stated in the Kārikā refers to the Taittirīya Śruti text 2-7 which says that there is fear if even the slightest difference is entertained *(Udaram antaram Kurute).*

अलब्धावरणाः सर्वे धर्माः प्रकृतिनिर्मलाः ।
आदौ बुद्धास्तथा मुक्ता बुध्यन्त इति नायका : ॥९८॥

alabdhāvaraṇāḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtinirmalāḥ,
ādau buddhāstathā muktā budhyanta iti nāyakāḥ. (98)

Translation

All *Dharmas (Ātmans)* are without any veil (or bondage) and pure by nature. They are always illumined and liberated from the very beginning. They are called as "being realised" as they have the capability of having the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

When it was stated that in the case of those others there is no removal of the veil, it may mean by implication that in Vedānta there is veil which is removed by some act. To dispel this doubt, we say no. All the *Dharmas (Ātmans)* are without any veil i.e. not having any kind of bondage due to *Avidyā* etc—they are without any fetters. They are pure by nature. They are ever illumined from the very beginning and liberated as they are by nature eternally pure, illumined and liberated. If that is so, why do you describe them as "being realised"? We say that the *dharmas (Ātmans)* are *Nāyakas,* masters of themselves, capable of knowing i.e. they have the capability of knowing the nature of the Ultimate Reality. It is like saying that the Sun is shining, even though the sun is of the nature of eternal light or like saying that the mountains are sanding, even though they have no motion of any kind.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Comments

There is no removal of veil for the ignorant, it may imply that there is some veil for Vedāntists which they remove by some act. To remove this doubt it is said that *Ātman* has no veil and is always liberated. The veil—*āvaraṇa*—is imagined due to *Avidyā* it is not there according to *tattvadṛṣṭi*. But if *Ātman* is always liberated, then how is it said that *Ātman* is the knower? The reply is that the verb, subject, grammatical termination etc are not to be taken in their primary sense here. The phrase *"Ātmā* becomes the knower" means Ātman has the capability of realising the Ultimate Truth.

This Kārikā is differently interpreted both by Prof. Vidhusekhar and Prof. Karmarkar, Śaṅkara interprets *Nāyakas* as *"Swāminaḥ Samarthāḥ Boddhum"* and *"Budhyante"* is taken metaphorically. Prof. Vidhushekhar interprets *Nāyakas* as Buddhas.

Prof. Karmarkar says that the second line of the *Kārikā* is not connected with the first. He also says that *Nāyakas* refer to Buddhas but observes that Gauḍapāda differs from Buddhists who believe that some are *Ādibuddhas* and some acquire Buddhahood later while according to Gauḍapāda all are Ādibuddhas and *Muktas* and there is no *Vaidharmya* among them.

क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः।
सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥९९॥

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṁ dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ.
sarve dharmāstathā jñānaṁ naitadbuddhena bhāṣitam. (99)

Translation

The knowledge of all pervasive enlightend one does not cross over into the *Dharmas* (entities) similarly all entities also do not cross over into the knowledge, This has not been declared by the Buddha.

Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya

The knowledge of the enlightened one, the knower of the Ultimate Reality, does not cross over into other objects or *Dharmas (Ātmans)*. This knowledge is always established in the.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Dharma (Ātman) like the light into the sun. The word *Tāyin* means having expansive all pervasive nature like the sky; or *"Tāyin"* may mean deserving veneration or possessed of wisdom. All *Dharmas (Ātmans)* also are like the knowledge, (all pervasive) like the sky and they too do not cross over into any other object. Whatever was stated in the beginning of this fourth chapter viz. "by the knowledge of (all pervasive) like the sky" etc.--that very knowledge is identical with the enlightened one who is all pervasive like the sky and that knowledge does not cross over anywhere into any other object. Similarly *Dharmas* i.e. *Ātmans* too (do not cross over into any other object). *Brahma,* the essence of self *(Ātman)* is like the sky without motion, transformation, parts, is eternal, non-dual, untouched, unseen, ungrasped, beyond hunger and thirst; the Śruti says "the knowledge of the seer is never absent' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 4-3-23).GautamaBuddha did not declare this knowledge regarding the non-dual Ultimate Reality which is without the distinction of "the knower, known and knowledge". Even though his doctrine rejecting existence of external objects and admitting the existence of ideas alone is very near the non-dual entity *(Ātman),* but this knowledge of the non-dual Ultimate Reality has to be attained through the Upaniṣads *(Vedānta)* alone.

Comments

When it is said that *Atman* is the real knower (has *Boddhṛtva),* why is that proposition now denied? The reply is that from the point of view of the enlightened one the knowledge has no touch or relation with any object. *Jīvas* are identical with *Brahma* that is all pervasive like the sky. *Jñāna* alone is the Ultimate Reality and the distinction of knower knowledge and known is imaginary—but then has *Vedānta* accepted the doctrine of the Buddhists? The reply is No. According to *Vedānta, Jñāna* of the enlightened one does not cross over into any other object or even in *Ātman* but is always established in *Ātman* like light in the seer—therefore there is no *Boddhṛtva (Ātman* being the "knower") of *Ātman* in the primary sense as there is then no distinction of knower, known and knowledge. Gauḍapādācārya concludes his treatise with the same proposition which he made at the beginning of this chapter. *Jñāna* and *Ātman* are identical, there is no crossing over into any

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

other object as no other object is ever born—there is *Ajāti* as expounded in the treatise—there is only non-dual *Brahma* identical with *Ātmatattva* without the distinction of *Jñātṛ, Jñeya* and *jñāna,* Gautama Buddha's doctrine though near to the Upaniṣadic doctrine, is different. He declared the rejection of external objects, and preached *vijñānavāda* but the real doctrine of the Vedāntic Absolute *Brahma* is to be attained only from *Upaniṣads.* About *Brahma* that is without imperfections, all complete, without birth or death, only of the nature of *Jñapti* (knowledge) as declared by the Upaniṣads.

The *Kārikā* has raised a lot of controversy.—particulatly the phrase. "This was not declared by Buddha". Śaṅkara's and Ānandagiri's interpretation is given above.

Prof. Vidhushekhar has his own pet theory about these Kārikās. He is keen on giving everywhere Buddhist interpretations. The sentence "This is not declared by Buddha" is interpreted by him as *"Avacanam Buddhavacanam"* i.e. as this is the transcendental Truth, it cannot be described by words or instructions to pupils and thus silence of Gautama Buddha is the silence of the Noble—silence only is his speech. Prof. Vidhushekar is keen on identifying Gauḍapāda's doctrine with some school or the other of the Buddhists. But neither eminent Buddhists have accepted Gauḍapāda as a Buddhist not do Vedāntins have accepted tenets of Buddhism and as Śaṅkara has pointed out, the difference in the two sets of tenets cannot be over-looked as it is a vain effort causing confusion.

Gauḍapāda has already shown in 4-28 his difference from *Vijñānavāda* Buddhism which believes in *Kṣaṇikatva* and some kind of birth of *Citta* while Gauḍapāda asserts *Ajātivāda*—non-origination of universe from *Aja Amṛta Brahma, Mādhaymikas* do not postulate any substratum for world illusion and therefore their doctrine is also rejected by Gauḍapāda.

Prof. Karmarkar observes that Laṅkāvatara contains the expression *"Bhāṣiṣye' ham tava"* repeated many times and put in the mouth of Buddha but what Gauḍapāda means to say is that Buddha did not grasp the *Ajātivāda* which is the proper solution of *Saṁsāra.* He stopped at denying *Bāhyārtha* and admitting *Vijñānavāda* but his philosophy is defective as Gautama Buddha did not somehow get out of the idea of causal relation and,

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

origination; and this is the meaning of the Kāriḳā—"this was not declared by (Gautama) Buddha".

This subject is discussed in some detail in the Introduction.

दुर्दर्शमतिगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम् ।
बुद्ध्वा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुर्मो यथाबलम् ॥१००॥

dundarśamatigambhīramajaṁ sāmyaṁ viśāradam.
buddhvā padamanānātvaṁ namaskurmo yathābalam. (100)

Translation

Having realised that state (knowledge) of the Supreme Reality) which is difficult to be grasped, profound, unoriginated, sameness, Pure (*viśāradam)* and free from multiplicity we offer our obeisance (to that state) as best as we can.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya

At the close of this treatise, obeisance is made in praise of the Ultimate Reality. It is difficult to be grasped. It is free from the four-fold and alternative theories of "Is, Is not", etc. It is profound and like a big ocean, entry into it is difficult. It is unoriginated, sameness, pure, this state is free from multiplicity. Having realised that state, i.e. having become one with that state, we offer our obeisance to that state. Even though that state is not within the scope of worldly treatment (like salutations etc) we try to bring it down to our worldly level and offer our salutations to that state (of supreme reality) to the best of our ability.

Comments

Obeisance to the Highest reality was made in the beginning with the word *Aum* (in the first chapter), in the middle (at the beginning of the 4th chapter) and now at the end. The Supreme Reality is *Kūṭastha* (changeless) Nirviśeṣa (without distinctions) and is free from all touch, relation or attachment. *(sarvasambandha-vidhura).* It is to be known, as declared by Upaniṣads, by removing illusory superimposed attributes, with which Brahma is unrelated. Salutation is made by continuing the imaginary *Māyā-Kalpita* belief in multiplicity. It is to indicate the vast glory and greatness of Brahma.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Śaṅkara's obeisance to the Supreme Reality

अजमपि जनिर्योगं प्रापदैश्वर्ययोगाद्
अगति च गतिमत्तां प्रापदेकं ह्यनेकम्।
विविधविषयधर्मग्राहिमुग्धेक्षणानां
प्रणतभयविहन्तृ ब्रह्म यत्तन्नतोऽस्मि ॥१॥

ajamapi janiryogaṁ prāpadaiśvaryayogād-
agati ca gatimattāṁ prāpadekaṁ hyanekam.
vividhaviṣayadharmagrāhimugdhekṣaṇānāṁ
praṇatabhayavihantṛ brahma yattannato'smi. (1)

Translation

I alter my obeisance to that *Brahma* who destroys the fear of those taking Its shelter—*Brahma* is unborn yet appears as taking birth when associated with Its *Māyā*—the prowess, It is motionless but appears to have motion It is one but appears as many—*Brahma* so appears to those whose vision is deluded by their perception of multifarious objects and their attributes.

Comments

Brahma is *Aja* but when associated with *Māyā*, on account of the indescribable prowess of that *Māyā-Avidyā*, It appears to have *Janma* etc. The latter description of *Brahma* is the *Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa* of *Brahma* while *Brahma* as *Aja Kuṭastha* (changeless) is the *swarūpa lakṣaṇa*.

Saṅkara's salutation to his Paramaguru Gauḍapāda

प्रज्ञावैशाखवेधक्षुभितजलनिधेर्वेदनाम्नोऽन्तरस्थं
भूतान्यालोक्य मग्नान्यधिरतजननग्राहघोरे समुद्रे।
कारुण्यादुद्दधारामृतमिदममरैर्दुर्लभं भूतहेतो-
र्यस्तं पूज्याभिपूज्यं परमगुरुममुं पादपातैर्नतोऽस्मि ॥२॥

prajñāvaiśākhavedhakṣubhitajalanidhervedanāmno'ntarastham
bhūtānyālokya magnānyadhiratajananagrāhaghore samudre.
kāruṇyāduddadhārāmṛtamidamamarairdurlabhaṁ bhūtaheto-
ryastaṁ pūjyābhipūjyaṁ paramagurumamuṁ pādapātairnato'smi. (2)

Translation

I alter my obeisance to my grand teacher (Gauḍapāda)—the highly venerable—by falling at his feet. By churning the ocean of *Vedas*, by the churning rod of his intellect out of compassion he

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

brought out for the benefit of all, the innermost nectar not accessible even to Gods—this he did out compassion when he saw that people were drowned in the fearful ocean full of great crocodiles in the form of incessent births and deaths.

Comments

Prof. Dasgupta sees much significance in Śaṅkara saluting Gauḍapāda and not Bādarāyaṇa. But this is reading too much between the lines. Śaṅkara uses the word *"Amum"* (this teacher) for the grand teacher standing in front of him and there is no occasion to remember others.

Śaṅkara's obeisance to his guru Govindapāda.

यत्प्रज्ञालोकभासा प्रतिहतिमगमत्स्वान्तमोहान्धकारो
मज्जोन्मज्जच्च घोरे ह्यसकृदुपजनोदन्वति त्रासने मे ।
यत्पादावाश्रितानां श्रुतिशमविनयप्राप्तिरग्र्या ह्यमोघा
तत्पादौ पावनीयौ भवभयविनुदौ सर्वभावैर्नमस्ये ॥३॥

yatprajñālokabhāsā pratihatimagama|tsvāntamohāndhakāro
majjonmajjacca ghore hyasakṛdupajanodanvati trāsane me
yatpādāvāśritānāṁ śrutiśamavinayaprāptiragryā hyamoghā
tatpādau pāvanīyau bhavabhayavinudau sarvabhāvairnamasye. (3)

Translation

I salute with complete devotion the purifying feet of my Guru (Govindapāda) which destroy the fear of transmigration. Those who resort to these feet attain to the invaluable and foremost knowledge of Śruti, control of mind and spiritual discipline. By the light of his brilliant intellect, the darkness of delusion of my mind has disappeared-of the mind of myself who was going up and down in the terrible ocean of incessant births and deaths.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Meanings of certain words in Kārikās according to Śaṅkara

— Akṛtā=uncreated, Prakṛti e.g. water flowing downwards
— Agrayāṇataḥ=Prathamataḥ (ś); from Mahāyāna (bh); from Pūrvamīmāṁsā (Kar). It may mean "before procedeeing further".
— Acala=3-37 unchanging Ātmā
— Aja=not born of any cause; or not passing into birth as effect.
— Aja, anidra, aswapna is the essence of Ātmā 1-16, 3-36; 4-81
— Aja Acala is the essence of Ātmā 4-45.
— Ajāti=Brahma having no Jāti or birth 3-2, 4-42.
— Ādi=(1) cause (2) passing into birth 4-23
— Ādibuddha = Nityabuddha
— Adwaya=having no second (Gauḍapāda) 2-23, 35, 4-45, 85, not having any of the two extremes of "is and is not" (Buddhism)
— Adwaya=without subject object relation 3-30, 4-62.
— Advaitam=non duality 2-18, 1-18.
— Adhvasu Triṣu=In past, present and future — Kalpatraye
— Anantatā=having no destruction 4-30
— Anantamātraḥ=without limitations 1-29
— Anābhāsam=without the appearance of the form of external objects
— Animittam=without external objects
— Anutpattiḥ=4-77 nature of having no birth.
— Anupalambham=without subject-object relationship.
— Abhilāpa=Vāk, (3-37) 4-88 i.e. all Bāhyakaraṇas
— Abhūtataḥ=Māyayā.
— Amaṇastā=Amanībhāva, Ātmabhāva.
— Amanībhava=3-31 Ātmabhāva of Niruddha mind
— Alabdhāvaraṇāh=Bandhana-rahitāḥ
— Avatāraḥ=3.15 making the idea enter the intellect.
— avastu, = without the graspable external objects 4-87
— Avastukam = without any Vastu
— Asparśayoga = sambandha = rahitaḥ = Brahma = swabhāvaḥ 3-39, 4-2.
— Ādiśāntāḥ = where no śāntikarma is needed for Ātmā.
— Āśramāḥ = grades of qualified persons
— Utsarga = giving up, Hāna 3-38

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

— Upadeśād (Pūrvam) ayaṁ vādaḥ 1-18
— Uplambha = Upalabdhi 4-42 to 44
— Ubhayatvam = Samanatvam
— Kalpita-saṁvṛtyā = that kind of phenomenal experience imagined as a device to lead to the Ultimate Reality.
— Kotyaścatasraḥ = four alternate imaginary theories about Ātman 4-84.
— Kṣāntiḥ = complete satisfaction 4-92 where there is no need of any Bodha.
— Graha = false persistent adherence 4-82.
— Catuṣkoṭi = Asti of Vaiśeṣika, Nāsti of Kṣaṇika vijñānavādin, Astināsti of Digambara jina and Nāstināsti of Mādhyamika.
— Jīva = Paramātman 3-11
— Jīva = Hetuphalātmaka 1-16 having phenomenal experience of causality
— Jñeyam = Brahma in 3-37
— Jñeyam = three Avasthās in 4-88, 89, 90.
— Tāyinaḥ = Santānavataḥ, Ākaśakalpasya, or Pujāvataḥ or Prajnāvataḥ 4-99
— Deśitaḥ = Upadiṣṭaḥ
— Dvayanāśataḥ 4-24 = Destruction of diversity
— Dharma (1) Paramātmā 4-6
(2) Jīva engaged in Upāsanā 3-1
(3) Dharma and Adharma i.e. merits and demrits 2-25
(4) Dharmāḥ = Ātmānaḥ 4-10 etc.
(5) Dharma = originated external object 4-21
(6) Dharma = Dhātuḥ = Paramātmavastu 4-81

— Dhātuswabhāvataḥ 4-81 = Vastuswabhāvataḥ
— Nayakāḥ = samarthāḥ, Bodha — śaktimat — swabhāvāḥ.
— Nidrā = concealment of Reality — non apprehension, āvaraṇa śakti of Māyā or Ajñāna 1-14.
— Nirnimitta = without the cause of birth i.e. without false adherence to unreal duality
— Niścitam Yuktiyuktam ca = in conformity with both śruti and logic 3-23.
— Paratantrābhiniṣpatyā = according to established conclusion of other schools of philosophy

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

— Paratantrābhisaṁvṛtya = according to vyavahāra of other schools of philosophy
— Paridīpakam = Avabhāsakam
— Pākya = Rāga – dweṣādi – Kaṣāyāṇi
— Prakṛti = Swabhāva
— Prakṛtinirmalāḥ = Pure by nature
— Prajñapti = Śabdādipratīti, subjective cognition
— Prapañca = Māyāmātram dwaitam
— Phala = Dehādisaṅghāta
— Buddha = Paṇḍita 4-19 = Adwaitavādin 4-42 = Paramārthadarśin 4-80, 4-88
— Buddhāḥ = Vādinaḥ 4-19
— Buddhāḥ = Jnāninaḥ 4-42, 80, 88, 98.
— Buddhena = By Gautama Buddha 4-99
— Bhūtataḥ = Paramārthataḥ

fcs1

— Māyā = Ajñāna, False appearance = Saṁvṛti = Indriyaprajñā which is part of Saṁvṛti 3-24.
— Lokottara = Suṣupta; grāhyagrahaṇavarjita 4-88
— Laukika = Jāgarita; lokād anapetam grāhyagrāhaka-lakṣaṇa
— Vastvābhāsam = Dharmivad Ābhāsamānam 4-45
— Vikalpa in 1-18 = Duality in the form of teacher, pupil etc.
— Vijñānam = Ātmacaitanyam 4-45.
— Viparyāsa = Viparītajñānam e.g. appearance of a jar in the absence of jar
— Vedāḥ in 4-22 Vedapāragāḥ in 2-35 Vedāntaniścayaḥ in 2-12
Vedic references Īśa 3-35, Kaṭha 1-28, 3-13, Chāndogya 3-13, 15, Taittirīya 3-11 Bṛhadāraṇyaka 1-1, 2, 9, 12; 2-3, 5: 3-12, 13, 15, 24, 25, 26, Vājasaneyī saṁhitā 3-24, Vedānta-vicakṣaṇa 2-31
— Śwapna = false projection after concealment of reality, vikṣepaśakti of Ajñāna
— Vaiśāradya, as opposed to Kārpaṇya 4-94 = purity, Viśuddhiḥ
— Śuddha Laukika = Jagaritāt Pravibhaktam = swapna
— Saṁvṛta = 4-33 enclosed space
— Saṁvṛti 4-57 = Avidyā-viṣayako Laukiko vyavahāraḥ
— Saṅkleśa 4-24 = Duḥkham
— Suniryṛtāh = Suṣṭhu uparataswabhāvāḥ.
— Swabhāva 1-9 = nature of Avidyā i.e. Avidyā
— Swabhāva in 4-9 inherent nature

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

— Hetuḥ = Dṛṣṭānta in 4-20 according to the context
— Hetuḥ = cause in the nature of Dharma and Adharma, the effect or Phala of which is Dehādisaṅghāta
— Heya 4-90 three states of Jāgrat, swapna suṣupti
Jñeya = Paramārthatattva catuṣkoṭivarjita
Āpya = Pāṇḍitya, Bālya and Mauna
Pākya = Kaṣāyas like Rāga, Dweṣa etc.

Prof. V. Bhattacharya's interpretation of certain words in Kārikās as per the Buddhist texts.

— Agrayāṇa 4-90 = Mahāyāna
— Adhvan 4-27 Divisions of time
— Abhitāpa 3-37 beyond all expressions, refers to Acala Samādhi
— Abhisaṁvṛti 4-73 empirical truth
— Asparśayoga 3-39, 4-2 Ninth successive stage of Dhyāna called Anupūrvavihāra
— Ādiśānta 4-93 Quescent from the outset
— Kṣānti 4-92 three kinds of patience
— Catuṣkoṭi 4-84 four points of adherence by which the glorious one is covered
— Tāyin 4-99 a name of Buddha (Gautama)
— Deśita 4-2, 42 taught
— Dharma 4-1 etc elements of existence
— Dharmadhātu = the glorious one
— Nāyakāḥ 4-98 The Buddhas
— Nirmitaka 4-70 of Supernatural power
— Paratantra 4-24 dependent (existence)
— Paramārtha 4-73 Absolute truth
— Paridīpaka 4-21 elucidater
— Paridīpita 4-19 elucidated
— Pākya 4-90 that which is to be matured
— Prakṛtinirmalāḥ 4-98 unsullied in their nature
— Prajñapti 4-24, 25 Practical denomination
— Prapanca upaśama = cessation of the expansion of the universe
— Buddha in 4-19 etc Buddha (Gautama)
— Māyāhastin 4-44 Elephant called up by illusion
— Lokottara 4-58 Supra-mundane (cf. yogācāra texts) without object and its perception
— Laukika 4-87 with object and its perception, mundane
— Viśārada 4-93, 100 fearless
— Vaiśāradya 4-94 intrepidity
— Saṁvṛti 4-57 etc Practical truth
— Saṅklesa 4-24 (experience of) impurities
— Sunirvṛta 4-93 perfectly merged in Nirvāṇa

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Ākārādikramaḥ

FIRST LINES OF KĀRIKĀS

अ	Ch	Verse
अकल्पमजं ज्ञानम्	III	33
अकारो नयेत विश्वम्	I	23
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नम्	III	36
" "	IV	81
अजातस्यैव धर्मस्य	IV	6
अजातस्यैव भावस्य	III	20
अजातेस्त्रसतां तेषाम्	IV	43
अजातं जायते यस्मात्	IV	29
अजाद्वै जायते यस्य	IV	13
अजेष्वजमसंक्रान्तम्	IV	96
अजे साम्ये तु ये केचित्	IV	95
अजः कल्पितसंवृत्या	IV	74
अणुमात्रेऽपि वैधर्म्ये	IV	97
अतो वक्ष्याम्यकार्पण्यम्	III	2
अदीर्घत्वाच्च कालस्य	II	2
अद्वयंच द्वयाभासम्	III	30
" "	IV	62
अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि	III	18
अनादिमायया सुप्तः	I	16
अनादेरन्तवत्त्वं च	IV	30
अनिमित्तस्य चित्तस्य	IV	77
अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुः	II	17
अन्तःस्थानात्तु भेदानाम्	II	4
अन्यथा गृह्णतः स्वप्नः	I	15
अपूर्वं स्थानिधर्मो हि	II	8
अभावश्च रथादीनाम्	II	3
अभूताभिनिवेशाद्धि	IV	79
अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति	IV	75
अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च	I	29
अलब्धावरणाः सर्वे	IV	98
अलाते स्पन्दमाने वै	IV	49

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

	Ch	Verse
अवस्त्वनुपलम्भं च	IV	88
अशक्तिरपरिज्ञानम्	IV	19
असज्जागरिते दृष्ट्वा	IV	39
असतो मायया जन्म	III	28
अस्ति नास्त्यस्ति नास्तीति	IV	83
अस्पन्दमानमलातम्	IV	48
अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम	III	39
" "	IV	2
आ		
आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन	III	32
आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैः	III	3
आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति	II	6
" "	IV	31
आदिबुद्धाः प्रकृत्यैव	IV	92
आदिशान्ता ह्यनुत्पन्नाः	IV	93
आश्रमास्त्रिविधा हीन	III	16
इ		
इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिः	I	8
उ		
उत्पादस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्	IV	38
उत्सेक उदधेर्यद्वत्	III	41
उपलम्भात्समाचारात्	IV	42
" "	IV	44
उपायेन निगृह्णीयात्	III	42
उपासनाश्रितो धर्मः	III	1
उभयोरपि वैतथ्यम्	II	11
उभे ह्यन्योन्यदृश्ये ते	IV	67
ऋ		
ऋजुवक्रादिकाभासम्	IV	47
ए		
एतैरेषोऽपृथग्भावैः	II	30
एवं न चित्तजा धर्माः	IV	54
एवं न जायते चित्तम्	IV	46
ओ		
ओंकारं पादशो विद्यात्	I	24

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

	Ch	Verse
क		
कल्पयत्यात्मनाऽऽत्मानम्	II	12
कारणाद्यद्यनन्यत्वम्	IV	12
कारण यस्य वै कार्यम्	IV	11
कार्यकारणबद्धौ तौ	I	11
काल इति कालविदः	II	24
कोट्यश्चतस्त्र एतास्तु	IV	84
क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य	IV	99
ख		
ख्याप्यमानामजातिं तैः	IV	5
ग		
ग्रहणाज्जागरितवत्	IV	37
ग्रहो न तत्र नोत्सर्गः	III	38
घ		
घटादिषु प्रलीनेषु	III	4
च		
चरन् जागरिते जाग्रत्	IV	65
चित्तकाला हि येऽन्तस्तु	II	14
चित्तं न संस्पृशत्यर्थम्	IV	26
चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदम्	IV	72
ज		
जरामरणनिर्मुक्ताः	IV	10
जाग्रच्चित्तेक्षणीयास्ते	IV	66
जाग्रद्वृत्तावपि त्वन्तः	II	10
जात्याभासं चलाभासम	IV	45
जीवं कल्पयते पूर्वम्	II	16
जीवात्मनोरनन्यत्वम्	III	13
जीवात्मनोः पृथक्त्वं यत्	III	14
ज्ञ		
ज्ञाने च त्रिविधे ज्ञेये	IV	89
ज्ञानेनाऽकाशकल्पेन	IV	1
त		
तत्त्वमाध्यात्मिकं दृष्ट्वा	II	38
तस्मादेवं विदित्वैनम्	II	36
तस्मान्न जायते चित्तम्	IV	28
तैजसस्योत्वविज्ञाने	I	20

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

	Ch	Verse
त्रिषु धामसु यत्तुल्यम्	I	22
त्रिषु धामसु यद्भोज्यम्	I	5
द		
दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वः	I	2
दुःखं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य	III	43
दुर्दर्शमतिगम्भीरम्	IV	100
द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य हेतुःस्यात्	IV	53
द्वयोर्द्वयोर्मधुज्ञाने	III	12
द्वैतस्यग्रहणं तुल्यम्	I	13
ध		
धर्मा य इति जायन्ते	IV	58
न		
न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः	III	48
" "	IV	71
न निर्गता अलातात्ते	IV	50
न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानात्	IV	52
न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः	II	32
न भवत्यमृतं मर्त्यम्	III	21
न भवत्यमृतं मर्त्यम्	III	21
" "	IV	7
न युक्तं दर्शनं गत्वा	IV	34
नाऽऽकाशस्य घटाकाशः	III	7
नाजेषु सर्वधर्मेषु	IV	60
नात्मभावेन नानेदं	II	34
नात्मानं न परांश्चैव	I	12
नास्त्यसद्धेतुकमसत्	IV	40
नाऽऽस्वादयेत्सुखं तत्र	III	45
निगृहीतस्य मनसः	III	34
निमित्तं न सदा चित्तम्	IV	27
निवृत्तस्याप्रवृत्तस्य	IV	80
निवृत्तेः सर्वदुःखानाम्	I	10
निश्चितायां यथा रज्जावाम्	II	18
निस्तुतिर्निर्नमस्कारः	II	37
नेह नानेति चाम्नायात्	III	24

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

	Ch	Verse
प		
पंचविंशक इत्येके	II	26
पादा इति पादविदः	II	21
पूर्वापरापरिज्ञानम्	IV	21
प्रकृत्याकाशवज्ज्ञेयः	IV	91
प्रणवो ह्यपरं ब्रह्म	I	26
प्रणवं हीश्वरं विद्यात्	I	28
प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत	I	17
प्रभवः सर्वभावानाम्	I	6
प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वम्	IV	24
" "	IV	25
प्राण इति प्राणविदः	II	20
प्राणादिभिरनंतैश्च	II	19
प्राप्य सर्वज्ञतां कृत्स्नाम्	IV	85
फ		
फलादुत्पद्यमानस्सन्	IV	17
ब		
ब्रहिष्प्रज्ञो विभुर्विश्वः	I	1
बीजाङ्कुराख्यो दृष्टांतः	IV	20
बुद्ध्वाऽनिमित्ततां सत्याम्	IV	78
भ		
भावैरसद्भिरेवायम्	II	33
भूततोऽभूतितो वाऽपि	III	23
भूतं न जायते किंचित्	IV	4
भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति	IV	3
भोगार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये	I	9
म		
मकारभावे प्राज्ञस्य	I	21
मन इति मनोविदः	II	25
मनसो निग्रहायत्तम्	III	40
मनोदृश्यमिदं द्वैतम्	III	31
मरणे संभवे चैव	III	9
मायया भिद्यते ह्येतत्	III	19
मित्राद्यैः सह संमन्त्र्य	IV	35
मृल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गाद्यैः	III	15

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

	Ch	Verse
य		
यथा निर्मितको जीवः	IV	70
यथा भवति बालानाम्	III	8
यथा मायामयाद्बीजात्	IV	59
यथा मायामयो जीवः	IV	69
यथा स्वप्नमयो जीवः	IV	68
यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासम्	III	29
" "	IV	61
यथैकस्मिन्घटाकाशे	III	5
यदा न लभते हेतून्	IV	76
यदा न लीयते चित्तम्	III	46
यदि हेतोः फलात्सिद्धिः	IV	18
यं भावं दर्शयेद्यस्य	II	29
यावद्धेतुफलावेशः	IV	55
" "	IV	56
युञ्जीत प्रणवे चेतः	I	25
योऽस्ति कल्पितसंवृत्या	IV	73
र		
रसादयो हि ये कोशाः	III	11
रूपकार्यसमाख्याश्च	III	6
ल		
लये संबोधयेच्चित्तम्	III	44
लीयते हि सुषुप्ते तत्	III	35
लोकाँल्लोकविदः प्राहुः	II	27
व		
विकरोत्यपरान्भावान्	II	13
विकल्पो विनिवर्तेत	I	18
विपर्यासाद्यथा जाग्रत्	IV	41
विप्राणां विनयो ह्येषः	IV	86
विभूतिं प्रसवं त्वन्ये	I	7
विश्वस्यात्मविवक्षायाम्	I	19
विश्वो हि स्थूलभुङ्नित्यम्	I	3
विज्ञाने स्पन्दमाने वै	IV	51
वीतरागभयक्रोधैः	II	35
वेदा इति वेदविदः	II	22

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

	Ch	Verse
वैतथ्यं सर्वभावानां	II	1
वैशारद्यं तु वै नास्ति	IV	94
स		
स एष नेति नेतीति	III	26
सतो हि मायया जन्म	III	27
सप्रयोजनता तेषाम्	II	7
" "	IV	32
संघाताः स्वप्नवत्सर्वे	III	10
संभवे हेतुफलयोः	IV	16
संभूतेरपवादाच्च	III	25
संवृत्या जायते सर्वम्	IV	57
सर्वस्य प्रणवो ह्यादिः	I	27
सर्वाभिलाषविगतः	III	37
सर्वे धर्मा मृषा स्वप्ने	IV	33
सवस्तु सोपलम्भं च	IV	87
सांसिद्धिकी स्वाभाविकी	IV	9
सुखमाव्रियते नित्यम्	IV	82
सूक्ष्म इति सुक्ष्मविदः	II	23
सृष्टिरिति सृष्टिविदः	II	28
स्थूलं तर्पयते विश्वं	I	4
स्वतो वा परतो वापि	IV	22
स्वप्नजागरितस्थाने	II	5
स्वप्नदृक्चित्तदृश्यास्ते	IV	64
स्वप्नदृक्प्रचरन् स्वप्ने	IV	63
स्वप्नदायुतावाद्यौ	I	14
स्वप्नमाये यथादृष्टे	II	31
स्वप्नवृत्तावपि त्वन्तः	II	9
स्वप्ने चावस्तुकः कायः	IV	36
स्वभावेनामृतो यस्य	III	22
" "	IV	8
स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु	III	17
स्वस्थं शान्तं सनिर्वाणम्	III	47
ह		
हेतुर्न जयतेऽनादेः	IV	23
हेतोरादिः फलं येषाम्	IV	14
" "	IV	15
हेयज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि	IV	90

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

INDEX

[Figures in brackets ( ) refer to mantra/verse numbers.]

A

ABHYANKAR, VASUDEO SHASTRI, *xiv*, 35
Ādiśea, *xiii*
Advaita, *xiii*
  contents, v, *xxviii* ff, 1
advaita (prakaraṇa)
  see also Dave, J. H.
Āgama (Prakaraṇa)
  contents, *v*, *xiii*, *xxiv*, 1, 15 ff
  see also Dave, J. H.
Alātaśānti, *xiii*, *xxxii* ff, 1
  contents, *v*
  see also Dave, J. H.
Alberuni
  Gauḍa, anchorite mentioned by, *vi*, *viii*
Ānandagiri
  Gauḍapāda quoted by, *v*, *vi*
  on : Advaita (Prakaraṇa) (14), 196–97; (25), 218–19; Āgama (Prakaraṇa) (1), 33; (2), 44; (6), 49; (7), 51; (8), 51;
  Alātaśānti (Prakaraṇa) (1), 255; (74), 329;
  Māṇḍūkya, 2; Vaitathya (Prakaraṇa) (4), 111; (5), 111–12; (7), 115; (8), 118; (20), 136; (21), 137; (22), 139; (24), 141; (26), 142, 143; (27), 144; (37), 165
Apalonys, Gauḍapāda's disciple, *vi*
Apte (Dr.), K. V., *xviii*
Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna's disciple, *vi*
Ātmā
  entities imagined as, *xxvii*, 135 ff
Atreya (Dr.), *xiii*
Ayārcya, 2

B

BALAKRISNANANDA
On : Gauḍa Jāti, *v*, Gauḍapāda, *vi*, 2
Barnett, L. D., *v*
Bhattacharya (Prof.), V., *x* ff
  On : Advaita (Prakaraṇa) 9, 187; (11), 189; (12), 191; (16), 202; (23), 212; (32), 228; (36), 236; (37), 238; (38), 239; (44), 248; Āgama (Prakaraṇa) (1), 33; (5), 46; (6), 49; (8), 51; (26), 83;
  Alātaśanti (Prakaraṇa) (1), 256; (2), 258–59; (4), 261; (12), 269; (19), 276; (24), 285; (42), 303; (57), 316; (73), 327; (74), 328; (78), 332; (80), 333; (81), 334; (82), 335; (83), 337; (85), 339; (88), 342–43; (90), 346–47; (92), 349; (94), 351; (98), 355; (99), 357;
  Gauḍapāda, *xix*, 33, Vaitathya (Prakaraṇa) (4), 110; (7), 115; (13), 125; (25), 142; (26), 143; (32), 156; (34), 161; (37), 164
Bhāvaviveka
  Gauḍapāda quoted by, *vi*
Brahmā, v, 1
Buddha
  and Upaniṣads, *xii*, teachings of; *vii*
Buddhism
  and Vedānta, *xvii* ff; doctrines of, *xii*
Buddhist Philosophy
  see Philosophy, Buddhist
Buddhist school
  refutation, *xxxii* ff

C

CHINTAMANI, T. R., *xiii*
On śaṅkara-Bhāṣya's authority, 34

D

DASGUPTA, S. N., *xx*
On : Gauḍapāda, 33; Śaṅkara's salutation to Gauḍapāda, 360
Dave, J. H.
On : Advaita (Prakaraṇa) (1), 168–69; (2), 170; (3), 172; (4), 173; (5), 174, 175, 176–78, 179–80, 182–83; (6), 184; (7), 185; (8), 186; (9), 187; (10), 188; (11), 189–90; (12), 190–91; (13), 192–93; (14), 195–97; (15), 199–201; (16), 202–03; (17), 204; (18), 205–06; (19), 207; (20), 208; (21), 208; (22), 209–10; (23), 211–13; (24), 214–15; (25), 217–19; (26), 220–21; (27), 222–23; (28), 224; (29), 225; (30), 225–26; (31), 227; (32), 228; (33), 229–30; (34), 231–32; (35), 233–34; (36), 235–36; (37), 237–38; (38), 239–40; (39), 241–42; (40), 242–43; (41), 244; (42), 245–46; (43), 246; (44), 247–48; (45), 249; (46), 249–50; (47), 251; (48), 252;

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Āgama (Prakaraṇa) (1), 32–5; (2), 36–7, 38–9, 40–1, 41–2, 43–4; (5), 45–6; (6), 47–9; (7), 50–1; (8), 51; (9), 52–3, 54, 55; (10), 63–4; (11), 64–5; (12), 65–6; (13), 66; (14), 67; (15), 68–9; (16), 69–70; (17), 71–2; (18), 73; (24), 82; (25), 82; (26), 83; (27), 84; (28), 85; (29), 86;
Alātaśānti (Prakaraṇa) (1), 254–57; (2), 258–59; (3), 260; (4), 261–62; (5), 263; (6), 264; (7–8), 265; (9), 266; (10), 267; (11), 268; (12), 269–70; (13), 270–71; (14), 272; (15), 273; (16), 274; (17), 274–75; (18), 275; (19), 276–77; (20), 278; (21), 279; (22), 280–82; (23), 283; (24), 284–85; (25), 286–87; (26), 287; (27), 289; (28), 291; (29), 292; (30), 293; (31–32), 294; (33), 295; (34), 295; (35), 296; (36), 297; (37), 298; (38), 299; (39), 300; (40), 301; (41), 302; (42), 303; (43), 304–05; (45), 306; (46), 307; (47), 308; (48), 308; (49), 309; (50), 310; (51–52), 311; (53), 312; (54), 313; (55), 314; (56), 315; (57), 316–17; (58), 317; (59), 318; (60), 319; (60–61), 319–20; (63), 320; (64), 321; (65–66), 322; (67), 323; (68–69–70), 324–25; (71), 325; (72), 326; (73), 327; (74), 328–29; (75), 329; (76), 330; (77), 331; (78), 332; (79), 333; (80), 333; (81), 334–35; (82), 335–36; (83), 337; (84), 338; (85), 339; (86), 340; (87), 341; (88), 342–43; (89), 344; (90), 345–47; (91), 348; (92), 349; (93), 350; (94), 351; (95), 352; (96), 353; (97), 354; (98), 355; (99), 356–358; (100), 358
Kārikās (Introductory) 10, 11–12;
Māṇḍūkya, (3), 20, 21–2, 22–3, 23–4; (4), 24–5, 25–6; (5), 28–9; (6), 30–1; (7), 56, 57–8, 58–9 60 ff; (8), 74; (9), 75; (10), 79; (11), 77; (12), 80–1
Peace Invocation, 5–7, 8–9;
Śaṅkara's obeisance to Gauḍapāda, 360
Supreme Reality, 360;

Vaitathya (Prakaraṇa) (1), 105; (2), 106; (3), 107–08; (4), 109–11; (5), 111–12; (6), 113; (7), 114–15; (8), 117–18; (9), 119; (10), 120–21; (11), 121–22; (12), 123; (13), 124–125; (14), 126–28; (15), 128–29; (16), 130–31; (17), 132–33; (18), 133–34; (19), 135; (20), 135–36; (21), 137–38; (22), 138–39; (23), 139–40; (24), 140–41; (25), 141–42; (26), 142–43; (27), 143–44; (28) 144, 145; (29), 146; (30), 147–48; (31), 149; (32), 151, 152–53, 154 ff; (33), 157–59; (34), 160–61; (35), 161–162; (36), 163; (37), 164–65; (38), 166
Deussen
On : Gauḍapāda, 35, Māṇḍūkya's position, *vii*
Dualism
see Dwaita
Dwaita (Madhva), *xi*, ff

E

F

G

GAUḌA, ANCHORITE, *vi, viii*
Gauḍa Jāti
Bālakṛṣṇānanda on, *vii*
Gauḍapāda, 1
Bālakṛṣṇānanda on, *viii*, 2, date of, *v* ff.
Kārikās; authorship, *v* ff, 2
Philosophy, *x* ff, 2–3
Bhattacharya on, *xix*, 33
Śaṅkara's salutations to, 359–60
works of, *vi*
Karmarkar on *vi–vii*
Gauḍapāda-kārikās
Advaita (Prakaraṇa) (1), 167–69; (2), 169–70; (3), 171–72; (4), 172–73; (5), 173–83; (6), 183–84; (7), 184–85; (8), 185–86; (9), 186–87; (10), 187–88; (11), 188–90; (12), 190–91; (13), 191–93; (14), 193–97; (15), 197–201; (16), 201–03; (17), 203–04; (18), 204–06; (19), 206–07; (20), 207–08; (21), 208; (22), 209–10; (23), 210–13; (24), 213–15; (25), 215–19; (26), 219–21; (27), 221–23; (28), 223–24; (29), 224–25; (30), 225–26; (31), 226–27; (32), 227–28; (33), 228–30; (34), 230–32; (35), 232–34; (36), 234–37; (37), 237–38; (38), 238–40; (39), 240–42; (40), 242–43; (41), 243–44; (42), 244–246; (43), 246; (44), 247–48; (45), 248–49; (46), 249–50; (47), 250–51; (48), 251–52
Āgama (Prakaraṇa) (1), 31–5; (2), 35–44; (3–5), 44–6; (6), 46–9; (7), 50–1; (8), 51; (9), 52–5; (10), 63–4; (11), 64–5; (12), 65–6; (13), 66: (14), 66–7; (15), 67–9; (16), 69–70; (17), 70–2; (18), 72–3; (19–23), 77–9; (24), 81–2; (25), 82; (26), 82–3; (27), 83–4; (28), 84–5; (29), 85–6
Alātaśānti (Prakaraṇa), (1), 253–57; (2), 257–59; (3), 260; (4), 260–62; (5), 262–63; (6), 263–64; (7–8), 264–65; (9), 265–66; (10), 266–67; (11), 267–68; (12), 268–70; (13), 270–71; (14), 271–72; (15), 272–273; (16), 273–74; (17), 274–75; (18), 275; (19), 275–77; (20), 277–78; (21), 279; (22), 279–82; (23), 282–83; (24), 283–85; (25), 285–87; (26), 287; (27), 287–89; (28), 289–91; (29), 291–92; (30), 292–93; (31–32), 293–94; (33), 294–95; (34), 295–96; (35), 296; (36), 296–97; (37), 297–98;

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

(38), 298-99; (39), 299-300; (40), 300-301; (41), 301-02; (42), 302-03; (43), 304-05; (44), 305; (45), 305-06; (46), 306-07; (47), 307-08; (48), 308; (49), 309; (50), 309-10; (51-52), 310-11; (53), 311-12; (54), 312-14; (55), 314; (56), 315; (57), 315-17; (58), 317; (59), 317-18; (60), 318-19; (61-62), 319-20; (63), 320; (64), 320-21; (65-66), 321-22; (67), 322-23; (68-69-70), 323-25; (71), 325; (72), 325-26; (73), 326-27; (74), 327-29; (75), 329; (76), 329-30; (77), 330-31; (78), 331-32; (79), 332-33; (80), 333; (81), 334-35; (82), 335-36; (83) 336-37; (84), 337-38; (85), 338-39; (86), 339-40; (87), 340-41; (88), 341-43; (89), 343-44; (90), 344-47; (91), 347-48; (92), 348-49; (93), 349-50; (94), 350-51; (95), 351-52; (96), 352-53; (97), 353-54; (98), 354-55; (99), 355-58; (100), 358

Vaitathya (Prakaraṇa), (1), 104-05; (2), 105-06; (3), 106-07; (4), 108-11; (5), 111-12; (6), 112-13; (7), 113-15; (8), 115-18; (9), 118-19; (10), 120-21; (11), 121-22; (12), 122-23; (13), 124-25; (14), 125-28; (15), 128-29; (16), 129-31; (17), 131-32; (18), 133-34; (19), 134-35; (20), 135-36; (21), 137-38; (22), 138-39; (23), 139-40; (24), 140-1; (15),141-2; (26), 142-3; (27), 143-4; (28), 144-5; (29), 145-6; (30), 146-8; (31), 148-9; (32), 149-56; (33), 156-59; (34), 159-61; (35), 161-62; (36), 163-63; (37), 163-65; (38), 165-66

Govinda, *v*

Govindapāda

Gaudapāda quoted by, *vi*

Govindapāda

Śaṅkara's obeisance, 360

Govindayatīndra, 1

H

HASTĀMALAKA, Śaṅkara's disciple, *v*, 2.

I

J

K

KAMALAŚĪLA, *vii, xii*

Goudapāda quoted by, *vi*

Kārikās, *vi, vii, ix*

authorship of, v, contents, *v, xiii, xxi*, ff, 2; *see also*, dave, J. H.

Karmarkar (Prof.), R. D.

On : Advaita (Prakaraṇa) (9), 187; (10), 188; (11), 189; (12),191; (14), 196, 197; (16), 202; (20), 208; (23), 212; (24), 215; (25), 218; (33), 229; (36), 236; (40), 243; (43), 246; (47), 251

Āgama (Prakaraṇa), xiii, (5), 44; (6-9), 48, 53; (17), 72; (23), 79

Alātaśānti (Prakaraṇa), (1), 257; (2), 258; (19), 276, 277; (24), 285; (57), 317; (58), 317; (73), 327; (74), 328: (77), 331; (82), 336; (83), 337; (88), 342, 343; (90), 346-47; (92), 349; (93), 351; (94), 351; (98), 355; (99), 357

Gaudapāda, v, 33, 35, (his) philosophy, *x, xii, xiv*

Vaitathya (Prakaraṇa), (3), 108; (4), 110; (5), 112; (8), 118; (16), 131; (20), 136; (21), 137, 138; (22), 138, 139; (23), 139, 140; (24), 140; (25), 141, 142; (26), 143; (27), 144; (29), 146; (32), 166; (33), 158-59; (34), 161; (37), 164

Kaviraj, Gopinath (pt.), *xvii*

Kevalādvaita

Guruparamparā in, *v*

Kūranārāyaṇa, *vii, viii*

On : Āgama (Prakaraṇa), (1), 33, 90; (3), 90; (4), 90-1; (5), 91; (6), 91; (7), 91; (8), 92; (9), 92; (10), 93; (11), 93-4; (12), 94; (13), 94; (14), 94; (15), 94; (16), 95; (17), 95; (18), 95; (19), 96; (20), 96; (21), 96; (22), 97; (23), 97; (24), 98; (25), 98; (26), 98; (27), 98-9; (28), 99; (29), 99

Māṇḍūkya, 34; (1-2), 87; (3), 88; (4), 89; (5), 89; (6), 90; (7), 92-3. (8-9), 95; (10), 96; (11), 96; (12), 97

L

M

MADHAVAN, *x, xiii*

On : Māṇḍūkya's position, *vii, viii*

Madhusudana saraswati, *xx*

On Kārikās : Advaita (Prakaraṇa) (42), 245-46; (46), 250

Madhva, *viii, xvi*

On : Āgama (Prakaraṇa), (1), 90; (2), 44, 90; (3), 90; (5), 91; (6), 91; (7), 91-2; (8), 92; (10), 93; (11), 94; (12), 94; (13), 94; (14), 94; (15), 94; (16), 95; (17), 95; (18), 95; (19), 96; (20), 96; (21), 96; (22), 97; (23), 97, 98; (24), 98; (25), 98; ;(26), 98; (27), 99; (28), 99; (29), 99

Māṇḍūkya, *ii*, 2, 34; (1,2), 88; (3), 88; (4), 89; (5), 89-90; (6), 90; (7), 93; (8-9), 96; (10), 96; (11), 96; (12), 97

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

GENERAL EDITOR AND AUTHOR

Professor Jayantkrishna Harikrishna Dave, M.A., LL.B. Advocate (S.C.), Mahamahopādhyaya, Vidyavacaspati, is the Hon. Director of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, having been associated with it since its inception. He is the author of more than 30 learned works. He was member of the Senate of the Bombay University and the Varanasi Sanskrit University. A Versatile writer, a reputed scholar and leading Advocate of the Bombay Bar, he had a brilliant academic career winning many a coveted Prize. He was the Head of the Bhavan's Post-Graduate Department. He was awarded the Upādhi of Mahāmahopādhya and Vidayā-vācaspati by H. H. Dwarikā Śaṅkarācārya. He studied Sanskrit in the traditional way also. He had his legal training under Dr. K. M. Munshi and he practised law for more than fifty years. For some time he was the Chief Justice of Banswara State in Rajasthan. With his great erudition in Sanskrit and Dharmaśāstra he became an authority on Hindu law which he also taught for forty years. He was recognised as a Post-Graduate Professor for M.A. LL.M. and Ph.D. in Law. He was a member of the Sanskrit Commission and the Maharashtra Sanskrit Samiti, Hon. General Secretary of Sanskrit Vishva Parishad, Gujarati Sahitya Parishad, Editor of Bhavan's Journal (Eng.), Samarpan (Gujarati), Bhartiya Vidya (Research Quarterly), Bharati (Hindi); was deputed to the World Conference of Religion and Peace at Japan in 1970; has lectured in various Universities in India and U.S.A. He has been working in an Honorary apacity in the Bhavan for 50 years. His Amrita Mahotsava was celebrated by the Bhavan in 1984. The Bhavan has issued a felicitation volume for MM. Prof. Jayantkrishna H. Dave's Amrita Mahotsava.

Works—Immortal India (4 volumes), History of Gujarati Literature (Hindi), Manusmriti with 9 sanskrit commentaries (6 volumes), Vyavahāra-Prakāśa, Śakti-tattva and Śiva-tattva. Editing critically 6 volumes of the Reputed Singhi series. General Editor of Bhavan's Upaniṣad Praject and writer on Praśna, Muṇḍaka and Māṇḍūkya with Kārikās etc.

Funding by IKS-MoE

CC-0. Agamnigam Digital Preservation Foundation, Chandigarh.

Funding by IKS-MoE